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THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
IN THE REVOLUTION
1780-1783

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OF

SOUTH CAROLINA

IN

THE REVOLUTION

1780-1783

BY

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
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HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE REVOLUTION, 1780-1783



CHAPTER I

1780

SINCE his defeat at Camden, Gates, crushed in spirit and subdued in tone, had been in Hillsboro, North Carolina, making feeble efforts to collect and organize the shattered remnants of his vanquished army. While Davie with his little band, and Sumter, Marion, Lacey, Hill, the Hampsons, Bratton, Winn, Williams, and McCall of South Carolina; Shelby, Sevier, Cleveland, Davidson, Graham, and the McDowells of North Carolina, and Campbell all the way from Virginia, and Clark from Georgia, were organizing volunteer partisan corps and assailing upon every opportunity the British outposts, fighting pitched battles, often with victory, and capturing large numbers of the enemy, the remains of the Continental army were lying idle in North Carolina—waiting, it was said, for reënforcements and supplies.

Congress had not indicated any dissatisfaction with the conduct of Gates when the news of his defeat and the destruction of his army had been first received. It was not, indeed, until near two months after—the 18th of October, 1780—that a resolution was passed requiring the Commander-in-chief to order a court of inquiry upon his conduct, and to appoint some other officer to the command

of the Southern army in the meantime. General Washington upon this at once appointed Major General Nathaniel Greene, of Rhode Island, to the field hitherto so unfortunate to Continental officers.

General Greene, who was now to assume command of the Southern Department, and to hold it until the end of the struggle, was a native of Rhode Island, born the 27th of May, 1742, the son of a Quaker who followed the joint occupations of blacksmith and farmer. From his early youth he was employed in assisting his father, but succeeded, notwithstanding, in acquiring much general information, and made a special study of mathematics, history, and law. At Coventry, where he removed to take charge of a forge of his own, he was the first to establish a public school; and in 1770 he was chosen a member of the General Assembly of Rhode Island. Sympathizing strongly with the Revolutionists he, in 1774, joined the Kentish Guards, and on this account was expelled from the Society of Friends. Regretting but disregarding the action of the religious body to which he had belonged, he devoted himself to the study of the science of war through such books as he could obtain, chief of which were Cæsar's campaigns and Turenne's *Memoirs*. So prominent had he become in military matters of the colony that, when the first blood of the Revolution was shed at Lexington, he was at once made Brigadier General to command "the army of observation" of fifteen hundred men raised by Rhode Island, the greater part of which, by the 8th of May, 1775, was organized and on its march to Boston. So efficient an officer did he prove to be that, by the time Washington reached Boston and assumed command of the American forces there, he regarded Greene's brigade, though raw and irregular and undisciplined, "under much better government than any around Boston"; and not

long after Colonel Reed, Washington's military secretary, wrote that Greene's "command consisted of three regiments, then the best disciplined and appointed in the whole American army."¹ He did not take part at Bunker Hill on the 17th, for he was stationed on the opposite end of the line. On the evacuation of Boston, Greene marched with Washington to New York, where, on August 9, he was promoted to the rank of Major General, and the troops on Long Island were formed into a division under his command. Having reached this high position without ever having been engaged in battle, General Greene was so unfortunate as to be taken ill just at the time when the battle of Long Island took place.

Greene first came under fire in the action at Harlem Plains on the 16th of September. It was by his advice that the attempt was made to hold Fort Washington, and upon its surrender with the garrison, Washington and himself were equally blamed, he for his advice, and Washington for his indecision, whereby the untenable position had not been evacuated. This was one of the events upon which the opposition to Washington relied for his disparagement. As a division commander General Greene had taken part in the battle of Trenton, at Brunswick, at Brandywine, at Germantown, and at Monmouth; also at the siege of Newport, Rhode Island, under Sullivan. At Washington's request, in 1778, he had taken charge of the quartermaster's department, then in a state of chaos, upon the condition, however, that he should not lose his right of command in action — a condition which he enforced at the battle of Monmouth. Though Washington, who had practically forced the office upon him, declared that he had performed the duties of the position to his satisfaction, it cannot be

¹ Great Commanders Series, *General Greene*, by Francis Vinton Greene, 1893, 23-24.

said that he had made any marked success in that department — his administration of it, indeed, was assailed as incompetent and extravagant, and even grave charges were intimated, but as these were attributed to the same source as the calumny against Washington himself, they were treated alike.¹ His abrupt, if justifiable, resignation in

¹ We do not wish to encumber these pages with anything unnecessary to the history of South Carolina, to which this work is devoted. We shall not therefore go at any length into the controversy of the times in regard to the administration of the quartermaster's department by General Greene in 1778-80, but will content ourselves generally with Washington's assurance that he had conducted the various important duties with capacity and diligence, and altogether to his satisfaction, Washington adding, "and as far as I had any opportunity of knowing, with strictest integrity." (Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 147.) In view, however, of events which occurred at the close of his command in South Carolina, clouding his reputation, but from which it is fair to say that Congress, as far as it could, ultimately vindicated his memory, we must add that very recently it has come to light, that, upon assuming the duties of that office, General Greene, the quartermaster, and Colonel Wadsworth, the commissary general, had formed a secret business partnership with Barnabas Deane, of Connecticut, the brother of Silas Deane, under the name of Barnabas Deane & Co., the business of which was that of general traders in staples and manufactures that were most needed for the use of the army, or that could be most advantageously exchanged for provisions or forage, the very articles of which these officers, as quartermaster and commissary general were purchasers for the government; the impropriety of which will be more appreciated when it is remembered that the emoluments of these officers consisted in commissions upon their accounts. Moreover that it appears from letters of General Greene which have been found that at his instance the most profound secrecy was observed as to the connection of Colonel Wadsworth and himself with the matter, Greene writing to Wadsworth: —

"You may remember I wrote you sometime since that I was desirous that this copartnership between Mr. Deane, you, and myself should be kept a secret. I must beg leave to impress this matter upon you again, and to request you to enjoin it upon Mr. Deane. The nearest friend I have in the world shall not know of it from me, and it is my wish that no mortal person should be acquainted with the persons forming the company except us three. I would not wish Mr. Deane even to let his brother

consequence, in 1780, had nearly lost him his commission in the line as well. Upon the treason of Arnold he had been appointed president of the court which tried and condemned Major André to death; and upon his application for the command of West Point it had been immediately granted him, General Washington taking occasion to observe, however, that it would not be an independent command, as he himself would probably make his headquarters in that vicinity. Such was the career of the officer now sent to command the Southern Department. He had certainly seen some service, and had had experience, not only in the field, but, what was of importance, in the administrative department of an army as well. He had not as yet, however, exercised an independent command, nor conducted a battle except under the eye and direction of another. He was now for the first time to be thrown entirely upon his own resources in the field, and that in a department which covered the whole country south of Pennsylvania,

know it. Not that I apprehend any injury from him; but he may inadvertently let it out into the broad world, and then, I am persuaded, it would work us a public injury," etc.

It also appears that, to preserve this secrecy, as an additional precaution against discovery it was agreed that the correspondence between the parties should be conducted partly in cipher for which an "alphabet of figures" was adopted, Greene urging also the use of a fictitious name, as that would "draw another shade of obscurity over the business, and render it impossible to find out their connection." Nevertheless, the author from whose article this account is taken closes his paper with this statement, "The business reputation of the firm [*i.e.* Barnabas Deane & Co.] was high at home and abroad; the integrity and honor of its partners without stain; nor is there a vestige of evidence that its founders took undue advantage of their official positions to extend the business or increase the profits of the firm."

See the whole story in an article over the signature of J. Hammond Trumbull, LL.D., entitled "A business Firm of the Revolution, Barnabas Deane & Co.," in vol. XII (1884) of the *Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries*, edited by Mrs. Martha J. Lamb, pp. 17-28.

and in which as yet no Continental officer had achieved success or glory.

The appointment of General Greene had been solicited by John Mathews, a delegate in Congress from South Carolina, who, as chairman of the committee of that body conferring with Washington upon the condition of the army, was in a position to entitle his opinion, as to the choice of a commander, to great weight, to which he added the assurance that he was authorized to make the request by the delegates of the three Southern States. "Besides my own inclination to this choice," wrote Washington to Greene on the 14th of October, 1780, informing him of his appointment, "I have the satisfaction to inform you that from a letter I have received it concurs with the wishes of the delegates of the three Southern States most immediately interested in the present operations of the enemy, and I have no doubt it will be perfectly agreeable to the sentiments of the whole."¹ Writing to Mr. Mathews he said, "You have your wish in the officer appointed to the Southern command—I think I am giving you a general, but what can a general do without men, without arms, without clothing, without shoes, without provisions?"²

General Greene was at West Point, to the command of which he had been assigned, as we have seen, when he received Washington's letter informing him of his new appointment. Washington's headquarters were at the time at Prakeness, near Passaic Falls, in New Jersey, and his letter informed Greene that his instructions would be prepared when he arrived there on his journey to his new field. Greene set out upon his journey on the 18th of October, and found his instructions at headquarters, as he had been told to expect. These directed him to proceed at once to the Southern army in North Carolina and

¹ Washington's *Writings*, vol. VII, 257.

² *Ibid.*, 277.

to take command. Uninformed as he was, wrote Washington, of the enemy's force in that quarter, or even of their own, or of their resources for carrying on the war, he could give no positive instructions, but must leave Greene to govern himself entirely according to his own prudence and judgment. Aware that the nature of the command would offer embarrassment of a singular and complicated nature, he relied, he said, upon Greene's abilities and exertions for everything his means would enable him to effect. He gave him a letter to Congress informing that body of his appointment, and requesting them to afford him such support as the situation and good of the service demanded. Greene was directed to take the orders of Congress on his way to his command, and was informed that Washington proposed to send Baron Steuben to the South with him, whom he was to employ as Inspector General with suitable rank if Congress approved, and that he had put Major Lee's corps under marching orders to join him.¹

Upon his arrival in Philadelphia, General Greene proceeded at once to inform himself as fully as he could of the force and condition of the Southern army, and to make provision for supplying its present and future wants. From Congress he could obtain nothing. And when the depressed credit and empty coffers of Congress dissipated every hope of present relief, he tried to obtain a voluntary contribution or loan among the merchants with which to procure clothing for the few troops in the field. This also failed. Colonel Joseph Reed, then Governor of Pennsylvania,² let him have some arms from the depot of that State, — and even the wagons to transport them were principally

¹ Washington's *Writings*, vol. VII, 271 ; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 326.

² Colonel Reed is spoken of by Johnson and others as Governor, and we have followed the usual title given ; but he was not in fact a Gov-

obtained from his kindness — the Governor relying on the armories of the United States and the pledge of Washington for his indemnity. All the support or encouragement General Greene received from Congress was the annexation of Delaware and Maryland to his department, the money to bear the expense of his journey to his command, and the promise to promote Major Henry Lee to a lieutenant colonelcy.¹

On the 23d of November General Greene took his way to the South, accompanied by Baron Steuben and his two aids, Major Burnet and Colonel Lewis Morris, Jr.² By the reduction of the Virginia contingent in number of men to each regiment, and still more by the actually reduced state of the numbers in service, many officers of the Virginia Continental line were now out of employment, and from these General Greene selected the additional members of his staff. Colonel Edward Carrington was appointed Quartermaster General, and Captains Nathaniel Pendleton and William Pierce, Jr., aides-de-camp. To Major Robert Forsyth, who was in the last days of the war to involve him, whether consciously or not, in a most corrupt and disgraceful affair, he offered the post of commissary of prisoners, and upon his declining it, recommended him to the Commissary General for the post of his deputy in the Southern Department.³

In the grand ministerial plan of operations by which, it will be recollected, the war was to be carried by the British “from South to North,” Sir Henry Clinton, the Com-

ernor. He was President of the Supreme Council of Pennsylvania, an office in which he exercised the duties of Governor, and hence so called.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 328.

² *Ibid.*, 329. Heitman in his Register of Continental Officers gives Major Burnet's name as Robert; but in three letters in the Sumter MSS., signed by him, the initial J is used — “J. Burnet.”

³ *Ibid.*, 333.

mander-in-chief, was to have sent an expedition to Virginia to meet the victorious Cornwallis as he marched in triumph from South Carolina, and together they were to move on to Baltimore and then on farther north. This plan, as we have seen, had been interrupted by the partisan bands of the South, and Lord Cornwallis had been compelled to fall back to Winnsboro in South Carolina, there to wait for reënforcements under Leslie, who had been despatched by Sir Henry Clinton to Virginia in accordance with the plan, but who was now diverted to South Carolina to make up for the losses inflicted upon his lordship.

On reaching Virginia, General Greene found that the expedition which had sailed from New York under General Leslie had, in obedience to first orders, put into Chesapeake, and that Leslie had taken possession of Norfolk and Portsmouth, and had proceeded to secure possession of both places by strongly fortifying the latter. Cornwallis's orders calling him to his assistance, by the way of Charlestown, had not yet reached Leslie, and Virginia was now intent only on her own defence against this threatening invasion. Leaving Baron Steuben to command in that State, Greene pressed on to Hillsboro. Arriving there, he found the place abandoned both by the officers of the State and the Continental army. The latter had been moved forward to Charlotte, and the invasion of Leslie had frightened the former away to Halifax in apprehension of danger to that quarter of North Carolina. Informing Governor Nash¹ at Halifax by letter that he had provided

¹ Abner Nash, member of the Provincial Congress of North Carolina in 1776, speaker of that body, and also of the Senate in 1779. Governor from 1779 to 1781. A brother of General Francis Nash, who had commanded the First North Carolina Continental Regiment at the battle of Fort Moultrie, and was afterwards killed at Germantown.

for the defence against Leslie, and urging that the Governor should turn his attention to the more pressing object of preparing to meet Lord Cornwallis in the opposite quarter, he hurried on to Charlotte, where he arrived on the 2d of December, and assumed command on the 4th, 1780.

On reaching Charlotte, Greene found that he had under his command the celebrated Daniel Morgan, who had served with him at the siege of Boston, and afterwards had joined Arnold's expedition to Canada, in which, after suffering great hardships, he had been made prisoner, and upon being exchanged had greatly distinguished himself at Saratoga, but had since resigned. As early as the 16th of June, Congress had directed that "Daniel Morgan of the Virginia line" with the old rank of Colonel should be "employed in the Southern army as Major General Gates should direct." It does not appear that Morgan had been in any haste to avail himself of the honor of serving under the hero of Saratoga; he, himself one of the most distinguished leaders the Revolution had produced, like Schuyler, had had just cause to be aggrieved at the slight recognition by Gates of his services in the capture of Burgoyne. But, when two months after his appointment he heard of the defeat at Camden and dispersion of Gates's army, he hurried to the scene of disaster, and before the end of September arrived at Hillsboro.¹ He brought with him only a few followers — young men who had come to share in the service and honor of helping to retrieve the cause in the South. Gates had gladly welcomed him, and had drafted four hundred Continental infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Howard of the Maryland line,² two companies of Virginia militia under Captains Triplett and Taite, and the

¹ Bancroft's *Hist. of the U. S.*, vol. V, 476 (ed. 1888).

² John Eager Howard of Maryland. Then commanding Second Maryland Continental Regiment.

remnants of the cavalry of Colonel White and of Colonel William Washington, which had been cut up at Lenud's Ferry on the 8th of May, and had since been out of action, now amounting to one hundred men, as an independent corps for his command.¹ To these were added a company of sixty riflemen under the command of Major Rose. Colonel White, who was in disrepute, had been given a leave of absence. In the meanwhile Congress had promoted Morgan to the rank of Brigadier General, his commission being dated 13th of October, 1780.

General Gates had made some reorganization of the shattered fragments of his army before the arrival of General Greene. The remnants of the Maryland and Delaware regiments had been consolidated into one, and the supernumerary officers sent to their respective States to obtain recruits and prepare them for service. This consolidated regiment was placed under the command of Colonel Otho H. Williams of Maryland,² and to it was added a company of light infantry. About the 16th of September, Colonel Buford had arrived from Virginia with what was left of his unfortunate regiment,³ reënforced by about two hundred raw recruits, all of them in ragged condition; and on the 18th the remains of Colonel Porterfield's corps,⁴ about fifty

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 222. Johnson puts the number of White's and Washington's cavalry at but seventy. *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 313.

² Otho Holland Williams entered the service as First Lieutenant, Cresap's Company Maryland Riflemen, June 21, 1775; Major of Stephenson's Maryland and Virginia Regiment of Riflemen, June 27, 1776; wounded at Fort Washington, November 16, 1776; Colonel Sixth Maryland, December 10, 1776; transferred to First Maryland, January 1, 1781.—*Heitman*.

³ For an account of the defeat and slaughter of Buford's regiment on the 29th of May, 1780, see *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 519, 523.

⁴ See *Ibid.*, 674, 675.

effective men, had come in under Captain Drew. General Gist had gone home to Maryland to superintend recruiting there. General Smallwood had remained, as he was commissioned by the State of North Carolina to a command in the militia. Upon Cornwallis's retreat, after the destruction of Ferguson's party at King's Mountain, Gates had advanced to Charlotte, and Smallwood had taken post at Providence, six miles below.

Greene's first hours of command were brightened by the news of a bloodless success by Colonel Washington. Colonel Rowland Rugeley, at whose house, it will be recollected, Governor Rutledge had nearly been overtaken by Tarleton, when escaping from Charlestown in May,¹ had since been commissioned in the British militia, and was just about to be appointed a Brigadier General in that service. A stockade had been made around his house, and in it he had collected 112 men under his command. Against this post Morgan sent Colonel Washington with a small force. Washington, repeating Gillespie's device in the capture of Mills's militia at Hunt's Bluff, in August,² threw up a few feet of earth into the form of an earthwork, and, mounting behind it some logs with the appearance of field guns, demanded an immediate surrender. Rugeley, deceived and frightened by the appearance of artillery, obeyed the summons and surrendered with his whole party.³ "Rugeley will not be made a brigadier," wrote Cornwallis to Tarleton. "He surrendered, without firing a shot, himself and 103 rank and file, to the cavalry only. A deserter of Morgan assures us that the infantry men never came within three miles of the house."⁴

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrady), 517.

² *Ibid.*, 646.

³ Ramsay's *Revolution of So. Ca.*, vol. II, 187-188.

⁴ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 205.

But besides this pleasing incident Greene found the condition of things deplorable indeed. The whole number of regulars by the returns made to him did not exceed eleven hundred, and of these eight hundred could not be mustered with arms and clothing fit for duty. Such was the condition of some of Washington's few cavalry that they were ordered back to Virginia, upon his representation that they were too naked to be put upon service. The country around Charlotte was exhausted. It had been the scene of operation on both sides for the last six months, and first one army and then the other had lived upon it. His army was then subsisting by small daily collections made upon the credit and by the influence of individuals who had patriotically engaged in the business. Indeed, the country about him was so much exhausted that Colonel William Polk, the commissary then acting as such from mere patriotism, declared the army could not subsist for a week longer. To draw provisions from any distance was impracticable for want of the means of transportation. Colonel Polk declined any longer to continue the struggle to supply the army. General Greene determined at once to remove the army to another position and to find a commissary.¹

It had so happened that just at this time Colonel Davie had left the field in disgust. When Cornwallis fell back from Charlotte in October, Davie, with three hundred mounted infantry, had advanced and occupied the outpost at Landsford. There the term of his gallant little band, which he had raised and equipped at his own expense, expired in November. General Smallwood, then in command of the North Carolina State troops, entertaining the highest opinion of Davie's military talents, desired to retain his services, and at his suggestion application for the purpose was made to the "Board of War" of North

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 337, 342.

Carolina, then sitting at Halifax. This board, lately created with extraordinary powers, overshadowed the Governor, though by the constitution the latter was "captain general and commander-in-chief." It was given to this board "to have the direction of the militia, provide ammunition, stores, appoint officers and remove such as they might deem proper, establish posts, and carry on military operations." The board was composed of three men who were unfit for such a position and incompetent for the duties. As was to have been anticipated, collisions occurred between the Governor and this body. Colonel Davie's application made to the board was by it referred to the Governor, and between the two it was not even considered. Greatly offended at such treatment, Colonel Davie retired. It was just at this time that General Greene, in need of one to fill the position of commissary, who possessed talents, integrity, influence, and zeal, appealed to Davie to undertake the duties. It has been seen that the talents and courage of this officer particularly fitted him for command in the field; combining, as it was said of him, the dash of Sumter and the caution of Marion. His tastes and ambition were all for active service. The office of commissary involved labor, untiring exertion, and great responsibility, while it could add to him but little honor and no opportunity of distinction. No one knew better than Greene himself the sacrifice it would cost one of Davie's temperament to accept the duties of such a position, for he himself had gone through the same trial when taken from the field by Washington and made Quartermaster General. Indignantly he had then written to Washington: "There is a great difference from being raised to an office and descending to one, which is my case. There is also a great difference between serving where you have a fair prospect of honor and laurels, and where you have no prospect of

either, let you discharge your duties ever so well. Nobody," he contemptuously adds, "ever heard of a quartermaster in history."¹ Taught by experience the sentiments of one who, like Davie, had exhibited such genius for the field, he does not seek to find a position in which Davie's great talents might further be displayed to the benefit of the country, but, as Washington had called upon him, he called upon Davie. Fortunately, strong as was Davie's love of fame, his love for his country was stronger. Ill suited as were the duties of the position to his stirring and chivalric temper, his patriotism overrode all personal ambition. He did not stop to complain that no one ever heard of a commissary in history, but accepted at once the trust, and from this time he became the faithful subordinate, confidant, and friend of Greene. Performing the arduous duties of supplying the army with subsistence, his previous knowledge of the country and experience in the field were always as much at the service of his chief as if he was to share the honors to which they contributed. To the appointment of commissary in the Continental army in behalf of the United States, were added also appointments of State commissary both for North and South Carolina.²

On the 16th of December the troops were put under marching orders, but incessant rains prevented them from abandoning their huts until the 20th. On that day they took up the line of march by Wadesboro to Haley's Ferry, where it was originally designed they should be posted, but on the recommendation of Kosciuszko, who accompanied General Greene as an engineer, they were moved down the east side of the Pee Dee nearly opposite Cheraw Hill, the present site of the town of Cheraw,

¹ *Nathanael Greene*, Great Commanders Series (F. V. Greene), 97.

² Wheeler's *Hist. of No. Ca.*, 196; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 342; vol. II, 116.

then known as Chatham, in South Carolina.¹ On this march the troops were under the immediate command of General Isaac Huger, who, it will be recollected, had been in Gates's army, and was one of the few officers of the Carolina Continental line not then in captivity.

On the day the army was put under marching orders for the Pee Dee Morgan's corps was ordered to cross the Catawba and threaten the position of Lord Cornwallis at Winnsboro. He was directed to move down the west side of the Catawba, where he would be joined by a body of volunteer militia of North Carolina under the command of General Davidson, and by the volunteers lately under the command of General Sumter. This force, with any other which might join him from Georgia, he was to employ either offensively or defensively, as his prudence and discretion might direct. Morgan was given entire command west of the Catawba, and all officers and soldiers engaged in the American cause were enjoined to obey him.

General Greene was much pleased with the position he had taken on the Pee Dee. Judge Johnson, his biographer, gives this summary of his views in regard to it as expressed to his friends:² —

“I am here in my camp of repose, improving the discipline and the opportunity for looking about me. I am well satisfied with the movement, for it has answered thus far all the purposes for which I intended it. It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to his own line of conduct. He cannot leave Morgan behind him to come at me, or his posts at Ninety Six or Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot chase Morgan far, or prosecute his views upon Virginia, while I am here with the whole country open before me. I am as near Charlestown as he is and as near Hillsborough as I was at Charlotte; so that I am in no danger of being cut off from my reinforcements, while an uncertainty as to my future designs has made it necessary to leave a

¹ Gregg's *Old Cheraws*, 119.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 350.

large detachment of the enemy's late reënforcements in Charlestown and move the rest up this side of the Wateree. But although there is nothing to obstruct my march to Charlestown, I am far from having such a design in contemplation in the present relative positions of the two armies. It would be putting it in the power of my enemy to compel me to fight him. At present my operations must be in the country where the rivers are fordable, and to guard against the chance of not being able to choose my own ground."

These comfortable assurances were soon to be rudely dispelled.

So effectual had been the work of the partisan bands, as we have seen, that Lord Cornwallis had been forced to fall back from Charlotte to Winnsboro, and instead of his triumphal advance to Baltimore and thence on farther north, his lordship had been compelled to send orders to Leslie to abandon his former instructions, and to proceed by sea to Charlestown and thence to reënforce him in the interior. While, therefore, Greene was lying in the "camp of repose" at Cheraws, this movement on the part of the British was taking place, and before the middle of December General Leslie arrived at Charlestown with 2300 men and found orders awaiting him to join his lordship with the Brigade of the Guards, the Hessian regiment of von Bose, 120 yagers, and a detachment of light dragoons, amounting in all to 1530 men. The remainder of Leslie's corps was destined to strengthen Lord Rawdon at Camden, and the garrison at Charlestown.¹

While General Greene was moving down to the Cheraws, Marion had been engaged in some very active movements against the British garrison at Nelson's Ferry, under Majors McArthur and Coffin;² and between that and the High Hills of Santee. To cut off his retreat by the Pee Dee, a strong

¹ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 184, 210.

² Major Archibald McArthur of the Seventy-first Regiment, and Major John Coffin of the New York Loyal Volunteers.

British detachment had been pushed on from Charlestown. But Marion soon secured intelligence of the movement, and divining its object retired across the country, and took a strong position on the north bank of Lynch's Creek, in the vicinity of his favorite retreat at Snow Island, where he kept a party to guard his boats and awe the Loyalists. From this point he communicated to General Greene, on the 27th of December, the arrival of General Leslie, and successively, Leslie's march for Camden, the return of a detachment which had marched to Georgetown, and the establishment of Colonel Watson near Nelson's Ferry with about two hundred men.¹

Colonel Pickens and other influential men in Ninety Six District had been often urged to resume their arms in the American cause; but to these appeals and remonstrances Pickens had, hitherto, consistently replied that his honor was pledged and that he was bound by the solemnity of an oath not to take up arms unless the conditions of that protection were violated by the British, or those who acted under the Royal government. Hitherto, Cornwallis's injudicious and cruel order, after the battle of Camden, had not been rigorously enforced in this region; but the time had now come when neutrality, even under the terms of paroles, would no longer be allowed; and this district, which since the fall of Charlestown had taken little part in the struggle, was now to be the scene, not only of military operations, but of a civil strife far more terrible than legitimate warfare. All now who refused to take up arms in support of the British government were plundered of their property by parties of Loyalists and British troops.

Chief among these marauders was Major James Dunlap,²

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 358. Lieutenant Colonel John Watson-Tadwell Captain and Lieutenant Colonel Foot Guards. — Index to *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy* (Stevens).

² Of the origin of this officer we have no account.

who had taken a prominent part in the operations in the Spartan section during the preceding summer. He was a man of enterprise, a captain in the Queen's Rangers, a partisan corps raised in the fall of 1776 from native Loyalists, mostly refugees from Connecticut and from the vicinity of New York. He was one of the officers picked by Ferguson for his select corps on coming to South Carolina. He had already exhibited a most sanguinary disposition in the operations in New Jersey, and had rendered himself infamous there by his barbarity. In the South his severities had already incensed the people against him.¹ It has been seen how he had sabred the sleeping Georgians at Earle's Ford,² the prominent part his dragoons had taken at Cedar Spring,³ and that he had been wounded at Cowan's Ford in North Carolina just before the battle of King's Mountain.⁴ When Ferguson fell back from North Carolina to King's Mountain, Dunlap had been left wounded at the house of William Gilbert. There he is said to have been attacked and shot through the body, while lying in bed, in revenge for the death, by his hands, of Whigs in the neighborhood, and more especially for the death of a young woman whom he had abducted and who died while in his power.⁵ It

¹ *King's Mountain and its Heroes*, 159.

² *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrady), 614.

³ *Ibid.*, 637.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 755.

⁵ Draper has presented the following interesting story as illustrating the times, and especially the character of this officer:—

Major Dunlap when wounded at Cowan's Ford had been removed to the house of Captain Gilbert, a loyal supporter of the King, who had gone on with Ferguson. Soon after he was taken in there, a party from the Fair Forest region rode up, and Captain Gillespie, their leader, asked Mrs. Gilbert if Major Dunlap was not in the house. She, supposing that the party were Loyalists with some important communication for him, frankly replied that he was. She was soon disabused of her mistake, for the party told her that Dunlap had been instrumental in putting some of their

was supposed by many that Dunlap had died of his wounds at that time, but he had not. He recovered, and as soon as he was able to ride was conveyed to Ninety Six. Indeed, neither wound received at that time could have been very serious, for he now, in December, but two months after, was again in the field at the head of his dragoons, plundering and murdering as before. With his own troops and parties of Loyalists he made a general sweep over the country. Colonel Pickens's house, notwithstanding his promised protection, was plundered, and his property wantonly destroyed. Colonel McCall's family was left without a change of clothing or bedding, and a halter put around the neck of one of his sons, by order of Dunlap, with threats of execution, to extort secrets of which the youth was ignorant.

Colonel Pickens, who had so stedfastly observed his parole, as involving his personal honor, now considered its conditions broken, and with many of his former officers and men determined to resume their arms in defence of their country. But Pickens was not one, even under such circumstances, to steal away quietly without openly avowing his purpose. As soon as his determination was taken, he sought an interview with Captain Ker, a British officer at White Hall, General Williamson's residence,

friends to death, and had, moreover, abducted the beautiful Mary McRea. This lady was the affianced of Captain Gillespie himself, and Dunlap had seized and carried her off, as she would not encourage his amorous advances, and had kept her in confinement under which she had died of a broken heart. The party had come for revenge. Gillespie, uttering imprecations upon the head of the man who had destroyed his earthly hopes, mounted the stairs, and rushing into the room where Dunlap lay in bed, demanded, "Where is Mary McRea?" "In heaven," was the reply. Whereupon Gillespie shot him through the body, and, supposing him dead, he and his party, mounting their horses, rode away. This, says Draper, is the tradition sifted and collected as preserved in the Hampton family.—*King's Mountain and its Heroes*, 159, 160.

with whom he had become very intimate, to whom he disclosed his intentions and assigned his reasons. Ker earnestly advised him against the measure, assuring him that his execution was certain, in case he should thereafter fall into the hands of the British, and that he would literally fight with a halter around his neck; that though their countries were at war, he had given him proofs of personal friendship, and ardently hoped he might never fall into the power of the British government. To this Colonel Pickens replied that he had honorably and conscientiously adhered to the rules laid down in his protection, but that he now considered himself completely absolved from its obligations by the plunder and wanton waste which had been committed upon his plantation, and the insults and indignities which had been offered to his family. He requested Captain Ker to communicate these remarks to Colonel Cruger, the commanding officer at Ninety Six, and to thank him for his civilities while he was under the protection of the British government.

This state of things was communicated to the commanding officer of the Georgia troops, who made another diversion into the neighborhood of Ninety Six, to favor the assemblage of Pickens and his friends in that quarter. At a council of officers, Colonel McCall was sent to invite the coöperation of Colonel Pickens; and Major Samuel Hammond was despatched to White Hall to Williamson, who, it will be recollected, upon the fall of Charlestown, had in vain urged his companions and followers in Ninety Six to retreat with him into North Carolina to carry on the war there, but who, accepting their decision, had given his parole and taken protection, to appeal to him, now that the British had violated its terms, once more to join his old friends in resistance. Major Hammond indeed was directed to seize his person and to bring him into camp, with or without his

consent. This plan was probably resorted to upon the hope that Williamson, if involuntarily recaptured by the Americans, would regard himself as released thereby from his parole. This hope was encouraged by the friendly disposition which the General had evinced to the families of those who had espoused and adhered to the cause of their country. But though willing six months before, in the very darkest days of the war, to leave his home and continue the struggle, even in another State if necessary, Williamson would not now resume his arms and rejoin his friends. He was taken by Hammond and brought to the Whig encampment at Long Cane; but he escaped and made his way to Charlestown. It was generally believed that there he took a British commission, but there is no evidence of his having done so, and he certainly did not engage in any active military movement in their service. Indeed, it is said that he was one of those in the town from whom General Greene later obtained information of the British movements through the influence of Colonel John Laurens.¹ Colonel Pickens being the senior militia officer in Ninety Six, in the absence of Williamson, assumed the command of such of the men of that District as would act with him, and marched towards the Pacolet River to join Morgan.

Pickens was a great accession to the patriot cause. He was younger than either Sumter or Marion, had not the experience in war of either of them, but he had exhibited in the action at Kettle Creek enterprise and ability. These qualities he was still more to illustrate, and to render military service of high order. But it was the weight of his high personal character which now brought so much influence to the cause of the country. His extreme conscientiousness in regard to the observance of his parole now

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, 353; Johnson's *Traditions*, 148-154; Johnson's *Life of Greene*.

rendered his conduct all the more important to the cause of liberty. Many would now follow his example who would not have been influenced by him had he more lightly absolved himself from the restraints of his given word. Fully understanding the warning of Captain Ker, he and many of his followers devoted their lives to the cause, knowing that for them there would be no quarter if taken by the enemy, but that ignominious death would be their certain fate. They entered the war again, as Captain Ker had warned Pickens, literally with the halter around their necks. Men who knowingly faced such consequences and so dared to die were not easily to be conquered.

In obedience to Greene's order, Morgan had crossed the Catawba, and moved through what is now York County, had crossed the Broad River above the mouth of the Pacolet, into what is now Union County, and there on the 25th of December took post at Grindal's Shoals on the Pacolet. Here Pickens, with Colonel McCall, joined him, at the head of about one hundred men, sending their families and slaves over the mountain for security.

On the second day after Morgan's arrival on the Pacolet, an opportunity for enterprise presented itself which was promptly embraced. A body of Loyalists had advanced from the Savannah to Fair Forest Creek, to check the spirit of disaffection to British interests which had begun to manifest itself there, and had commenced their depredations upon settlements on that stream. Their distance was about twenty miles in advance of Morgan's, in the direction towards Ninety Six, and their number was reputed at 250. Colonel Washington, with his cavalry of 75 only in number, but of very superior quality, and 200 mounted volunteers under Lieutenant-Colonel McCall, consisting of a selection from his own men and Clarke's Georgians now under the command of Major John Cunningham, were despatched to

dislodge this body of Loyalists. The latter, learning of the approach of Washington, retreated about twenty miles to a place called Hammond's Store, in what is now Abbeville County, where, being covered as they supposed on their right by Lord Cornwallis at Winnsboro, and on their left by the post at Ninety Six, they halted in mistaken security. Washington pressed the pursuit with such rapidity and diligence that he overtook them early the next day, the 3d of December, after a march of forty miles, and instantly charged them. It was a flight and not a conflict that ensued. The killed and wounded of the enemy were reported at 150 and the prisoners at 40. There was little time for hesitation or room for pursuit, for Washington was now so far advanced between the enemy's posts, and so near Tarleton, at the head of 250 cavalry, that prompt measures alone could assure him safety. Washington would not, however, forego the opportunity of striking another blow.

Robert Cuninghame, who, it will be recollected, had been arrested by Williamson in 1775 and sent to Charlestown, where he had moderately, but firmly, refused to recognize the authority of the new government, and whose arrest had created such indignation in the back country, continuing true to his allegiance to the King, had now been appointed by Cornwallis Brigadier of the Loyal militia, as one who had by far the greatest influence in that region.¹ He was now posted in the stockade fort at Ferguson's former camp at Williamson's plantation with about 150 men. Thither Colonel Hayes² at the head of a detach-

¹ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 205.

² Colonel Joseph Hayes of Saluda served first as captain in all or nearly all of the services performed by Colonel Williams in Georgia, Brier Creek, Stono campaign against the Cherokees, and at Savannah; and in 1780 at Hanging Rock, Musgrove's Mills, and King's Mountain, where he succeeded

ment of infantry and Cornet Simons¹ with a detachment of the cavalry were immediately despatched. As soon as the Americans were discovered General Cuninghame and all his men abandoned the fort. Cornet Simons, coming up, stationed his detachment and, advancing with a flag, demanded their surrender. Cuninghame requested time to consult his officers and five minutes were given him for the purpose. In that short time the whole body of Tories ran off and dispersed through the woods. A few of them were killed and some were taken. The fort, which contained a great deal of plunder taken from the Whig inhabitants, and was well stored with forage grain and other provisions for the use of the British army, was destroyed.²

to the command of Williams's men on his death. He was also at Blackstock, and at Hammond's Store.—*King's Mountain and its Heroes* (Draper), 467-468.

¹ Cornet James Simons. This officer was the only Continental officer (or as far as is known Continental soldier) from South Carolina in this battle.

² Ramsay's *Revolution of So. Ca.*, vol. II, 195-196; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 363.

CHAPTER II

1781

WHEN the year 1781 came in it found Greene with his small army at the Cheraws on the Pee Dee, the position with which he was so much pleased; while Morgan at Grindal's Shoals on the Pacolet was threatening Ninety Six, and Marion from Snow Island was pushing his scouting parties on the road to Charlestown, his foraging parties nearly to Georgetown, and bringing in provisions to his snug retreat. Cornwallis, preparing for another attempt to carry out the ministerial plan of carrying the war from South to North by an advance into North Carolina, still lay at Winnsboro, between the Catawba and the Broad, with about thirty-five hundred fighting men¹; and Leslie was on the march to join Cornwallis with fifteen hundred more.² Leslie, instead of approaching Cornwallis by Granby³ on the Congaree and marching up the Wateree or Catawba, his shortest route, was by his lordship's orders moving by the old way of Nelson's Ferry to Camden, thus placing a deep and rapid river and often impracticable swamps between the reënforcements he was bringing and the main army. Cornwallis had directed Leslie to pursue this route because of Greene's position at the Cheraws, which threatened Camden, and in order also to mislead Greene as long as possible as to his own intended movement. Leslie was much retarded by the waters in the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 365.

² Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 216.

³ Granby, or Friday's Ferry, is half a mile below present city of Columbia, on the opposite bank of the Congaree.

swamps, and did not get out of them until the 14th of January; and when he did he was halted at Camden, where he remained until Cornwallis was ready to move from Winnsboro.¹

In the meanwhile Morgan's position at Grindal's Shoals, Washington's attack and slaughter of the Tories at Hammond's Store on the 29th, and the dispersion of Cunningham's party at Williams's plantation on the 30th of December alarmed Cornwallis for the safety of Ninety Six, an alarm which was much increased by the growing disaffection in that region which hitherto had been the most loyal to the King of any part of the State. Curiously, too, while he knew that the fortifications at Ninety Six were sufficient to secure it against attack unless with artillery, he had failed to learn that Morgan was entirely deficient in that arm of the service. While waiting for Leslie to struggle through the swamps, Cornwallis determined to check the disaffection in the western part of the province and to clear his left flank of Morgan. Accordingly, on the 1st of January, he ordered Tarleton over Broad River with his corps of cavalry and infantry of 550 men, the first battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment, consisting of 200, and two three-pounders. His instructions to Tarleton were that if Morgan was still at Williams's plantation or anywhere within his reach he should push him to the utmost. With his usual celerity Tarleton obeyed this order, and, leaving his baggage behind, crossed the Broad at Brierly's, now Strother's, Ferry and advanced into what is now Union County some twenty miles. He had been directed by his lordship to inquire and report upon the condition of affairs in this region, and, finding that Washington had fallen back to Morgan on the Pacolet, and hearing that the reports of the rising of the people had been exaggerated, he halted

¹ Tarleton's *Campaigns* (notes), 148, 260.

here and reported to Cornwallis that Ninety Six was safe and that Morgan was far distant. He requested that the baggage which he had left behind should be forwarded to him, and asked for the Seventeenth Light Dragoons and the Seventh Regiment, which latter he proposed to send to Ninety Six with a field-piece. He proposed to Cornwallis that when he advanced up the west side of the Broad his lordship should advance up the east, so that when he drove Morgan's corps from the Pacolet it would be forced to recross the Broad towards King's Mountain, where his lordship would be ready to fall upon it. To this plan Cornwallis agreed, and sent the reënforcements Tarleton asked. The Seventh Regiment, 200 men, and 50 dragoons of the Seventeenth Regiment brought his baggage to Tarleton, who then received permission to retain the Seventh Regiment instead of sending it to Ninety Six.

Cornwallis moved on Sunday, the 7th of January, a few miles to a place called McAllister's, and wrote Tarleton that he would remain there till Tuesday, the 9th, march to the crossroads on Wednesday, halt Thursday, and reach Bullock's Creek meeting-house, in what is now York County, on Saturday, the 13th. He did not, however, move from McAllister's until Saturday. He was waiting for Leslie, who was still in the swamps. On Sunday, the 14th, he was at Bull Run, about two miles southeast of the present town of Chester. From this place he informed Tarleton that Leslie was at last out of the swamps.

Tarleton, on receiving the reënforcements of the Seventh and Seventeenth regiments, moved westwardly and crossed Indian Creek in the present Newberry County, and afterwards Dunkin's Creek in the present Laurens County, seeking practicable fords for the passage of the Enoree and Tyger rivers. These rivers were passed, on the 14th, above the Cherokee Road, and in the evening Tarleton ob-

tained information that Morgan guarded all the fords upon the Pacolet, that Cornwallis had reached Bull Run, and that Leslie had surmounted the difficulties which had retarded his march. Tarleton thereupon informed Cornwallis that he would endeavor to pass the Pacolet, and thus force Morgan to retreat up the Broad. He urged his lordship to proceed up the eastern bank of that river without delay, as such a movement, in coöperation with his, would undoubtedly stop the retreat of the Americans, cut off, as they would be, from the main army under Greene. Cornwallis, however, still waited upon Leslie's movements, and detained him at Camden after he had passed the swamps until the 16th in order to mislead Greene as to his own movements.¹ Nor had he himself advanced at the time farther than Turkey Creek, in what is now York County, 25 miles to the southeast of Morgan's position, instead of having advanced as many miles to the north on the route which the latter must have proceeded to join Greene or to seek shelter in North Carolina. It was not until the 18th that Leslie, by his orders, crossed the Catawba, and joined him in what was spoken of as the middle road, *i.e.* the route between the Catawba and the Broad. From the 14th to the 17th Tarleton was left without information as to his lordship's movements; but having ascertained the position of Morgan's outposts, and supposing that the main army was now in Morgan's rear, he commenced his march on the evening of the 15th, directing his course to the old iron works which were situated higher up the river, indicating an intention of crossing it above Morgan's position, and thus to place his adversary between himself and the main army. Morgan, deceived by this stratagem, made a corresponding movement up the river, upon which Tarleton, silently decamping in the night, secured a passage below,

¹ Cornwallis to Lord George Germain, Tarleton's *Campaigns*, (note) 260.

within six miles of Morgan's camp, and made good his crossing before daylight. Upon this Morgan fell back, precipitately, towards Thicketty Creek.¹ Tarleton then advanced to some log houses, formerly constructed by Major Ferguson, which lay midway between the British and Americans. Here he intended to take post with his whole corps behind the cabins, and await Morgan's movements, but a patrol discovering that the Americans were gone, Tarleton occupied their abandoned position, in which he found a quantity of provisions and half-cooked rations, so suddenly had Morgan been compelled to move. Here he remained during the 16th, and, supposing that his adversary was resolved to fly early on the morning of the 17th, started in pursuit.

The forces, British and American, about to be engaged, were as follows: On the British side Tarleton had his own Legion, which he puts at 550 men, the Seventh Regiment, 200, and a detachment of the Seventeenth Dragoons, 50. To these were added the First Battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment, 200, and a detachment of the Royal Artillery to man the field-guns, about 50. So that Tarleton's force, by his estimate, was about 1000. The Americans contended that it amounted to 1150, and there certainly was a party of Loyalists with him, not included in his estimate, for he mentions the capture by such a party of a militia colonel from whom he obtained information in regard to Morgan's movements.² These are also said to have been about 50,³ which may have brought his force up to the American estimate.

Johnson, in his *Life of Greene*,⁴ asserts that Morgan's

¹ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 221; Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 320; *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 226.

² Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 210, 211, 214.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 374.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 346.

whole force on duty consisted of 290 regular infantry, 80 cavalry, and 600 militia, in all, 970. General Greene, in his letter appointing Morgan to this command, informed him that it was to consist of the Maryland line of 320, a detachment of the Virginia militia of 200, Washington's cavalry of from 60 to 100, and that he would be joined by a body of volunteer militia under General Davidson of North Carolina, and those of South Carolina, lately under the command of General Sumter.¹ From a disagreement between Sumter and Morgan the former's troops do not appear to have formed a part of the latter's command. In a letter of Morgan to Greene, written on the 15th of January, two days before the battle, he puts the militia from South Carolina and Georgia at 200, and those from North Carolina at 140.² So that his whole force was 940. In a recent work³ this statement is made as to the respective quota of militia from the States of North and South Carolina and Georgia. Accepting Morgan's statement as to the strength of the Continental troops and Virginia militia composing his corps, the author goes on to say—"To this were added McDowell's mounted North Carolina volunteers, 190 men, Davidson's Mecklenburg volunteers, a part of whom, however, were from Tryon,—in all 310 North Carolinians. Pickens's South Carolinians, 70 men, and the Georgians under McCall about 30 men." To this it may be objected that Morgan's report to his commanding officer, immediately preceding the battle, is at least more likely to be correct as to the strength and composition of his force than estimates made long after; and in his report Morgan gives 140 as the exact strength of the North Carolina militia, and estimates the South Carolina and Georgia contribution at 200. The author of the work quoted, while

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 346.

² *Ibid.*

³ *No. Ca., 1780-81* (Schenck), 205.

severe upon Judge Johnson for alleged intemperate zeal on behalf of his State, South Carolina, has himself fallen into palpable errors in attempting to show mistakes by the author of the *Life of Greene*. He states that Pickens's command proper was only 70 men, and McCall's *Georgians* were only 30 in number.¹ He evidently supposes McCall himself to have been a Georgian. As has appeared, he was a South Carolinian from Ninety Six, having been in the service during the siege of Ninety Six in 1775, with a company from that district.² Fortunately for the fame of South Carolina, the historian of Georgia has given the account of the organization of Pickens's party. When this officer took the field he assumed command of an encampment of his followers at Long Cane, in Ninety Six District, and marched to join Morgan. The historian of Georgia goes on to say: "Lieutenant-Colonel McCall was ordered to make a selection of forty-five men, who, equipped as dragoons, *in which there were several Georgians*, to act with Colonel Washington's regiment. *Major John Cunningham commanded the Georgia troops under the orders of General Morgan.*" McCall's mounted corps were, with the exception of a few, South Carolinians.³

There was a marked difference in the character of the opposing forces at Cowpens from those who fought at King's Mountain. At King's Mountain there were no British regulars of the line on the one side nor Continental regulars on the other. It was a battle between Amer-

¹ *No. Ca., 1780-81* (Schenck), 201.

² James McCall, captain Ninety Six, *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution* (McCrary), 9; commands expedition to capture Indian agent (*ibid.*, 189, 190); joins Sumter on the Catawba (*ibid.*, 633); joins Clarke in effort to recover Georgia (*ibid.*, 733); with Clarke lays siege to Augusta (*ibid.*, 734); takes part under Sumter in battle of Fishdam (*ibid.*, 821); in battle at Blackstock (*ibid.*, 826); with Clarke moves against Ninety Six; takes part in battle of Long Cane and is wounded (*ibid.*, 831-850).

³ *Hist. of Ga.* (McCall), vol. II, 354, 355.

ican Tories, from North and South, and American Whigs, from the Carolinas and Virginia. Ferguson appears to have been the only British officer present. The British forces at Cowpens were nearly all regulars. The three regiments, Seventh, Seventeenth, and Seventy-first, and the Royal Artillery were all from the British line; and Tarleton's Legion, though raised at New York, were practically regulars. On the American side there were present the Maryland line and Washington's Dragoons of the Continental Army. In the quality of troops, it has been supposed, says Johnson, that the British had infinitely the advantage, but this was scarcely so. At least 300 or 400 of the enemy are said to have been new recruits and probably not yet disciplined or ever before in battle, and it appears that Tarleton's own corps, the famous British Legion, had been recruited from the prisoners taken at the battle of Camden, and it is said, seeing their own regiment opposed to them, would not proceed against them, but broke. On the other hand, besides the Continentals he commanded, such a body of militia as served under Morgan has seldom been collected in the field of battle. Two companies of them, under Captains Triplett and Taite, were from Virginia, and were mostly veteran soldiers who had served out their enlistment and were now hired as substitutes by the drafted militia. The Georgians consisted of Clarke's veterans, volunteers, 100 in number, who had been almost the whole war in constant service, and a more dauntless little corps it would have been difficult to find. Their gallant Colonel did not share in the honors of the field, for he had recently been disabled by a severe wound; but they were led by two gallant officers, Cunningham and Jackson.¹ The 140

¹ In a letter written by Major Jackson to General Morgan, dated January 20, 1795, from the U. S. Senate chamber, he says: "The officers commanding . . . were Major Cunningham and Captain Samuel Hammond,

North Carolina Riflemen under Major McDowell had fought at Musgrove's Mills, King's Mountain, and in almost every action during the preceding summer, and had therefore seen service and were reliable.¹ The rest of the militia were new men from Ninety Six District, South Carolina, under Pickens — 45 of them mounted under Lieutenant-Colonel McCall, and the remainder riflemen. These as yet had probably seen no service, but like their commander, Colonel Pickens, they had entered the field fully aware that for themselves there was no quarter to be asked, and realized that death upon the field was preferable to the ignominious end which would be theirs if taken. They were practised marksmen, and with the desperation of their situation, voluntarily assumed, were most formidable foes. Morgan's force was also most admirably officered. The Regulars or Continentals were commanded by two distinguished officers; the North Carolina militia by Major McDowell, who had seen much service; and Pickens, who commanded the South Carolinas, had already commanded with great success in the field and had now even gained the esteem of Morgan.² No eulogium, says Johnson, is necessary to the reputation of Pickens; but McCall is less known and has been too soon forgotten. He was amongst the most distinguished partisan leaders of his time; unfortunately he did not live to see the issue of the contest in which he had taken part. Excelled by no one for activity, resolution, and intelligence, he fell a sacrifice to small-pox contracted in the field.³

When Tarleton turned his position on the Pacolet, Mor-

George Walton, and Joshua Inman. . . . The detachment was under my immediate command and direction, although I acted also as brigademajor to all the militia present." — *Atlanta Constitution*, January 5, 1902.

¹ *No. Ca., 1780-SI* (Schenck), 201.

² Letter to Greene, Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 371. ³ *Ibid.*, 373.

gan fell back to the Cowpens, near Thicketty Mountain, in what is now Spartanburg County, the scene of the memorable bivouac of the gathered clans on the evening of the 6th of October, 1780, and from which they marched to the victory of King's Mountain.¹ Here Morgan was forced to deliver battle. His choice of ground has been severely censured. The ground about the Cowpens was an open wood, admitting the operations of cavalry with facility, in which arm of the service the enemy trebled his own. His flanks had no resting-places, but were exposed to be readily turned, and Broad River ran parallel to his rear, forbidding the hope of a safe retreat in the event of disaster. "Had Morgan crossed the river," says Lee in his *Memoirs*, "and approached the mountain (*i. e.*, King's Mountain), he would have gained a position disadvantageous to cavalry but convenient for riflemen, and would have secured a less dangerous retreat. But these cogent reasons, rendered more favorable by his inferiority in numbers, could not prevail. Confiding in his long-tried fortune, conscious of his personal superiority in soldiership, and relying on the skill and courage of his troops, he adhered to his resolution. Erroneous as was the decision to fight in this position," says the author, "the disposition for battle was masterly."² To this criticism Morgan himself has replied, as follows:—

"I would not have had a swamp in the view of my militia on any consideration; they would have made for it and nothing could have detained them from it. And as to covering my wings, I knew my adversary, and was perfectly sure I should have nothing but downright fighting. As to retreat, it was the very thing I wished to cut off all hope of. I would have thanked Tarleton had he surrounded me with his cavalry. It would have been better than placing my own men in the rear to shoot down those who broke from the ranks.

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrady), 774, 775.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 226.

When men are forced to fight they will sell themselves dearly; and I knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of my bayonets, and keep my troops from breaking as Buford's Regiment did. Had I crossed the river, one-half of the militia would immediately have abandoned me." ¹

The victory of Saratoga must surely have turned the heads of those who achieved it. This attempted justification by Morgan — one of its heroes — for the violation of every military rule, if indeed he voluntarily chose the ground, is as rash and silly as it is bombastic, and is much in the style of his commander Gates when in the height of his folly upon the surrender of Burgoyne. He would not, he declared, have had a swamp in the view of his militia on any consideration, because they would have made for it, and nothing could have detained them from it! And yet it was from the swamps of the Wateree that Sumter had fallen upon Carey's Fort at Camden Ferry, and carried off as prisoners the whole garrison and convoy of the provision train. It was in the swamps of the Santee that Marion's men had rescued the Continental prisoners lost at Camden by Gates. It was through the swamps of Thicketty Creek itself that Campbell's Virginia militia had marched to victory at King's Mountain. And it was in the swamps of the Pee Dee that Marion was even then keeping alive the spirit of resistance in the Low-Country — swamps which Marion was to render famous in history by the deeds of volunteer militia. He would not cover his wings because he knew his adversary and was sure he would have nothing but downright fighting! Did ever a military leader announce a more foolish proposition? He had no confidence in his militia, which constituted nearly two-thirds of his whole command, and would have thanked Tarleton for surrounding them and saving him from the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 375, 376.

necessity of placing men in his rear to shoot down those who broke from their lines. And yet, situated as he was, with the best troops in the British service in his front, especially strong in cavalry, led by a desperate fighter, Morgan would have us believe that he deliberately selected as his battle-ground an open field, and of purpose formed his line of battle with his "wings in the air"! This he did, he asserts, because he knew that the dread of Tarleton's cavalry would give due weight to the protection of his bayonets, and keep his troops from breaking as Buford's regiment had done. Mark! As Buford's regiment had done! He seems ignorant of the fact that Buford's regiment were Continental regulars and not militia, and entirely oblivious of the glorious deeds which had been accomplished by the partisan bands in South Carolina since that event. His bayonets could not have exceeded 300. The Maryland line, the only regular infantry he had, amounted to but 290, and the militia were armed only with rifles and shotguns. Tarleton's cavalry alone numbered 350, and to oppose the Maryland line was the famous Seventy-first Regiment, to say nothing of the Seventh, which it is supposed was somewhat inferior because of its newly recruited ranks. What bayonets had he, then, with which to protect his militia? Forsooth, his bayonets had all they could do that day to protect themselves. Through the whole of this, his justification, runs the vein of criticism and distrust of the volunteer soldiery so common to the writings of all the Continental officers of the time. Men who had voluntarily abandoned their families and homes to enter the struggle for liberty without pay, a service in which, to many of them, there was no quarter to be expected, most of whom had had also as much, and in some instances, even more experience in actual warfare than those who so derided them, were contemptuously termed "militia," and their conduct esteemed

less trustworthy than that of enlisted men who were fighting only for pay. Clarke's and McCall's volunteers, who had been victors at Musgrove's Mills and had fought so desperately at Augusta and Long Cane, and McDowell's riflemen, who had borne their part at King's Mountain and in many other fields, were not considered worthy to be associated with the Continentals who had been defeated at Camden, and had since lain idly by while the partisan bands of North and South Carolina and Georgia had victoriously fought twenty-six battles and put *hors de combat* of the enemy more than three times their own loss.

If Morgan, for the reasons assigned by him in this letter, deliberately chose the field of the Cowpens as his battleground, he was unfit for the command with which he was intrusted, notwithstanding all his previous services; nor could the brilliant victory achieved by his troops on the ill-chosen field relieve his memory, in this instance, of the most wanton and reckless conduct. This justification in the choice of his position was, however, an afterthought. The history of the battle does not comport with its theory — a theory worked out to meet adverse criticism long after the battle had taken place.

That no such idea was entertained by Morgan at the time is clear from his communications both before and after the battle. Writing to General Greene on the 15th of January, two days before the battle, — the day before Tarleton manœuvred him out of his position on the Pacolet, — requesting that he should be recalled with his detachment, he proposed that General Davidson and Colonel Pickens might be left with the militia, as they would not be so much the object of the enemy's attention, but would be capable of being a check on the disaffected, which is all he himself could effect. He adds, Colonel Pickens is a valuable, discreet, and attentive officer, and has the confidence

of the militia. Objecting to Greene's proposal of attack upon Cornwallis in his camp, he says he has only 200 South Carolina and Georgia and 140 North Carolina volunteers. "Nor do I expect to have," he adds, "more than two-thirds of these should I be attacked, for it is impossible to keep them collected."¹ He objected to the straggling of the militia or volunteers, but so far from doubting their courage and conduct, he proposes to leave them to overcome the disaffected, while he joins Greene with his Continentals. In his report of the battle, written on the 19th, two days after its occurrence, there is no suggestion of such an idea. The report is disingenuous, for it makes no allusion to the fact that he was forced to abandon the line of the Pacolet by Tarleton's stratagem, but accounts for his movements giving "the appearance of a retreat," as of his own choice, seeking a more advantageous position; but so far from implying any doubt of the efficiency of the volunteers, as he calls them, he details how he placed them, under Colonel Pickens, to guard his flanks. He reports, "The volunteers from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under the command of Colonel Pickens, were posted to guard the flanks."² And yet, in his old age, he would persuade us that he had to place "his own men in the rear to shoot down those (whom he had thus posted to guard his flanks) if they broke." Was ever anything more preposterous!

The truth is that Morgan had no business on the west side of Broad River for any other purpose than for one of those raids by which the partisan bands in this section had broken up the British outposts during the last six months,

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 371.

² Original report of General Morgan. Collection of Mr. T. Bailey Myers of New York, published in *News and Courier*, Charleston, South Carolina, May 10, 1881.

in the absence of any regular army in the field. He had been sent by Greene to threaten Ninety Six, and to countenance and aid the uprising of the people there. He had accomplished the dispersion of Cuninghams party at Williams's plantation, and had come back reënforced by Pickens and McCall. But when Tarleton was interposed between himself and Ninety Six, and it was known through Marion that Leslie was approaching a junction with Cornwallis, he should no longer have allowed two large rivers—the Broad and the Catawba—to remain between Greene's army and his detachment. Greene had written to him on the 9th: "It is not my wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest advantage and a moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard. A retreat may be disagreeable, but it is not disgraceful. Regard not the opinion of the day. It is not our business to risk too much; our affairs are in too critical a situation, and require time and nursing to give them a better tone." His position on the Pacolet was precarious in the extreme. He was practically between Tarleton and Cornwallis, beyond any possibility of succor from Greene at Cheraw. The line of the Pacolet itself was a weak one. The stream was shallow and abounding with fords. But there he remained while Tarleton was strongly reënforced by Cornwallis. From this position by his first move his opponent outmanœuvred him. Moving as if to cross above, Tarleton induced him to uncover a better crossing below, and then by a sudden and concealed countermarch in the night threw his force across the Pacolet so promptly and quietly as to compel Morgan, precipitately, to abandon his camp, leaving his half-cooked rations on the ground. Morgan had now no alternative but to fight or fly to the mountains. Lee supposes that Morgan's decision to fight where he did grew out of irrita-

tion of temper, which overruled the suggestions of his better judgment ;¹ but it rather appears that Tarleton had deprived him of any other alternative. Early in the night of the 16th Tarleton's scouts reported that Morgan had struck into byways tending towards Thicketty Creek, whereupon Tarleton immediately prepared for pursuit, and began his march at three o'clock in the morning of the 17th. Before dawn he had overtaken Morgan, who had now either to fight or to retreat with the enemy hanging upon his rear — a retreat which would probably have ended in rout. But even could he have reached the Broad, his troops, fatigued and dispirited, could scarcely have crossed in the face of Tarleton's powerful cavalry. Well did Cornwallis write to Tarleton after the battle, "The means you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly, and must ever do you honor."² Accustomed to fight and to conquer, as he had been, Morgan did not hesitate to accept the issue of battle thus forced upon him ; and however ill suited the ground, masterly was the disposition of his forces to meet it, but not such as he afterwards so foolishly stated them to have been. Tarleton had proceeded but a little way before his advance guards reported that the American troops had halted and were forming.

Morgan, thus forced to action, took ground on an eminence gently ascending for about 350 yards and covered with an open wood. On the crown of this eminence were posted what, as he considered, his best troops, composed of the 290 Maryland regulars, and in line on their right the two companies of Virginia militia veterans, under Triplett and Taite, and a company of Georgians, under Captain Beale, about 140 in the whole, making his second line to consist of 430 men. This was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Howard. One hundred and fifty yards in advance

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 226.

² *Tarleton's Campaigns*, 252.

of this line the main body of the militia, about 270 in number, were posted in open order. These, all volunteers and practised marksmen, most of them burning under a sense of personal injury, were commanded by Colonel Pickens. In advance of this line, about 150 yards, were posted 150 picked men, deployed along the whole front, on the right commanded by Major Cunningham of Georgia, and on the left by Major McDowell of North Carolina. The descent in the ground behind the second line was sufficiently deep to cover a man on horseback. Behind this the American reserve was posted, consisting of Washington's and McCall's cavalry, the former 80, and the latter 45 in number. The skirmish line of militia, under Cunningham and McDowell, were permitted to consult their security as far as circumstances would permit by covering their bodies with trees and firing from rest. Their orders were to reserve their fire until the enemy were within 50 yards. Then, having delivered it, to retire, covering themselves with trees as occasion offered, until they reached and resumed their places in the first line. The orders to the first line were to deliver two deliberate discharges at the distance of 50 yards, and then to retire and take their posts on the left of the regulars; if charged by cavalry, every third man to fire, and two to remain in reserve lest the cavalry should continue to advance after the first fire. The second line were cautioned not to be alarmed at the retreat of the militia in their front. The orders given to the militia were detailed to the regulars. They were directed also to fire low and deliberately; not to break on any account, and if forced to retire, to rally on the eminence in their rear, where they were assured that the enemy could not injure them. The baggage of the American army had been sent off early in the morning under a suitable escort, with orders to halt a few miles in the rear, and the militia horses—for

the volunteers were all mounted — were secured to the boughs of trees a convenient distance in the rear of the reserve. Every arrangement having been thus completed, the men were ordered to rest in their places.¹ All were in high spirits and ready for the action, for, however Morgan disparaged the militia in his correspondence, he had followed the custom of the warfare in this region and had submitted to them, with the other troops, the question whether they should fight. They had replied with a universal cry to be led to battle.²

It was about eight o'clock in the morning that the British army arrived in view of the Americans, and, instead of overtaking his adversary in the hurry, confusion, and fatigue of a flight, Tarleton found him rested, breakfasted, and deliberately drawn up, every man at his post, and their commander, in a forcible style of elocution, addressing them. On the other hand, the British troops had been five hours that morning on the march; but Tarleton judged the excitement of the moment of greater consequence than rest or refreshment, and prepared immediately for action. The American army calmly looked on while the enemy formed his order of battle at the distance of four hundred yards from the first line.³

Tarleton had approached with his army in the following order: the Light Infantry and Legion Infantry and the Seventh Regiment, with the artillery in the centre, and a captain and 50 dragoons on each flank composed his advance. The battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment and 150 dragoons composed his reserve. As they arrived upon the ground, the infantry were required to disencumber themselves of everything except their arms and

¹ In this account of Morgan's disposition for the battle Johnson has been followed, *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 377-379.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 372.

³ *Ibid.*, 372, 379.

ammunition. The Legion Dragoons were ordered to drive in the skirmish line which covered Morgan's front, that it might be more conveniently and distinctly inspected. On the advance of the cavalry the American parties retreated and fell back into the first line. This retreat upon their part, it is said, was made earlier in the action than Morgan had intended, but not before they had inflicted a blow upon the enemy from which they did not recover and which proved ultimately fatal to their fortunes¹—Cunningham's and McDowell's marksmen had, before falling back, given the British cavalry a few discharges which made them tremble, for at least that day, at the deadly aim of the American riflemen.

The American skirmishers having fallen back, the British Light Infantry were filed to the right till they covered the flank of the American front line; and the Legion Infantry formed upon their left. Before the other troops had been placed in position Tarleton ordered an advance of the partly formed line under fire of a three-pounder to within 300 yards of the American line. Here the Seventh Regiment was formed upon the left of the Legion Infantry, and the other three-pounder was given to the right division of the Seventh. The two field-pieces were placed equidistant from each other and from the extremity of each wing, thus dividing the line into thirds. A party of dragoons of 50 under a captain was placed on each flank of the corps which formed the British front line, to protect their own and threaten the flanks of their adversaries. The reserve, composed of the Seventy-first Regiment and 200 cavalry, was posted 150 yards in the rear and to the left of the line of battle.

These dispositions having been made, the British advanced under the fire of the artillery and also with some firing of

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 228; *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. I, 379.

the line and with loud shouts for approaching victory. The infantry fire Tarleton declares to have been only from some of the recruits of the Seventh Regiment, which he suppressed. The militia under Pickens maintained their line with perfect coolness. They received the enemy's fire with a firmness which astonished the British, unaccustomed to such resistance from the description of the troops they supposed they had in front of them.¹ At the distance ordered they delivered their fire with unerring aim, and it was, says Johnson, the magnanimous confession of a gallant officer of the Maryland line who fought on this day "that here the battle was gained." The killed and wounded of the British commissioned and non-commissioned officers who lay on the field of battle where the fire of the riflemen was delivered, and the great proportion which the killed and wounded of this description bore to the whole number sufficiently justified the assertion.² The riflemen had carried out the determination which they had formed before the action to "mark the epaulette men."³ The British line now charged with their bayonets, upon which Pickens ordered a retreat to the post assigned them before the action began, on the left of the Continental troops.⁴ As the volunteers fell back the enemy rent the air with their shouts, and quickened their advance; but from that moment the work of Pickens's marksmen began to show its effects; the loss of officers was soon manifest by the confusion which ensued in the ranks.

As soon as the second line was cleared the latter commenced their fire, and for near thirty minutes it was kept up with coolness and constancy. The fire on both sides

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 357.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 380.

³ *Ibid.*, 378.

⁴ General Morgan reports, "Majors McDowell and Cunningham gave them a heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended for their support; the whole of Colonel Pickens's command then kept up a fire by regiments, retreating agreeable to orders."

was well supported and occasioned much slaughter. The British, though frequently halted for the restoration of order, continued to advance, but with such hesitation that Tarleton ordered up the Seventy-first into line on his left, while his cavalry made a sweep upon the American right.

The cavalry of Tarleton's left wing had fallen upon the rear of the retreating militia, who, having to traverse the whole front of the second line to reach the ground on which they were ordered to rally, were much exposed in doing so. Washington, seeing this, dashed to their assistance, and, repulsing the enemy, enabled the militia to recover their composure and steadiness. The eminence which covered this reserve was exceedingly favorable to their purpose, and Pickens ably availed himself of it. Here most of them gathered around him, and were soon reduced to order.

Apprehensive that the reserve could not be brought up in time to defend this exposed flank, or if it were that it would leave his other flank too much exposed, Morgan sent an order to the Virginia and Georgia militia on his right, to fall back so as to form a new line at right angles with that of the Continentals, and repel the enemy's advance upon his right flank. To effect this movement with precision and despatch, the commanding officer ordered his men to face to the right-about and wheel on their left. The first part of the order was executed with coolness. And now came the crisis of the battle. An accident, under a misapprehension of orders, which for a while threatened the destruction of the American army, was averted, strange to say, by a misapprehension of the commander-in-chief of what had actually taken place. The Continentals, seeing the movement of the militia on their right, and supposing that this was the state of things which required a retreat to the eminence in their rear, faced about also and began to move rather in an accelerating step, but still in perfect

order, towards the intended second position. Howard, presuming that the order must have emanated from the commander, made no opposition, but bent his whole attention to the preservation of order and encouragement of his men. Morgan, also, under the impression that the movement was made under the order of Howard, and thinking favorably of it under existing circumstances, rode along the rear of the line, reminding the officers to halt and face as soon as they reached their ground. But just at this crisis, says Johnson, whose account is here followed, they were accosted by another officer, and their attention drawn to some facts which produced an immediate change of measures. This officer was a messenger from Colonel Washington, who, having been carried, in pursuing the enemy's cavalry, some distance in the advance of the American line, found the right flank of the enemy wholly exposed to him, disclosing the confusion existing in their ranks, from the want of the officers who had fallen under Pickens's fire. "They are coming like a mob — give them a fire and I will charge them," was the message delivered, and the messenger galloped back to join his command. At that instant Pickens showed himself above the second hill, advancing to support the right, and in twenty minutes more the whole British army were prisoners of the Americans.

The British, seeing the second line retreating, as they supposed, advanced rapidly with shouts of victory, but in the disorder which Washington had described. They had reached within thirty yards of Howard's rear when, at Washington's suggestion, that officer halted his troops. "Face about and give them one fire, and the victory is ours," was reiterated by Morgan as he passed along the line. It was promptly obeyed. The enemy were within a few yards tumultuously shouting and rapidly advancing; scarcely a man of the Americans, it is said, raised his gun to his

shoulder; when their fire was delivered they were in the attitude of using their bayonets. The bayonets of the two armies were interlocked. The enemy threw down their arms and fell upon their faces. The cry of "Tarleton's quarters" rang from right to left, but Howard controlled his men, and his order to "give them quarter" was obeyed. Tarleton as a last effort sent orders to his dragoons to charge the right of the Americans while he attempted to rally the infantry to protect the guns; but the deadly aim of Pickens's riflemen in the commencement of the action had so completely demoralized men who had been accustomed only to sabring defeated troops and plundering the unprotected, that he could get no response to his order. His efforts to collect his infantry were alike ineffectual. Neither promises nor threats, he declared, could gain their attention. They surrendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns to the artillerymen who defended them for some time with exemplary resolution. In this last stage of defeat Tarleton made another struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge, hoping that such an attack might retrieve the day, but all attempts to restore order or reanimate their courage proved fruitless. Tarleton admits that above two hundred dragoons forsook their leader and left the field of battle. They had been accustomed to slaughter fugitives, not to take part while the battle waged. They had massacred Buford's regiment at the Waxhaws, had sabred the fugitives from Camden, had surprised and cut to pieces Sumter's unarmed men at Fishing Creek; but they failed to dislodge this same leader's recruited ranks when they had arms in their hands at Blackstock, and when brought face to face with the foe at Cowpens they ignominiously fled. But very unlike the conduct of the cavalry was that of the Royal Artillerymen; abandoned by the cavalry and supported only by a few of the infantry who rallied

around them, these devoted men stood to their guns, though Washington's cavalry was amongst them. Most were killed or wounded by the time that Tarleton, with a number of mounted officers and all that remained to him of his cavalry, about fifty in number, returned to support them. Here it was that occurred that memorable contest between Tarleton and Washington from which Washington so narrowly escaped. Seeing Tarleton approach, Washington ordered his men to charge and dashed forward himself. Tarleton ordered a retreat. Being in the rear of his retreating men and looking behind him, Tarleton perceived that Washington was very near him and fully thirty yards ahead of his troops. Observing this, with three officers he wheeled about and advanced to meet his pursuer. One of his officers, the one on the right, led, and parrying a blow aimed at him by Washington, the sword of the latter proved of inferior temper and broke in half. Washington, now at his mercy, was about to fall under the sword of this British officer, when the latter was disabled by an American sergeant who had come to the assistance of his leader. At the same instant a serving-man, too small to wield a sword, but who had joined the affray, by a pistol shot saved Washington from the sabre of the British officer who had come up on the left. Then Tarleton himself, in the centre, made a thrust at Washington, which was parried; when, retreating a few paces, he used his pistol, with which he wounded Washington's horse.¹ In the meanwhile all was over with the British army on the extreme right of the Americans. The Seventy-first behaved, as usual, with courage, and maintained their order to the last. But when the cavalry fled and the whole weight of the American army pressed on them, resistance was vain.

¹ Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 347; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 383.

They laid down their arms, and Colonel Pickens in person received the sword of their commander, Major McArthur.

Never was victory more complete. Not a British corps retired from the field under command except the few cavalry who accompanied Tarleton. Washington pursued the flying enemy until evening, and on his return drove before him near 100 straggling prisoners collected on his route. Two field-pieces, four-pounders, 800 muskets, two stands of colors, 35 baggage wagons, and 100 dragoon horses fell into the hands of the victors. Johnson, upon a review of the authorities and from original matter, concludes that the British loss was 600 prisoners and 184 killed and wounded, of whom he estimates the slain at 60. The loss in officers was particularly great. At least one-tenth of the killed and wounded were commissioned officers. Ten were found on the field of battle, almost all of whom had evidently fallen under the fire of the militia. Hence the irretrievable confusion which the writers on both sides admit to have ensued in the British line.¹ A part of Tarleton's cavalry fled to Hamilton's Ford on Broad River, and reached Cornwallis's camp at Fisher's Creek, about twenty-five miles from Cowpens, in the evening. The remainder arrived with Tarleton the following morning.² The whole American loss was but 11 killed and 61 wounded. No officer of rank was among the killed or wounded.³

The distinguishing feature of the battle of Cowpens upon the American side was undoubtedly the effective work of Pickens's marksmen. It was this which in the very commencement of the action had carried terror into the hearts of Tarleton's dragoons, and it was this which disorganized

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 384.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 227.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 383.

the British line to such an extent as to render it only a mob when the critical moment of the onslaught had arrived. So far from deserving the subsequent preposterous, though cruel, censure of the leader they served so well that day, it was Pickens himself who received the sword of the gallant commander of the Seventy-first Regiment.¹ And yet it was of these men that Morgan wrote years after that he would have thanked Tarleton to have kept them in their ranks. Whatever confusion occurred among them this day was the result of Morgan's own orders.²

Thus ended the brilliant but cruel career of Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton in South Carolina. Lord Cornwallis, his commander, loyally stood by the young officer to whom he had intrusted this important movement, and so many of his best troops. "You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer by the unfortunate event of the action of the 17th," wrote his lordship on the 30th of January. "The means you used to bring the enemy to action were able and masterly and must ever do you honor. Your disposition was unexceptionable; the total misbehavior of the troops could alone have deprived you of the glory which was so justly your due."³ But not so considerably was Tarleton's

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 383.

² In his official report Morgan writes: "Such was the inferiority of our numbers that our success must be attributed under God to the justice of our cause and the bravery of our troops. *My wishes would induce me to mention the name of every private centinel in the corps.*" In an order mentioning the names of the commissioned officers in the action the general announces, "*Colonel Pickens and all the officers in his corps behaved well; but from their having so lately joined the detachment it has been impossible to collect all their names and rank so the general does not particularize any lest it should be doing injustice to others.*" And yet it is these men that in after life he said he had to keep in their places by posting men to shoot them down if they broke!

³ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 252. Tarleton did not reciprocate his lordship's generosity; in his work he by no means stands by his chief, who so

conduct generally regarded in the British army. There was much jealousy of Tarleton among the officers of the British line, whose rank as commandant of the Legion, a provincial organization, superseded officers who had been long in the service. Especially was this the case in regard to Major McArthur of the Seventy-first and Major Newmarsh of the Seventh or Fusileers, officers who had held commissions long before Tarleton was born.¹ The partiality which the Commander-in-chief constantly displayed in Tarleton's favor was not calculated to abate this jealousy or to assure him the cordial support of those over whom he was thus placed. Had the misfortune of the battle involved only the Legion, it is not probable that it would have excited so much criticism. But it was observed with bitterness, that, while after the battle few of the Legion cavalry were even missing, the only body of his infantry which escaped was the guard left with the baggage, which had not reached Cowpens at the time of the action. The Seventh, the Seventy-first, and artillery, commanded by veteran officers who had not been in any way consulted as to the action, had been sacrificed to the impetuosity of this officer, without experience in anything but partisan warfare. It was impossible, it was said, to form any other conclusion than that there was a radical defect and a want of military knowledge on the part of Colonel Tarleton. It was admitted that he possessed bravery inferior to no man, but his talents never exceeded that of a partisan captain of light dragoons, daring in skirmishes.² Moultrie relates that he happened to be in Charlestown at the time when the news of the battle was received, the

magnanimously supported him in his defeat. In his *Campaigns* he lays blame on Cornwallis for many things which at the time he himself approved. *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, Introduction, 17.

¹ *Strictures on Tarleton's Campaigns*, 108.

² *Hist. Am. War* (Stedman), vol. II, 323, 324.

particulars of which he knew as soon as the British there, Governor Rutledge having sent in a person on some pretence with a flag, but in fact to inform the American prisoners of the success, news which he at once communicated to the officers at Haddrell's Point. The defeat of Tarleton, he says, chagrined and disappointed the British officers and Tories in Charlestown exceedingly. He saw them standing in the streets, talking over the affair with very grave faces. Some of the old British officers who were made prisoners and paroled to Charlestown, when they came down, were exceedingly angry at their defeat and were heard to say, "That was the consequence of trusting such a command to a boy like Tarleton."¹

Ramsay, the historian, glorying in this American victory, asserts that Tarleton's defeat was the first link in a grand chain of causes which finally drew down ruin both in North and South Carolina on the Royal interests.² It is scarcely to be wondered at that an author who had collected so little information in regard to the operations of the partisan bands in South Carolina and the results thereby obtained as to hold that but little impression had been made by them on the British army in the State, that Huck's defeat at Williamson's (improperly spoken of by him as Williams's) plantation, and Hanging Rock were the only checks, and these nothing more than checks, which the British arms had received before the battle of King's Mountain,³ which battle in itself was nothing more, according to him, than an "unexpected advantage," which gave new spirits to the desponding Americans, who did not even know of the battle of Musgrove's Mills — it is scarcely to be wondered that such a one should regard the victory at Cowpens as the day-dawn of success upon the cause of liberty in these

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 256, 257.

² Ramsay's *Rev. of So. Ca.*, vol. II, 200.

³ *Ibid.*, 174.

States. It is surprising, however, that one so much better informed as the author of the life of Greene should have fallen into the same mistake, asserting it in almost the same words.¹

The battle of Cowpens was much nearer the end of the chain of causes which led to the redemption of these States than to its beginning. The material results of the victory at Cowpens bear no comparison to those obtained by the series of partisan actions which culminated at King's Mountain, and which were enlarged and emphasized at Fishdam, Blackstock, and Hammond's Store. As has been shown in the preceding volume, the net results of these engagements had been three to one in favor of the Americans in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and had resulted in disconcerting a campaign in which the whole American cause was involved. The victory at King's Mountain had caused the abandonment of the invasion of North Carolina and Virginia at a time most favorable to the Royal cause. It had recalled Cornwallis to South Carolina just as he was about to commence a march which but for this cause might have ended in a junction between Leslie and himself in Virginia and their united advance upon Washington in the Jerseys, and this at a time while the British fleet had command of the American waters, blockading the French at Newport. It had delayed this grand movement for 1780. De Grasse had arrived in 1781, raised the blockade of Newport, released the French army, and Cornwallis's renewed invasion ended in surrender. If a chain is to be drawn from the fall of Charlestown to the glorious end of the war, its first link will be found at Williamson's plantation, when Bratton and Lacey rose upon Huck, and its last at the capitulation at Yorktown.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 377.

The material results of the battle of Cowpens were the destruction of the best regiment in the British service, the loss to it of some others of their best troops, and the end put to the terror of Tarleton. Had the Seventy-first Regiment been present at Guilford Court-house it would most assuredly have rendered efficient service. But Tarleton's discredit was by no means so serious an injury to his Majesty's cause as the death of Ferguson, who was an abler and a better man. Nor was it more so than the capture of Wemyss. It was a glorious victory—that achieved at Cowpens; but it had no decisive effect upon the opening campaign. Cornwallis, when joined by Leslie, notwithstanding it, marched as he had purposed.

Congress, says Lee, manifested their sense of this important victory by a resolve approving the conduct of the principal officers and commemorative of their distinguished exertions. To General Morgan they presented a gold medal, to Brigadier Pickens a sword, and to Lieutenant-Colonels Howard and Washington a silver medal each, and to Captain Triplett a sword.¹

And well did these distinguished officers deserve these remembrances of their services. But Campbell for King's Mountain, and Sumter for Hanging Rock, Fishdam, and Blackstock, were let go with thanks. Neither Davie, nor Shelby, nor Sevier, nor Clarke, nor Lacey received even that compliment; nor was any notice taken of McCall, under whose influence it was that Pickens was again in the field to win and merit so distinguished a mark of his countrymen's approbation.

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 230.

CHAPTER III

1781

GENERAL SUMTER has been much censured by the biographers of General Greene for a want of cordiality in the support of that commander during his campaign in South Carolina.¹ How far this censure was deserved, the reader will be able to judge as the story proceeds. It is manifest, however, that General Greene, while in the outset warm in his encomiums upon Sumter's character and influence, upon assuming command had not appreciated what had been accomplished by Sumter, Marion, and the other partisan leaders during the months in which the State had been practically abandoned by Congress; and that he

¹ Great Commanders Series, *General Greene* (Francis Vinton Greene), 238, 248, 255, 265, 266; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 210, 216. The Hon. William Johnson, the biographer of Greene, was the son of William Johnson who took so active a part in the early movements of the Revolution. He was Speaker of the House of Representatives of South Carolina at the early age of twenty-six, a judge of the State at twenty-eight, and an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States at thirty-two. The author of this work, his grand nephew, regrets to find himself unable to concur generally with the views and judgments of his distinguished relative in regard to the great leaders, Greene and Sumter. Possibly had the judge the advantage which the author has enjoyed of having before him the Sumter manuscripts, the full correspondence between the two, and much that has come to light since he wrote, he might have modified some of his strictures upon Sumter and have been persuaded that his hero, General Greene, was not always in the right, nor Sumter so much in the wrong. Judge Johnson's work, notwithstanding his partiality for General Greene and hostility to Sumter, is, nevertheless, the fullest and best history of the War of the Revolution in South Carolina.

did not believe in the system of warfare which they had so successfully waged. It has been seen, too, with what disparagement and affected contempt Morgan was accustomed to speak of those who had alone achieved so much. An officer could not have held the views, concerning a part of his command, expressed by Morgan in his correspondence with Greene, and indeed maintained during the rest of his life, as shown in his attempted vindication of the choice of his battle-ground at Cowpens, without imparting that opinion to those whom it affected. Unfortunately, too, a clash of authority occurred between Morgan and Sumter in the very commencement of Greene's command, about which, though the latter wrote most kindly to Sumter in explanation, he failed to remove his just cause of complaint, or even to attempt to do so. Very probably there was a jealousy on the part of the heroes of Hanging Rock, Musgrove's Mills, King's Mountain, and Blackstock of the command of Continental officers, who had brought with them neither men, arms, nor clothing, and who constituted themselves nearly all the reënforcements Congress had sent. Very probably these leaders conceived that, if the struggle was still to be carried on by their men, they knew best how to conduct the warfare. In all this they may have been mistaken. Greene and Morgan may have been abler generals and more competent to direct their movements and carry on the war; but, if so, it all the more behooved these leaders to be careful not to offend the sensibilities of those who, having so long and so well fought without the aid of Congress, were now called upon in its name to yield obedience to those whom they did not know. Morgan came with great reputation. He had been at the siege of Boston, had served with Arnold upon his expedition to Quebec, and had been distinguished under Gates at Saratoga; but, like Greene, he had never had an independent command.

Greene had been sent by Washington at the solicitation of the delegates of the Southern States in Congress, but his reputation rested solely upon his being the choice of his Commander-in-chief. He had never, as we have before observed, commanded an army or served in the field anywhere but under the command of another. He had participated in no victory except the surprise of the Hessians at Trenton, in which he accompanied Washington.

The assumption, too, of military superiority by the Continental officers, because of their being regulars, over the partisan leaders had really but little substantial ground on which to rest. Few of them had any more military education than those upon whom they affected to look down. Like the partisan leaders, they had almost all been plain citizens until the Revolution broke out four years before; nor had Charles Lee nor Gates, the professional soldiers, demonstrated their greater ability in the field. It might have been a different matter had these Continental officers brought with them a body of regular soldiers sufficient to cope openly in the field with the British regiments of the line and the well-trained provincials — American Tories — from the North which constituted Cornwallis's command. But this they had not done. They had come only themselves, without a following, to command those who had already achieved no mean successes without their leadership. It was not unnatural therefore that Sumter, who had begun his military career in the French War, had served under Braddock in 1755, while Greene was but a boy, and under Richardson in 1775, in the "Snow Campaign," who had himself been a Continental officer, and who had already seen so much service in this war, should be somewhat restive under the control and criticism of those really less experienced than himself. But he exhibited no such spirit to Greene upon his arrival; nor do we think it can be discovered afterwards.

General Greene brought with him to his new command an unfortunate habit. He was a voluminous writer and a moralizer. His pen was as busy as his sword. His literary style was certainly not based upon Cæsar's Commentaries, which we are told he had studied to prepare himself for the war. He wrote, not military reports,—clear and succinct accounts of the battles which he fought, and of the situation and condition of his army, — but long personal letters, going into personal details, and criticism and discussions, usually of complaint. Such were his letters to Washington, to Lafayette, and to Governor Reed of Pennsylvania, to each of whom he poured out his troubles, explaining after each battle how through the fault of others it had not resulted in a brilliant victory. Such also was the character of his communications to his subordinates; and indeed to these latter there was withal an assumption and tone of superiority and patronage which must have been galling to men who were his seniors in years and of greater military experience. Nor did he restrict himself in this style of address to his subordinates; he could not divest himself of it even when addressing the General Assembly of the State. To a remonstrance of the legislature against the unjust imposition upon South Carolina of the support of the cavalry of the Continental army, at the end of the war, he returned, says his biographer, “a truly parental answer”¹ — a parental answer, forsooth, to the Rutledges, Gadsden, and the Pinckneys. It is difficult, indeed, to understand how General Greene found the time amidst his pressing duties to conduct the immense correspondence he carried on during his campaigns.

On the 3d of December, Governor Rutledge, then at Charlotte, wrote, telling Sumter of the arrival of General Greene, and requesting him to come there as soon as his health and the weather would permit, for he was still suffering from

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 392.

the wound received at Blackstock.¹ This summons Sumter at once obeyed; and it also appears that upon this conference he urged an immediate attack upon Cornwallis; for on the 12th Greene wrote to him: "I proposed to Generals Smallwood and Morgan the attack upon Lord Cornwallis. They are both pointedly against it, as impracticable. I am not altogether of their opinion, and therefore wish you to keep up a communication of intelligence, and of any changes of their disposition that may take place." In this letter Greene informed Sumter of his purpose to change his position.² On the 15th Greene again wrote to him: "Governor Rutledge shew[ed] me a couple of notes which you sent him, wherein you express a desire to have a detachment made from this army on the other side of the Catawba. The measure you wish I have been preparing for ever since I was with you and shall have the troops in readiness in a day or two at farthest."³ But while both Governor Rutledge and General Greene were in constant correspondence with Sumter, as if he were in actual command, as he really was,⁴ his wound still prevented his personally taking the field. On the 8th of January, Greene writes to him, from his camp on the Pee Dee whither Greene had moved, this remarkable letter: —

"I am impatient to hear of your recovery, and of seeing you again at the head of the militia. General Morgan has gone over to the west side of the Catawba, agreeable to what I wrote you before I

¹ Sumter MSS., in the possession of Miss Brownfield, General Sumter's granddaughter, in Summerville, S. C., published in the *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899 (Smyth), Appendix, 71. The correspondence between Greene and Sumter, thus published, we regret to observe, is very inaccurately edited.

² Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 73.

³ Letter, Sumter MSS., *ibid.*, 73.

⁴ See letters of Governor Rutledge of date December 16 — 20, 21, 25, Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1889, Appendix.

left Charlotte. But I expect he will have but few men from your brigade, until you are in a condition to appear at the head of them. Your influence in bringing them out is not only necessary but the means you have of obtaining intelligence is not less important. I lament exceedingly your wounds confining you so much longer than I was flattered with, from appearance at the time I was with you, and I esteem it no less unfortunate for the public than myself. If General Morgan don't meet with any misfortune until you are ready to join him I shall be happy as your knowledge of the country and the people will afford him great security against a surprise."¹

Breaking the thread of this flattering communication, General Greene proceeds to pronounce this treatise upon military operations in general:—

“When I was with you your soul was full of enterprise. The salvation of this country don't depend upon little strokes, nor should the great business of establishing a permanent army be neglected to perform them. Partisan strokes in war are like the garnish of a table. They give splendor to the army, and reputation to the officer, but they afford no substantial national security. They are . . . ² should not be neglected . . . ²; they should not be preserved to the prejudice of more important concerns. You may strike a hundred strokes and reap little benefit from them unless you have a good army to take advantage of your success. The enemy will never relinquish their plan nor the people be firm in our favor, until they behold a better barrier in this field than a volunteer militia, who are one day out, and the next at home.”³

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 73, 75.

² Illegible from mutilations in the original.

³ The British critics of the war at the time took a very different view of these affairs from that here expressed by Greene. “Most of these actions,” it was said, “would in other wars be considered but as skirmishes of little account and scarcely worthy of a detailed narrative. But these small affairs are as capable as any of displaying military conduct. The operations of war being spread over that vast continent by the new plan that was adopted, it is by such skirmishes that the fate of America must necessarily be decided. They are therefore as important as battles in which a thousand men are drawn up on each side.”—*Annual Register* for 1781, vol. XXIV, 83. “Too mean an opinion of the American prowess seems to have prejudiced the Commander-in-chief (Sir Henry Clin-

“There is no mortal man more fond of enterprise than myself, but this is not the basis on which the fate of this country depends. It is not a war of posts but a contest of States dependent upon opinion.¹ If we can introduce into the field a greater army than the enemy, all their posts will fall of themselves, and without this they will reestablish them, though we should take them twenty times. Nevertheless, I would always hazard an attack when the misfortune cannot be so great to us as it may be to the enemy. Plunder and depredation prevails so in every quarter I am not a little apprehensive all this country will be laid waste. Most people appear to be in pursuit of private gain or personal glory. I persuade myself, though you may set a just value upon reputation, your soul is filled with a more noble ambition.”

There was some general truth, of course, in all this. But why should Greene have taken this occasion to remind Sumter of these elementary principles of warfare? “When I was with you your soul was full of enterprise” is the text upon which this discouraging letter is written. “The salvation of this country don’t depend upon little strokes, nor should the great business of establishing a permanent army be neglected to perform them.” Why write this to Sumter, who, still suffering from his ton). Thus he speaks of ‘a small body of ill-armed peasants full as spiritless as the militia of the Southern provinces.’ But Lord Cornwallis, who knows more of the provinces, aptly replies, ‘The list of British officers and soldiers killed and wounded by them since last June proves but too fatally that they are not wholly contemptible.’—*Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, xii.

¹ And yet, strange to say, it was to be the boast of one of General Greene’s biographers, claiming for him the results of Sumter’s, Marion’s, and Lee’s achievements, accomplished with scarcely his sanction, that “by the unparalleled success of *this war of posts* the American leader was doubly benefited. He weakened his adversary by the prisoners he made, and strengthened himself by constant accessions to his scanty stock of ammunition and stores. This was one mode in which he *created* his own resources, compelling the enemy to furnish him with materials for the subsistence of his troops and their own annoyance. *By no other plan could he possibly have maintained himself in South Carolina.*”—Caldwell’s *Life of Greene*, 258-259.

wounds, was planning such enterprises against the enemy as his limited means admitted? What had Sumter to do with the great business of establishing a permanent army? If Washington and Greene had found Congress deaf to all their arguments in favor of such an army, why, by repeating them to him, harass Sumter, who was doing all he could to supply the omission of that body? Why discourage him by saying that he might strike a hundred strokes and reap little benefit unless he had a good army to take advantage of his success? If it was true that the enemy would never relinquish their plan, nor the people be firm in favor of liberty, until they beheld a better barrier in the field than a volunteer militia, why remind Sumter of the fact, when Greene had himself brought no army to his assistance? This long and carefully prepared and studied letter must have been written for a definite purpose. It must have been designed to influence Sumter's conduct in some way. Its purpose could not have been to have persuaded Sumter to raise an army; for Sumter was, at least, as powerless to do so as Washington himself. The only effect which the letter could produce was to dissuade Sumter from striking any more partisan blows. Again, why write all this to Sumter, who had urged the gathering of all their forces at this time and making a grand attack upon Cornwallis himself? It was Smallwood and Morgan — Continental generals — who had opposed the scheme of a general battle, as the Continental officers did again, as we shall see, when a most favorable opportunity presented itself for a telling blow.

There was doubtless, we say, some abstract truth in this letter of General Greene; but was it true that at present the war was not one of outposts? If so, and if, as was also true, Congress could or would provide no grand armies to

fight great battles, then there could be no war at all — at least in the Southern Department. This letter was written either in ignorance of what had taken place in South Carolina during the last six months, or in want of appreciation and disparagement of the great results which had been accomplished. The war of outposts had been so successfully waged in South Carolina, as has been shown, as to disconcert the grand plans of the enemy, affecting their movements not only in the South, but in the North as well. By this war of outposts the partisan leaders here had broken up the grand ministerial plan of the British campaign, had saved Virginia for the time from invasion, and prevented Leslie's movements in concert with Cornwallis. The war of outposts had required Leslie's army to be diverted to supply the losses inflicted by these volunteer soldiers upon the British forces.

But it is needless further to discuss this letter of Greene's, which his own course repudiated. In writing to Sumter that he had been preparing ever since he was with him to send a force to the other side of the Catawba, as if to assure Sumter that he was not acting upon his advice in the matter, he was careful to observe that this was a part of a plan he had had in contemplation ever since he had come to the ground. Sending Morgan to threaten Ninety Six, then, was not upon Sumter's suggestion, he was careful to assert, but upon his own. But what was the movement of Morgan's but a threat of an attack upon that outpost? a threat emphasized at Williams's plantation where Washington dispersed Cuninghams party. We shall next see Greene sending Colonel Lee with his Legion, as soon as it arrives, to join Marion in an attack upon Georgetown. So that within ten days he had two affairs of outposts fought under his own orders.

The misfortune of the letter of General Greene's was

that it failed to recognize the great work which had been done by the volunteer bands in South Carolina, and seemed intended purposely to belittle its results. If Sumter was at all to act upon it, he must disband his parties and cease from any further enterprises.

The letter concludes, however, with a passage which shows that Greene was not ignorant of the great difference between the men whom Sumter led and the ordinary militia. He writes: —

“I tell you in confidence — I am in distress — my fears increase respecting subsistence; and if the State of North Carolina continues to bring out such shoals of useless militia, as they have done in the last season, it will be impossible to subsist an army in this country. Ten of the militia drawn out in classes are not worth one of your men, whose all depend upon their own bravery. What gives safety to one, brings on ruin to the other. If your militia don't fight, their families are exposed. If the others run away, their persons are safe.”

In the account of the battle of Cowpens an allusion has been made to a difference which had arisen between General Morgan and General Sumter. This difference, which was never reconciled between these two towering spirits, which was to have lasting and far-reaching consequences, arose from Morgan's assumed control of Sumter's men, without reference to him; and as this difference between the two involved the relation of the States to the Confederation, and was supposed to have been also the origin of the unfortunate relations which grew up between Sumter and Greene as well, it deserves more than a passing notice.

It will be recollected that, on the 6th of October, 1780, when there was not a Continental soldier in South Carolina, nor any south of Hillsboro in North Carolina, Governor Rutledge had appointed Sumter brigadier general, sending him full instructions and intrusting him with

great powers. He was directed to embody all the militia he could collect, and to hold them in readiness to coöperate with the Continental troops when they should come, receiving orders for that purpose.¹ Morgan had been made a brigadier general in the Continental army on the 13th of October, 1780,² so that Sumter's commission antedated Morgan's. When Greene, upon conference with Sumter, decided to send a detachment to the west of the Catawba, he appointed Morgan to that command, informing him that he would be joined there by the militia of North Carolina, under the command of General Davidson, and by that lately under the command of General Sumter. "For the present," wrote Greene to Morgan, "I give you the entire command in that quarter, and do hereby require all officers and soldiers engaged in the American cause to be subject to your orders and command." Under this appointment, Morgan, as has been seen, had been sent to that region, and commenced operations threatening Ninety Six. A part of Greene's instructions to Morgan was to collect provisions and forage out of the way of the enemy, "which you will have formed," he wrote, "into a number of small magazines in the rear of the position you may think proper to take."³ Under these instructions Morgan reports to Greene on the 15th of January, from his camp at Burr's Mill on Thicketty Creek, among other things, as follows: ⁴—

"Sensible of the importance of having magazines of forage and provisions established in the country, I have left no means in my power unessayed to effect the business. I despatched Captain Chitty

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 813.

² Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 146; *Historical Register* (Heitman), 11.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 347; collection of T. Bailey Myers of New York, *News and Courier*, Charleston, S.C., May 10, 1881.

⁴ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 370; collection of T. Bailey Myers of New York, *News and Courier*, Charleston, S.C., May 10, 1881.

(whom I have appointed as commissary of purchases for my command), with orders to collect and store all the provisions that could be obtained between the Catawba and Broad rivers. I gave him directions to call on Colonel Hill, who commands a regiment of militia, to furnish him with a proper number of men to assist him in the execution of this commission, but he, to my great surprise, has just returned without effecting anything. He tells me his failure proceeds from the want of countenance and assistance of Colonel Hill, who assured him that General Sumter directed him to obey no orders from me unless they came through him."

Upon receiving this complaint of Morgan, Greene, on the 19th of January, wrote to Sumter:¹—

"I imagine there must be some misapprehension about the matter, for I cannot suppose you could give an improper order, or that you have the most distant wish to embarrass the public affairs. It is certainly right that all orders should go through the principal to their dependents as well for the preservation of good government as to inspire a proper respect. This is a general rule, and should never be deviated from but in cases of necessity or when the difficulty of conveying an order through the principal will be attended with a fatal delay. In that case the order should be directed to the branches and not to the principal, and as the head is subject to the order the branches are, of course, for it would be very extraordinary if a captain should presume to dispute an order from his general because it was not communicated through his colonel. At the same time that the right is indisputable, it should always be avoided but in case of absolute necessity."

General Greene then continues, assuring Sumter of Morgan's high regard for his character, and that if there had been interference contrary to the general principles which should govern military affairs, it must have happened through inadvertence, or from a persuasion that Sumter had not intended to exercise command during the time of his indisposition. Greene dismisses this subject in his letter, which is a very long one, with this appeal to Sumter's magnanimity, ending, as usual, with a moral lecture:—

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, 79.

“If anything in his [Morgan’s] conduct has had the appearance of indelicacy or neglect, I hope you will not suffer it to bias your conduct from that line which has given you might and influence among your countrymen. It is the mark of a great mind to rise superior to little injuries, and our object should be the good of our country and not personal glory.”¹

If Sumter had given such a general order to Colonel Hill, about which, however, Greene expresses a doubt, he certainly erred in doing so, for occasions might arise in which it would be not only proper, but necessary, that intermediate commanders should be for the immediate purpose overlooked, and the order extended directly to the subordinate officer in the absence of his immediate commander. But, on the other hand, nothing but pressing necessity would justify such a deviation from the general rule requiring all orders to be transmitted through the regular channels; and this case seems to have presented no such occasion for its violation. It is easy to understand

¹ Sumter MSS. Greene writes in a similar strain to Morgan: “I am surprised that General Sumter should give such an order as you mention to Colonel Hill, nor can I persuade myself but that there must be some mistake in the matter, for though it is the most military to convey orders through the principal to the dependents, as well from propriety as respect, yet this may not always be convenient or even practicable, and therefore to give a positive order not to obey was repugnant to reason and common sense. As the head was subject to your orders, consequently the dependents also. I will write General Sumter on the subject, but as it is better to conciliate than to aggravate matters where everything depends so much on voluntary principles, I wish you to take no notice of the matter but endeavor to influence his conduct to give you all the aid in his power. Write him frequently and consult with him freely. He is a man of great pride and considerable merit and should not be neglected. If he has given such an order, I persuade myself he will see the impropriety of the matter and correct it in future, unless personal glory is more the object than public good, which I cannot suppose is the case with him or any other man who fights in the cause of liberty.”—Collection of T. Bailey Myers of New York, *News and Courier*, Charleston, S.C., May 10, 1881.

with what indignation Sumter, with his own imperious temper, received this lecture on his conduct and patriotism in a matter in which he considered himself to have been the injured party. He appears to have complained to Governor Rutledge upon the subject, for his Excellency, in a letter without other date but that of "Sunday night, nine o'clock," but which bears intrinsic evidence of having been written on Sunday the 21st,¹ and which was sent by a messenger from Greene to Sumter, who was now carrying the letter from which we have just quoted, writes: —

"Gen'l Greene and you understand the matter with respect to you not having any command at present in a very different way — as I perceived on speaking to him a few days ago on that point. However I presume he has explained himself to you respecting it. I am sorry to hear that you mend so slowly and that the enemy are plotting to take you, but I hope you will escape all their endeavors and be able soon to take the field and render further important services to the country."

This letter, after giving Sumter the latest information from Congress, thus concludes: —

"I shall be glad that you continue to give Gen'l Greene and myself the earliest intelligence of any material movements of the enemy or any accurate information, reporting any which app: material & you will give out orders to the militia in your Brigade not already in the field with Gen'l Morgan as you conceive the good of the service renders most expedient."²

Johnson, whose devotion to the reputation of Greene does not allow him to see any justification in the conduct of those who in any way crossed his views or plans, thus severely comments upon Sumter's conduct in this matter:

¹ The Governor mentions in this letter information derived from a person who had left Camden "last Wednesday," that Leslie was there on that day. This fixes the *Wednesday* mentioned as the 17th of January, 1781. Leslie crossed to join Cornwallis on the 18th.

² Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1889, Appendix.

“It is not easy to assign a satisfactory or even plausible reason for *Colonel* Sumpter’s interference on that occasion to prevent his officers from executing the commands of General Morgan. The commander of the Southern Department was not only the supreme military governor of the country, but *Colonel* Sumpter was at that time actually out of the State and still confined by his wounds. *Colonel* Sumpter, it seems, complained of some interference of Morgan with his commands, but in what instances or to what effect we are not informed. But supposing it to have existed, still the authority of General Greene was sufficient to sanction it, and although *Colonel* Sumpter might have had cause to complain, nothing could justify him in undertaking to resist the execution of an order from the commander of the Southern Department.”¹

This criticism is scarcely in accord with the high judicial character of the author. He admits that he was not informed as to the cause of Sumter’s complaint, but proceeds to condemn Sumter upon the supposed sanction by Greene of Morgan’s conduct, which he assumes was sufficient. It will be observed that the Judge speaks of Sumter as “*Colonel*,” when the fact is that Sumter was himself a *General*, with a commission antedating that of Morgan, with whose command he is condemned for interfering. The explanation, therefore, that Mr. Justice Johnson gives in a note,² *i. e.*, that Morgan had been made a general to obviate the inconvenience of his being ranked by State officers into whose districts he was sent, will not hold. Indeed, it is conclusive against Morgan’s assumed superiority of rank, for it presupposes that unless his grade was higher than the State officers with whom he came in contact, he would be subject to their command. The Constitution of the United States gives specifically to Congress the power of organiz-

¹ Johnson’s *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 410.

² *Ibid.*, 412.

ing, arming, and disciplining the militia of the States, and governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; ¹ and under this specific power Congress has by statute provided that militia officers, when employed in conjunction with the regular or volunteer forces of the United States, shall take rank next after officers of like grade in the regular service. ² But this provision is a statutory one under the present Constitution; without it militia officers holding senior commissions would rank and command regular officers of like grade. And this was the case of Sumter; his commission from Governor Rutledge as brigadier general antedated Morgan's commission of the same grade from Congress. There was nothing in the Articles of Confederation which gave power to the Continental Congress to govern the militia of the States. ³ General Sumter was only subject to Greene's orders as directed by Governor Rutledge; and it will be observed that Governor Rutledge had not put him under Morgan's command. The governor's directions were that he should coöperate with the Continental troops, and give orders to the militia in his brigade, not already in the field with Morgan, as he (Sumter) conceived the good of the

¹ Art. 8, Sec. 8, Subdiv. 15.

² *Articles of War*, 124; *Revised Statutes U. S.*, 241.

³ In 1776, when General Charles Lee undertook, it will be remembered, to direct the militia of the State without reference to the Governor, his right to do so was at once questioned, and though to avoid then any conflict of authority in the emergency, John Rutledge as President had put the command of the militia under Lee, when that officer intimated his purpose of abandoning Fort Moultrie Rutledge promptly intervened, resumed his authority, and wrote to Moultrie, "General Lee wishes you to abandon the fort. You will not without a written order from me. I would rather cut off my hand than write one." — *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80*, 140, 144. And again, in 1779, upon the invasion of Charlestown, his Excellency again exhibited his jealousy of the control of Continental officers over his militia. — *Ibid*, 358, 359.

service rendered most expedient. Morgan had, therefore, no right to be giving orders to Sumter himself, still less to Sumter's officers without Sumter's knowledge. But supposing he had the right to command Sumter, his conduct in other matters was clearly irregular and unjustified.¹

General Greene, in his letter to Sumter, states very correctly the military rule that all orders to subordinates should go through intermediate commanders, and that the rule ought not to be deviated from but in case of necessity; but, strange to say, he does not attempt to explain to Sumter wherein lay the propriety of the application of the exception in this case. Assuming Morgan's right, by virtue of the Continental commission, to command Sumter, whose commission, of equal grade, antedated his own, Greene writes to Sumter, upon Morgan's complaint, that Morgan was an exceedingly good officer, who perfectly understood his duty and had the highest respect for his (Sumter's) character. But that did not meet the question, even admitting Morgan's right to command. The truth was that Morgan's order to Colonel Hill did not come within the rule as stated by Greene himself. The order was not one issued in an emergency, when the difficulty of extending it through the regular channels would be

¹ If General Sumter had really given such an order his precedent was followed by distinguished generals. The following extract is given from an order of General Andrew Jackson :—

“HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE SOUTH, NASHVILLE.

“April 22, 1817.

“The Commanding General considers it due to the principles which ought and must exist in an army to prohibit obedience of any order emanating from the *Department of War* to officers of this division . . . unless coming through him as the proper organ of communication. The object of this is to prevent the recurrences,” etc.

General Zachary Taylor is said also to have denounced such violation of military usage. — *Two Wars*, an autobiography (S. G. French), 160.

attended with inconvenience or delay. It was an administrative order of a permanent character — an order directing Colonel Hill, one of Sumter's partisan leaders, to detail a number of men to assist Morgan's commissary in collecting supplies, an order detailing men from Sumter's command, without his approval or knowledge. The impropriety of the order will be still further understood when it is recollected that neither Sumter nor Hill had any men permanently in the field from which to make such details, nor was there really any militia under their command. A militia presupposes an existing established government under which citizens are organized and called into the field. It cannot exist where there is no government to regulate or support it. There was no such government in South Carolina. Nearly all the original leaders of the Revolutionary party, including, with the exception of Governor Rutledge himself, all the State officials, were either in exile at St. Augustine or confined in the prison ships in Charlestown harbor. Dictatorial powers had been intrusted to Governor Rutledge and such of his council as he could convene; but he was not even in the State. Wisely and properly, he remained just beyond its border, under the protection of Greene's small army; for, had he been captured, there would not have remained a nucleus upon which to reorganize a government when the State should be redeemed. Sumter's men were volunteers, and nothing more. There was no government to call and compel their attendance, as there was none to support them while in the field or on duty. Under Sumter's call they would leave their families, and on their own horses would join him, with provisions of their own supplying for the immediate occasion. But it was the immediate occasion only for which they could remain in the field. As soon as that was over, whether for good or evil, victory or defeat, they

must return to their farms to provide for their families. It was from these people that Morgan had ordered Colonel Hill to furnish him with a detail to assist his commissary to gather forage and provisions, — not for immediate use, but to be stored away in magazines in his rear, It was to Sumter himself that Governor Rutledge had intrusted the power and authority to call out the militia, as the partisan bands were called. Whatever questions, if any, might arise when in the field, as to the right of a Continental officer to supersede the authority of a State officer of equal rank, there was no power given, nor could there be any given, to Continental officers to draft citizens into the service ; nor would such an order have been tolerated in any of the States.

General Greene's explanation to Sumter of Morgan's conduct, that it had happened through inadvertence, or from a persuasion that Sumter did not mean to exercise command during the time of his indisposition, could scarcely have been expected to have satisfied the offended general, in view of the fact that Greene himself was in constant correspondence and communication with him, as was also Governor Rutledge, and that communications to Morgan himself were passing through Sumter's hands ; that during this very time, though he was still suffering from his wound, Greene was relying upon him for intelligence as to the enemy's movements, and treating him in all respects as if in actual command. Even supposing that this was a proper occasion on which orders might be sent to a subordinate directly, military rule required that the intermediate commander should at once have been notified, and a copy of such an order sent him ; and as both Greene and Morgan were in communication with Sumter, there was not the slightest excuse for Morgan's conduct.¹

¹ See *U. S. Army Regulations*, sec. 650.

It is true that, however Sumter might justly have complained of Morgan's interfering with his command, and issuing orders to his officers without even notice to him, he had no right to refuse to obey an order properly issued because of his disapproval of its policy. Nor is it charged that he did so; but, further to complicate the matter, the order to Hill was one upon a subject of great delicacy. How was this forage and these provisions, which Hill was ordered to detail men to gather and guard, to be obtained? Greene was absolutely without money to purchase them, and the provisions thus to be taken and stored away in magazines were to be impressed; that is, taken by force from the people of a section already harried by the marching and countermarching, pillaging and plundering, of both the contending armies. We have seen how Washington, the year before, while Greene was his quartermaster, hesitated to resort to such measures in New Jersey, though desperately pressed for supplies, and that every such attempt was resented in the Northern States.¹ It was to furnish men for this purpose that Hill was called upon by Morgan. And this, too, when it was known that Sumter disapproved of the whole scheme from a military point of view.

In this opinion Sumter was undoubtedly right, as subsequent events fully proved. The folly of establishing magazines of supply in a country in which there was no army to protect them was manifest to him. Greene had taken a position at Cheraw which, however excellent in his opinion, left the country towards the mountains entirely open and exposed. Morgan's small force was the only American body in that region, and that was utterly inadequate to do more than strike a blow and retreat. To collect supplies in his rear therefore — more

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrady), 841.

than sufficient for immediate use — was simply to collect them for the enemy. And as it soon happened that this country was abandoned by Greene, supplies collected there would have fallen into the enemy's hands. It is curious to observe the inconsistencies of the justifications of Greene and Morgan in this matter. Judge Johnson first charges that the opposition of General Sumter to Morgan's collecting magazines in his rear, put an end to all hope of a rapid retreat to the mountains, after he should have given battle to Tarleton.¹ And yet farther on he declares that Morgan was unjustly charged with an intention of crossing the mountains. He states that nothing was less consistent with the facts than the story which first made its appearance in Ramsay's *History of the Revolution in South Carolina* and was repeated by General Moultrie in his *Memoirs*; that even from the battle-field the route Morgan took led away from the mountains, and towards a point where he contemplated forming a junction with the main army.² But if so, why then blame Sumter for objecting to establishing magazines of supplies on a route Morgan did not intend even to follow? Sumter and his men had been too long holding the country for the coming of the great armies from the North, which never arrived, to be willing to strip his people of the few supplies they had to be stored in advance for such forces — stores which, collected, as he foresaw, must inevitably fall into the enemy's hands.

But beyond all this, and more far-reaching, was the radical misconception of Greene, to which he persistently clung throughout the campaign until Governor Rutledge's return to the State, and upon which almost all of his complaints against Sumter were based, in assuming that Sumter had a regular militia under his command which

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 371.

² *Ibid.*, 408.

he could call out, and require to attend under adequate penalties, whenever he saw fit of himself or was called upon to do so.¹ As we have before explained, and must again impress upon the reader, there was no civil government in South Carolina, during this time, and no militia; the militia, so called, were but the personal voluntary followers of Sumter, Marion, and their partisan officers, over whom they had no further control than that their own patriotism enjoined. There was, hence, nobody from whom Sumter or Hill could make details to guard stores.

Morgan and Sumter were no doubt alike imperious in their natures, and Sumter was unfitted to submit to the arrogant tone which Morgan assumed in regard to the men Sumter had led on so many hard-fought fields, still less so to Greene's lectures on patriotism and personal conduct. Very likely, from what he had himself seen, Sumter had no better opinion of the Continental troops sent to the South than Morgan affected to have had of his brave followers. But, however that may be, upon a review of the unfortunate controversy which led to the estrangement of the two principal officers in the coming campaign in South Carolina, Sumter is certainly not to bear the whole odium.

From his camp on Snow Island Marion had been carrying on successfully his raids upon the enemy's communications with Charlestown, causing them to expend their forces in establishing a post at Nelson's Ferry, and in guarding every exposed point below the Santee. So serious were these inroads of Marion that Tarleton, it will be

¹ And yet, in his letter to Morgan upon the question between Sumter and himself, before quoted, there is an allusion which indicates that he understood the true condition. He writes to Morgan, urging him to conciliate Sumter rather than aggravate matters "*where everything depends so much on voluntary principles.*"

remembered, had been sent to break him up; but had been recalled by Cornwallis to defend him against Sumter, who had just defeated Wemyss at Fishdam, and was then at Blackstock on his other flank. Tarleton had failed to find the Swamp Fox, but had, with less difficulty and no more honor, fallen upon Sumter. As soon as released from Tarleton's presence, Marion was again on the road, as we have mentioned, against a party of the enemy, under Majors McArthur and Coffin, about Nelson's Ferry, and between that and the High Hills of Santee. With the hope of cutting off his retreat, a strong detachment had been pushed from Charlestown to Georgetown; but, informed of the movement, Marion had again retired to his safe retreat at Snow Island. Curiously enough, General Greene, who had, on his arrival, received a report from Marion of these operations, addressed to General Gates, instead of lecturing Marion on the subject, and informing him, as he informed Sumter, that this was not a war of outposts, and depreciating his partisan strokes however brilliant, on the day he takes command, writes to Marion, on the contrary:—

“I have not the honor of your acquaintance, but am no stranger to your character and merits. Your services in the lower part of South Carolina in awing the Tories, and preventing the enemy from extending their limits, have been very important. And it is my earnest desire that you continue where you are until further advice from me. . . . Until a more permanent army can be collected than is in the field at present, *we must endeavor to keep up a partisan warfare*, and preserve the tide of sentiment among the people in our favor as much as possible.”¹

But if this was true for Marion, why not for Sumter? Why write to Marion to keep up a partisan warfare until a permanent army could be collected, and to Sumter that

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 357.

partisan strokes in war are but the garnish of a table, giving splendor to the army and reputation to the leaders, but accomplishing no substantial purpose? If it was worth while to encourage Marion to preserve, by these sallies, the tide of sentiment among the people, why discourage Sumter by telling him that the enemy would never relinquish their hold, nor the people be firm in our favor, until they had a better barrier in the field than a volunteer militia?

In his letter to Greene informing him of his appointment to command in the Southern Department, General Washington had mentioned that he had put Major Lee's corps under marching orders to join him, and that Congress had promised to promote Lee to a lieutenant-colonelcy. This Congress had done,¹ and Colonel Lee had been expected to march early in October from Philadelphia, but the equipping and disciplining of his command had retarded his movements; his journey from Fredericksburg to Richmond, for instance, occupied a fortnight, not a little to the distress of Greene, who, having sent home Armand's corps as no longer to be depended upon, after their conduct at Gates's defeat,² and having sent all of Washington's cavalry with Morgan, had not a horseman with his army. In Maryland, General Greene had made a requisition for sundry equipments for the Legion, and the liberal spirit in which the requisition was complied with gave Lee an opportunity of equipping his cavalry in a brilliant style. In Virginia they were received and completed by Steuben, and moved on at the same time with a body of recruits.³

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Lee's commission was dated the 6th of November, 1780. — *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 172.

² See *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 673.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 354. "The Legionary corps commanded by Colonel Lee," says Judge Johnson, "was perhaps the finest corps that made its appearance in the arena of the Revolution. It was formed expressly for Colonel Lee under an order of General Washing-

Virginia had now collected about one thousand recruits, but which could not be sent into the field for want of clothing; but this to a measure Thomas Jefferson, Governor, remedied by impressment under his very extensive powers, and from the articles thus procured Steuben was able, by

ton whilst the army lay in Jersey. It consisted at the time of about three hundred men in equal proportion of infantry and horse. Both men and horses were picked from the army, the officers with reference only to their talents, and the men by a proportional selection from the troops of each State, enlisted for three years of the war. Virginia contributed twenty-five. No State south of Virginia contributed any, as they had no troops in the field." This must be understood, of course, to mean that the three Southern States had no troops in Washington's army, for the Continental troops of South Carolina and Georgia were stationed on the southern coast. It may have been that there were no troops in the Legion from any State south of Virginia, but it is a mistake to say that there were no troops from any of these States in Washington's army, for almost the whole North Carolina regiments of the line were with the Commander-in-chief. There were twenty-three officers of the Legion during the service in North and South Carolina. These were from the following States: from Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Lee, Commandant; Captains Patrick Carnes, Joseph Eggleston, and George Handy; Lieutenants George Carrington, William Winston, and Peter Johnson; Cornet Clement Carrington, and Dr. Alexander Skinner, surgeon (9); from Pennsylvania, Lieutenants Robert Power, and Lawrence Manning, and Dr. Matthew Irvine, surgeon (3); from Maryland, Major John Rudulph, Captain Michael Rudulph (2); from Massachusetts, Lieutenant William Lovell, adjutant (1); from New Jersey, Lieutenant Jonathau Snowden (1); from South Carolina, Lieutenant John Middleton (1); from France, Captain Ferdinand O'Neill (usually spelled O'Neall). We have not been able to ascertain from what States the following officers came: Captains Archer, Hurd, and James Armstrong, and Lieutenants Lunsford and Jordan (5). To these officers should be added Alexander Garden, who served for some time with the Legion as a volunteer after its arrival in South Carolina. On the arrival of the Legion in South Carolina Governor Rutledge, then at the Cheraws, gave Colonel Lee authority for recruiting it in the State:—

"CHERAWS, 11 January, 1781.

"Colonel Lee, being desirous of raising about one hundred and fifty cavalry on a regular and permanent establishment to be attached to his Legion, I do not only consent to his doing so, but recommend to active

the 1st of December, to equip four hundred of these recruits, enlisted for eighteen months (a great part of which had already expired), in a condition fit to be marched to the Southern army; this detachment, together with a corps commanded by Colonel Lawson, supposed to contain five hundred men, were put under marching orders for the third of the month from Petersburg, and Steuben wrote in high spirits to Greene that he should forward on to him a reënforcement of twelve hundred men, consisting of Lee's and Lawson's legions and the four hundred recruits, to meet the enemy's reënforcements under Leslie. Steuben was fully alive to the importance of time, not only for the purpose of giving strength to the Southern army, but to anticipate any interruption to the marching of these troops from another invasion of Virginia, an event by no means improbable or distant, from the intelligence from New York; an apprehension which subsequent events proved to be well founded, for these troops finally moved off barely in time to avoid being detained to oppose Arnold, who had been sent by Sir Henry Clinton to replace Leslie, upon his diversion to South Carolina. But when the day appointed for the march of Lawson's corps and the recruits came, not a man could be moved from the ground. Only one-half of Lawson's corps paraded, and they were ordered by the Legislature of Virginia to be discharged because their term of service was far advanced to a termination, and the officers of the detachment of recruits had sent a remonstrance to the legislature complaining of ill-usage. Lawson's corps was discharged, and spirited young men in this State, to join him upon that footing, whereby they may signalize themselves and render important service to their country.

“J. RUTLEDGE.”

We have found no account of the raising of such an additional corps to the Legion.*

* *Campaigns of '81 in the Carolinas* (Lee), 72.

the four hundred recruits detained until the middle of the month, that the officers might settle their differences with the government. On the 15th, however, Steuben had the happiness to see Colonel Green with four hundred men, and Colonel Lee with his Legion of three hundred, move off for the Southern army. On the 11th of January they reached General Greene's encampment on the Pee Dee, where Lee had been for some time impatiently expected in order to carry into effect a plan of operation projected against Georgetown.¹

Marion had been commissioned brigadier general by Governor Rutledge soon after Sumter's appointment, and about the beginning of this year he organized his staff by the appointment of two aides, Thomas Elliott and Lewis Ogier. His principal officers and counsellors were Colonels Peter and Hugh Horry and James Postell. Putting in requisition all the saws and all the blacksmiths in the country, he made swords, and with them armed four troops of cavalry which he raised and organized into another regiment. The command of this he gave to Colonel Peter Horry, who had been major under him in the Second Continental Regiment, and who was an excellent officer. Benison, who had been wounded at Nelson's Ferry when the prisoners of the Maryland line had been recaptured,² was made major; the captains were John Baxter, John Postell, Daniel Conyers, and James McCauley. A company of riflemen was also organized under Captain William McCottry, which soon became the dread of the enemy. These were a new race of young warriors who had sprung

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 354, 355, 356. Johnson gave the date of Lee's arrival as the 12th, but Governor Rutledge at the Cheraws on the 11th gives Lee authority to raise 150 cavalry for his Legion in South Carolina. — *Campaigns of '81 in the Carolinas* (Lee), 73.

² *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 700.

up during the contest. The retirement of the British detachment from Georgetown leaving Marion free to resume operations with the force thus organized, he pushed down his parties near to Georgetown on all the rivers that flow into Georgetown Bay, and employed them in collecting boats and removing provisions to Snow Island. Captain John Postell¹ was sent down Black River to the mouth of the Pee Dee with twenty-eight men, to take all the boats and canoes, to impress all the negroes and horses, and to take all arms and ammunition for the use of the service. He was to forbid all persons from carrying grain, stock, or any sort of provision to Georgetown, or where the enemy might get them; all persons who would not join him he was to bring to Marion.

On the 18th of January Captain James De Peyster, with twenty-nine grenadiers of the British army, had posted himself in the dwelling-house of Captain Postell's father. Towards day on the morning of the 19th, Postell, knowing well the ground and avoiding the guards, got possession of the kitchen and summoned De Peyster to surrender. This was at first refused, whereupon the rebel captain at once set fire to his father's kitchen, and summoned De Peyster a second time, with the positive declaration that if he did not surrender he would burn the house. Upon this the British laid down their arms and surrendered immediately.²

Soon after this Colonel Peter Horry had an affair with the enemy in which he was able to test the qualities of his

¹ Captain Postell was an officer of experience; he had been a captain in one of the independent provincial companies prior to the Revolution, and as such accompanied De Brahm in 1756 in establishing Fort Prince George at Keowee, afterwards the scene of the Indian massacre of Coytomore's garrison. — *Documents connected with So. Ca.* (Weston), 208; *Hist. of So. Ca. under Roy. Gov.* (McCrady), 341.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 93.

newly organized regiment. It was the boast of the Tories that, though Marion had proved too cunning for Colonel Tynes, Captain Barfield, and other British and loyal officers, there was still one who would show him quite a different sort of play; and that was Colonel Gainey, from the head waters of the Pee Dee.¹ It was against this officer that Colonel Horry had now to lead his recruits. On the morning of a day in the latter part of January, Marion ordered him with Captain Snipes and thirty men to proceed down the Sampit Road in quest of the enemy, and to charge them when found, whether British or Tories. In obeying this order Horry soon came upon a party of horsemen who were engaged in killing beeves for the camp near by. He instantly charged them before they had an opportunity to form. They fled, and were pursued through woods towards Georgetown, with some disorder on the side of Horry. In the meantime the firing was heard in the town, and the Tories under Gainey came out to the rescue of their friends. A savage fight now took place in the woods between the Sampit and Black River roads during the whole morning, the opposing parties alternately advancing and retreating. At one time Horry was, as he supposed, left alone, and a party of the Tories under Captain Lewis was rushing upon him, when a boy by the name of Gwyn shot Lewis from behind a tree, upon which his party, fearing an ambuscade, deserted their leader and ran away. As Lewis fell his gun was discharged and killed Horry's horse. The Tories were finally routed and chased into Georgetown. In this affair Sergeant McDonald who, it will be recollected, was one of the three of the prisoners released by Colonel Hugh Horry at Nelson's Ferry who availed themselves of their rescue and remained faithful to the cause, first exhibited the daring spirit and address for

¹ Weems's *Marion*, 167.

which he afterwards became noted. In the pursuit McDonald singled out Gainey as his object of attack. In going at full speed down the Black River Road he shot one of Gainey's men, and, overtaking Gainey soon after, thrust a bayonet up to the hilt in his back. The bayonet separated from the gun, and Gainey reached Georgetown with the weapon still in his person. He recovered, but, cured of his taste for the field or tired of garrison life, after a few months he and his men deserted the British.¹

While thus engaged, Marion received intelligence of the organization of a force of Tories under Hector McNeill at Amie's Mill on Downing Creek,² on the confines of the two States. This Hector McNeill was a person of some celebrity in North Carolina. He had, in the commencement of the Revolution, held a commission in one of the provincial regiments of that State,³ but had deserted the cause as early as 1776 and had taken up arms against it. Marion had no force to send against McNeill, nor could he afford to wait his coming while his own party was broken up into detachments. He, therefore, called in his parties and communicated to General Greene the necessity to reënforce him against his increasing enemies, and to look to the movements of McNeill, as he supposed them to be in part directed against the country between the Waccamaw and the seacoast, which had never been foraged and contained at this time abundance of provisions. This was the situation of things when Colonel Lee reached Greene's camp at Cheraw. He was immediately ordered to join Marion with his corps, comprising, on its arrival, about 280 in horse and foot, and which was in excellent condition, as it had come in easy march from Virginia. At the same time,

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 93-94.

² Now Lumber River.

³ Wheeler's *Hist. of No. Ca.*, vol. I, 71.

Greene detached Major Anderson with a party of regulars and one hundred Virginia militia to attack and disperse the Tories at Amie's Mill.¹

Colonel Lee reached Marion's camp on the 23d of January, and on the 24th, in pursuance of a plan previously agreed upon and approved by Greene, a combined attempt was made to surprise Georgetown. The garrison of the town consisted of two hundred men commanded by Colonel Campbell. There were some slight defensive works in front of the town on the land side; but the rear of the place was wholly undefended, and dams running through the adjacent rice fields, extending from the rear of the town, afforded easy access to it on the southeast. The plan of attack was founded on the facility with which a force might be conveyed down the Pee Dee, undiscovered because of the woods and deep swamps which covered its banks. The force comprising the expedition was divided into two parties. The infantry of the Legion, about ninety men, under Captains Carnes² and Rudolph,³ were to drop down the Pee Dee from Snow Island in boats and under guides provided by Marion. The militia and cavalry of the Legion, under Marion and Lee, were to approach the town by the land side under cover of night, and when the infantry entered the town from the water in the rear, they were to assail it in front.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 358-359; James's *Life of Marion*, Appendix, 16. Letter of General Greene to Marion of January 19, 1781, given, in which General Greene says, "I have detached one thousand regulars and one hundred Virginia militia to attack and disperse the Tories at Mr. Amy's Mill," etc., but there must be some mistake, probably one hundred.

² Patrick Carnes, Virginia, entered service as Lieutenant Second Cavalry, Pulaski Legion. — Heitman, 116.

³ John Rudolph, of Maryland, entered service as Lieutenant in the Legion. — Heitman, 352.

In pursuance of this plan, Captain Carnes fell silently down the river with his party the first night, and occupied an island at its mouth within a few miles of Georgetown. He lay concealed there the ensuing day, with directions to re-embark at an early hour the night following and reach Georgetown between one and two in the morning. Marion and Lee proceeded to their destination, having taken all the requisite precautions to prevent any intimation to the enemy of their approach. At twelve o'clock the second night they occupied, unperceived, a position in the vicinity of the town, and waited anxiously for the announcement of Carnes's arrival. At the appointed time, Carnes crossed from the island to Georgetown, and landed in the town unperceived. The garrison was surprised, and the commandant, Colonel Campbell, was seized and secured by Captain Carnes, who judiciously posted his party for seizing any of the enemy who might repair to the parade ground. Captain Rudolph, who led another party with equal good fortune, gained the vicinity of the fort and arranged his troops so as to arrest any fugitive. On the first fire, which took place at the commandant's quarters, Marion with his men and Lee with his dragoons rushed into the town. To the astonishment of these officers, says Colonel Lee, everything was quiet, the Legion infantry holding its assigned stations and Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell a prisoner. Not a British soldier appeared; not one attempted to gain the forts or repair to the commandant. Having discovered their enemy, the British troops kept close to their respective quarters, barricaded the doors, and determined there to defend themselves. The assailants were unprovided with the requisite implements for battering doors and scaling windows. The fort was in the possession of the enemy, and, daylight approaching, Marion and Lee were, therefore, compelled to retire with a partial accom-

plishment of their object. Colonel Campbell was suffered to remain on parole, and the troops withdrew from Georgetown unhurt and unannoyed. Colonel Lee attributed the want of success to the tenderness of Marion and himself for the lives of their followers; and supposes that if instead of placing Rudolph's detachment to intercept the fugitives it had been ordered to carry the fort by bayonet, success would have been complete.¹ Johnson, on the other hand, quotes Moultrie as alleging that in the hurry and confusion the guides became alarmed and frightened and lost their way to the fort; and that the cavalry did not arrive in time to coöperate with the infantry. The Americans sustained no loss. The loss of the British is not known. Lee reported to Greene that "many were killed, few taken, among the former is Major Irvine, among the latter Colonel Campbell, the commander of the garrison."² The British acknowledged the death of Major Irvine of the Loyal militia and the capture of Colonel Campbell and another officer.³ Major Irvine, it is related, was killed by one of Marion's officers, Lieutenant Cryer, who had been whipped by Irvine's orders some time before for attempting to take away his horse from Georgetown.⁴

While this brilliant if not entirely successful attempt upon Georgetown had not resulted in the capture of the garrison as had been hoped, it checked the forwarding of reënforcements to Cornwallis and caused another dispersion of the British troops, for, upon learning of the narrow escape of Georgetown, a considerable reënforcement was sent there.

In the orders under which Colonel Lee marched to join

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 224, 225.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 360.

³ *The So. Ca. and Am. Gen. Gazette*, January 31, 1781.

⁴ James's *Life of Marion*, 91.

Marion he was instructed to direct his attention first to the surprise of Georgetown, and then to an attempt on Watson, who had taken post at Nelson's Ferry; and, notwithstanding Marion had expressed strong doubts of the practicability of succeeding against Watson, Greene still urged him to attempt it. Accordingly, after the attack upon Georgetown, Marion and Lee moved the same day directly up the north bank of the Santee towards Nelson's Ferry. But Watson did not wait to receive them. After throwing a garrison of about eighty men into Fort Watson, ten miles above Nelson's Ferry, he moved off to Camden. An attempt was then made to throw a detachment of dragoons across the river, with orders to ascend its south bank and destroy the enemy's stores at Colonel Thomson's plantation, in what is now Orangeburg County, and some other depots on the Congaree. Some delay ensued from the want of boats, but the detachment was out on that service when Colonel Lee was recalled with orders to hasten to Salisbury and join Morgan there, retreating before Cornwallis.¹ It is necessary therefore now to recur to the movements of the opposing forces west of the Catawba.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 362.

CHAPTER IV

1781

WHEN the battle of Cowpens was fought the positions of the British and American forces, it will be borne in mind, were as follows: Morgan and Tarleton were fighting at the Cowpens, some twenty miles west of Broad River; Cornwallis lay with the main British army at Turkey Creek, between the Broad and the Catawba; Leslie with his reinforcements was at Camden just east of the Catawba, there known as the Wateree; while Greene with his little army was opposite Cheraw on the eastern side of the Pee Dee; and Marion lay at Snow Island, a hundred miles east of Cheraw. Four great rivers ran between Morgan and Greene, — the Broad, the Catawba, Lynch's Creek, and the Pee Dee. If Morgan, victorious or in defeat, were to attempt to reach Greene, he must first cross the Broad and expect to meet Cornwallis with the main British army as he did so. If Greene were to attempt to cross the Pee Dee to meet Morgan, Leslie was lying at Camden watching to strike him. Notwithstanding, therefore, the victory at Cowpens and the complacency with which Greene had surveyed his position on the Pee Dee, the American forces were in a most precarious condition. To unite, either wing must in the outset cross a great river and meet a superior force. On the 23d of January, a week after the battle at Cowpens, and the day upon which Marion and Lee appeared before Georgetown, Greene received news of Morgan's victory and at once despatched "the glorious intelligence"

to Marion and to Lee.¹ He made, however, no move to join Morgan, or to cover his retreat with his prisoners. Five days after he was still on the Pee Dee, urging Marion to cross the Santee.²

It was not yet noon when the battle of Cowpens was ended. Morgan, knowing of the proximity of Cornwallis, halted no longer on the field of battle than to refresh his men and prisoners, and make the provision which humanity required of him. He boldly moved across the Broad that evening, leaving Colonel Pickens with a detachment of his partisans to bury the dead, and provide as far as possible for the wants and comforts of the wounded of both armies. After making such provision as he could for their care and attendance, the wounded of both armies were left upon the field of battle under a safeguard and a flag, and the next day Pickens rejoined his commander. Early in the morning Morgan had resumed his march, anxiously expecting and fearing the return of his patrols with intelligence that the enemy was at hand; but, strange to say, though, encumbered with his prisoners, he was then moving directly across the enemy's front, none appeared to assail his flank and arrest his progress. To his great surprise and relief authentic intelligence was received, not only that the enemy had not moved, but that he showed no intention to move that day. Morgan, however, still pressed on, and reached the fords of the Catawba, which he crossed. Two rivers which had separated him from his commander-in-chief had thus been safely passed.

While Leslie was leisurely crossing the Catawba to join Cornwallis, Morgan was at Gilberttown — the present Lincoln in North Carolina. Here Morgan detached the greater part of his militia, as he called them, and a part of Colonel

¹ Greene's letter to Marion, James's *Life of Marion*, Appendix, 18.

² General Huger's letter to Marion, January 28, *ibid.*, 20.

Washington's cavalry, as a guard, with the prisoners. At Island Ford, on the north fork of the Catawba, Washington left the prisoners with the volunteers under Pickens, and rejoined Morgan, who remained between them and the enemy. Major Hyrne, the commissary of prisoners, now relieved Colonel Pickens of his charge, and marched with the six hundred prisoners to the prisoner camp established at Charlottesville, Virginia.

Upon the diversion of the force sent under Leslie from the invasion of Virginia to the reënforcement of Cornwallis in South Carolina, Sir Henry Clinton had despatched another body to the Chesapeake to renew that movement, and the advance of this force under the traitor Arnold had, on the 4th of January, ascended the James River and debarked seven hundred men about twenty-five miles below Richmond. Cornwallis, learning of this and that a further embarkation of troops destined for Virginia under General Philips was about to take place, determined to renew his invasion of North Carolina to coöperate with this movement against Virginia. On the 19th of January, that is, three days after Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens, Leslie having formed a junction with him, Cornwallis began his march northward.¹

¹ This movement of Lord Cornwallis in prosecution of the original ministerial plan was the subject of bitter controversy in England after the loss of the colonies. Sir Henry Clinton attributed to it all of the subsequent disaster to the British arms. He admits that such an advance had been part of the original plan by which the war was to have been prosecuted from South to North, and that upon Lord Cornwallis's junction with the forces of Leslie sent to meet him in Virginia the objective point was to have been Baltimore, and thence an advance northwardly. But Sir Henry's contention was that, after his reverses in South Carolina and the failure of the Loyalists in North Carolina to rise in 1780, as had been expected, Lord Cornwallis should have abandoned the campaign and remained in South Carolina (*Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, 2 volumes, compiled by B. F. Stevens, London, 1888). But whatever force there is

Colonel Lee states that Greene was quickly advised of the advance of the British from Winnsboro; indeed, that he learned of this movement before he learned of Morgan's victory, and that he accordingly issued preparatory orders for the movement of his own troops.¹ He heard of the victory on the 23d, for on that day he wrote to Marion informing him of it, and requesting him to communicate the intelligence to Lee, but there is no intimation in his letter of any movement on his part, on the contrary, he left Lee to continue his attack upon Georgetown.² He writes again to Marion on the 25th, reiterating the agreeable news of the defeat of Tarleton, and urging an attack by Lee and himself

in Sir Henry's position must be restricted to his lordship's decision and action after his losses at Cowpens, and must not include his previous losses at King's Mountain, etc., in 1780, for if these former reverses should have influenced the combined movements, Sir Henry was himself as much to blame in the matter as Cornwallis—nay, more so, for he was the Commander-in-chief and should have countermanded the movement. He was immediately informed of the disaster at King's Mountain by Lord Rawdon, who wrote to Sir Henry on the 29th of October, during the illness of Lord Cornwallis, giving Sir Henry a full account of it (*Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 277). This letter Clinton received on the 5th of December, and on the 13th replied to Lord Cornwallis, acknowledging the receipt of Lord Rawdon's letter, approving his lordship's call to Leslie to join him, and informing his lordship that he had sent Arnold with a corps to replace Leslie's, which had gone to him (*ibid.*, 310). Cornwallis received this letter of Sir Henry on the 6th of January (*ibid.*, 315). Had Sir Henry then thought proper to abandon the ministerial plan, he should have so instructed his lordship in his letter of the 13th. Unless, therefore, the defeat of Tarleton at Cowpens should have influenced him, Cornwallis had no choice under his existing instructions but to proceed with the plans, as he did on the 19th. He writes to Sir Henry on the 18th, the day before he began his march, "It is impossible to foresee all the consequences that this unexpected and extraordinary event [Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens] may produce, but your Excellency may be assured that nothing but the most absolute necessity shall induce me to give up the important object of the winter's campaign," etc. (*Ibid.*, 321.)

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 232.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist. of the Am. Rev.* (1781-82), 16.

on Watson at Nelson's Ferry, saying nothing of his own movements.¹ On the 26th he writes to Lee that he intended to start for Charlotte to consult with Morgan, Davidson, Sumter, and Pickens in regard to assembling all his force and moving against Ninety Six. But on further reflection, it is said, he abandoned these ideas, and determined to limit his plans to a junction of his main body with Morgan, and resisting, if possible, Cornwallis's advance to Virginia.² If, as Colonel Lee says, Greene received the gratifying intelligence of Morgan's victory the day after he heard of Cornwallis's advance, it was, therefore, on the 22d that he did so, and yet it was not until the 28th that he decided upon his course in consequence, and then, as his biographer says, he committed what will be deemed by many the most imprudent action of his life. With only a guide, one aide, and a sergeant's guard of cavalry, he started across the country to join the army of General Morgan and aid him in his arduous operations. The distance was one hundred miles at least, the country infested with Tories, and Camden not far on his left where such a prize would be liberally paid for.³ This was indeed a most extraordinary step to have taken after six days of hesitation and indecision. Why he should have deemed it so necessary to abandon his main army and leave it under Huger, to join Morgan with his detachment, as to warrant this mad ride, it is difficult to imagine. Before he started he had recalled Lee and directed General Isaac Huger to follow with the army he had at Cheraw, and to join Morgan at Salisbury. Huger, on the 29th, began his march, and South Carolina was again aban-

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist. of the Am. Rev.* (1781-82), 17.

² Great Commanders Series, *General Greene* (Greene), 193-194.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 394. In the Great Commanders Series, *General Greene*, it is said that he was accompanied by his aide, Major Burnet, a sergeant, and three mounted militiamen, 194.

done by the Continental army, to contend as best she might with the British forces still remaining within her border.

The position at Cheraw with which General Greene was so much pleased when he took it did not prove to have the advantage which he supposed. It did not compel Lord Cornwallis to divide his forces. On the contrary, his lordship did not hesitate to order Leslie to join him when he was ready to move, though Greene was still at Cheraw; nor did he hesitate to prosecute his views on Virginia, and to advance into North Carolina, though Greene was upon his flank; nor did Greene find it practicable to advance upon Charlestown, the goal of all movements in the South. Instead of all this, as Greene had fondly considered, he found himself cut off from Morgan despite Morgan's victory, and forced, as he deemed, to take a most desperate ride across the country to join Morgan, leaving his army under Huger to make the best of its way after him. Had Cornwallis advanced with promptness and despatch he would completely have divided Greene's forces, which he would have crushed, one after the other. Greene's escape was entirely the result of his lordship's dilatoriness. Greene reached Morgan on the 30th, and learned that Cornwallis was only a few miles away, across the Catawba.

The British forces in South Carolina on the 1st of December, 1780, amounted to 7384.¹ Sir Henry Clinton estimated that Lord Cornwallis ought to have had with him, after the battle of Cowpens, 3000 men exclusive of cavalry and militia.² The loss at Cowpens was 784. Deducting the 3784 from the British forces in the State on the 1st of December, 1780, there remained 3600 men. But Lord Cornwallis did not take all his army with him when he marched for North Carolina. He left with Lord Rawdon, at Camden,

¹ Washington's *Writings*, vol. V, Appendix, 544.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 4.

the Sixty-third Regiment and Rawdon's own, the Volunteers of Ireland. These Rawdon estimated at 700;¹ but Stedman, the historian, places the number at 800.² There still remained therefore, in South Carolina, a British force of at least 4300 men, against which Sumter and Marion, alone with their volunteers, were left to contend.

There seems to have been some question upon whom the command of the British forces remaining in South Carolina devolved in the absence of Lord Cornwallis. Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet Balfour, the commandant at Charlestown, was the ranking officer in the line, he being lieutenant colonel of the Twenty-third Regiment, known as the "Welsh Fusileers," of which Sir William Howe was colonel, while Lord Rawdon, holding the position on the staff of adjutant general with the rank of lieutenant colonel, was ranked by Balfour in the line, and was colonel only of a provincial regiment, the Volunteers of Ireland, which he had raised in Philadelphia, and as such, it was said, was subordinate to the youngest lieutenant colonel of the line. But Cornwallis, before he left the State, had intrusted the command of the troops on the frontier to Lord Rawdon, limiting Colonel Balfour's command to the country within the Santee, Congaree, and Saluda rivers.³ This arrangement was not at all

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), Appendix, 615.

² Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 355.

³ Letter of Marquis of Hastings, formerly Lord Rawdon, written July 23, 1813, appendix to *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 613.

The comparative rank of Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour was a matter about which there was question, and one which we shall see assuming considerable importance in the case of the execution of Colonel Isaac Hayne and of their respective responsibility therefor. The facts appear to be that Lord Rawdon was a lieutenant colonel on the staff of the British army, and as such was adjutant general to Sir Henry Clinton; but desiring to serve in the line, he had raised in Philadelphia a provincial regiment, the "Volunteers of Ireland," of which he was colonel.

satisfactory to Lord Rawdon, who complained that he was left to defend Camden, a position which he had always reprobated as being on the wrong side of the river and covering nothing, with but seven hundred men. He complained that his only concern with the interior posts of Motte's House, Granby, and Ninety Six was the necessity he was under of subordinating his movements to their protection, while he could draw no reënforcements from them for his own, or even for the protection of his communications, without the leave of Colonel Balfour, between whom and himself there was an estrangement. Sir Henry Clinton, with whom Balfour was no favorite, in order to assure Lord Rawdon the command, subsequently promoted him to the rank of brigadier general, but the commission, it is said, did not arrive until Lord Rawdon had left the field and embarked for England.¹

Supposing the commission incompatible with that on the staff, he had tendered his resignation of the commission of lieutenant colonel. But his resignation was not accepted. Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, writing to Sir Henry Clinton July 5, 1780, says: "The King is fully sensible of his lordship's merits, and of the great advantage which the corps under his command has derived from his lordship's attention to it; but his Majesty commands me to signify to you his royal pleasure that you do immediately acquaint his lordship that he still retains his rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the army."—*Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 230. Lord Cornwallis certainly regarded Rawdon as ranking Balfour. He writes to Lord George Germain on August 20, 1780, "I set out on the 21st of June for Charlestown, leaving the command of the troops on the frontier to Lord Rawdon, who was, after Brigadier-General Patterson, the commandant of Charlestown, the *next officer in rank to me in the province*."—*Ibid.*, 244. Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour had not, however arrived in the province on the 21st of June; but in another letter from Cornwallis to Germain in which Colonel Balfour's arrival is mentioned, Cornwallis writes, "I likewise think it highly proper that as Lord Rawdon is acting with and commanding all these officers, he should be allowed the same allowance," to wit, the pay of a brigadier general.—*Ibid.*, 240.

¹ Letter of Marquis of Hastings, *supra*.

While General Greene, with the Continental troops, had abandoned South Carolina to the domination of the British forces under Balfour and Rawdon, Judge Johnson claims for him the conception of the bold operations undertaken by Sumter and Marion in his absence; for these gallant leaders did not hesitate, with their volunteer bands, at once to assume the offensive in the face of the overwhelming force of the enemy remaining in the State. General Greene had certainly suggested to Marion an attack upon the British post at Nelson's Ferry before the 19th of January, for he closes a letter on that day, "I wish your answer respecting the practicability of surprising the party at Nelson's; the route, and force you will be able to detach."¹ Again, on the 23d, he wrote to Marion: "I wish to have your opinion of the practicability of crossing the Santee with a party of three or four hundred horse, and whether they would be much exposed by being in the rear of the enemy; also whether the party could not make good their retreat if it should be necessary, and join our people towards Ninety Six. If the thing is practicable, can your people be engaged to perform the service?"² But in a letter of the 3d of February, he wrote to Sumter from North Carolina: "*I agree with you in opinion* that if proper measures are taken, the enemy may be made apprehensive of their rear. For this purpose I have desired General Marion to cross the Santee if possible, and in order to pave the way for this service I desired Lieutenant-Colonel Lee to surprise Georgetown, that the militia be left more at liberty to cross the river."³ This rather implies that

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, Appendix, 16.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 361.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 362; Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 80.

the suggestion was Sumter's. It certainly indicates that it was as much Sumter's scheme as his own. The order was extended by General Huger. On the 28th of January this officer, before marching to join Greene, wrote to Marion: "General Greene wishes that you will attempt to cross the Santee, and if possible reach some of the enemy's magazines, and destroy them. I am persuaded you will not leave any practicable measure unattempted to effect this business. The execution is left entirely to your judgment and address."¹ But whether this move was first suggested by Greene or Sumter, the order for it had been anticipated by the action of Marion himself. Marion, who was then at Cordes's plantation one hundred miles distant, on the 29th,² that is, a day at least before the letter could possibly have reached him, ordered Captain John Postell to cross the Santee with twenty-five men, and make a forced march to Wadboo bridge, which crosses a prong of the western branch of Cooper River, known as the Fair Forest Swamp, about twenty-five miles from Charlestown, and there to burn all the stores of every kind. "It is possible," Marion wrote to Postell, "you will find a small guard there, which you

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, Appendix, 20.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 20, Appendix, 91. Marion appears at this time to have had what were called three regiments. Of these Peter Horry was colonel of one, with William Benison as major, and John Baxter, John Postell, Daniel Conyers, and James McCauley, captains. Adam McDonald was colonel of another, but then being a prisoner, the regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Horry. A third regiment was commanded by Colonel John Ervin, who resigned and was succeeded by Captain John Baxter. Captain William McCottry commanded a company of riflemen, but whether attached to one of these regiments or as an independent command does not appear. The following list of other of Marion's officers is compiled from those mentioned from time to time in James's *Life of Marion*: Colonels James Postell, William Harden, and Hezekiah Maham, Majors John James and Alexander

may surprise, but bring no prisoners with you. You will . . . return the same way, and recross the river at the same place, which must be done before daylight the next morning. After effecting my purpose at Wadboo it will not be out of your way to come by Monck's Corner, and destroy any stores or wagons you may find there." ¹ This order gave Captain Postell but twenty-five men, but it appears that he took thirty-eight with him. Colonel James Postell was at the same time despatched with about an equal number. Colonel Postell burnt a great quantity of valuable stores at Manigault's Ferry, and Captain Postell a great many more in its vicinity. Thence the latter posted to Keithfield, near Monck's Corner, and burnt fourteen wagons loaded with soldier's clothing, baggage, and other valuable stores, and took prisoner about forty British regulars, without losing a man. The taking of these prisoners, though against Marion's orders, appears to have been approved, for General Greene extends to the Postells his particular thanks for the spirit and address with which they had executed Marion's orders over the Santee. To the Postells it was said nothing appeared difficult.²

As the navigation of the Wateree did not permit the transportation of supplies, the British were obliged to have their stores of rum, salt, ammunition, and clothing sent overland across from Nelson's Ferry to Camden. Marion had in the last summer shown that Nelson's Ferry was not beyond his reach, and the Postells, under his orders, had now

Swinton, Captains John T. Greene, Thomas Waties, Gavin Witherspoon, Thomas Potts, — Irby, John Simons (killed at Quimby), William Allston, Samuel Cooper, William Capers, G. Sinclair Capers, John Futhey, — Bennett, William Clay Snipes, John Carraway Smith, Lieutenant Snizer.

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, Appendix, 20.

² *Ibid.*, 91, Appendix, 20.

reached Monck's Corner. So that the transportation of stores was now threatened along the whole road from the Cooper to the Santee, and to the Wateree. To protect the route the British had established a line of posts. The first of these was at Biggin's Bridge over the Cooper, just above Monck's Corner; the next at Nelson's Ferry; then one at Wright's Bluff, on Scott's Lake, about ten miles above Nelson's Ferry; another at Thomson's plantation, on the Congaree, protecting the roads to McCord's and to Granby on the Congaree; and still another at the latter place, which was also known as Fridig's or Friday's Ferry. These lines of posts thus protected the road either to Camden or Ninety Six. Besides the additional security thus afforded, the supplies were always attended by escorts, which, since the enterprises of the two Postells, seldom consisted of less than three hundred or four hundred men. But not even with these precautions were these lines secure.

About the middle of February Major McLeroth,¹ of the Sixty-fourth Regiment of the British army, was marching from Nelson's Ferry at the head of one of these escorts, when Marion, with about an equal number of mounted men, assailed him near Halfway Swamp, eighteen or twenty miles from Nelson's Ferry, in what is now Clarendon County. Marion at first cut off in succession two pickets in McLeroth's rear, then, wheeling round his main body, attacked him in flank and front. As McLeroth had no cavalry, his situation became perilous in the extreme; but by a rapid march, with constant skirmishing, he gained a field upon the road about a mile and a half from the swamp, which was open, but enclosed with a fence. Here he posted himself on the west of the road within the en-

¹ In his *Life of Marion* James spells the name of this officer, McIlwrath (p. 91); we follow the spelling found in Tarleton's *Campaigns*, p. 153, and in the Army List, Almanac, 1780.

closure. On the east, skirting the road, there was a large cypress swamp stretching towards Halfway Swamp, on the verge of which Marion took position.

In this situation of the parties a most curious and romantic incident took place. Major McLeroth sent a flag to Marion, reproaching him with shooting his pickets contrary, as he alleged, to all the laws of civilized warfare, and defying him to combat in the open field. Marion replied that the practice of the British in burning the houses of all who would not submit and join them was more indefensible than that of shooting pickets, and that as long as they persisted in the one he would persevere in the other. That as to his defiance, he considered it that of a man in desperate circumstances; but if he wished to witness a combat between twenty picked men on each side he was ready to gratify him. Strange to say, this extraordinary proposition of Marion was accepted by McLeroth,¹ and a place for the combat, near an oak tree which stood for many years afterwards, agreed upon. Accordingly Marion appointed Major John Vanderhorst, then a supernumerary officer, to take command of this band, and Captain Samuel Price to be second in command. The names of the men were written on slips of paper and presented to them individually. The first chosen was Gavin Wither-
spoon, who promptly accepted, and no one else who was chosen refused. Major Vanderhorst formed his party in

¹ The character of Major McLeroth, says James, has been constantly represented by the inhabitants of this State among whom he passed as the most humane of all the officers of the British army. To those in their power even forbearance was at that time a virtue, but his virtues were active. It has been currently reported, adds James, that he carried his dislike of house-burning so far that he neglected to carry into effect the orders of his Commander-in-chief on that point to such an extent as to gain his ill will and that of many other British officers. James's *Life of Marion*, 97-98.

single file and proceeded with them to the fence, where they were addressed by Marion. "My brave soldiers," he said, "you are twenty men picked this day out of my whole brigade. I know you all and have often witnessed your bravery. In the name of your country I call upon you once more to show it. My confidence in you is great, and I am sure it will not be disappointed. Fight like men, as you have always done, and you are sure of victory." This short speech, we are told, was received with applause, and the party under Vanderhorst advanced towards the oak. The British party had also formed in like order in front of the tree. But just as they were about to engage, an officer was seen to advance swiftly towards the oak, when the British shouldered their muskets and retreated with quick steps towards the main body. Vanderhorst and his men gave three huzzas, but did not fire. James, who relates this story, observes that thus a British officer was met on his own boasted ground and proved recreant; but it is more probable that McLeroth, finding himself at such disadvantage with Marion's mounted men, skilfully availed himself of the opportunity for delay, and accepted the challenge without any intention of meeting it, but merely in order to gain time.¹

The next morning, McLeroth abandoned his heavy baggage, left his fires burning, and retired silently from the ground, along the river road, towards Singleton's Mill, distant ten miles. Near day Marion discovered his move-

¹ Sir Walter Scott's novel, *The Fair Maid of Perth*, it will be remembered, is based upon the story of two powerful clans having deputed each twenty champions to fight out a quarrel of old standing in the presence of King Robert III, his brother the Duke of Albany, and the whole court of Scotland at Perth in the year of grace 1390. Sir Walter Scott's story had not yet been published, but Major McLeroth, a Scotchman, as his name suggests, was probably familiar with this legend, and availing himself of it accepted Marion's proposition to amuse him while he arranged for his escape.

ment, and detached Colonel Hugh Horry, with one hundred men, to intercept him before he could reach the mill. The colonel made all possible speed, but, finding he could not overtake McLeroth with his whole party, despatched a party, under Major James, on the swiftest horses, to cross the mill pond above, and take possession of Singleton's houses, which stood on a high hill commanding a narrow defile, on the road between the hill and the Wateree swamp. Major James reached the houses as the British advanced to the foot of the hill, but found Singleton's family down with the small-pox. This disease was more dreaded than the enemy. James therefore contented himself with giving them a fire, by which a British captain was killed, and then retired. As McLeroth was now in a strong position, Marion pursued him no farther.¹

Marion, in this movement, had been operating from his fastness at Snow Island, keeping open his communication with that retreat. Sumter, now partially recovered from his wound but still greatly suffering, took the field for bolder enterprises.

On the 30th of January, General Greene writes to Sumter from Sherard's Ferry, on the Catawba, in North Carolina: "I have the pleasure to hear, by General Morgan, that you are almost well enough to take the field. Nothing will afford me greater satisfaction than to see you at the head of the militia again; and I can assure you I shall take a pleasure in giving you every opportunity to exercise that talent of enterprise which has already rendered you the terror of your enemies and the idol of your friends."² Again, on the 3d of February, he writes, endeavoring to allay Sumter's jealousy of Morgan, assuring him that, when he shall be able to take the field and

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 94-97.

² Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 79.

embody his militia, he shall have the command of the whole, whether employed in South Carolina or with the Continentals.¹ General Greene appears to have wished Sumter to operate in the rear of the British army under Cornwallis. He gave, however, no specific directions to him to do so. On the 9th of February he writes to Sumter, acknowledging the receipt of a letter from him of the 7th,² in which it appears that Sumter had reported himself in the field, and saying:—

“There are few or no militia with us, nor are there many in the enemy’s rear. I heard by several people that you were with the latter, which gave me great pleasure; but I find I was misinformed. Before I heard of your being out I had sent General Pickens to take the command in the rear. His character and influence I hope will be useful.”³

But Sumter had other plans. General Greene had scarcely exaggerated Sumter’s influence when he wrote that he was the terror of his enemies and the idol of his friends, for Cornwallis himself, in a letter to Tarleton, declared, “Sumter’s corps has been our greatest plague in this State.”⁴ At his call only would the heroes of Hanging Rock, King’s Mountain, and Blackstock come out. Lacey, Taylor, and his other leaders now at once joined him. Collecting his whole force in his old camping ground, the Waxhaws, he marched for Fort Granby on the Congaree, where he arrived on the 19th of February. This was a stockade work on the west side of the Congaree, three miles below the junction of the Broad and the Saluda rivers, and a half mile below the present city of Columbia on the opposite bank. It was defended by about three hundred

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 79.

² This letter is not found in the Nightingale collection.

³ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 82.

⁴ Tarleton’s *Campaigns*, 203.

men, under the command of Major Maxwell. The same *ruse de guerre* which had twice before been successfully used was again resorted to, — Quaker guns of logs and tobacco hogsheads were mounted and trained upon the works, but this time without effect.¹ An attack was made, and kept up for two days; and as all supplies were cut off, the place must have been taken had not Lord Rawdon appeared on the opposite bank of the river early on the third day. His lordship's arrival was not unexpected. On the 20th, Sumter writes to Marion: —

“Hurry of business obliges me to be laconic. I arrived at this place yesterday morning about four o'clock. Shortly after attacked the fort, with which I have been ever since engaged. Everything hitherto favorable, and have no doubt but I shall succeed if not interrupted by Lord Rawdon, who, I know, will strip his post as bare of men as possible to spare; to obviate which, as far as possible, may be in your power, it is my wish that you would be pleased to move in such a direction as to attract his attention and thereby prevent his designs. Timely assistance in this way portends much good to this State. . . . If you can with propriety advance southwardly so as to coöperate or correspond with me it might have the best of consequences.”²

Marion did not, however, receive this letter in time, and Lord Rawdon, having learned of Sumter's bold move, had, as Sumter had anticipated, marched at once from Camden with all his force; but his appearance did not induce Sumter to abandon the enterprise until he had destroyed the British magazines and supplies. This having been accomplished on the third day (21st of February), in the presence of Lord Rawdon's party, he moved away that night.³ There is no statement of the casualties on either side in this affair.

¹ Sumter MSS.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-83), 23.

³ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 226; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 273.

Rawdon had supposed that Sumter, upon his approach, would have retreated up the west bank of the Congaree, and so on towards the upper part of the State, and accordingly he had seized all the passes above. But in this supposition he was mistaken. Sumter had still other designs. Raising the siege of Granby, he marched with the utmost celerity in the opposite direction, and arrived the next morning, the 22d of February, before the British post at Colonel Thomson's plantation, thirty-five miles from Granby. This post was near the site of Fort Motte, in what is now Orangeburg County. It was a stockade which was formed around Colonel Thomson's house, the outhouses forming a part of the defences. The troops advanced through an open field, under a severe fire, and reached a part of the works. The enemy defended themselves with great bravery. The houses were set on fire by the Americans, but the defenders succeeded in extinguishing the flames and resisting every assault. The assault was given up in about half an hour, but the investment was continued. Sumter was encamped at Manigault's Ferry, two miles below Thomson's, refreshing a part of his troops, while a strong detachment maintained the investment of the post. He had also sent out several smaller detachments for various purposes, so that he had with him not more than one hundred men. In this condition, early the next day, the 23d, he received information of the approach of a considerable body of troops, with a number of wagons. The enemy advanced so rapidly that he had only time to form for their reception on a well-chosen piece of ground half a mile below his encampment. The British, upwards of eighty in number, forming a compact line, advanced with a daring front, affecting a contempt for the troops formed to oppose them. The ground was open. Both parties seemed assured of victory. The contest was short and decisive. The Brit-

ish were outflanked and defeated. They lost thirteen killed and sixty-six taken prisoners, and twenty wagons with clothing, supplies, and arms intended for Lord Rawdon's army. To secure a prize so seasonable to the wants of the captors became an object of the greatest importance. It happened that the Santee was overflowed and impassable for the wagons. But Sumter had collected and secured all the boats at Fort Granby, and also at Thomson's. On board these were placed the captured stores, under a determined officer, who was ordered to fall down the river to a point where Sumter would meet him with the troops. These dispositions had not long been completed when, on the day following, the 24th, at about three o'clock, Lord Rawdon appeared, coming to the relief of the post at Thomson's. Sumter, informed of his approach, had all his parties called in and his troops formed in order of battle, expecting only to meet the light troops of his lordship, but when he saw his whole army was with him, he moved off leisurely in the presence of Rawdon, who did not attempt pursuit, and hastened to meet his little flotilla at the point where he proposed crossing the river. The point selected for this purpose was some distance above Wright's Bluff, on the Santee, about ten miles above Nelson's Ferry, where the British had a post on the east side of the river commanding it. Unhappily the fatality which so often pursued Sumter's most brilliant movements again overtook him. By the treachery of the pilot, the boats were permitted to drop below the proposed point, within range of the guns of the British post, and the stores fell into the enemy's hands. The guard escaped and rejoined Sumter. Great as was the loss of the stores, that of the boats was still greater. Without them the passage of the river and the swamps on the low ground was extremely difficult. It was, however, determined on, and effected by the aid of such canoes as

could be collected, and the post at Wright's Bluff, known as Fort Watson, was attacked to regain the stores. To recover the ample supply of arms and clothing which had been captured and so treacherously lost to him, which would have relieved so many of the wants of his men, induced Sumter to hazard all on one effort. The attack was begun at twelve o'clock, on the 27th of February, by a direct assault. The post had been reënforced but a few hours before by the arrival of Colonel Watson with a detachment of four hundred provincial light infantry. The Americans were received with a tremendous fire, which they sustained for some time, but at length were obliged to give way, with considerable loss. The British accounts claimed that eighteen were killed, and some prisoners and many horses taken.¹

Upon this repulse Sumter led his troops to a secure position within five or six miles of the fort, where his wounded were attended to. Thence he moved to the High Hills of Santee and rested. In response to his letter of the 20th, Marion had, on the 26th, written to Sumter reporting his progress towards him; but while at the camp on the High Hills of Santee² Sumter received, on the 4th of March, another letter, dated the 2d, from which it appeared that

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, March 3, 1781.

² "The High Hills of Santee are a long, irregular chain of sand hills on the left bank of the Wateree, near twenty miles north of its junction with the Congaree, and some ninety miles northwesterly of Charleston. They are huge masses of sand and clay and gravel, rising two hundred feet above the river banks, twenty-four miles long, varying in breadth from five miles to one. Though directly above the noxious river, the air on them is healthy and the water pure, making an oasis in the wide tract of miasma and fever in which the army had been operating. Both officers and men felt the vigor return as soon as they inhaled the pure breezes." —Greene's *Life of Greene*, vol. III, 335. These hills were from time to time in occupation of both armies, British and American. Upon them we shall see Greene in his Camp of Repose later on in the summer.

Marion was still far out of the way of meeting him. Sumter was much disappointed, and wrote :¹—

“I made no doubt but your route to me would be by the way of King’s Tree or the Ferry, and after receiving yours of the 28th ultimo, informing me what the number of your men were, I found you to be very weak and the enemy near at hand in force. This determined me to move on to meet you, to concert measures for our further operations, which is still absolutely necessary. I shall therefore remain at or near this place for that purpose, and beg that you may come this way with all possible speed; if not convenient with all your men to facilitate an interview, please come with a few. My horses are so worn out that I can scarce move at all, and officers and men are quite discouraged, finding no force in these parts, not even men enough to join to guide me through the country. But notwithstanding little may be done now, yet much good might be expected to result hereafter from a personal consultation, which I hope to have the favor of by to-morrow night,” etc.

But Marion did not come. The British, indeed, were laying meshes for his capture, and, no doubt, he was busy avoiding them. Still, it is strange that, within a day’s journey of Sumter, he does not appear to have made any response to the earnest appeal for a conference, or even to have communicated to Sumter his own difficulties. After waiting in vain for Marion a day or two, finding his men somewhat rested and refreshed, Sumter began a retreat from the High Hills of Santee to the Waxhaws by way of Black River, leaving Camden about twenty miles to the left. On the 6th of March, while on this march, he was intercepted by a considerable body of British troops under Major Fraser on Lynch’s Creek, and a sharp conflict ensued in which neither party gained a decided advantage. The British claimed a victory, but Sumter’s retreat was not impeded, to effect which was the object of the British movement. By the enemy’s account Sumter

¹ Gibbes’s *Documentary Hist.* (1781–82), 27, 28.

lost ten killed and about fifty wounded.¹ Ramsay claims that the British lost twenty killed and were obliged to retreat.²

General Sumter having fallen back to the Waxhaws, Lord Rawdon now determined upon a concerted move to crush Marion. For this purpose Colonel Watson, with his own regiment and Harrison's regiment of Tories,³ amounting in the whole to more than five hundred men, was ordered to march from Nelson's Ferry (Fort Watson) down the Santee towards Snow Island; and soon after

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, March 14, 1781.

² Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 226. So engrossed have historians and romancers been with Marion's brilliant performances that they have been oblivious to Sumter's. Thus we find one of our own historians stating that, "during the absence of Greene from South Carolina, Marion was the only force in active operation against the British." (Simms's *Life of Marion*, 205). Sumter's equally brilliant operations at this time are entirely ignored. Judge Johnson, in his *Life of Greene*, speaks of Sumter's force as "a body of about two hundred and fifty North Carolinians" (vol. II, 31), but this is a mistake. The account of these operations here given is taken from the Sumter manuscript which states that "when Sumter had nearly recovered from his wound, finding that Lord Cornwallis had left the State of South Carolina, he collected *his whole force* in the Waxhaws and marched for the lower country." His force was certainly composed of South Carolina volunteers, and not North Carolina militia. In the *Life of Edward Lacey* it is stated: "Early in February, 1781, General Sumter had so far recovered from his wounds as to take the field again. When he ordered out the militia of his part of the State Colonel Lacey immediately joined him with his regiment and was with him at the assault on Friday's Ferry *i.e.* Granby the 19th February, 1781." — Moore's *Life of Lacey*, 24.

³ This corps was organized under the authority of Colonel Tarleton (Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 117). Lord Cornwallis speaks of it as "Harrison's new varied Legion, cavalry and infantry" (*Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 238), "but it was not a success" (*ibid.*, 260). It was organized at first from the Tories on Lynch's Creek in the neighborhood of McCallam's Ferry (Gregg's *Old Cheraws*, 308). Of the character of Harrison and his brother we have already spoken (*Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* [McCrady], 642, 650).

Colonel Doyle¹ with the Volunteers of Ireland was directed to proceed from the neighborhood of Camden, crossing to the east of Lynch's Creek at McCallam's Ferry into what is now Darlington County, and moving down Jeffers's Creek to the Pee Dee, was to form a junction with Watson. This joint expedition was begun about the 1st of March.

¹ Lieutenant colonel of Lord Rawdon's American regiment, "The Volunteers of Ireland," recruited in Philadelphia, afterwards General Sir John Doyle, G.C.B. and K.C., created a baronet October 29, 1805. See an account of this officer by his nephew, Sir Francis Hastings Doyle, in his *Reminiscences*, etc., Appleton, 1887, 365-369, in which this interesting story of the times we are now treating is quoted from a speech of Sir John while a member of Parliament, in support of an establishment in Ireland for the relief of worn-out and disabled soldiers. "Another brilliant example of devotion to duty flashes across my mind. When Lord Rawdon was in South Carolina he had to send an express of great importance through a country filled with the enemy's troops. A corporal of the Seventeenth Dragoons known for his courage and intelligence was selected to escort it. They had not proceeded far when they were fired upon, the express killed, and the corporal wounded in the side; careless of his wound, but he thought of his duty; he snatched the despatch from the dying man and rode on until from the loss of blood he fell, when, fearing the despatch would be taken by the enemy, he thrust it into his wound until the wound closed upon it, and concealed it. He was found the next day by a British patrol, with a smile of honorable pride upon his countenance, and with life just sufficient to point to the fatal depository of his secret. In searching the body was found the cause of his death, for the surgeon declared the wound itself was not mortal, but was rendered so by the irritation of the paper. Thus fell," exclaimed Sir John, "this patriot soldier; in rank, a corporal, he was in mind a hero. His name was O'Leary, from the parish of Moria in County Down. Whilst memory holds her seat, the devotion of this generous victim to his own sense of duty will be present to my mind. I would not for worlds have lost his name. How much would it have lived in Greek or Roman story! Not the Spartan hero of Thermopylæ, not the Roman Curtius, in their self-devotion went beyond him. Leonidas fought in the presence of a grateful country, *he* was in a strange land unseen. Curtius had all Rome for his spectators, O'Leary gave himself to death alone in a desert. He adopted the sentiment without knowing the language, and chose for his epitaph, Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori."

Marion's scouts informing him of Watson's movement, that gallant and intrepid leader did not wait for the attack, but himself at once assumed the offensive. Leaving Colonel Erwin in command of the camp at Snow Island, by one of his rapid movements, on March 6th Marion met Watson at Wiboo Swamp, about midway between Nelson's and Murray's ferries, in what is now Clarendon County. Having but little ammunition, not more than twenty rounds to each man, Marion resorted to strategy, and here he laid his first ambushade. Colonel Peter Horry was placed in advance, while he with the cavalry and remainder of his brigade, amounting to about four hundred men, lay in reserve. Horry made considerable impression upon the Tories in advance, but Watson with two field-pieces at the head of his regulars dislodged Horry's men from the swamp, whereupon the Tory cavalry, under Major Harrison, pursued. This had been anticipated, and Captain Conyers with a party of cavalry had been placed in a concealed position to meet it. As the British and Tories came up, Conyers dashed in among them, killing with his own hand the officer who led them, and with that Captain McCauley, upon Marion's order, charged and dispersed the enemy. In this action Gavin James, a private in Marion's ranks, of gigantic size, greatly distinguished himself, holding a causeway single-handed against a strong party of the enemy.¹

While these movements were being made by Sumter and Marion on the Congaree and Pee Dee, a spirited affair had taken place on the Saluda, in what is now Newberry

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 98, 99. The officer killed by Conyers, James says was said to have been one of the two Harrisons mentioned in a previous volume (*Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution* [McCrady], 642). And this supposition appears to have been correct (Gregg's *Hist. of the Old Cheraws*, 308).

County. The battle of Mud Lick, as it was called, was fought on the 2d of March. A garrison of British soldiers and Tories stationed at Williams's Fort, annoying the people in that neighborhood, Colonel Benjamin Roebuck¹ and Colonel Henry White determined to break up the nest of plunderers. This they proceeded to do with a party of about one hundred and fifty men, and by a stratagem induced the enemy to abandon the fort and come out to attack them. A party of mounted men showed themselves before the fort and retreated. Upon this the enemy came out and began a hot pursuit, confident of an easy victory. The mounted Whigs fell back before the advancing foe until they had drawn them within easy range of riflemen concealed in ambush. At the proper moment Colonel White fired a shot, killing one of the foremost British officers. The battle soon became general, and continued for an hour with alternate advantages, ultimately resulting in the total rout of the British and Tories. The Whigs did not lose many, but among the killed was Captain Robert Thomas, an officer much beloved and lamented. Both Colonel Roebuck and Colonel White were wounded.²

After the affair at Wiboo Swamp, Watson rested a day or two at Cantey's plantation in what is now Clarendon, and then continued his march down the Santee, which Marion

¹ Benjamin Roebuck was born in Orange County, Virginia, about 1755. His father settled in what is now Spartanburg County in 1777, and the next year young Roebuck served as lieutenant in Georgia, and was at Stono and Savannah. In 1780 he joined Sumter and was at Hanging Rock, Musgrove's Mills, and, as we have seen, at King's Mountain, distinguished himself at Cowpens, where he had a horse shot under him. He was now badly wounded, and made prisoner, was incarcerated at Ninety Six, where he remained during the siege, was subsequently taken to Charlestown, and placed on a prison ship until exchanged in August, 1781.

² Johnson's *Traditions*, 423-424; *King's Mountain and its Heroes*, 470.

opposed by destroying bridges and harassing him at every step. At Mount Hope, in what is now Williamsburg County, Watson found the bridge destroyed, and had to sustain a second conflict with Marion's rear guard under Horry. But with the aid of his field-pieces and by the strength of his column he was enabled to make good his way. Near Murray's Ferry, Watson passed the Kingstree road to his left, and when he came to the Black River road which crosses at the lower bridge, he made a feint of still continuing down the Santee; but soon after turning, took that road on which the lower bridge was, distant twelve miles. Marion had not been deceived. He had detached Major James at the head of seventy men, thirty of whom were riflemen under McCottry, to destroy the remnant of the bridge which had been partially broken up, and to take post there while he kept watch on Watson. Major James reached the bridge by a nearer route, crossed it, threw off the planks, fired the string-pieces at the northeastern end, and posted his riflemen so as to command the ford and all the approaches on the other side. Marion soon after arrived with the rest of his men, and disposed them in the rear so as to support James's party. Watson now appeared on the plain beyond and opened with his field-pieces, which had been so effective at Wiboo and Mount Hope, but, fortunately for Marion, the topography of the ground here rendered them comparatively useless. Owing to the elevation on the southwestern side of the river, the effect of the artillery was but to cut off the tops and limbs of the trees above the heads of Marion's men. To remedy this Watson brought up his guns to the brow of the hill, so as, by depressing them there, to reach the riflemen on the low ground on the opposite side; but these picked off the cannoneers with their rifles before they could bring their pieces to bear. An attempt was then made to carry the

ford by direct attack. Watson drew up his columns in the old field over the river, and his advance was now seen approaching the ford with an officer at its head waving his sword. McCottry fired the signal gun, the officer clapped his hand to his breast, and fell to the ground. The riflemen and musketeers next poured in a well-directed and deadly fire, and the British advance fled in disorder, nor did the reserve move forward to its support. Four men returned to bear off their fallen leader, but all four shared his fate. In the evening Watson succeeded in removing his dead and wounded, and took position at John Witherspoon's, a mile above the bridge. General Marion then took position on a ridge below the ford of the river, which was afterwards called General's Island. The next day he pushed McCottry and Conyers over the river to annoy the British pickets and sentinels. Thereupon Watson moved farther up and established his camp at Blakeley's plantation. There he remained about ten days, during which, though he was posted on an open field, Marion's riflemen kept his regulars in constant dread and almost panic. While Blakeley's and Witherspoon's provisions lasted Watson was able to maintain himself here in comparative safety, notwithstanding the apprehensions caused by Marion's marksmen; but when these failed it became necessary to send out foraging parties, and this brought on daily skirmishes. In these affairs Captain Conyers greatly distinguished himself, his name becoming almost as great a dread to the British as Tarleton's had been to the Americans. An incident which is said to have increased the panic of the British was the shooting, at three hundred yards distant, of an officer, Lieutenant Torriano, by McDonald, the same who had been among the prisoners rescued by Marion at Nelson's Ferry the year before, and who had remained with him. For the removal

of this officer and some other of his wounded men Watson applied for a pass to Charlestown, which Marion granted. Colonel Watson was now literally besieged. His supplies were cut off on all sides, and so many of his men killed that he is said by tradition to have sunk them in Black River to hide their number.

Watson at length abandoned the field, making a forced march down the Georgetown road, but paused at Ox Swamp, six miles below the lower bridge, for on each side of the road through it there was a thick boggy swamp, and Marion had trees felled across the causeway, and the bridges, of which there were three, destroyed. There was, moreover, a still more difficult pass at Johnson's, ten miles farther on. Watson, therefore, turned to the right and crossed through the open piney woods to the Santee road, distant about fifteen miles. Marion pressed on after him, sending Colonel Peter Horry in advance with the cavalry and riflemen. Watson was thus pressed and annoyed along his whole route until they reached Sampit bridge, nine miles from Georgetown, where the last skirmish took place. Here Marion received news of Doyle's movements, which arrested his progress and summoned him to meet new perils. Watson reached Georgetown with two wagon-loads of wounded men.¹ An intercepted letter, dated March,² without the day of the month, but which James gives as of the 20th, shows that he had been hemmed in so closely that he was in want of everything, and had taken this route to Georgetown, fifty miles out of his way, to obtain supplies. From the fort at Wright's Bluff Watson had not advanced more than forty miles on his way to join Doyle in an attack upon Snow Island. The loss of the British during these movements was great, but the

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 99-104.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 47.

exact number is unknown. Marion is said to have lost but one man.

In the meanwhile, Colonel Doyle, in pursuance of the plan of their joint operations, after crossing Lynch's Creek at McCallam's Ferry, had moved down on the east of that river towards Snow Island, which, it will be recollected, had been left with a small guard under Colonel Erwin. This officer, after a short engagement in which he lost seven killed and fifteen prisoners,¹ retreated; but before doing so he had the supplies there of army stores and ammunition thrown into Lynch's Creek. This, at this crisis, was a most serious loss.

From Sampit Marion marched back towards Snow Island. On the way, receiving intelligence that Doyle lay at Witherspoon's Ferry, across Lynch's Creek, he proceeded forthwith to attack him. Doyle had taken a position on the north or Georgetown side of the ferry, and when McCottry in advance with his mounted riflemen arrived at the creek, the British were scuttling a ferry-boat on the opposite side. From a position behind the trees, he gave them a well-directed fire, under which a British officer and sergeant were wounded.² They ran to their arms, and returned the fire with a heavy volley, which, however, inflicted no loss upon the Americans. Doyle then retired. The ferry-boat being scuttled, and Lynch's Creek swollen, and at this place wide and deep, Marion moved up its course until he reached a more practicable place for crossing, five miles above the ferry, there he swam the river and pursued Doyle. He continued the pursuit for two days, when, coming up to a house at which Doyle had destroyed all his heavy baggage, and learning that he had proceeded with great celerity towards Camden, he halted.

Marion now learned of the loss of his ammunition and

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, April 4, 1781.

² *Ibid.*

stores at Snow Island. It was a great blow to him, and under present circumstances appeared irretrievable; but his spirit was still unbroken. In the meantime, Colonel Watson, having refreshed and reënfined his party, and received a fresh supply of military stores and provisions at Georgetown, turned again towards the Pee Dee, and marched to Catfish Creek, a mile from where the town of Marion now stands. Here Gainey's party¹ had flocked in to him in such numbers that he was soon said to be nine hundred strong. Returning from the pursuit of Doyle, and hearing of the approach of Watson, Marion crossed the Pee Dee at the Wrahees, five miles from him. His own force was now increased to five hundred men, but he had no more than two rounds of ammunition to each man. It was proposed, therefore, to retreat into North Carolina, or, if necessary, to the mountains, and Colonels Peter Horry, Hugh Horry, James Postell, and John Erwin, Majors John James, John Baxter, and Alexander Swinton, had agreed to go with him, when the news was received of the approach of Colonel Lee, the advance of General Greene, upon his return to South Carolina. The circumstances which led to this event must be reserved to another chapter.

¹ Major Micajah Gainey, son of an Englishman, Stephen Gainey, who had settled at an early period on a spot six miles below the present town of Marion. He had a respectable property and at first took sides with the Revolutionary party, but considering himself aggrieved, he went over to the enemy, and was rewarded with a commission of major and put in command of the Tories of his neighborhood. He became a person of considerable influence on the Tory side in that section.

CHAPTER V

1781

GENERAL GREENE, as it has appeared, was anxious to bring out and organize the militia to operate in the rear of Cornwallis during his invasion of North Carolina, and for this purpose he had called upon the Whigs of Mecklenburg. Unhappily General Davidson, the gallant commander of the militia of North Carolina, had already fallen while resisting the crossing of the Catawba at Cowan's Ford by the British; and the office to which Colonel Davie had been assigned having withdrawn him from the field, the Whigs in this neighborhood were left without either leader under whom they had formerly acted, and none other appeared sufficiently popular to inspire and conduct them to further enterprise. They therefore held a meeting and requested General Greene to assign Morgan to their command; but Morgan had become dissatisfied, and, suffering also from a serious indisposition, declined the command and retired from the field. Greene, it also appears, was in hope that when Sumter came out he would undertake this duty, but, as has been seen, he had moved in another direction. General Greene now turned to Pickens, who, as soon as he was relieved of the charge of the Cowpens prisoners, had rejoined his commander at Salisbury. His followers were now reduced to a handful, for the retreat of the army had called most of them away to provide for the subsistence and safety of their families. The Whigs of North Carolina were advised to place them-

selves under the command of Pickens, who had now been made brigadier general by Governor Rutledge and he was instructed to hang upon the skirts of the enemy, watch the movements of his small detachments, guard particularly against surprise, and as soon as an opportunity afforded, to pass Lord Cornwallis and join Greene's army at Guilford or wherever else he should make a stand. General Huger, who on his march from the Cheraws had been overtaken by Colonel Lee from the lower Pee Dee, formed a junction with General Greene and Morgan's command at Guilford on the 7th of February. On the 10th of the month the two armies lay within twenty-five miles of each other, the one at Salem, the other at Guilford. From Guilford Greene retreated to the lower Dan and crossed into Virginia, while Cornwallis marched to Hillsboro. The armies were in these positions when Greene resolved, on the morning of the 22d, to strike a blow at one of the British posts at Hart's Mill, two and a half miles from Hillsboro. Captain Eggleston of the Legionary corps was accordingly despatched for the purpose, and with boldness and precaution approached the position of the picket, but found himself anticipated and the whole picket already killed or in possession of an American party.

This service, says Johnson, was performed by Colonel McCall detached for the purpose by General Pickens.¹ The necessities of their families, as we have said, had obliged one-half of Pickens's command to return to their homes; but the gallant little band of South Carolinians under McCall still adhered to him, and by the accession of volunteers from Virginia and North Carolina their numbers were increased to 360 rank and file, consisting of Mc-

¹ Johnson speaks of this officer as Hugh McCall; but there is evidently a mistake. It was James McCall.

Call's party of horse, about 45 in number, and the rest well-mounted riflemen. With this party Pickens advanced upon Cornwallis by the direct road from Guilford to Hillsboro, and without knowing of his near approach to the party under Lee, although apprized of their being on the same service, had anticipated him in the enterprise against the British picket.¹ Schenck charges that Johnson falls into an error in ascribing this *coup de main* to McCall of South Carolina, and asserts that it was really performed by Captain Graham of North Carolina, that McCall was in fact ten miles distant from the scene.² But the evidence of Pickens and Greene is decisive upon the point. Greene writes to Pickens on the 26th of February: "I have to acknowledge the receipt of your two letters of the 23d, wherein you acquaint me with the surprise of a British picket by Colonel McCall. . . . The affair of Colonel McCall was executed with firmness and address, and discovered a spirit of enterprise and genius which I shall be ever happy to cherish."³ This contemporaneous testimony of the two commanding officers was certainly sufficient to warrant Johnson in crediting the affair to McCall. It is not at all impossible, however, that Captain Graham may have commanded the detachment which under McCall's orders actually made the attack and capture.

On the night of the 21st, General Greene, attended by a small escort, had visited General Pickens's camp, and spent the greater part of the night in his bush tent in consultation with Pickens and Lee as to their future movements. Then, committing the combined detachments of Pickens and Lee to the command of the former, he exhorted the two commanders to let nothing disturb their harmony — an admoni-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 450.

² *No. Ca., 1780-81* (Schenck), 275.

³ See letter, Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 457.

tion which was not violated by either of them during the war. The orders given to Pickens were to make every effort to prevent the embodying of the Loyalists and impede the progress of the British army should their commander attempt to retreat before the main army could advance to attack it. Pickens lost not a moment in performing the service committed to his charge. By the examination of prisoners taken by McCall, Greene became satisfied that Cornwallis had no intention of moving southwardly; and having been joined by about a thousand militia from North Carolina and expecting a thousand more in a few days, Greene determined to prepare for a decisive blow by hastening on his reënforcements, while he occupied with the main army a position favorable for covering the concentration and for cutting off the enemy's communication with the upper country. For this purpose he recrossed the Dan, and marched toward the head of Haw River on the route to Guilford in a westwardly direction. Pickens directing his march in a line nearly parallel to that of the main army, and about twenty miles distant from it, purposed to pass the Haw, and by secret and rapid movements to disperse several parties of Tories who were collecting. This route soon brought him upon the trail of Tarleton, and apprehensive of the safety of several parties of militia who were marching to join him, as they were without cavalry to oppose to Tarleton, Pickens, without hesitation, moved at once in his pursuit. Such was the expedition with which he pressed the pursuit that at noon on the 25th he was near surprising the great cavalry leader when quietly at his dinner. Following Tarleton as he was, from the direction of Hillsboro, his party was taken for a reënforcement to that officer, a mistake the more easily made because of the similarity in the uniforms of Tarleton's and Lee's Legions. Never, declared Pickens, was there a more glorious

opportunity of cutting off a detachment, when it was lost by a most singular circumstance — a circumstance, however, which brought about the utter destruction of a party of Tories instead. While pushing on in the pursuit of Tarleton, Pickens fell in with a body of two hundred or three hundred Tories under the command of a Colonel Pyles. The situation of Pickens was now embarrassing in the extreme, between Tarleton's Legion and this body of Tories. But fortunately observing from the confident approach of a courier from the Tories, that they had also mistaken his command for a British party, he boldly resolved to pass without undeceiving them, and to hasten to the attack of Tarleton, then within one mile encamped, without an apprehension of danger. Pyles, unfortunately for himself and his band, inspired with a loyal desire to pay due homage to his Majesty's troops, had drawn up his men on the right of the road very near to its margin. They were all mounted and their guns resting on their shoulders. So complete was the imposition that the dragoons which marched in file in front, their swords drawn, had reached the end of Pyles's line before a suspicion was excited. The infantry of the Legion might also have passed, and probably the militia, for there was nothing to distinguish them from the troops with Tarleton; but, unfortunately, the Maryland companies under Lee had been too familiarly known in that neighborhood and their uniform had nothing like it in the British army. Their appearance exposed the deception, and the instantaneous discharge of a few guns in the rear brought the whole corps upon the unfortunate Loyalists. What followed was the result of a very few minutes. Those who did not sink under the first onset of the cavalry broke away in confusion, and many fell beneath a volley from the riflemen. Pickens made the most earnest efforts to suppress the firing, not only from the dictates of humanity, but from the fear of alarming the unsuspecting

Tarleton. But before his order could be enforced, the work had been done, one hundred had been left dead on the field, and very few escaped not grievously wounded. Pyles himself fell under many strokes of the sword, but survived, though dreadfully mutilated.¹ So complete was the deception that Tarleton relates that several of the wounded Loyalists entered the British camp and complained to Tarleton of the cruelty of his dragoons.² This was the first explanation given him of the firing which had been heard in his camp. Night put an end to the slaughter, and Pickens, notwithstanding the darkness, proceeded at once to place himself between Tarleton and his own approaching reinforcements. Tarleton, with no suspicion that he was in the neighborhood of so superior an enemy, had actually drawn up his men at midnight to strike at Preston, who was in command of one of the parties for whose safety Pickens was so solicitous, when an express from Lord Cornwallis recalled him instantly to Hillsboro. His lordship had heard of the advance of the Americans, and had at once sent to warn Tarleton of his danger and to recall him to the main army.

It is not within the scope of this history to follow the movements of the armies under Greene and Cornwallis, which culminated at Guilford Court-house, or to detail the events of that battle, in which South Carolina, save in the presence of General Isaac Huger, had no part. It is more immediately concerned in the history of the small party under Pickens. From the time this officer had joined General Morgan it has been seen that he had not rested a day. Some of the officers and men under him had been engaged in the most active service ever since the fall of Charlestown. The rest had abandoned their homes with Pickens himself, and had taken to the field when, in

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 454-455.

² Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 232.

violation of their paroles, they had been called upon to serve in the British army. They had received neither clothing nor pay, and came into the service mounted at their own expense. They were not of that class of men who can minister to their own by invading the comforts of others; most, if not all, were men of respectable connections and comfortable property. But their condition now was scarcely to be borne; they had not the clothing necessary to common decency. Yet no one deserted, no one murmured, but, foregoing the privileges of volunteers, they resisted the example of hundreds who daily came and went as they pleased, and never shrank from their duty in the midst of retreat, privation, and suffering. But Pickens could no longer forbear calling the attention of the commanding general to their claims and suffering. In the neighborhood of their friends their tattered clothing might be replenished. No demand for discharge was hinted at. But besides their own increasing necessities, affairs in their own State were now demanding their return. In addition to the large British force retained in South Carolina, appearances on the frontier threatened a serious invasion from the Indians. Not only their own apprehensions, but those of General Greene himself, were seriously awakened for the fate of their families and connections; and General Pickens was ordered to repair to the back parts of South Carolina to protect the Whigs, suppress the Loyalists, and cooperate with General Sumter in the active enterprises in which that indefatigable patriot was then engaged.¹

While General Pickens was on his march to South Carolina, a party of the New York Volunteers under the command of Captain Grey was detached by Lord Rawdon from Camden, to disperse a body of militia who were gathering on Dutchman Creek, in what is now Fairfield County.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. I, 469.

This the New York Volunteers succeeded in doing, killing two captains, sixteen privates, and taking eighteen prisoners without the loss of a man on their part.¹

General Pickens on his return to South Carolina was joined by Colonel Elijah Clarke, who had now recovered from his wounds received in the affair at Long Cane in December. As he was pursuing his march, Pickens received intelligence that Major Dunlap with seventy-five British dragoons had been detached from Ninety Six into the country on a foraging expedition. Pickens at once detached Clarke and McCall to attack him. On the 24th of March they came up with Dunlap, encamped at Beattie's Mill, on Little River, in what is now Abbeville County. A bridge over which Dunlap must pass in retreat was seized by a party detached for the purpose, and with the main body Clarke himself advanced to the attack. Dunlap, surprised, retired into the mill and some outhouses, but these were too open for defence against riflemen. Recollecting, no doubt, his infamous conduct and dreading the revenge of these men—if not of Pickens and McCall themselves—for his outrageous treatment of their families and friends, Dunlap resolved to sell his life dearly, and resisted for several hours, until thirty-four of his men were killed and others wounded, himself among the latter, when he held out a flag and surrendered. The prisoners taken were forty-two, including the wounded. These were sent to Watauga, in what is now East Tennessee, for safe-keeping.²

McCall, the historian of Georgia, states that Dunlap died the ensuing night, and adds, "The British account of this affair stated that Dunlap was murdered by the guard after he had surrendered, but such is not the fact, however much he deserved such treatment." Commenting upon this,

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, March 21, 1781.

² McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, 361.

Draper observes that McCall errs in supposing that Dunlap was not killed by his guard, or by some one with their connivance. It was covered up as much as possible by those who perpetrated the act; but General Pickens, whose high sense of honor revolted against such turpitude, even against an officer of Dunlap's infamous character, "offered a handsome reward for the murderer," as General Greene subsequently testifies in a letter to Colonel Balfour, accompanied with a copy of Pickens's order proclaiming the reward.¹ It will be remembered that once before Dunlap was supposed to have been killed. It is curious that a doubt should have again existed as to his death at this time; and it is worthy of observation that *The Royal Gazette*—published in Charlestown—the faithful chronicler of the affairs of the British army, especially of all alleged atrocities on the part of the Americans, should have no notice of this affair, or even of Dunlap's death. Draper asserts, however, that a successor was appointed to his place, whose commission bore date the 28th of March, which he supposes to be the date of Dunlap's death. Certain it is that this noted and cruel man disappears from the scene of the war at this period, and, as Draper observes, while the manner of his taking off is to be regretted, he had little reason to expect better treatment.

¹ *King's Mountain and its Heroes*, 163-164; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 195; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 161; Gordon's *Am. War*, vol. IV, 167. This work has recently been severely criticised by Orin Grant Libby, Ph.D., in a critical examination of it published in the *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1899, vol. I, 365, in which Professor Libby shows that it is made up, to a large extent, of excerpts from the *Annual Register*, without acknowledgment or reference. In this instance, however, Gordon's authority is not the *Annual Register*, but a letter of General Greene to Colonel Balfour on the subject of Colonel Hayne's execution. Jared Sparks, in his *Life of Gouverneur Morris*, vol. I, p. 255, observes "that Gordon suspected many things that never happened, as he wrote many things not worth recording."

Another leader now took the field whose deeds were to rival those of Sumter and Marion, and who was to carry the war across the line of communication between Charlestown and the upper country, back into the region in which it had first been waged.

William Harden was a native of what is now Barnwell County. On the 23d of February, 1776, he had been elected captain of an artillery company at Beaufort by the Provincial Congress, and had subsequently become a colonel of militia, in which capacity he served under General Bull in the early part of the war. Upon the fall of Charlestown he had joined Marion with a few followers whom he kept together. His small party had now been considerably increased by refugees from his old neighborhood, in the present counties of Barnwell, Hampton, and Beaufort, and now numbered seventy-six. With these and with another party—a band of Georgia patriots under Colonel Baker, who had also seen considerable service in the early part of the war—Harden conceived the bold design of leaving Marion on the Pee Dee, crossing the Santee and the country between Charlestown and the enemy's posts in the interior, and renewing the war between Charlestown and Savannah, so as to coöperate with Pickens who, it was now known, was on his march to Ninety Six. He started upon this enterprise some time in March before the 21st, for Marion wrote to him on that day a letter which he received before the 7th of April.¹ With his party numbering about one hundred men, he crossed the Santee, and then the Edisto at Givhan's Ferry, and took position near Godfrey's Savannah on the Ashepoo River. Here he was directly between Charlestown and the British post called Fort Balfour at Pocotaligo. From his camp at this place he reported to Marion that the British Colonel Ballingall had a few days before come up with one hundred regulars and sixty horse to Pon Pon, and

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 49.

said he would run him off. However, he had sent a small party to see how Colonel Ballingall was situated, as he proposed to surprise him that night; that his party had succeeded in bringing off two prisoners within three hundred yards of his main body, whereupon the British that evening had made a precipitate retreat to Parker's Ferry across the Pon Pon, as the Edisto is there called, and the next day to Dorchester. Harden had expected Marion to have followed him, for he writes: "I have been able to keep from Purrysburg to Pon Pon clear that two or three men may ride in safety, and would have gone lower down but was in hopes you would have been over the river, and been in their rear where we might have been sure of them. I shall remain hereabouts till I can hear from you, as I have not been able to take orders from General Pickens at Ninety Six."¹

It is in this letter of Colonel Harden to General Marion that the name of the unfortunate Colonel Isaac Hayne first appears in connection with the events which were to end in his tragic death. This gentleman, it will be remembered, had been elected without his knowledge a member of the General Assembly which adopted the Constitution of 1778.² He was a man of great popularity and a staunch Whig; and when the State was invaded by Sir Henry Clinton, had raised a company of volunteer cavalry, which operated in the rear of the British posts during the siege of Charlestown. He had been appointed colonel of the Colleton County Regiment, of which his company formed a part, but in consequence of some intrigue had resigned his commission, and had served as a private soldier with great zeal and determination, thus adding greatly to the discipline of the regiment and the encouragement of his fellow-citizens. After the surrender of the town, Hayne had returned to his plan-

¹ Gibbes's *Doc. History of the Am. Revolution*, 1781-82, 49-51.

² *History of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 212.

tation on the Edisto under the protection of the Articles of Capitulation, which provided that "the militia now in garrison shall be permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners of war on parole," which provision, it was claimed, applied to the outposts as well as to the garrison."¹ When, however, Sir Henry Clinton issued his extraordinary proclamation revoking paroles to all but those who were actually in garrison at the time of the capitulation, Colonel Ballingall of the Royal militia in this district waited on Hayne, and informed him that he had orders to require him to become a British subject or report instantly to the commandant at Charlestown. Hayne claimed the benefit of the terms of capitulation under which he had surrendered. But his popularity and patriotism caused a rigid enforcement of the terms of the proclamation in his case, and although small-pox was raging in his family, — all of his children being at the time sick, one having just died, and his wife being at the point of death, — even under all these cruel circumstances and distress, this amiable and upright citizen was compelled to choose between the abandonment of his sick family or of his country's cause. Finding remonstrance unavailing, he declared to Ballingall that no human force should remove him from his dying wife. The discussion terminated in a written stipulation by which Hayne engaged "to demean himself as a British subject so long as the country should be covered by the British army." Had matters rested thus it would have been well for the unfortunate gentleman. But from some necessity of his sick wife and children he repaired to Charlestown, presented himself to General Patterson with the written agreement of Colonel Ballingall, and solicited permission to return home. This was peremptorily refused, and Hayne was told that he must either become a British subject or submit to close confinement. He was in great

¹ *Southern Review* (1828), vol. I, 76.

distress at this, not on his own account, for he would readily have submitted to the threatened imprisonment had it not been for the condition of his family. He must return to his wife, who was supposed to be dying, and who did actually die shortly after. In this embarrassing situation he consulted with Dr. David Ramsay, one of the patriots, soon after sent into exile, and who was subsequently the historian, and left with him the following paper declaratory of the motives under which he acted:—

“If the British would grant me the indulgence which we in the day of our power gave to their adherents, of removing my family and property, I would seek an asylum in the remotest corner of the United States rather than submit to their government; but as they allow no alternative than submission or confinement in the capitol at a distance from my wife and family, at a time when they are in the most need of my presence and support, I must, for the present, yield to the demands of the conqueror. I request you to bear in mind that previous to my taking this step I declare that it is contrary to my inclinations and forced on me by hard necessity. I never will bear arms against my country. My masters can require no service of me but what is enjoined by the old militia law of the Province, which substitutes a fine in lieu of personal service. This I will pay as the price of my protection. If my conduct should be censured by my countrymen, I beg that you would remember this conversation, and bear witness for me that I do not mean to desert the cause of America.”

In this state of distress, Colonel Hayne subscribed a declaration of his allegiance to the king of Great Britain, but not, says Ramsay, without expressly objecting to the clause which required him “with his arms to support the Royal government.” Whereupon the commandant of the garrison, General Patterson, and James Simpson, the Intendant of the British police, assured him that this would never be required, and, it is said, added further “that when the regular forces could not defend the country without the aid of its inhabitants, it would be high time for the Royal army to quit it.” Having thus submitted and taken pro-

tection, Hayne obtained permission to return to his family. The British authorities, however, did not respect the reservation which he had made in regard to military service, with the assent, as he claimed, of those who took his allegiance, but in violation of it repeatedly called upon him to take arms against his countrymen, and finally threatened close confinement in case of further refusal.¹

Affairs were in this condition with Hayne when Harden appeared with his party and established himself in his immediate neighborhood. Hayne, it is said, regarded the refusal of the British authorities to recognize the special condition under which he had given his allegiance as relieving him from its obligation, and also that Harden's appearance presented the condition under which he had been assured that it would be no longer binding; but he was not yet prepared to act upon these views. He wavered. Harden had expected that he would take the field and join him and had brought him a commission of colonel. By Paul Hamilton,² one of the party, and an intimate friend of Hayne, Harden sent to invite his coöperation; but Hayne refused to receive the commission or even to allow Hamilton a few horses, of which he had a fine stock. Indeed, he informed Hamilton that the moment he heard of Harden's approach he had ordered all his horses removed lest assistance might be obtained in violation of his parole.³

Harden was very much disappointed at Hayne's course, and impatient under it. In his letter to Marion he writes:—

“ You will receive a letter from Col. Hayne with the commission. You will hear his reason for not accepting it. This gentleman has

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 277-280.

² This Paul Hamilton, who was afterwards Secretary of the United States Navy, was a nephew of the Paul Hamilton who was one of the addressees of Clinton and whose estate was amerced by the General Assembly of South Carolina.

³ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 451-452.

kept many from joining me, and is staying on too much formality. I have given the command of the Regiment to Major Ladson, who turned out the day I crossed the river, without hesitation. I hope you will not take it amiss, as Col. — wont be seen, and the Lieutenant Colonel, Saunders, is to the northward— Ladson to act as his major on his old commission. I find the leading men very backward, which keep many thus, so hope you will send me or some other officer some proclamation, or orders what is to be done. They all say they wait for your army to come their way, then they will all turn out, but I found too many of them are waiting for commissions—they can't turn out without," etc.¹

Though disappointed in the support which he received from the people in the neighborhood, Harden entertained no idea of abandoning this field. The very day he wrote the letter just quoted—that is, Saturday the 7th of April—he succeeded in capturing a captain and twenty-five men at a muster field on the Four Holes.² He then pushed on to another small post, and on Sunday night, the 8th, got within six miles of it. This was garrisoned by Captain Barton and six men. Major Cooper was detached by Harden with fifteen men, who surrounded the house and demanded a surrender. This was refused, and a fire opened on the attacking party, a brisk fight ensued, in which Cooper was wounded, one of his men killed, and another wounded. Barton was also wounded and taken, three of his men killed, and the other three taken.³

Hearing that Colonel Fenwick with a corps of dragoons was at Pocotaligo, Harden moved at once to surprise him, but Fenwick heard of Harden's approach and advanced to meet him. Harden attempted an ambuscade. As the advanced parties met he ordered his men to turn into the

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 50.

² *Ibid.*, 53. This date is fixed by notice in *The Royal Gazette* of April 11th. From date of Harden's letter (18th) it would appear to have been the 14th.

³ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 54.

woods, but unfortunately they went too far; and when he attempted to bring them back to an attack, they gave way before a charge of the enemy. Fenwick, however, did not pursue his advantage, but retreated, leaving one man killed, and having seven wounded, to which must be added two taken prisoner the next morning. Harden lost one man taken and two wounded.¹ *The Royal Gazette* claimed that the Americans had lost fourteen killed and wounded and some horses.² Harden fell back about ten miles and rested a few days, then rapidly crossing the Combahee or Salkehatchie, as the river is here called, he marched upon Fort Balfour at Pocotaligo, which he came in sight of at twelve o'clock on Friday, the 13th. At once posting his men, he sent ten of the best mounted to draw out the garrison. It happened that just at this time Colonel Fenwick and Colonel Lechmere, another British militia officer, were visiting their hospitals at Vanbiber's house, a short distance from the redoubt. Harden's party surprised and took them prisoners with seven dragoons. Having thus secured the principal officers of the garrison, Captain Harden was sent to demand the surrender of the fort. This Colonel Kelsell, who was now in command, refused, saying that he would not give it up. A second demand was sent with a message that if he was obliged to storm the post he would give no quarter. Colonel Kelsell desired half an hour to consider and Harden allowed him twenty minutes; at the expiration of which the fort surrendered upon terms. In two hours the fort was given up. The garrison, consisting of one militia colonel, one major, three captains, three lieutenants, and sixty privates, and one lieutenant and twenty-two dragoons, marched out and piled their arms outside of the abatis;

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 54.

² *The Royal Gazette*, April 11, 1789.

Harden and his party marched in and took possession. That night and the next day they destroyed the fort, as they had received intelligence of a relief for the garrison coming from Charlestown.¹ This proved to be true. Colonel Ballingall with 100 of the Seventy-first, 30 Highlanders, and about 40 militia soon made his appearance. Harden did not consider himself strong enough to give battle to this force, as he had detached Captain Barton with a party in pursuit of some boats going up the Savannah to Augusta. Harden had thus secured 100 prisoners with their arms, and the horses of the dragoons, and had destroyed a British post without the loss of a man. In a week's operation, with a party originally but 100 strong, Harden had broken into the enemy's lines in the rear of Charlestown and had in four engagements killed, wounded, and taken prisoners of the enemy as many as he had in his own ranks. Harden reported to Marion that the enemy had left Pocotaligo and were then lying at Blake's plantation, he supposed, for some of the 'Tories to join them. He hoped, however, that but few would do so, as he had been among them and they had all taken to the swamp. He proposed to move off southwardly. He writes again: —

“The men about Pon Pon are the backwardest, though when I first went there I learned they were all to be in arms only waiting till they could send a man to you for commissions, when they were to turn out. I beg you will send some immediately with your orders, it seems they wait for Colonel Hayne's and he says he can't act without a commission, and is sure if he turns out at least two hundred will join him. If so I am very sure that this part of the country can be held.”²

He closes his letter with reporting he had not yet heard from General Pickens.

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 54; *The Royal Gazette*, April 14, 1781.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 53, 55.

CHAPTER VI

1781

SINCE the 1st of January, 1781, the volunteer partisan bands of South Carolina under Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and Harden had now added twenty-six more engagements to the list of twenty-six they had fought in 1780.¹ In eight of these affairs the reported casualties among the British and Tories amounted to 340, and in the five in which the numbers are given, the Americans lost but 53. In those affairs in which there are no reports of casualties on the British side, there was some of the hardest fighting, as in Watson's engagements at Mount Hope and Black River. There can be little doubt, therefore, that the loss inflicted upon the enemy in the year 1781, up to this time, amounted to something over 500. And it may be as safe to compute the loss of the partisan bands at 200. So that in the fifty-two battles, great and small, which these volunteer soldiers in South Carolina had fought in the ten months from the fall of Charlestown, they had killed, wounded, and taken prisoners of the enemy at least 3000, at a loss to themselves of about 1000. Between Lord Rawdon, at Camden, on the frontier, as it was termed, and Balfour's command at Charlestown, Sumter, Marion, and Harden had worked up the whole country from the Pee Dee across the Santee, and Congaree to the Savannah—from the Waxhaws to Beaufort; and now Pickens was

¹ See Tables of Engagements in 1780, *History of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 850-853.

hastening to bring into the field the increasing friends to the American cause in Ninety Six. But far beyond the achievements which these numbers indicate, these volunteer soldiers, with the assistance of their brethren from North Carolina on the one side and Georgia on the other, had accomplished much for the cause of freedom against the invaders. They had, as has been shown, by their own unaided efforts broken up the plans of the enemy, and disconcerted their schemes of campaign for the whole country. The advantages of their uprising had not been confined to South Carolina, or even to the South. It is not presumptuous to say they had done much to save Washington's army from destruction in the time of its weakness, and to render Yorktown possible.

But notwithstanding their unselfish heroism and the essential services they had rendered to the country at large, the conviction was growing even among their own leaders, and the most patriotic of themselves, that this system of warfare could no longer be relied upon, nor indeed could it longer be endured. From its very nature it was productive of great evils. Fighting without pay, clothing, or provisions furnished by a government of any kind, their necessities engendered irregularities in the best of their organizations. Serving as volunteer militia, it was impossible to preserve any more discipline than their patriotism would impose upon them. Coming and going from their homes to the battle-field, compelled to be caring for their families, as well as providing for their own wants, fighting to-day and ploughing to-morrow, not even their patriotism could afford the discipline necessary to an army. Then, beyond these evils, which afflicted the virtuous and the true, there was the still greater evil that the means of supplying the necessities of the good soldier opened the door to the rapacity and cruelty of the evil. There came with

the true patriots a host of false friends and plunderers. And this was true of both sides in this terrible struggle. The outlaw Whig and the outlaw Tory, or rather the outlaws who were pretended Whigs or Tories, as the occasion served, were laying waste the country almost as much as those who were fighting for the one side or the other.

There was no civil government in the State beyond the precinct of the British Intendant and Board of Police in Charlestown, and they administered a military rule.¹ Governor Rutledge, embodying in himself all that remained of the civil power and authority under the new State constitution, wisely and properly remained beyond the limits of immediate danger of capture. He had come from Philadelphia with Gates in the hope that the Continental army would restore at least a part of the State to his government, and when that hope was frustrated by the defeat at Camden, he had retired to Hillsboro, there counselling with the authorities of North Carolina and the Congress. Then he had come to Charlotte with Greene, from which point he was in close communication with Sumter and Marion.

On the 8th of March the Governor wrote to Sumter from the camp on Haw River, North Carolina:—

“The present situation of affairs rendering it impracticable for me to return immediately into So. Carolina, not seeing any prospect of being able to go thither very soon, and it being impossible if we s^d penetrate that country to reestablish the civil government for some time; & my remaining here being of no service to our State, I have determined to set off in a few days for Philadelphia with a view of procuring if possible some supplies of clothing for our militia (whose distress for want of it give me the greatest concern) and of obtaining such effectual aid as may soon restore both Ch^a Town & and the country to our

¹ This court, established by military authority, assumed civil jurisdiction; but after the Revolution it was repeatedly adjudged an illegal body, and all acts under its authority void. — *Brisbane v. Lestarjette*, 1 Bay's Reports, 113.

possession — my utmost endeavor for these purposes shall be exerted, & I flatter myself that I may succeed by personal application — I am persuaded of your utmost attention & that you will pursue such measures as may be most serviceable to the State, & I doubt not that Gen^l Marion (to whom I have wrote) & Gen^l Pickens (to whom I have spoke on the subject) will forward your views to the utmost of their power — I shall be glad to hear from you under cover to Gen^l Greene when any material occurrence offers, & shall write to you under cover to him when I have any material to communicate.”

He promised to send blank commissions as soon as he could procure them, and in the meanwhile he authorized Sumter to give brevets, and “in order,” he wrote, “that you may carry sufficient authority over the several officers of your brigade you may remove any of them and appoint others in their stead, from time to time, as you think proper.”¹ His Excellency wrote a similar letter to General Marion, indeed almost in the same words. In the letter to Marion he adds : —

“I am persuaded of the continuance of your utmost attention, and hope you will cultivate a good understanding with Gen^{ls} Sumter and Pickens, and do everything in your power to forward the former's views, and shall be glad to hear from you when anything material offers, under cover, to him,” etc.²

Governor Rutledge had probably some good reason for thus carefully enjoining the line of precedence and communications among his generals, and urging a cordial cooperation between them, for Marion does not appear to have been anxious to subordinate his movements to the direction of Sumter. The latter had made strenuous efforts and earnest appeals to Marion for counsel and cooperation. From his camp at Friday's Ferry, on the 20th of February, he had written to Marion, “If you can with propriety advance southward so as to coöperate or corre-

¹ Sumter MSS.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.*, 1781-82, 32.

spoud with me it might have the best of consequences.”¹ Again on the 28th he had written : —

“Nothing can at this time be more essentially necessary to the interest of this country than to form a well-regulated army in the interior part of this State, while the enemy’s principal force is so far removed. I hope it will not interfere with any plan that you have laid to come this way. From the idea I have of the state of things in this quarter I think it expedient for you to proceed to this place. I shall wait impatiently for the happiness of an interview with you.”²

From the High Hills of Santee he once more appeals to Marion for an interview, adding, “You will readily agree with me that the worst of consequences are to be apprehended from my having to return without seeing you and fixing upon a proper mode of our future proceedings.”³ But Marion had made no response, and Sumter, failing to obtain coöperation from him, had gone back to the Waxhaws, whereupon Rawdon had turned upon Marion.

As he could obtain no conference with Marion, Sumter now assumed the responsibility of a reorganization of the militia, under Governor Rutledge’s original instructions accompanying his commission as brigadier general, and by which he was especially charged to give the strictest orders and use the most efficient means to prevent the shameful practice of plundering.

As the volunteer, who was always mounted, must be supplied with food for himself and forage for his horse, he had helped himself from the British magazines or the Tory barns as occasion allowed; and when these could not be drawn upon, he took from his own friends what his necessities demanded. This was not improper in such a warfare, but it was demoralizing to the troops and ruinous to the country. Still more so were the bands of thieves and robbers which this condition of affairs inevitably pro-

¹ Gibbes’s *Documentary Hist.*, 1781–82, 23.

² *Ibid.*, 49.

³ *Ibid.*, 28.

duced — men representing themselves now as Whigs, and now as Tories, according as were the parties to be plundered. In regard to horses also there was the further consideration that, if not taken by the Americans, they would fall into the hands of the British or Tories, and supply their most pressing want. General Greene writes to Sumter, 15th of April: —

“Although I am a great enemy to plundering, yet I think the horses belonging to the inhabitants within the enemy’s lines should be taken from them, especially such as are either fit for the wagons or dragoon service. If we are superior in cavalry, and can prevent the enemy from equipping a number of teams, it will be almost impossible for them to hold their posts, and utterly impossible to pursue us if we should find a retreat necessary.”¹

From the “New Acquisition,” the present county of York, Sumter writes to Marion, on the 28th of March, his plan of remedying these evils: ²—

“It was exceedingly mortifying, after so much pains taken, to be deprived of a conference with you, a circumstance much to be lamented, as both individuals and the publick are consequently much injured thereby. Your advice and assistance in framing, adjusting, and laying down a proper plan of operation against the enemy in future might have produced the most happy events. My unfortunate failing herein, and withal finding, contrary to my expectations, that you had neither men or supplies of any kind, and the force I had with me but small and from many causes decreasing, rendered my retreat at once both necessary and difficult. I find that the disorders are prevalent in your brigade which have for some time been practised in the frontiers with such avidity as to threaten the State with inevitable ruin. To obviate which evil, as far as possible, I have adopted measures truly disagreeable, such as can only be justified by our circumstances and the necessity of the case. But it is clearly my opinion, unless this or a similar method be immediately carried into effect, that neither the State or the wealth thereof will

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, **Appendix**, 89.

² Gibbes’s *Documentary Hist.* (1781–82), 44–45.

be in the power or possession of the deserving citizens after a few weeks. The dissoluteness of our pretended friends and the ravages committed by them are as alarming and distressing as that of having the enemy among us. It is therefore necessary immediately to discriminate who are enemies and who are real friends; the former treated as their business and perfidy authorize; the latter to be known only by their conduct — that is, by bearing arms and doing duty when thereunto required by proper authority, and in case of refusal or neglect both person and property to be treated and dealt with accordingly. Nothing can be more unwise or impolitic than to suffer all the wealth of our country to be so basely and unfairly appropriated for the sole purpose of accumulating our misfortunes, and finally completing our ruin, which it is in our power at once to check, if not totally prevent the evils and disadvantages resulting therefrom; to which end I propose raising several regiments of Light Dragoons upon the State establishment, agreeably to the enclosed sketch of a plan for that purpose. I therefore request that you would be pleased to cause to be immediately raised in your brigade two regiments agreeably thereto. I have also to request that you give orders and oblige every person with you to join their proper regiments or brigades, and that none of the enemy when taken be paroled or set at liberty, but in cases of extreme necessity — that all the property captured or taken from the enemy be securely kept for publick purposes except what is allowed to, and appropriated to and for the use of the troops in service agreeably to terms proposed. Nothing can be more essential to promote the happiness and secure the peace and tranquillity of the people of this country than treating with the utmost severity all persons who contrary to orders and to the total subversion of all authority take upon themselves to form parties to go a plundering, distressing the resources of the country necessary for the use and support of the army.”

Sumter at this time was still suffering from the wound received at Blackstock. He closes this letter to Marion with the observation, “I write in so much pain as hardly to know my own meaning or read what I write.”

What were the measures so truly disagreeable which he directed Marion to adopt are not stated; but a letter written by Colonel Richard Hampton to Major John Hampton just after, that is, on the 2d of April, gives the terms upon

which the new regiments were to be organized. It is as follows:¹—

“DEAR BROTHER — For news I give you the following, viz: Bro. Wade has joined Gen'l Sumter and has left all his property in the possession of the British and Tories; he now fights them hard. Bro. Henry is raising a regular regiment of Light Horse, as also Col. Middleton, Hawthorn Hill. Bro. Wade, I believe, will also raise a regiment. It will not be amiss to mention the terms on which they are to be raised and the number each regiment is to consist of. The troops are to enlist for ten months, each regiment to have one Lieutenant Colonel, one Major, five Captains, ten Lieutenants. Each company two sergeants, twenty-five privates, the pay to be as follows: Each Colonel to receive three grown negroes and one small negro; Major to receive three grown negroes; Captain two grown negroes; Lieutenants one large and one small negro; the Staff one large and one small negro; the sergeants one and a quarter negro.² Each private one grown negro. And to be furnished with one coat, two waistcoats, two pair overalls, two shirts, two pair stockings, one pair of shoes and spurs, one horseman's cap, one blanket, (and one half bushel salt to those who have families), with two-thirds of all articles captured from the enemy except negroes and military stores, and salvage allowed them for all articles belonging to our friends which we may capture from the enemy, and to be equipped with a sword, pistols, horse, saddle, and bridle, &c. Should you meet with any young men who are willing to turn into this kind of service you may assure them that the terms will be strictly complied with, and the General directs that any who think proper to come out with the wagons to join the hard service are to be served with provisions for themselves and horses.”

Earnest and sincere as Sumter doubtless was in this effort to reorganize the volunteer bands and to provide a regular force enlisted for a definite term upon consideration

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 47-48. MSS. in Secretary of State's office, Columbia.

² Under ten years or over forty was a half negro, a full negro being valued at \$400. — Ed. Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 48. Negro slaves were regarded as subjects of spoil by all parties, the British officers as well as by the Americans, Continental and State troops.

of pay in kind — negroes and salt — if not in money, it might well have been doubted if troops raised upon such terms would prove better soldiers than the patriotic volunteers, who came and went as the occasion permitted, but who served for no other reward than the hope of obtaining the freedom of their country. Sumter's purpose was to secure a body of men enlisted for a definite period and compensated for their services in such a manner as to avoid the necessity of their living upon the country indiscriminately; and then to put down all excuse for plunder. As there was no organized government to draft men, nor any money with which to pay them, he proposed voluntary enlistment for a share of the spoils taken from the enemy and salvage on property rescued and restored to their friends. But this scheme was at last based only upon organized plunder instead of private robbery. The troops were to be paid from what they could take from the enemy.¹

¹Sumter and Pickens each organized troops on this plan, which was known as "Sumter's law," and in doing so incurred responsibilities for which they were called upon to answer when the war was over. To relieve them from their liabilities acts were passed by the General Assembly in 1784 to indemnify them and such persons as had acted under them "from vexatious suits on account of their transactions during the British usurpations in this State" (*Statutes of So. Ca.*, vol. IV. 598-601). Cases were, however, brought which necessitated a consideration of the matter by the courts of the State, and in which the judges repudiated the seizures under "Sumter's law," but in which the juries would not follow the instruction of the judges. The first case, *Porter v. Dunn*, 1 Bay's Reports, 53, was tried in 1787 before Judge John Faucheraud Grinké, who had been an officer in the Continental army. From the reports of this case, we learn, that it had appeared in evidence on the trial that in order to do justice to the officers and soldiers in the brigade, a commissary was appointed to take custody of the property seized, and also a board of field officers whose duty it was to examine into the claims of each individual and likewise into the property taken; and if the property belonged to one friendly to the interests of the country, it was restored to him; but if to the enemy or their adherents, it was delivered to the officers and men in lieu of pay.

The case was hotly contested. General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney,

Marion appears to have disapproved of the scheme, and quite a sharp correspondence passed between Sumter and

who, it must be observed, had been in the Continental line and not in the militia or volunteers, appeared for Dunn, from whom the negroes in the case had been taken. He maintained that Dunn had never been divested of his property either voluntarily or by any competent tribunal. That the seizure of the negroes was an unlawful act not warranted by the law of nations or any municipal law. He endeavored to show, that though Dunn had at one time been deluded and had joined the British standard, he had returned to the American cause and had since conducted himself as a good citizen. But he insisted that the property taken from an open enemy was not changed in war until the capture had been legally investigated in some court of competent jurisdiction, nor until a condemnation had taken place. On the other side John Julius Pringle, appearing for Porter, the officer who held the negroes under an assignment from the board of field officers, urged that, though the act of taking the property was not squared with the nice rules of law, yet the necessity of the times, the desperate situation to which the country was at that time reduced, justified its policy. The State was overrun, ravaged, pillaged from one end to the other, and its defenceless inhabitants suffered every species of injury and insult. It was without resources and without men to defend it. New and extraordinary measures were necessary, and they were adopted. He pleaded the acts of indemnity as sure and complete protection to his client. That whatever was irregular or not conformable to the rules of war in the conduct of the General or any of his officers was cured and legalized; that the property so disposed of for public use vested in the persons to whom it was delivered. The only remedy the former proprietor had was by application to the legislature, which had, in many instances, when favorable circumstances accompanied the applicant's claim, granted full compensation.

Judge Grimké charged the jury that the practice of taking property from an enemy was not justified by the law of nations or rule of warfare. That it had a tendency to promote licentiousness in the army, was discountenanced by all civilized nations. Nevertheless, he held that the act of indemnity protected the officer, and that the former owner of the negroes could only look to the legislature for compensation. Under this charge the jury found for the officer. A new trial was moved for before a full bench, consisting of Judges Henry Pendleton, Ædanus Burke, Thomas Heyward, Jr., and J. F. Grimké, who granted a new trial on the ground that *it was a hard case*; but upon the second trial, at Camden, the verdict was again for the officer and this was acquiesced in.

But the subject was not yet closed. It was again mooted in 1792, in

himself upon the subject. This, however, originated in a matter of much less consequence,—a dispute between two of their officers as to the regiment in which certain recruits were to be enlisted. Colonel Kolb, an officer of Marion's brigade, complained that Major Snipes, under Sumter's alleged authority, had taken some of Kolb's recruits for an independent company Governor Rutledge had authorized Snipes to raise. But, though originating in the discussion of this matter, Sumter complains of Marion's opposition to the raising of troops upon the State Establishment as he proposed, and resents the ground which Marion seems to have taken that there was no authority for the measure.¹

Sumter's scheme was not a success. He raised but few the case of the *Administration of Moore v. Cherry*, 1st Bay's Reports, 269. In this case, which was tried at Ninety Six, it appeared that the negro was taken from some persons called *Tories*, says the report, by a scouting party under the command of Colonel Brandon, who sold the property taken and divided the proceeds among the party. Judge Grinké presided at this trial, as he had at the former, and likewise charged the jury against the defendant who had purchased the negro from the captors, and in favor of the plaintiff, the former owner. The jury, however, as did the former, found for the defendant. At a second trial Judge Burke, who presided, charged, as had Judge Grinké, for the plaintiff, but the jury again found for the defendant. An appeal was taken, and upon the hearing the principal question was whether a third trial would be granted. John Rutledge, who was then Chief Justice under the constitution of 1790, was of opinion that, as this was a dispute about property taken during the war, it was best that there should be an end of it; though holding that it was competent for a court to order a third trial, he nevertheless was opposed to granting it in this case. Judge Waties, who had been one of Marion's men (and Marion, it will be recollected, had refused to act under "Sumter's law"), not only maintained the power of the court to order a third trial, but was of opinion it should be granted in this case; and in this view Judge Bay concurred. What was the result of the trial, if it ever took place, we do not know. James Yancey appeared for the plaintiff, and Robert Goodloe Harper for the defendant. It is interesting that the author has before him the original manuscript notes of argument of the counsel in this case.

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781–82), 65.

men under it. Ramsay observes that hitherto all of Sumter's enterprises had been effected by volunteers from the militia, but the long-continued service in the field pointed out the propriety of a more permanent corps. General Sumter, therefore, in March, 1781, with the approbation of General Greene, enlisted three small regiments of regular State troops, to be employed in constant service for the space of ten months. With these and the returning Continentals, he says, the war recommenced in South Carolina.¹ In regard to the number of regiments in the field, the historian was undoubtedly mistaken. Besides Marion's brigade on the Pee Dee, and the troops Pickens and McCall were raising on the Savannah, Sumter had with him upon Greene's return to South Carolina the regiments of Taylor, Lacey, Winn, Bratton, Hill, and Henry Hampton.

Wade Hampton now for the first time appears in the field upon the side of the Whigs. Judge Johnson mentions him as one of Sumter's officers taken and paroled by the British at Fishing Creek;² but this is a mistake. Henry Hampton was then with Sumter, Wade Hampton was not — indeed, as has appeared, more than a month after that battle, that is, on the 21st of September, he declared himself a loyal subject of his Majesty.³ It is doubtless in allusion to this that, on the 2d of April, Richard Hampton writes to John: "*For news* I give you the following; viz., Bro. Wade has joined Gen^l Sumter and has left his property in the possession of the British and Tories; *he now fights them hard.*" Notwithstanding his declaration of loyalty, it appears, from Johnson's account, that he had been arrested for some cause, and that a party of twelve men were taking him to prison, when, by one of those extraordinary

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 227.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 31.

³ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrady), 729.

actions which characterize the men of that day, he succeeded in seizing the muskets of two of his guard and overawing the whole body, and by his threats and his known character he effected his escape, having with him the weapons that insured his safety. Considering himself now released from his obligations to the British authorities, he joined Sumter. Johnson narrates this incident as if it had taken place before Sumter's raid, in February, but Richard Hampton's letter of the 2d of April indicates that it was then of a more recent occurrence.¹

The case of Wade Hampton was one of many which were now giving great concern to the British authorities, and which were to result in the execution of the unhappy Hayne. Upon the fall of Charlestown many of the militia then in the field, it will be remembered, had accepted the terms of surrender offered them, that is, the same as had been accorded the garrison of the town; viz., that they should be permitted to return to their homes as prisoners of war on parole. The militia accepting these terms had been those embodied under Richardson and Kershaw in the eastern part of the State, under Williamson and Pickens in the western or Ninety Six District, and under Bull in the Low-Country. Though Bratton, Winn, Lacey, and others had individually served during the siege of Charlestown, the militia of the upper country had not come out. While, therefore, the British held the line from Ninety Six to Camden, and from Camden to Georgetown, few, if any, questions had arisen in regard to the effect of Sir Henry Clinton's proclamation revoking the paroles of

¹ Dr. Johnson, in his *Traditions*, mentions the incident on the authority of Colonel Thomas Taylor, but does not give any date. By his account, Wade Hampton was taken prisoner upon some occasion, and was being taken under guard to be placed in a prison ship, when he thus effected his escape.

the militia who had not actually served in the garrison of the towns, as the militia in the upper country had not been in arms to accept the terms and give their paroles. But when Marion and Harden broke through from the Pee Dee, and Clarke and McCall from the Savannah, and appealed to the Whigs, their former comrades, to arise, the status of these persons became of the greatest importance to both sides. Were they bound by the paroles they had given since Clinton's proclamation annulling the terms upon which they surrendered? If so, the Whigs could obtain no recruits in the territory they might recover. If not, the British officers saw the people within the lines they had hitherto held ready now to rise and turn upon them. It has been seen how Pickens had hesitated, and how strongly he had been warned by his friend, Captain Ker, a British officer, of the danger of disregarding his parole, and warned of his certain execution in case he should unfortunately again fall into their hands. But, regarding the terms of his surrender as violated, Pickens had not been deterred, but was now, though "with a halter round his neck," as the phrase was, heroically and successfully fighting with his old comrades against the faithless enemy. His example had been contagious. Many of the paroled militia were now joining the Whig partisan bands, as Sumter, Marion, and Harden penetrated to the rear of the British lines. Colonel Hayne, a man of great influence, was going through the same trial which had resulted in returning Pickens to the field. Lord Rawdon and Balfour determined that a stop must be put to the movement.

The issue was first made in the case of Captain John Postell, the officer of Marion's brigade who had made the successful raid upon Monck's Corner in January. Captain Postell had been in the garrison of Charlestown during the siege, and had been paroled. His parole, which was simi-

lar in form to that given in a note to a former volume,¹ required him to remain at his plantation in the parish of St. Mark's, in the county of Craven, until exchanged or otherwise released, and pledged him that in the meantime he would not do or cause to be done anything prejudicial to the success of his Majesty's arms, or have intercourse or hold correspondence with his enemies.² By the terms of the capitulation it had been stipulated that the militia, upon giving these paroles, so long as they observed them, should be allowed to return to their homes, and there to be "secure from being molested in their property by British troops."³ In violation of this stipulation Postell had been stripped of his property. "My honor is all I have left," he wrote to Marion, "my family has been reduced to beg their bread."⁴ Considering himself released from the obligations of his parole, Postell had joined Marion and had become one of his most trusted officers. Just before Postell's exploit at Monck's Corner, Marion had come to an agreement with Captain Saunders, commanding the British post at Georgetown, for a partial exchange of prisoners, and at Postell's request Marion sent him with the flag to deliver the prisoners on their side. Postell had sought the mission, hoping to obtain the release of his father, who was a prisoner in the hands of the British.⁵ The British refused to recognize the flag because it was accompanied by Postell, seized him, and threw him into the jail at Georgetown as a prisoner who had broken his parole. Marion, indignant at this treatment of his flag, wrote at once to Captain

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrady), 718.

² *Gibbes's Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 36.

³ *Moultrie's Memoirs*, vol. II, 100.

⁴ *Gibbes's Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 36.

⁵ *James's Life of Marion*, 113. The author says that Postell "obtained leave to go with a flag," but is not explicit whether he was himself the bearer of it, or merely accompanied it — a point of consequence.

Saunders, protesting against its violation. Postell, he stated, had been sent by his orders with a flag to effect the exchange of prisoners, to which Saunders had agreed; he was greatly surprised to find that Saunders not only refused to make the exchange, but had violated his flag by taking Postell prisoner, contrary to the laws of nations. "I shall immediately acquaint the commandant at Charlestown," he writes, "and if satisfaction is not given I will take it in every instance that may fall in my power."¹ He adds:—

"I have ever used all the officers and men taken by me with humanity; but your conduct in closely confining Capt. Clark in a place where he cannot stand up, nor have his length, and not giving him half rations will oblige me to retaliate on the officers and men which are or may fall in my hands, which nothing will prevent but your releasing Capt. Postell immediately and using my officers as gentlemen, and your prisoners as customary in all civilized nations."²

To Balfour, the commandant at Charlestown, he wrote that, unless his flag was discharged, he must immediately acquaint Congress. He informed him of the ill treatment of other officers by Captain Saunders, and concluded:—

"Should these evils not be prevented in the future it will not be in my power to prevent retaliation taking place. Lord Rawdon and Colonel Watson have hanged three of my brigade for supposed crimes, which will make as many of your men in my hands suffer. I hope this will be prevented in the future, for it is not my wish to act but with humanity and tenderness to the unfortunate men whom the chances of war may throw in my power."

To Watson he also wrote:³ "The hanging of men taken prisoners and the violation of my flag will be retaliated if

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 31.

² We have not been able to find further information in regard to the case of Captain Clark here alluded to.

³ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 30; James's *Life of Marion*, Appendix, 25.

a stop is not put to such proceedings, which is disgraceful to all civilized nations."

In sending these letters Marion took the precaution to send an armed party along with the flag to prevent any further detention of its bearers. Though this party was attempted to be concealed, the British were aware of their presence, and Watson, taking exception, sent his reply by a little boy.¹

"It is with less surprise," he writes, "that I find a letter sent by you in all the apparent forms of a flag of truce attended by an armed party who concealed themselves within a certain distance of a place that pointed itself out for the delivery of it, than to see the contents of it exhibit a complaint from you against us for violating the law of nations."

A considerable correspondence ensued, each party charging the other with conduct unbecoming civilized warfare. In this correspondence two things are noticeable: first, that Watson, who was regarded by the British as one of their best officers and esteemed by the Americans for his humanity,² defends the burning of houses and property of the inhabitants who were their enemies, notwithstanding the distress it occasioned to women and children, as the custom of war; and second, that Marion takes no issue with Watson as to their right to take and to hold Postell as a prisoner who had broken his parole, but rests his complaint upon their violation of his flag. "If Captain Postell was a prisoner," he writes, "it was no reason for the violation of my flag, especially when it was sent to exchange prisoners agreed upon by Captain Saunders." Watson held that a flag of truce could not cover one of their own men. Marion held that they could not inquire or know who was under his flag of truce. He did not

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 33, 38.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 111, 112.

meet the great question at issue as to the status of those who had given their paroles and claimed now to be released from their obligations.

This correspondence had been carried on while Marion and Watson were facing each other across the Black River, and, notwithstanding it, Marion had allowed a pass to Nelson's Ferry for some of Watson's wounded men, and matters may have been in some way accommodated between these generous foes; but Balfour, the commandant of this department, was a man of a different character. He determined to secure Postell's person against all chance of release. He writes to Saunders:—

“As to Postell, you have done perfectly right. I have got his parole which he has broke, and which renders him wholly unfit to enter any service, as it entitles me to seize him as our prisoner wherever we can find him; no sanction whatever can defend him against a breach of the parole, by which his liberty was allowed him, and by trusting to his honor, permitted him to use the means of making his escape if he chose to break it and take the advantage of these means. He takes the chance of falling into our hands and feeling the punishment due to his breach of the laws of war. I wish you to send him by land, but if inconvenient you may send him by water in Dorrell's vessel or any other fast sailer when she returns with a guard; but of this do as you will, only be so good as not allow him to have a chance of escaping. I send you an answer to a letter received from Marion by a flag of truce sent to Col. Watson's post; and I also send you a copy of his letter to me. In sending it out be so good as to be careful who you send; a non-commissioned officer will be best for fear he detains the person sent on account of Postell, which I forgot to mention to you in my last.”

Balfour's caution had come too late. Captain Saunders, less wary than either Watson or Balfour, had sent to Marion a flag by an officer, Mr. Mariott of the Queen's Rangers, whereupon Marion seized and detained him as a hostage for Postell's release. Balfour and Saunders wrote, protesting against such action, insisting that the cases were

not similar. Their arguments would not, however, have availed; but unfortunately Marion had not a jail within which to cast Mariott as Balfour had for Postell. He had only the insecure confinement of a guard in the field, and from this Mariott succeeding in making his escape, and, as was claimed by *The Royal Gazette*, taking off with him twenty-five men. Postell, on the contrary, underwent a long and vigorous imprisonment,¹ which lasted indeed until the end of the war.

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 29-43; James's *Life of Marion*, 111-112, 113; *The Royal Gazette*, April 4, 1781.

CHAPTER VII

1781

WHILE these events had been transpiring in this State, Green had, on the 15th of March, unsuccessfully fought the battle of Guilford Court-house, in North Carolina. News of the battle appears to have reached both parties here about the same time. The British were greatly elated at its result. *The Royal Gazette* of the 28th states that intelligence of this important victory was announced to the public in Charlestown by the ringing of bells on Sunday evening the 24th. On Monday afternoon the troops in garrison, with the volunteer companies, were paraded and fired a *feu de joie*, while guns in the batteries on his Majesty's ships and the merchant vessels in the harbor thundered a salute. The populace, said the *Gazette*, joined in these military manifestations of joy by loud and continued acclamations. At night a ball was given at the State House by Mr. Cruden, the commissioner of sequestered estates, to a numerous and brilliant assembly of ladies and gentlemen. The ball lasted till the next morning, when, the *Gazette* states, the company broke up, rejoiced at the happy occasion of the meeting, and delighted with the politeness and attention of the gentleman whose loyalty had called so many persons together.¹

¹ The ladies here mentioned were doubtless those of the British officials and Loyalists, for Dr. Ramsay assures us that those of the Whigs withstood all solicitation to grace public entertainments with their presence. Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 123-124.

The Americans were equally disappointed, but Sumter would not admit defeat. In his letter of the 28th of March he congratulates Marion upon the happy advantage gained by Major-General Greene and the army under his command over Lord Cornwallis near Guilford Court-house.¹ And though Greene had been compelled to abandon the field with the loss of his artillery, and to admit a defeat, which he attributed to the conduct of the North Carolina militia, he still persuaded himself that the advantages remained with him. He entertained a confident hope "that although his adversary had gained his cause, he was ruined by the expense of it,"² and this was in a great measure true. The British had lost many more than had his army, and had been able to keep the ground only because the Americans were unable longer to contest it. Then Cornwallis had left the field of action in a movement which soon degenerated into a retreat, scarce becoming a victorious army — a retreat in which he was obliged to abandon his wounded, and to leave unburied those who died.³ Greene had resumed the offensive and had pursued the British, but having been obliged to send away the horses of the militia for the want of forage, he had now no mounted infantry with which to support his small force of cavalry. Still more fatal to his recovery of the advantages lost at Guilford was the refusal of the Virginia and North Carolina militia longer to serve when their term expired on the 30th. This caused a halt and an abandonment of the pursuit.

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 46.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 24.

³ This is Sir Henry Clinton's contemptuous comment on Lord Cornwallis's victory at Guilford Court-house, ". . . from 3200 when he (Lord Cornwallis) passed the Catawba in January he is reduced by sickness and desertion to 1300, and after the victory, which was brilliant, to 700. With those, without provisions or arms, he invites by proclamation those poor people to join him!" — *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 396.

Cornwallis escaped to Wilmington, with his crippled, if victorious, army.

The day after the battle of Guilford, Captain Wade Hampton arrived in the American camp there, and brought to Greene information of the movements in South Carolina since he had left the State, and the following letter from Sumter, dated Waxhaws, 9th March, 1781.¹

“I marched on Tuesday the 16th ultimo from the Catawba with about two hundred and eighty men for the Congaree. I proceeded from thence to the enemies' posts at Col. Thompson's, Nelson's ferry, South Lake, etc., was within fifty miles of Charlestown, but finding I could get no assistance from Gen^l Marion, thought proper to return, which I have happily effected with very inconsiderable loss—as I still labor under the misfortune of having but little use of my right hand, and writing very painful, therefore not to deprive you of a full account of my proceedings and any necessary intelligence, respecting the situation of the enemy in So. Carolina, I have sent Capt. Hampton, a valuable and intelligent officer, who will wait upon you for that purpose, on whose information you may rely—and to whom you may communicate with safety—he is fully acquainted with my late operations and partly with my designs in future. Until your pleasure is known notwithstanding Capt. Hampton is well acquainted with my late proceedings I shall in the course of a few days transmit to you a particular account thereof in writing—a variety of things I could wish to mention but fear you are not circumstanced so as to give me the necessary assistance I want, I say nothing.”

The information of Sumter's movements contained in this letter, and no doubt more fully stated by Captain Hampton, and of the condition of the British posts by one

¹ Sumter's letters, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 6-7. These are copies of fifty-seven letters obtained in 1894 by the South Carolina Historical Society from Mr. William Nightingale, of Brunswick, Georgia, in whose possession the originals were held. These letters were published in the Charleston *Year Book* as above, but we regret to say very inaccurately edited. Some of the errors have been pointed out in the *So. Ca. Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, vol. I, 343-345. They will be referred to as the Nightingale Collection.

whose intelligence could be so thoroughly relied upon, afforded General Greene the best grounds on which to decide as to his future measures.¹ How far they suggested or influenced his subsequent conduct of the campaign we have no means of learning. Whether the course General Greene adopted was the outcome of his own thought, or was suggested to him by Colonel Lee, has been the subject of acrimonious discussion. Colonel Lee, in his *Memoirs*, without assuming the credit to himself, represents that the plan was that of another than Greene. The proposer, he says, suggested that, leaving Cornwallis to act as he might choose, the army should be led back into South Carolina; that the main body should move upon Camden, while the light corps, taking lower direction and joining Marion, should break down all intermediate posts, breaking upon the communications between Camden and Ninety Six with Charlestown, and thus placing the British force in South Carolina in a triangle, Camden and Ninety Six forming the base, insulated as to coöperation and destitute even of provisions for any length of time. On the other hand, it had been proposed to the general to take a more salubrious and distant position, with Virginia in his rear, and there to await his lordship's advance. This was pressed upon Greene by influential soldiers around him, who laid it down, as a cardinal principle never to be relinquished, or even slighted, that the safety of the South hung upon the safety of Virginia, and the sure way to afford to that State full protection was to face Cornwallis. They dwelt with much emphasis upon the singular fitness of Greene to cope with his lordship, as well as the superior capacity of his army to contend with that under Cornwallis.²

Judge Johnson takes sharp issue with Colonel Lee upon

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 32.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 315-322.

this point, and insists that the idea of the movements back into South Carolina originated with Greene himself, and claims for him great merit for its conception and execution. As a commanding officer is responsible for the result of his movement, he is ordinarily entitled to the credit of it if successful, whether originating with himself or suggested by another. But the evidence is, we think, conclusive that, with whomsoever this scheme of campaign did originate, it did not originate with General Greene, nor, while adopting, did he cordially approve or warmly enter into it.¹ How far it may have been suggested by the report which Wade Hampton had brought from General Sumter of the operations of the partisan bands under Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and Harden, since Greene had left the State, and their great success in breaking up the enemy's communications between Camden and Charlestown, and thus preparing the way for such a movement, can only be conjectured; but certain it is that from Colonel Lee's account the subject was one of discussion at headquarters — and upon which there were two parties, one urging a retreat to Virginia, and the other an advance into South Carolina.² Dr.

¹ In a note to *General Greene*, in the "Great Commanders Series," 231, the author says: "Greene consulted Lee concerning his plan of operation and probably referred to the second Punic War, and the famous 'carrying the war into Africa.' Lee replied on April 2, 'I am decidedly of opinion with you that nothing is left for you but to imitate the example of Scipio Africanus.' In his funeral eulogy on Greene, Hamilton says, 'This was one of those strokes that denote superior genius and constitute the sublime art of war. 'Twas Scipio leaving Hannibal in Italy to overcome him at Carthage.'" But Scipio carried his heart with him into Africa. Greene left his in Virginia, where he wished to be confronting Cornwallis.

² Major Eggleston, an officer of the Legion, in a letter to Colonel Lee dated 10th of June, 1810, writes, "I well recollect that I felt great reluctance to the movement from Deep River to South Carolina, as I thought it leaving our own State [Virginia] exposed to Cornwallis's army, although the event proved so fortunate to the cause of America." — *Campaigns of 1781 in the Carolinas* (Lee), 242.

Mathew Irvine, a surgeon in the service, states that he carried a letter from Colonel Lee, who was then on a foraging expedition, to General Greene, suggesting and urging this movement; that he was not merely the bearer of the letter, but was familiar with its contents and in full possession of Colonel Lee's views, with which he was entrusted in order that he might urge them upon the general verbally in case of loss of the letter.¹

General Greene followed Colonel Lee's advice, if he did not altogether adopt his views. Indeed, a want of final decision seems to have been one of the defects of his mind; he could never altogether help hankering after the rejected alternative:² and so it was that, throughout the ensuing campaign we shall find him turning to and longing for the field of Virginia as the proper sphere of operations for the Commander of the Southern Department. Nor, after his defeat at Hobkirk's Hill, did he hesitate to blame Colonel Lee for his advice, and to regret that he had followed it.³

¹ Garden's *Anecdotes*, 64. Major Garden, it will be recollected, was himself an officer of the Legion, but not at this time.

² Kinglake, in his *History of the Crimean War*, says of Lord Lucan, "He had decision, and decision apparently so complete that his mind never hankered after the rejected alternative." — Vol. II, 380.

³ The Honorable Peter Johnston of Virginia, Judge of the United States District Court, who had been an officer of the Legion, in a letter to Major Garden of the 11th of November, 1821, writes: "Nor has he [Lee] always done justice to himself. I am perfectly satisfied that the grand enterprise for the recovery of South Carolina and Georgia, by marching into those states when Lord Cornwallis retreated to Wilmington after the action at Guilford Court-house, was suggested by Colonel Lee. Accident afforded me the view of a letter written by General Greene to Colonel Lee immediately after the second battle of Camden, fought on the 25th of April, 1781, in which the General expressed a determination to abandon the scheme of continuing his progress southwardly, and directed Lee to join him immediately with his corps, which had, about that time, reduced a post of the enemy at Wright's Bluff on the Santee River. I shall never forget one expression in that letter, which goes far to prove that I am right in the opinion which I have ever since entertained. 'I

Having thus reluctantly determined upon the movement to South Carolina, he wrote on the 30th of March to Sumter, probably by Hampton, giving an account of his movements since the battle of the 15th, and continuing, he went on to inform him of his proposed plans: ¹ —

“ They [the British] are on the route to Cross Creek, and probably will fall down the country as far as Wilmington, but this is not certain. The greater part of our militia’s term of service being out will prevent our further pursuit, especially as the difficulty is very great in procuring provisions. Indeed, it would be impossible to subsist the army in the pine barrens, and as we are obliged to halt a day or two to collect provisions at this place, it will give the enemy such a start of us as leave no hopes of overtaking them if they choose to continue their flight, nor can we fight them upon equal terms after our militia leave us. All these considerations have determined me to change my route and push directly into South Carolina. This will oblige the enemy to give up their prospects in this State or their posts in South Carolina, and if our army can be subsisted there we can fight them upon as good terms with your aid as we can here. I beg you will therefore give orders to Gen^{ls} Pickens and Marion to collect all the militia they can to coöperate with us. But the object must be a secret to all except the generals, otherwise the enemy will take measures to counteract us. I am in hopes by sending forward our horse and some small detachments of light infantry to join your militia you will be able to possess yourself of all the little outposts before the army arrives. Take measures to collect all the provisions you can, for on this our whole operation will depend. I

fear, my friend,’ says the general, ‘ *that I have pursued your advice too far. I have resolved to march back with the army towards Virginia, and desire you will join me with your command as soon as possible.*’ ” — *Charleston City Gazette* of the 11th of May, 1822. Republished in *Lee’s Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 399–401; also quoted in *Garden’s Anecdotes*, 64. “The letter,” says *Garden (ibid.)*, “mentioned by Judge Johnston was seen also by Dr. Irvine. He states that the general added, ‘ *Although I am confident that your wish was to give increase to my military reputation, yet it is evident to me that by listening to your advice I have forfeited my pretensions to it forever.*’ ”

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 85.

expect to be ready to march in about five days, and perhaps we may be in the neighborhood of Camden by the 20th of next month or earlier."

In this letter it is said that Greene sedulously inculcated secrecy, and enjoined that his purpose should be communicated to none but his generals,¹ that Sumter was the only officer in the Southern country to whom General Greene confided his intention of penetrating into South Carolina prior to his actual movement;² and the implication is pointed that Sumter was in some way responsible that the secret was divulged. Colonel Lee, however, states that before Greene's departure from Deep River he had communicated his plans to Pickens as well.³ And Ramsay asserts the same.⁴ He certainly did so to Marion.

It was on the 7th of April that he broke up his camp at Ramsay's Mill, on Deep River, and commenced his march to South Carolina.⁵ Three days before, that is, on the 4th, he writes to Marion from his camp on Deep River.⁶

"This will be handed to you by Cap^t Conyers, who will inform you what we have contemplated. He is sent forward to collect provisions for the subsistence of the army, and I beg you will assist him in this necessary business. The army will march to-morrow, and I hope you will be prepared to support its operation with a considerable force. General Sumter is written to, and I doubt not will be prepared to coöperate with us, etc."

Nor only so. The day that he commenced his march he sent on Major Hyrne in advance with a letter requesting Sumter to inform that officer of what he might expect from him in the way of assistance.⁷ Colonel Davie, Colonel Carrington, and Captain Singleton of the general's staff were all

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 34.

² *Ibid.*, 68.

³ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 325.

⁴ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 227.

⁵ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 44.

⁶ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 48.

⁷ Sumter MSS.

informed of his purpose,¹ as doubtless was necessary and proper. So far, therefore, from Sumter being the only officer in the Southern country informed of Greene's purpose, not only were Marion and Pickens also directly informed of it, but several subordinate officers as well. If Greene's plans were divulged, it is unjust therefore to charge Sumter with the fault on the ground that to him alone they had been confided. In the condition of the country it was impossible that any such hopes as Greene indulged as to the secrecy of his movements could have been realized. Sumter's critic, Judge Johnson, himself gives the reason. "The country," he says, "from which he had marched and that through which he had marched, was too much infested with Loyalists to admit of his making a single movement unobserved. Runners from the Tories had preceded him six days, and long enough to enable the commander of the garrison at Camden, Lord Rawdon, to summon to his aid a considerable body of Loyalists and recruits under Major Frasier, from the banks of the Saluda and Broad rivers; and to his great mortification Greene found that the garrison of Camden was fully equal to the force he had brought against it. Still, however, he advanced, bent on an attempt to carry the post by assault, when, on reconnoitring, he found that his force was wholly inadequate to the purpose."²

It will be recollected that there had already been a jar between Greene and Sumter, because of orders given to Sumter's command without communicating them to or through him; that Sumter had resented thus being passed over and ignored, and had complained of it both to General Greene and Governor Rutledge. Upon setting out to Philadelphia, Governor Rutledge, it will also be remembered, had again left Sumter in command of all the militia of

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 67.

² *Ibid.*, 45.

the State, enjoining upon both Marion and Pickens their obedience to him, and requiring that all communications from them should be sent under cover to Sumter, which Sumter should forward under cover to General Greene. The governor had thus left, as he hoped, matters in such order as to prevent any friction in the future between these officers. Marion, it has, however, been seen, had paid very little attention to these instructions, and Sumter had again had cause to complain of the neglect of his authority. Greene's course now tended to aggravate this trouble. In his letter of the 30th he had expressly put the preparatory movements in South Carolina into Sumter's hands. He had written, "*I beg you will therefore give orders to Generals Pickens and Marion to collect all the militia they can to coöperate with us.*" The object was to be kept secret to all but the generals. "I am in hopes," he wrote, "that by sending forward our horse and some small detachments of light infantry *to join your militia you will be able to possess yourself of their little outposts before the army arrives.*"

Sumter undoubtedly had a right to regard himself under this letter, independently of his command of all the militia, as charged with the movements in South Carolina before the arrival of Greene with his army. This supposition must have been further confirmed upon the arrival of Major Hyrne with another letter from Greene, of the 7th of April, saying, "This will be handed you by Major Hyrne, who has been kind enough to come on before the army, which is on the march for South Carolina, to see and consult with you respecting the force you are likely to collect to aid our operations."¹

Acting upon this supposition, Sumter appears to have

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 86, 87.

entered eagerly into the general's plans. He wrote on the 9th, at once, in reply:¹—

“ . . . Thursday next I should have had five hundred ten-months men in the field, chiefly so well mounted as to perform tolerable service, and from the activity of the enemy & indiscretion(?) of our militia, I think all the men that can by any justifiable method be procured will not be too many.

“ Gen' Pickens men are much scattered. He will have but few out, that is, in any short time. I expect four or five hundred will be ready to join you out of Gen' Marions brigade. I have requested him to take a position high up Black river if it can be done with safety, to prevent the enemy from foraging that way to have as much provision as possible provided. . . .

“ Nothing in the summit of power shall be neglected that may in the least tend to further your operations against the enemy.”

As it became a matter of much discussion thereafter as to the number of men Sumter had promised to bring to the support of Greene, it is well now to observe that Sumter in this letter reports that he will have five hundred ten-months men in the field, capable of tolerable service, and that he expected four or five hundred would be ready to join out of Marion's brigade. From Pickens he could hope for but few. All that Sumter hoped that he could get were one thousand men, including Marion's. This letter Greene received, probably by Major Hyrne. On the 14th he wrote to Sumter:—

“ I received your letter dated the seventh instant and am happy to understand that our plan of operations agrees with your sentiments. You will collect your force with all possible speed and endeavor to take a position *as mentioned by you to Major Hyrne* where you may be enabled to cut off or intercept the communication between Camden

¹ Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 7-8. This letter was undoubtedly received by Greene, for it is found among his papers, now in the possession of Mr. Nightingale, but its receipt is not acknowledged. Greene on the 14th acknowledges a letter of the 7th which is not found among his papers.

and the other posts of the enemy, keeping it in your power to coöperate with or join this command should the movements of Lord Cornwallis render such measures necessary," etc.¹

Sumter, it is thus seen, was not only put in charge of the movement, but his plan of it was accepted. What must have been his surprise and mortification, then, to learn that the "horse and some small detachments of light infantry" which had promised to join *his* militia so as to enable him to take the outposts of the enemy, without his knowledge or any notification to him, had been sent forward as early as the 4th of April, not to him — but to Marion? Was it to be supposed that Sumter, with his quick and impetuous temper, would not have resented such trifling with his confidence and disregard alike of the assurances given him and of his authority as Marion's commanding officer?

It has been charged by Colonel Lee that General Greene expected to be joined by General Sumter before Camden; but that Sumter held off, much to the surprise, regret, and dissatisfaction of the General-in-chief, and very much to the detriment of his plans and measures.² And, strange to say, Johnson countenances this charge in a summary of the grounds of complaint which Greene entertained against Sumter,³ forgetting, apparently, that in previous pages he had himself shown how unwarranted were these jealousies of Sumter's conduct.⁴ Colonel Lee himself had undoubtedly been misled by General Greene as to the force Sumter had undertaken to raise. On the 10th of April the General had written to Lee, then on his march to join Marion, "General Sumter will have one thousand men to join us."⁵

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 87, 88.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 333.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 212.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 107-109.

⁵ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 51.

But Johnson shows that in this Greene had made a great mistake. He says that it was on Hyrne's report and Sumter's letter of the 7th that General Greene founded his expectation that Sumter would be able to bring one thousand men into the field; but that, on comparing the two documents, it is found that, while they agree as to the number, in Sumter's letter four or five hundred of the one thousand are expressly made to consist of the men to be brought out under Marion and five hundred of his own brigade.¹ Sumter hoped to have this number of the ten-months men he was attempting to raise on the bounty of a prime negro per man, for which purpose he had his best officers actively engaged in procuring enlistments in both States along the Catawba. Hyrne's report says, "General Sumter expects by Monday (the 18th) to have upwards of two hundred ten-months men from South Carolina, and three hundred from North Carolina; these are immediately to join the militia, who will amount to about five hundred, and proceed down the country," but makes no mention of four or five hundred expected under Marion.² Greene, apparently without observing the discrepancy between Sumter's own letter and Hyrne's report, or that Hyrne's report did not mention Marion, assumed, against the expressed statement of Sumter's letter of the 7th, that Sumter promised himself to bring one thousand men to his assistance. Not only counting upon this himself, he writes it to Lee. Hyrne had also anticipated by two the day upon which Sumter had fixed as the time when he hoped to have this reënforcement. Promising the most zealous coöperation, Sumter did not express a hope that he would be able to take the field before the 20th. Opposition, it seems, was made to his enlisting men in North Carolina, professedly on the ground of its interfering with the draft then going on in

Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 107.

² *Ibid.*

that State, but really, as Sumter asserted, because it raised the price of substitutes. Greene was no doubt disappointed by not receiving earlier support from Sumter, but Johnson admits that no suggestion of a suspicion can be found that it was not as sensibly felt by Sumter himself.

We would call attention here, again, as we may have still further occasion to do, to the extraordinary mistake or misconception of Greene, exhibited again and again during his campaign, in failing to recognize and appreciate the condition of affairs in South Carolina, and Sumter's position and power. From his first entry into the State he persisted in treating Sumter as having the power to bring out as many men as he desired, as if he had a settled government behind him through which he could draft militia and enforce the attendance of those drafted to the army; whereas, the fact was, that there was no government in South Carolina at the time, and that it was only through the personal influence of Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and other leaders, appealing to the patriotism of the Whigs, that these could be brought into the field, and then only as volunteers and not as drafted men. It was impossible, therefore, for Sumter to undertake or promise to furnish any given number of men, and it is strange indeed that Greene should have supposed that he did so, and counted upon them as he claims to have done.

So, too, with regard to provisions. Greene had solicited Sumter to take measures to collect all that he could, for on this his whole operations would depend; and Sumter had made every endeavor to do so through the officers who commanded where the provisions were sought, but he constantly declared, as was unquestionably the fact, that all the provisions were within the enemy's lines.¹

Although disappointed greatly in the number of men

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 108.

and the provisions he expected to collect, Sumter actually commenced operations by the time he had promised. It has been charged that, instead of descending between the Broad and Catawba rivers, he moved down beyond the Broad River.¹ Upon what this criticism is based it is difficult to understand, as there was no outpost to attack between these rivers, and it is certain that Sumter was never ordered to form a junction with Greene prior to the affair at Camden.² The position he was to take was determined upon in consultation between Hyrne and himself, and was doubtless that mentioned with approval by Greene in a letter to Lee of the 10th of April, as "a position between Camden and Ninety Six about thirty miles from the former."³ From this post Sumter soon swept the country between the Broad and the Saluda, as well as between the Broad and the Wateree.

We left Marion, it will be remembered, after the affair at Witherspoon's Ferry, on the point of retreating into North Carolina for the want of ammunition, a step which had only been arrested by the news of the approach of Colonel Lee, the advance of General Greene, upon his return to South Carolina. While Marion was in the greatest despondency from this cause, and about to retreat to North Carolina, one Johnson, an old tried Whig, came into the camp in an almost starving condition, begging for God's sake for something to eat. A pot of cold rice was put before him, and when his hunger was somewhat allayed he was asked the news. "Fine news," said he; "I saw a great number of Continental troops, horse and foot, crossing at Long Bluff." "Come, tell the general," said Captain Gavin Witherspoon. "No," replied the Whig.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 212.

² *Ibid.*, 109.

³ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 51.

“I am starving with hunger; if the general wants the news, he must come to me.” The general soon complied, and going to the hungry, but true and tried, bearer of the good tidings, he soon satisfied himself of the truth of the information. The news, says James, was sudden and unexpected, and to men now in a state of desperation nothing could be more transporting—scarce was there a dry eye. All sufferings appeared now to be at an end, and that balm of the soul, hope, began to revive. Even while Johnson was still communicating his intelligence, it was confirmed by the sound of an approaching drum.¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, when within a day’s march of the Pee Dee, had despatched a small party of dragoons under Captain Conyers to find Marion. By Conyers, Marion received Greene’s letter ordering him to coöperate with Lee in striking at the posts below Camden. Marion received Lee’s officer with joy, and furnished boats, which he had kept concealed on the Pee Dee, for the transportation of his corps across the river. On the 14th of April Lee joined the general.

Colonel Watson, it will be remembered, upon Sumter’s retreat to the Waxhaws in March, had been sent by Lord Rawdon with his own regiment and Harrison’s Tories, numbering in all about five hundred men, to crush out Marion. This, however, he had not accomplished. On the contrary, Marion had assumed the offensive, and had fought him at Wiboo Swamp, Mount Hope, and Black River, and had finally driven him into Georgetown. Having refreshed himself at Georgetown, Watson had proceeded again towards the Pee Dee. He had taken the nearest route, across Black River at Wragg’s Ferry, the Pee Dee at Euhany, and the Little Pee Dee at Potatobed Ferry, and had halted at Catfish Creek, a mile from where the town of Marion now stands. Here Gainey’s party

¹ James’s *Life of Marion*, 107.

flocked to him in such numbers that he was soon nine hundred strong.¹ Leaving Captain Witherspoon with a small party to watch Watson, Marion and Lee moved through Williamsburg and took position in the open country with Watson to their left, considerably below them, and on the route for the fort at Wright's Bluff, called by his name. But Watson, having learned of Lee's approach through Captain John Brockington, a noted Tory, about the same time as Johnson, the Whig, had informed Marion, had immediately rolled his two field-pieces into Catfish Creek, destroyed all his heavy baggage, recrossed the Little Pee Dee, and not venturing by the route he came, he crossed the Waccamaw, and retreating between that river and the sea, crossed Winyaw Bay three miles west, and then returned again to Georgetown.²

Upon the junction with Colonel Lee, Marion proposed to pursue Watson, and if unable to capture him, at least to prevent his junction with Lord Rawdon; but Lee was of opinion that the pursuit would carry them too far from General Greene, who was marching upon Camden. Marion gave up the movement with great reluctance, and was afterwards heard repeatedly to regret that his orders had not allowed him to pursue it. A great consideration, however, against Marion's plan and in favor of another, was the fact that both Lee and himself were in great want of ammunition, and an opportunity presented itself of supplying themselves in this particular from Fort Watson, into which, it will be remembered, the supply obtained by Sumter in March had been taken through the treachery of a guide. Fort Watson was known to be otherwise well supplied in this essential article, and was now with but a small garrison in the absence of its commander, who had retreated to Georgetown. Still another advantage pre-

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 108.

² *Ibid.*, 106.

sented itself to a movement against the fort instead of a pursuit of the commander, and that was that at the fort they would be on the road by which Watson was expected to move to rejoin Lord Rawdon — there being then no road from Kingstree to Camden.¹

In the estimate of one thousand men which Sumter had reported to General Greene he hoped to raise to join him, he had counted upon Marion's having from four to five hundred; but so far from this, so many of Marion's men had gone home to rest and to plant their crops, after the operations against Doyle and Watson, that he was reduced to but eighty men when Lee joined him.² Lee's Legion corps numbered about three hundred horse and foot.³ The combined force thus numbered about 380. Marion's men were, however, coming in one or two at a time. With this force the two leaders determined to carry Fort Watson without delay, and sat down before it early in the evening of the 15th of April, not doubting from their information that the garrison must soon be compelled to surrender for want of water, with which it was only supplied from Lake Scott, and from which it might be readily and effectively excluded. The garrison consisted of about eighty regular troops and forty Loyalists, under the command of a brave and efficient officer, Lieutenant James McKay.⁴ Fort Watson, as the post at Wright's Bluff was called, from which Sumter had lately been repulsed, was an Indian mound at least thirty feet high, surrounded by a plain table-land and far removed from any ground that could command it. In a very few hours the customary mode of obtaining water was completely stopped, and had

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 109.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 333.

⁴ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 70.

the information upon which Marion and Lee acted been correct, a surrender of the garrison could not long have been delayed. But McKay was an officer of resource as well as of courage, and he immediately cut a trench secured by abatis from his fosse to the river which passed close to the Indian mound. Neither party possessed artillery, and the steep sides of the mound and strong palisades forbade an attempt at storming it. Marion and Lee had nothing else to do, therefore, but to sit down to an investment of the place and thus lose most precious time.

Greene, in the meanwhile, had broken up his camp at Ramsay's Mill on Deep River in North Carolina, and advanced on Camden, and on the 19th of April had taken post at Hobkirk's Hill, about a mile and a half in advance of the British redoubts. Marion, fearing that he would not be able to carry the fort without artillery, and learning of Greene's arrival, sent an urgent request that a piece should be forwarded to him. Greene, it will be remembered, had lost all of his artillery at Guilford, but he had since received two pieces, and one of them he resolved to forward to Marion, but the fort had been reduced before the piece was on the road.

While Marion and Lee were impatiently waiting for the field-piece Colonel Maham, one of Marion's officers,¹ suggested a plan which led to the immediate reduction of the place. At King's Mountain the underbrush at the foot of the mountain concealed the Americans, while the bare rock on the top exposed the enemy to the unerring aim of the mountaineer's rifle. But here the case was reversed. The open plain afforded no shelter for Marion's marksmen, while the stockade and abatis protected the British upon the mound, and enabled them to fire upon the Americans

¹ See this officer mentioned, *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 144, 298.

with security. To counteract this advantage Colonel Maham proposed to build up a tower of logs which would overtop the mound, and from this to fire into the stockade on the mound. This suggestion was at once adopted. There was an abundance of timber in the neighborhood of the fort, and axes were obtained from the neighboring farms. During the night trees were felled and were borne on the shoulders of the men, and piled crosswise until a tower higher than the mound was raised. To the astonishment of the besieged, as soon as light permitted the discrimination of an object, the fatal effect of a shower of bullets announced to them that their stronghold was commanded by a superior work. A detachment of Marion's men under Ensign Baker Johnson and of the Continentals under Mr. Lee, a volunteer in the Legion, then made a lodgement near the stockade, and began to pull down the abatis and to dig away at the mound itself. Such was the effect of the fire of the riflemen upon the tower, having complete command of every part of the fort, that the besieged found it impossible to resist the lodgement effected by the attacking party. Lieutenant McKay, who had so gallantly held out for eight days, then hoisted a white flag, and the garrison capitulated. The American loss was two of Marion's men killed and three wounded, and three Continentals wounded.¹ Far beyond the prisoners taken was the value of the arms, and especially ammunition, secured in the fall of the post, which included the arms and ammunition Sumter had taken, but had lost by the treachery of his guide.

From Georgetown, to which place Watson had retreated upon the junction of Marion and Lee, the most practicable route to Camden, where he should now proceed to reën-

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 331-332; *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, 70; *James's Life of Marion*, 109-110.

force Lord Rawdon, was by crossing the north and south branches of the Santee River and advancing up the southwest bank of that river to Nelson's Ferry, and thence by the ordinary route up the east bank of the Congaree and Wateree to Camden. But Marion and Lee now stood at Fort Watson to dispute the passage of Nelson's Ferry. By coming to the assistance of McKay, Watson might have compelled the raising of the siege of Fort Watson, and have forced his way on this the direct road to Camden. But this he did not think the state of the force with him sufficient to justify, and rather determined to sacrifice the post and to evade Marion in his attempt to reach Camden. After crossing the Santee on the route from Georgetown, therefore, he moved down by Monck's Corner and cautiously advanced. Relieved of the siege of the fort and supplied with ammunition, Marion moved, on the 23d, to the High Hills of Santee, and occupied a position from which all the roads that led to Camden could be securely watched. From this place he pushed forward his prisoners by the Black River road to the depot in rear of Greene's army. This movement of Marion towards Camden brought on the battle of Hobkirk's Hill.

Johnson asserts that from the time of this junction until the siege of Fort Motte, Colonel Lee acted under the command of General Marion.¹ This Mr. Henry Lee, in his work in answer to the judge, denies, and ridicules the idea that the commander of the Legion — a Continental lieutenant colonel should be outranked by a militia general, especially by one holding his commission from Governor Rutledge during the interregnum of Carolina.² The

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 69.

² *Campaigns of 1781 in the Carolinas* (H. Lee), Review of Johnson's *Life of Greene*, 249, 250. In point of fact Marion, though now acting under his commission of brigadier general of State militia, was actually

fact, nevertheless, appears to be as stated by Johnson. In a letter of the 28th of April General Greene writes to Marion, informing him of the result of the action of Hobkirk's Hill, making light of his repulse and saying, "*You will cross the river Santee, or detach Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, and direct your force as information and circumstances may direct.*"¹ And in a letter of the next day to Lee himself, appended by Mr. Lee to his reply to Judge Johnson, he repeats, "In my letter to General Marion last evening I desired him *either to detach you, or cross the Santee with you as he might think advisable.*"² It may have been, as Lee asserts, that he was by his own request under Marion. But under him he undoubtedly was. Marion, as compared with Sumter, was Greene's favorite, though in his private correspondence Greene was accustomed to sneer at both. While constantly criticising Sumter, for Marion he had, to him, only words of praise.

"When I consider," he writes to Marion on the 24th of April, "how much you have done and suffered, and under what disadvantages you have maintained your ground, I am at a loss which to admire most, your courage and fortitude, or your address and management. Certain it is no man has a better claim to the public thanks or is more generally admired than you are. History affords no instance wherein an officer has kept possession of a country under so many disadvantages as you have; surrounded on every side with a superior force, hunted from every quarter with veteran troops, you have found means to elude

still a lieutenant colonel in the Continental line, and as such two years the senior of Lee, and thus ranked him in that line.

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 61.

² *Campaigns of 1781*, Appendix C. In a letter of General Greene of the 16th of January, 1782, written to General Marion upon the subject of a legionary corps then raised by Maham, he says, "Lee's Legion is frequently under particular officer's command according to the nature of the service." This must refer to the command of Sumter, Marion, or Pickens, for under no other officer, except Laurens, was it ever so put; but it was put at different times under each of these officers.

all their attempts, and to keep alive the expiring hopes of an oppressed militia when all succor seemed to be cut off. To fight the enemy bravely with a prospect of victory is nothing, but to fight with intrepidity under the constant impression of defeat, and to inspire irregular troops to do so, is a talent peculiar to yourself. Nothing will give me greater pleasure than to do justice to your merit, and I shall miss no opportunity of declaring to Congress, the Commander-in-chief of the American army, and to the world in general, the great sense I have of your merit and services.”¹

He writes on the 24th, to Marion, that history affords no instance wherein an officer had kept possession of a country under so many disadvantages as he had — hunted from every quarter with veteran troops, he had found the means to elude all their attempts, and to keep alive the expiring hopes of an oppressed militia when all succor seemed to be cut off. He assures Marion that he will miss no opportunity of declaring to Congress, the Commander-in-chief of the American army, and to the world in general, the great sense he had of Marion’s merits and services. General Greene had just had an opportunity of informing the Commander-in-chief, General Washington, of what Marion had dared and accomplished, and of declaring to Congress through his Excellency his great sense of Marion’s merit and services, and this is the way in which he had done so. Two days before he wrote to Marion, *i.e.* on the 22d, he had written to Washington: ² —

“The conflict may continue for some time longer; and Generals Sumter and Marion, and many others, deserve great credit for their exertions and perseverance, but their endeavors rather seem to keep the contest alive, than lay any foundation for the recovery of these States.”

Would Marion have considered this lukewarm and indifferent report to Washington what he had a right to sup-

¹ Gibbes’s *Documentary Hist.* (1781–82), 59.

² Johnson’s *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 92.

pose from Greene's letter to him that Greene would have made? To Marion he recognizes that that partisan officer had kept possession of the country under circumstances of which he extravagantly says history affords no parallel. To Washington he reports with faint praise that Sumter and Marion were good and brave men, but that their efforts accomplished nothing but to keep the contest alive!

The letter to Washington was written on the 22d, two days before the letter to Marion. The battle of Hobkirk's Hill was fought and lost on the 25th. A few days after, *i.e.* on May 4th, in one of his voluminous communications to his friend, Governor Reed of Pennsylvania, he is more unguarded in his language, and instead of taking this opportunity—so favorable a one of reaching the ears of Congress—of extolling Marion, his faint praise to Washington degenerates into little less than complaint and disparagement.¹

“You frequently hear,” he writes, “of great things from Generals Marion and Sumter. These are brave and good officers; but the people with them just come and go as they please. These parties rather seem to keep the dispute alive than lay any foundation for the recovery of the country. Don't be deceived in your expectations from this quarter; if greater support cannot be given for the recovery of these States, they must and will remain in the hands of the enemy.”

This is the version of the letter of the 4th of May given by Johnson, in the text of his life and correspondence of Greene; but there is another letter of the same date to the same person, given by Gordon in his work on the American war,² or another version of the same letter, in which Greene is still more disparaging. He writes:—

“Generals Marion and Sumpter have a few people who adhere to them, perhaps more from a desire and the opportunity of plundering than from any inclination to promote the independence of the United States.”

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 88.

² Gordon's *Am. Revolution*, vol. IV, 88.

Judge Johnson, in a subsequent part of his work in which he is engaged in defending Greene's character from the imputation of a connection with Mr. Banks's fraudulent speculations, in a note is compelled to admit the genuineness of this latter version; but does not account for the version which he had previously given in the body of his work. He says that he has looked into the original correspondence, and found that there was actually such a passage as that quoted by Gordon.¹ A possible solution of the matter is that the passage given by Johnson in the body of his work was from the first draft retained by Greene, and that found among Governor Reed's papers and quoted by Gordon, the letter as actually written out and sent by Greene. Certain it is that the letter in its most objectionable form was that actually sent to Governor Reed, for it was found among his papers after his death. Judge Johnson endeavors to defend Greene from the apparent insincerity of his correspondence in this matter by observing that this was a private letter to Governor Reed, not intended for publication, and only published by the indiscretion of Gordon.² That may be so, but Governor Reed was a person of large influence near Congress, whose personal views would have great weight, and, indeed, it was because of this fact that Greene was so assiduous in his voluminous correspondence with him. He was Greene's mouthpiece at

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 436.

² This may be true, but was Judge Johnson aware that Gordon was assisted in the commencement of the preparation of his work by General Greene himself? Prof. Edward Channing, in Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History*, vol. VI, 518, says: "The most valuable history of the Revolution from a British pen is Gordon's well-known work. This author was assisted by Gates and Greene so far as the Southern campaigns was concerned." See this quoted by Orin Grant Libby, Ph.D., in *Ann. Report Am. Hist. Ass.*, 1899, vol. I, 368. General Greene died, however, it should be remembered, June 19, 1786, two years before Gordon's work was published.

the seat of government. Was this letter consistent with Greene's voluntary promise to testify to Washington and to Congress of the great work Marion had accomplished?

Gordon's work on the Revolution, as it happened, appeared in 1788, and Sumter, who had just then been elected a member of the first Congress under the Constitution, in a circular to his constituents on the 24th of August, 1789, concludes with this paragraph: ¹—

“The following is an abstract of a letter from General Greene to Governor Reed of Pennsylvania dated May, 1781, taken from Gordon's history of America just published, ‘Generals Marion and Sumpter have a few people who adhere to them, perhaps more from a desire and opportunity of plunder than from any inclination to promote the independence of the United States.’ View this and suppress your indignation if you can!”

Sumter was also a member of the House of Representatives in the Second Congress, in 1792, when upon the petition of General Greene's widow for indemnity of his estate on matters growing out of the Banks affair, he was present to pronounce these letters of Greene to Washington and Governor Reed as “gross calumnies on and misrepresentations of the character of the people.” ²

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 437.

² Abridgment of the *Debates of Congress*, vol. I, 341. It cannot be understood that in this charge against the followers of Sumter and Marion, General Greene was alluding to the system of pay in spoil upon which Sumter was attempting to organize regiments of State troops upon the basis of regulars, (1) because that scheme was inaugurated with Greene's own concurrence and approval (See his instructions to Sumter of 17th of May, 1781, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 101-102), (2) because at the date of the letter it had not yet gone into actual operation at all, (3) because it never was adopted by Marion in his brigade, and (4) because Greene's own immediate army was practically living upon the same means, *i.e.* spoils taken from the Tories and impressments from the Whigs. Indeed, we shall see him refusing to return horses belonging to Whigs recaptured by his men, under the specious plea of the doctrine of *postliminium*, and appropriating them to the use of his officers.


CHAPTER VIII

1781

BREAKING up his camp at Ramsay's Mill on the 7th of April, the day after he had despatched Lee to Marion, Greene sent off all the stores that could be spared from present demands on the route by Salisbury to the head of the Catawba; and, crossing the Deep River, he made a day's march, as if following Cornwallis, then, taking the first convenient road to the right, he advanced directly upon Camden. The route which he pursued crosses the Pee Dee River below the mouth of Rocky River, and passing through Anson County in North Carolina and the eastern part of Lancaster in South Carolina, crosses the branches of Lynch's Creek some miles above their confluence. The distance to Camden was about 130 miles, the country poor and exhausted, yet such was the perseverance with which his march was urged that, although delayed at the Pee Dee for want of boats full four days, on the 19th the American general made his appearance before Camden.¹

On the road General Greene received a communication from Sumter by Captain McBee, telling him that a party of the enemy, numbering about 150 horse and foot, from Camden, had made a raid into the Waxhaws, burnt the meeting-house and several other houses, barns, etc., killed, wounded, and taken several persons, and plundered the settlement, carrying off horses; that he had at once detached Colonels Hampton and Taylor after them, but did not ex-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 44.



SKETCH
of the Battle of
HOBKIRK'S HILL,

NEAR
CAMDEN

on the 25th April 1781.

Drawn by C. Vallancey, Capt. of the Volt of Ireland.

✂ Where the Enemy's Piquets were attacked.

pect that they would be able to overtake them. He also reported that he had just received accounts from General Pickens that he had collected a few men of his brigade, and also a few Georgians, but was unable to attempt anything against the enemy; that he had ordered four of his regiments to join Pickens, and had requested him to move down and take position upon Tyger River near Fishdam ford, to cover the country and collect provisions; that he had just learned from Captain McBee, the bearer of the letter he was writing, that, with the men of the four regiments he had detached and sent to him, Pickens was moving upwards, which, if with the design to take them to the Savannah, would weaken him considerably, but that he had written to General Pickens, telling him of the measures necessary in consequence of his (Greene's) movements towards Camden, and that he did not think Pickens would go far — however, he expected to have near the number in the field he had mentioned to Major Hyrne; he missed his four regiments he had sent to Pickens, but intended to form a junction of all that were embodied on Tuesday next (which would be the 17th of April).¹ This letter was handed by Captain McBee to General Greene on the 15th, who at once replied that he was on his way to Camden, where he expected to arrive in four or five days; that Lieutenant-Colonel Lee was on his march from the Pee Dee to the Santee, and would cross that river somewhere near Nelson's Ferry and come up on the other side; and suggested that perhaps Sumter might make his movements coöperate with Lee's, and also with Pickens's. He charged him, however, to bear in mind that their whole force when collected was very small, and that he should not lose sight of a junction should Lord Cornwallis move that way; if

¹ Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 8-9.

Lord Cornwallis did not, and if the garrison at Camden was not well supplied with provisions, it must fall in a few days; that was his hope, for he had no battery cannon and too few troops to warrant a storm of the post. He charged Sumter to give him constant intelligence of his force and situation, as matters might grow very critical by and by.¹

Upon his arrival before Camden, General Greene at once wrote to Sumter that he had taken a position three miles from the town, that the country was barren and promised no hope of support: he depended entirely on him for supplies, corn and meal; both these articles were immediately wanted, and unless Sumter could furnish them it would be impossible for him to keep his position; he wished very much to know Sumter's situation, and how he had disposed of himself to coöperate with his army in any particular emergency.² Four days after, that is, on the 23d, he wrote again, mentioning his former letter, to which he had received no answer, and expressing the fear that it had fallen into the hands of the Tories. He had since, he went on to say, carefully examined the fortifications of the place, and found them much superior to what he had expected; that the garrison was likewise stronger, and that he had the mortification yesterday to learn that the South Carolina Royalists had the day before thrown themselves into the place, coming from Ninety Six; that he was too weak in numbers to invest the place, and must depend upon him to secure him on the quarter from Ninety Six and Charlestown on the west side of the Wateree, while Marion did so on the east side from Georgetown and Charlestown. He mentioned that Marion and Lee were at Nelson's Ferry, and had closely invested the fort at that place, but for want of cannon he was afraid they would fail of taking it.³

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 88-90.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 90-91.

By Greene's letter of instructions to Sumter of the 15th, the latter was to coöperate with Marion and Lee at Nelson's Ferry, as well as with Pickens from the neighborhood of Ninety Six. On the 25th, the day the battle of Hobkirk's Hill was fought, but of which Sumter knew nothing, he writes to Greene reporting his operations under his instructions. His movements, he wrote, had been very slow, and he feared attended with many disadvantages; the militia were coming in tolerably well; he had a number of wagons coming down, and he expected to be joined by three more well-appointed troops from North Carolina. As he found delay unavoidable, he had marched into the Mobley and Sandy Run (Tory) settlements with a view of harassing the enemy, which had effectually been done, and he hoped would give relief to their friends in that neighborhood. Some small skirmishes had taken place; he had lost no men; several of the enemy had fallen and many others had been taken prisoners; upon the whole they had been pretty well scourged. He would send some large parties into the Dutch Fork to clear that place, and call out the well-disposed inhabitants, and then march with all speed for the Congaree. He had detached Colonel Hampton to the Wateree with a few wagons for provisions, if any could be found, to be sent to Greene. Hampton would also keep small parties of the enemy from going into and coming out of Camden. Pickens had joined him, but had none of his men with him. Pickens would set off the next day with a regiment of Sumter's brigade to take command in the neighborhood of Ninety Six. The Georgians had gone back into their own State and had been joined by almost every man in the Up-Country.¹ In those movements Sumter had been strictly carrying out Greene's in-

¹ Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 10-11.

structions. But on the day on which Sumter wrote the battle of Hobkirk's Hill had been fought, and Greene had been defeated.

As has already appeared, Lord Rawdon had received information of Greene's approach and received the reënforcement of a considerable body of Loyalists and recruits from the Saluda and the Broad rivers, under Major Frazier; and, to his great mortification, Greene found that the garrison of Camden was fully equal, if not superior, to the force he had brought against it. There is a great discrepancy among the authorities in regard to the numbers of Greene's army. Ramsay, on the one hand, states that the American army consisted of about seven hundred Continentals, and makes no mention of any militia or other body,¹ while Colonel Lee, on the other, estimates its numbers at fifteen hundred.² But as Lee himself states that the force was inadequate to the investment of Camden, it is preferred to adopt Johnson's careful estimate in detail, which is as follows:—

The whole regular infantry of the American army at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill was 843 present fit for duty. The approach to an enemy's garrison had, as usual, increased desertions; the Virginia line was continually fluctuating in numbers from the daily discharge of those whose time of service had expired, and this was partially the case at this time with the Maryland troops; and long marches, hard service, and great exposure had sent many men to the hospital, most of whom had necessarily been left in the rear when they crossed from the Cape Fear to Camden. The cavalry nominally consisted of two regiments, White's and Washington's, but actually in number only 87, and only 56 of these were mounted. The artillery also

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 230.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 333.

nominally constituted a regiment and was commanded by Colonel Harrison in person, but actually there were not men enough to fight three pieces, and after sending off the piece to Marion not above 40 artillerists remained. The only militia force then with the army consisted of 254 North Carolinians. Of these 150 under Colonel Read had joined Greene soon after he crossed the Dan, and had faithfully adhered to him from that time. They were, like Sumter's and Marion's men, volunteers — men of the first respectability, from whom much might have been expected in action. The rest had escorted the supplies sent to the army by Colonel Davie. Those authors who extend the American force beyond this estimate, says Johnson, must be led into some error, since General Greene repeatedly asserts that the forces of the combatants were nearly equal.¹ The Americans thus numbered 939. The British accounts assert that Lord Rawdon, by arming every person in the garrison capable of bearing arms, musicians and drummers, mustered an effective force of about 900.² The two armies, thus nearly equal in numbers, were as well matched in the quality of the troops. Greene's army consisted of 650 Continentals, or regulars, including the First Maryland Regiment, which had distinguished itself alike at Cowpens and Guilford Court-house, so that it was spoken of as the Tenth Legion. And of the 250 militia 150 at least were volunteers of the first respectability. Lord Rawdon's force was made up of the Sixty-third Regiment of the British line, his own regiment, the Volunteers of Ireland, organized in Philadelphia, the King's American Regiment, raised in and around New York, Colonel Turnbull's New York Volunteers, the South Carolina Provincial Regiment, and a small

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 77.

² Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 356; *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 81; see also Gordon's *Am. Revolution*, vol. IV, 81.

body of New York Dragoons under Captain Coffin. These provincial regiments were of the same character as the Continental regiments of the American service. They were regular troops enlisted in America. Besides these regulars, Lord Rawdon had a body of Loyalists who corresponded to the militia under Greene.

On the 20th of April General Greene, advancing a little from the position he had taken the day before, took post at Hobkirk's Hill, to the north of Camden, about a mile and a half in advance of the British redoubts. Here he lay on his arms that day and the next, reconnoitring the enemy's position, getting intelligence of his strength, and hoping to tempt him into the field. He had received two pieces of artillery, as has been seen, to replace those lost at Guilford, one of which he proposed to send to Marion upon his urgent request, the more readily as he knew that Colonel Harrison was at the time on his march from Virginia with two pieces more. To mask the departure of this gun, Greene moved his army down to the southeast of Camden, having, before he did so, sent back the artillery, his baggage, and everything that could impede his movements, with an escort of North Carolina militia under Colonel Carrington. This officer was directed to proceed no farther than Rugeley's Mill, from which the piece destined to Marion was to be sent under Captain Finley by the Black River road. Major Eaton, with 220 North Carolina levies just arrived, was to march with the piece for its protection. The meanwhile Greene lay beyond Pine Tree Creek, southeast of Camden, at a place called the South Quarter, until the 24th, when, learning of the approach of the body of North Carolina levies under Major Eaton, and despairing of tempting Lord Rawdon from his stronghold, he sent orders to Marion to march up as soon as he should have gained the fort and to assist him to invest Camden.

To Carrington he sent orders to move down and rejoin him at Hobkirk's Hill. But this officer, instead of halting at Rugeley's Mill, ten miles distant, had conceived that it would be safer to move farther on, and had gone eight miles farther to a place called Upton's Mills. This unfortunate disobedience of orders of which the general was unapprised, nearly doubled both the time it took the couriers to reach Carrington and the time necessary to comply with the orders to rejoin him. The consequences of this derangement, says Johnson, exhibited themselves in that hurry in camp on the morning of the 25th, which gave rise to the charge that Greene had suffered a surprise.¹

Lord Rawdon, following the example of the Earl Cornwallis the year before at the same place, assumed the offensive, as Greene had at first hoped that he would do. He had been informed by a deserter of Colonel Carrington's march to Rugeley's Mill, and deemed it an opportune moment to attack Greene before Carrington or Marion should join him, or his artillery should come up. Accordingly, at nine o'clock in the morning of the 25th of April, he marched out from Camden with all the force he could muster. Turning aside from the direct road to Rugeley's Mill and keeping close to the edge of the swamp of Pine Tree Creek, under cover of the woods, he formed his army for attack upon the left of the American line. His order of battle was the same also as that of Cornwallis in the previous engagement. His first line was composed of the Volunteers of Ireland on the right, the New York Volunteers in the centre, and the King's American Regiment on the left. The Sixty-third Regiment supported the volunteers of Ireland on the right, a detachment under a Captain Robertson supported the King's American Regiment on the left. The South Carolina Provincial Regiment and the New

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 75.

York Dragoons were held in reserve. The accounts of this battle, English and American, generally agree that Greene was surprised by the advance of Rawdon and taken at a disadvantage. General Huger, the second in command, told General Moultrie that they had just come on the ground, and that so little did they expect the British out of their line that a number of officers, with himself, were washing their feet, and a number of soldiers were washing their kettles, in a small rivulet that ran by their camp, when their pickets were driven in.¹ Colonel Lee states that the men were engaged in distributing provisions and washing their clothes;² Stedman, that the Americans were resting in a fancied state of security when the pickets were driven in.³ The *Annual Register* goes farther, and accuses the Americans of being shamefully remiss and inattentive;⁴ but Johnson fully exonerates the American commander from this aspersion. He shows, we think satisfactorily, that though the attack was commenced while Greene himself was at breakfast and his men were cooking theirs, his line was formed and every battalion was in its place, the artillery in battery, and all the baggage moved off, before the enemy presented themselves. As observed by Colonel Davie, who was present, "Men must cook and eat, and, when they can, will be washing and mending their clothes."⁵ This is unavoidable. Blame only is deserved when, in the performance of these duties, proper precautions are neglected. The American line of battle which Rawdon found posted was as follows: The two Virginia regiments, forming a brigade under General Isaac Huger,

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 276.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 336.

³ Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 356.

⁴ *Annual Register*, 1781, vol. XXIV, 82.

⁵ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 94-95.

were on the right of the road, the Fourth under Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, and the Fifth under Lieutenant-Colonel Hawes. The two Maryland regiments, under Colonel Otho H. Williams, were on the left, the First Maryland under Colonel Gunby, and the Fifth under Lieutenant-Colonel Ford. The reserve consisted of the cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, and the North Carolina militia under Colonel Read. Conjecturing that the enemy were still unapprised of the arrival of his artillery, the two centre regiments—the Fifth Virginia and the First Maryland—were closed across the road, and masked the pieces which were placed there. Patrols were out to scour the country upon Greene's right, and two strong pickets, commanded by Captains Morgan and Benson, were a mile in advance on his left, and in support of them was posted Captain Kirkwood of Delaware, with the remains of his gallant command.

The enemy's advance was announced by the firing of these pickets, who advanced with the utmost coolness, gathering in their videttes, retiring in good order, and forming under Kirkwood. As the British approached, the American infantry unmasked the artillery, and received the assailants with showers of grape. Availing himself of the effect of this fire of his artillery, Greene assumed the offensive, assured of an easy victory. Nothing more appeared to be necessary but to close upon the flanks of the enemy, and cut off the flying troops from regaining the redoubt of Camden.¹ As the British front occupied a smaller space than the American, it was received by Colonel Hawes's Virginians and Colonel Gunby's Marylanders, Colonel Campbell's Virginians on the extreme right, and Colonel Ford's Marylanders on the left overlapping the attacking column. Confident of suc-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 77-80.

cess, Greene hurriedly ordered Washington to make for the enemy's rear, Colonel Campbell to wheel upon their left and Colonel Ford upon their right, and the centre regiments, Hawes's and Gunby's, to charge. But Greene had no ordinary adversary to deal with in Lord Rawdon, nor had his troops inferior men to oppose. Lord Rawdon at once advanced his support, and extended his line in such a manner as not only to counteract this movement of the Americans, but to expose their wings to the very disadvantage to which Greene had proposed to subject his. As Campbell and Ford executed Greene's order, and wheeled their regiments to attack the flank of the advancing column of the British, they themselves were outflanked by Lord Rawdon's support, now extended on the right and left. Disorder followed, and Greene's flanking wings were driven back. Nor did the centre regiment respond to his wishes.

The deflection to the right pursued by Rawdon had brought the brunt of the attack upon Greene's left centre. But nowhere else could he have wished it to have fallen, as that was the position of the famous First Maryland. Against this excellent regiment, the movements on the field had thrown the best troops on the British side — the Sixty-third Regiment of the line, and the King's American Regiment.¹ Here, then, might well have been expected a terrific struggle for the mastery. But, strange to say, the Marylanders, who had fought so gloriously against the Seventy-first at Cowpens, and fought half the battle at Guilford now quailed before the Sixty-third, and shrank away in a panic. The first symptom of confusion was shown by the fire contrary to orders. This was scarcely suppressed when Captain Beatty, who led the right company of the First Marylands, who was the pride and stay of his command, fell pierced to the heart. His fall caused

¹ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 463

those nearest to him to check their progress, and the halt was rapidly communicated, from right to left, through two companies before the cause was understood. Some hesitation ensued when the men were urged to regain the line. Then occurred the event upon which Greene asserts that the fate of the battle turned. Colonel Gunby despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Howard with orders to his remaining companies of the regiment, then advancing with confidence, to halt and fall back in order that he might reform their faltering comrades upon them. But, instead of this, the retrograde movement only extended the panic to those who had been before without fear. Nor did the evil end here. While Williams, Gunby, and Howard were actively and earnestly engaged in a combined effort to rally their regiment, Colonel Ford, whilst gallantly executing his orders on the American left, fell from his horse with a mortal wound. His regiment, dispirited by the fall of its leader, and severed from the line by the retirement of the First Maryland, soon faltered and retired.

Nothing, says Johnson, could exceed the surprise and disappointment of the commander at this instant. His favorite regiment, in whose courage and conduct he reposed with such confidence, now blasting all his fair hopes by a retreat without making the smallest trial for victory! Conscious of the vital importance of rapidity in the movement of the wings, he had spurred his horse up to the extreme right, and was leading on Campbell's right in person when he was called away by the hesitation and confusion manifested in his centre. He vainly tried the influence of his voice and presence to bring his panic-stricken soldiers once more into action. They heard him and they halted, but by this time they had reached the bottom of the hill, and his attention was now drawn away by the loud shouts of the enemy. Again urging

his horse to the summit of the hill, the whole extent of his misfortune opened upon his view.

Hawes's regiment was now the only one remaining intact. The artillery was left open and exposed on the summit of the hill. Its loss, besides the certain evidence of defeat, could not have been repaired. In the midst of the flying bullets which were showered about him, for he was then almost alone upon the most exposed part of the hill, his historian asserts, his orders were issued in a tone of perfect composure, to draw off the right and left regiments and form them on Gunby's regiment which was now rallied; while Hawes with the Second Virginia should cover their retreat. This order was well executed, and in the issue left the American commander the election of a renewal of the battle or a composed retreat. But during its execution the artillery was exposed to imminent danger. To save this Greene ordered up Captain Smith, who commanded a light infantry company detailed from the Maryland line. The enemy, with loud shouts, ascended the hill, and the British horse, commanded by Captain Coffin, now appeared to join in the pursuit. The matrosses were quitting the drag-ropes when Greene galloped up alone,—for his aides were engaged elsewhere carrying his orders,—and, dismounting, himself seized the ropes, thus inspiring his men with a zeal which could not be resisted. Smith now arrived and assisted in drawing off the guns, until Coffin's cavalry approached the hill, when, forming in the rear of the artillery, he poured into Coffin's ranks a volley from which they recoiled and retreated. Again and again did Coffin return to the charge, while Smith's men in the intervals assisted at the drag-ropes; and as often as Coffin repeated his attempts was he foiled and driven back with loss. But the enemy's infantry now coming up, Smith's men began fast to fall. He himself was badly wounded, but neither his resolution nor

even his cheerfulness flagged. His little party of forty-five men was now reduced to but fourteen, and some accident having caused them to deliver an irregular fire, Coffin succeeded in forcing them, and every man was killed or taken. The artillery would now have been lost had not Colonel Washington appeared on the field, and, charging in, put an end to the contest.

Colonel Washington's appearance at this critical moment undoubtedly saved Greene the loss of his artillery; and Greene, in his official report, gives him great credit, asserting that he had penetrated into the enemy's rear, found them flying, and made two hundred prisoners. But, strange to say, it appears that these prisoners were all non-combatants, to secure or parole whom Washington not only lost the most precious time, but actually encumbered his own force. General Davie, who was with Greene at this time, thus describes his action:—

In turning the enemy's left Washington made a circuit so large as to bring him into the open commons between Log Town and Camden; this space was filled with doctors, surgeons, quartermasters, commissaries, wagon masters, waiters, and all the loose trumpery of an army who had pushed out to see the battle. The cavalry immediately charged this mixed multitude, and employed in taking, securing, and parolling a great number of these people those precious moments which would have brought them in actual contact with the second line of the enemy, either before it moved up to extend the front, or while this manœuvre was performing, and in either case the charge would have been decisive, and the battle would not have lasted fifteen minutes. But the charge was never made on the line of the enemy, the critical moment was lost, and in battles minutes are hours. The British officers acknowledged the unfortunate effect of the clemency of our cavalry in waiting to capture and parole prisoners when they should have cut them out of their way without stopping, and charged the rear of the British line. They were, in fact, so encumbered with prisoners they could do nothing."¹

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 83.

The British accounts make still less of Colonel Washington's movement in their rear. They restrict its results to the capture of a few stragglers and the parolling of some British officers who lay on the ground.¹ Not only did Washington waste his time in parolling wounded officers and non-combatants, but he encumbered his cavalry by mounting these useless prisoners behind his troopers, thus exhausting his horses and rendering them, while thus doubly burdened, useless for further action. It was in this condition that he approached his own army upon his return, and had, of course, to lose further time while throwing off his prisoners before he could make the charge.

When Greene found his artillery, ammunition wagons, and other material safe from the enemy, he remained only long enough to collect his wounded as far as circumstances would permit, and ordered a retreat; upon which Lord Rawdon occupied the ground whereon the American army had been drawn up. He did not pursue far, and Greene, after retiring two or three miles, halted to recover his stragglers. Here he remained until afternoon, and, having refreshed his men, continued the retreat with his infantry and artillery as far as Sanders's Creek, about four miles from the field of battle and near the place of Gates's defeat in August before, and there he encamped.

Lord Rawdon did not pursue farther, but as Greene retired he also withdrew towards Camden, leaving Captain Coffin and some mounted men on the field of battle. This party Washington succeeded in drawing into an ambush, and cut to pieces or dispersed, and thereupon occupied the position where Greene had drawn up his army in the morning, and thus, in a manner, the Americans remained in possession of the field.

¹ Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 358; *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 82; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 464.

The Americans lost in this action 19 killed, 113 wounded, and 136 missing, in all 268.¹ The British lost 258, of which about 38 were killed.² The loss to the Americans in officers was severe. Lieutenant-Colonel Ford's wound proved mortal, and, as has been seen, Captain Beatty was killed. The British lost no officers of prominence. One only was slain and 11 wounded. The respective losses on the two sides were thus as nearly equal as was the strength of the contending armies.

Great was Greene's disappointment at the result of this battle. He had confidently anticipated victory, and in this his officers appear to have joined, but upon what ground it is difficult to perceive. The opposing armies, as it has appeared, were almost of exact equality in numbers, and in material the British were in no wise inferior. The only advantage which Greene possessed was in his three pieces of artillery. In any event the issue of a struggle with so good a soldier as Lord Rawdon upon such equal terms must have been in doubt to the last. But Greene's confidence, and his singular want of respect for his adversary, led him to commit the great error of attempting to attack on all sides an enemy whose force was equal to his own. Thus it was that, in attempting to strike his opponent upon both flanks, he exposed his own wings to the very danger he designed for his opponent. As the wings under Campbell and Ford, on the right and left, in obedience to his order, wheeled towards the advancing British column, they themselves exposed their flanks to the prolongation of the British line made to meet them. So, too, Washington, in carrying out his order to make for the enemy's rear, was

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 85; *Memoirs of the War of 1776*, 339; Return of Col. Williams, Adjutant General; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 470.

² Stedman's *Am. War*, 358; *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 83; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 464.

practically withdrawn from the battle, and his strength and energy wasted in a raid which had no effect upon its result.

But Greene was not convinced of his error by the practical working out of his plan of battle in defeat. The loss of victory was due to some one else. There must be found a victim, and so Colonel Gunby was settled upon as the responsible author of the defeat. He was immediately called before a court of inquiry consisting of General Huger, Colonel Harrison, and Lieutenant-Colonel Washington. The court found that Colonel Gunby's spirit and activity were unexceptionable, but that his order for the regiment to retire was extremely improper and unmilitary, and in all probability the only cause why they did not obtain a complete victory. Gunby, though thus personally exculpated from all but an error of judgment, was detached upon some employment in the rear of the army, and did not rejoin it.

Greene was greatly chagrined at the result of the battle. He was one of those commanders who can always persuade themselves that but for the untoward conduct of others, great victories would undoubtedly have been achieved. Of the battle of Guilford Court-house, he had written with the same confidence, "Had the North Carolina militia done their duty, the victory would have been certain and easy."¹ So now he writes: "Gunby was the sole cause of the defeat. . . . We should have had Lord Rawdon and his whole command prisoners in three minutes if Colonel Gunby had not ordered his regiment to retire."² And again: "We have been twice beaten, the last time by the unfortunate order of Colonel Gunby, who ordered the First Maryland Regiment to retire when the enemy were fleeing before them and in confusion in all quarters.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 24.

² *Ibid.*, 86-87.

Victory was certain, and the fall of Camden as certain, as I had taken measures to cut off their retreat." ¹

The result of the battle might have been much longer in doubt, and might have been decided very differently, had not the Marylanders failed at this critical moment. But it will be observed that Gunby's order was not the beginning of the difficulty. The trouble arose from one of those unaccountable panics which occasionally take possession of the best troops, and against which no precaution can be maintained, and over which no leadership can prevail. Greene's line had been broken, not by Gunby, but by Captain Beatty's men upon his fall. Had Gunby taken a different course, the Marylanders might have been rallied and brought back to action. But they might not. And to assert that but for his mistake victory was certain was mere assumption. With quite as much reason may the defeat have been attributed to the course pursued by Washington on his raid into a deserted camp, instead of a charge upon the flanks of the fighting enemy; or, indeed, to Greene's own mismanagement, by which in advancing his centre he covered his artillery so completely as to silence it, while, attempting to assail both flanks of the enemy, he exposed his own wings to a like danger.

It does not appear that there was any such break or confusion in the British ranks as Green supposed. The grape-shot from his field-pieces was very destructive to the enemy, but, so far from fleeing before it, it was their steady advance which so disconcerted the Marylanders.

Greene's chagrin was not confined to the loss of the battle by Gunby. He was disheartened and dissatisfied. To his friend, Governor Reed of Pennsylvania, he pours out his complaints. The nature of the war and the resources of the country appear, he writes, to be little known

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 87-89.

to the northward. The strength and resources of these States to support the war had been greatly magnified and overrated, and those whose business and true interest it was to give a just statement of the situation had joined in the deception, and from a false principle of pride in having the country thought powerful had led people to believe it was so. It was true there were many inhabitants, but they were over a great extent of country and nearly equally divided between the king's interest and ours. The produce raised in it was difficult to collect from the extent of the country in the best of times, and it was utterly impossible to do so then, as all the horses and means of transportation were destroyed. The love of ease and want of zeal among the friends of the cause rendered their exertions very languid, and unless the Northern States could give more efficient support these States must fall; and what was worse, their fall would sap the foundations of the liberties of all the rest. The service in their quarter was so disagreeable to the Continental soldiers that many of them deserted and entered the British service. Camden, Ninety Six, and Augusta covered all the fertile parts of the States, and the enemy had laid waste the upper country in such a manner that an army could not subsist in the neighborhood of their posts; and this must secure them. Nothing but a superior army to the enemy's collective force could give relief to this distressed country, the miseries of which exceeded all belief. He did not believe any people suffered greater calamities. The Whigs and Tories were butchering each other hourly. The war here was on a very different scale from what it was at the North. It was a plain business there. The geography of the country reduced its operations to two or three points. But here it was everywhere. The country was so full of deep rivers and impassable creeks and swamps that one was always liable to

misfortunes of a capital nature. In collecting provisions and forage he was obliged to send the same guards and escorts as if the country was avowedly the enemy's.

He complained that Virginia, which had exerted herself the winter before when the enemy approached, had done nothing since. That North Carolina had done nothing at all until she saw that the enemy would not be allowed to possess the State quietly. Maryland had given no assistance to his army. Not a recruit had joined him from that State, and he was discharging his men daily upon the expiration of their terms of service. "You hear great things," he continues, "from Generals Marion and Sumpter. These are brave, good officers; but the people who are with them just come and go as they please. These parties rather seem to keep the dispute alive than lay a foundation for the recovery of the country. Don't be deceived in your expectations from this quarter; if greater support cannot be given for the recovery of these States, they must and will remain in the hands of the enemy."

"The prospects here," he declared, "are so unpromising, and the difficulties so great, that I am almost sick of the service and wish myself out of the department. When I made this last movement I expected two thousand Virginia militia to operate with us and one thousand men with Sumpter;¹ but both have failed and I am in the greatest distress. The tardiness of the people put it out of my power to attempt anything great. If our good ally the French cannot afford assistance to these Southern States, in my opinion there will be no opposition on this side of Virginia before the fall, and I expect the enemy will possess all the lower country of that State. The want of subsistence will prevent further operations in this country unless

¹ In this, as it has appeared, he was mistaken. Sumter's estimate included Marion's men as well as his own.

we can take post on the Congaree where provisions are to be had in great plenty.”¹

Such was Greene's despondency and discontent. Yet Sumter and Marion, whose achievements he so belittled as to declare that they rather served to keep alive the dispute than lay a foundation for the recovery of the country, had already in the judgment of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Rawdon rendered necessary the abandonment of Camden, and it was Greene's coming only which had postponed its evacuation. Lord Rawdon had the earl's instructions to retire within the cover of the Santee, which had only been delayed by Greene's approach.² If the French could not afford assistance, it was Greene's opinion that before the fall there would be no opposition this side of Virginia. The French did come to the assistance of Virginia; but before their arrival there South Carolina had been recovered, and the British confined to the neighborhood of Charlestown. What part Sumter, Marion, and Pickens had in the accomplishment of this great result has already appeared, and will still further appear in the sequel. It is sufficient now to observe that Greene failed to appreciate that the geography and topography of the country of which he complained was much more disadvantageous to the enemy than to the Americans. Its deep rivers and impassable swamps were so many natural defences against the invaders. Marion understood this, and, availing himself of these fastnesses, became a terror to the enemy. Greene had no taste nor talent for this kind of warfare. He was for a grand army and open country, in which he might apply the stock of military knowledge which he had acquired, as his biographer tells, at Boston in the commencement of the Revolution.

Lord Rawdon had achieved a decisive victory over Greene

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 87-89.

² Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 461, 462.

and his Continental troops, but the work of the Carolina partisan bands, while Greene was in North Carolina, was not undone. The spirit of the whole people was aroused, especially in the Low-Country, which had been stunned by the blow of the fall of Charlestown and the following disasters; armed parties of patriots were everywhere scouring the country. The British were not deceived by Lord Rawdon's victory; they yet fully recognized the gravity of their situation. Colonel Balfour, writing to Sir Henry Clinton, giving him an account of that success, thus closes his letter:¹—

“But notwithstanding this brilliant success, I must inform your Excellency that the general state of the country is most distressing, that the enemy's parties are everywhere, the communication by land with Savannah no longer exists. Colonel Brown is invested at Augusta, and Colonel Cruger in the most critical situation at Ninety Six, nearly confined to his works and without any present command over that country. Indeed, I should betray the duty I owe your Excellency, did I not represent the defection of this province so universal, that I know of no mode short of depopulation to retain it.

“This spirit of revolt is in some measure kept up by the many officers prisoners of war here, and I should therefore think it advisable to remove them, as well as to make the most striking examples of such as, having taken protection, snatch every occasion to rise in arms against us.”

This was the work of Sumter and Marion, as the British recognized it; but which, in Greene's opinion, served only to keep alive the dispute, rather than lay any foundation for the recovery of the country.

¹ *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 472.

CHAPTER IX

1781

GREENE, who on the morning of the 25th of April had been so confident of victory and the capture of Rawdon's army, that evening despatched to Sumter an order to collect all his force and join him immediately. His army, he wrote, was too small to maintain his ground before Camden, and therefore it had become necessary that they should form a junction of their forces. The enemy had advanced that morning and given battle. They had driven him some little distance from the field, but he had saved his stores and taken some prisoners.¹

The next morning he received letters from Marion, informing him of the capture of Fort Watson, and wrote at once, congratulating that officer upon his success and approving the articles of capitulation. The enemy, he wrote, had advanced upon him yesterday and given him battle. The conflict had been short and seemed once to promise him advantage, but he had been obliged to retire and give up the field, though with no material loss. He was now within five miles of Camden and should closely invest it in a day or two again. That he might be enabled to coöperate with more certainty against the post, he requested Marion to move up immediately to their assistance and take post on the north side of the town.² Orders were also sent to Colonel Lee, requiring him to join the army

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 92.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 60.

forthwith.¹ The fact is that Greene, mortified at the result of the battle, was now contemplating the abandonment of the State, and the withdrawal of his army to Virginia.² This, it is true, Johnson, his biographer, will not allow, but the evidence is conclusive that it was so; and the result of the movement which he now ordered opened the way for Watson to rejoin Rawdon.

As soon as the capitulation of Fort Watson had been signed, Lee, followed by his infantry, hastened to the cavalry of his Legion, who were still in front of Watson, and, on the next morning, was joined by Marion, who had been delayed, disposing of the prisoners and stores. Watson, it will be remembered, after crossing the Santee in his movement from Georgetown, had cautiously advanced to Monck's Corner. As Marion and Lee were directly in his way by the Nelson's Ferry road, he turned to his left, and, moving up the southwest bank of the Santee, through what is now Orangeburg County, beyond where the Congaree and Wateree uniting form the Santee, taking the route by Fort Motte, crossed the Congaree at McCord's Ferry, then proceeding up the west bank of the Wateree, through what is now Richland County, he finally joined the army by crossing the Wateree near Camden. Watson had placed himself at a considerable distance before his enemy discovered his course. Lee was, nevertheless, about to attempt to intercept him, when he received Greene's

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 341.

² Lee writes: "General Greene, heretofore soured by the failure of his expected succor from Sumter, now deeply chagrined by the inglorious behavior of a favorite regiment, converting his splendid prospects into the renewal of toil and difficulty, of doubt and disgrace, became for a while discontented with his advance to the south. He sent orders to Lieutenant-Colonel Lee requiring him to join the army forthwith, and indicated by other measures a disposition to depart from his adopted system." — *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 341.

order to rejoin the army. This he at once obeyed, and, moving with all possible despatch, he had marched thirty-two miles during the course of the day and a part of the night, when he was met with an order countermanding his junction with the army. In the meanwhile the possibility of stopping Watson had been lost. Captain Finley, with the piece of artillery which Greene had despatched upon Marion's application, joined Lee, and they at once returned to that officer, who was at the High Hills of Santee, in the vicinity of the Congaree and Wateree, waiting for Watson's advance. But Watson had eluded them.

The day after the battle Greene moved his army to Rugeley's Mill, where he remained for several days; then, breaking up his camp there, he crossed the Wateree into what is now Fairfield County, and took a strong position on Twenty-five Mile Creek, hoping in this way to intercept Watson upon his southern route.¹

Neither Sumter, Marion, or Lee joined Greene, as called upon to do, after the battle of the 25th. Lee, as it has appeared, moved at once to do so, but was met by countermanding orders, and returned to Marion, and with him proceeded to Black River. Sumter has been much criticised because he did not come as ordered.² This criticism, which came first from Greene himself, was most unjust, as appears from their correspondence at the time. On the 19th of April Greene writes to Sumter, informing him of his arrival within three miles of Camden, telling him that his greatest dependence was upon him for supplies, and inquiring as to his situation. On the 23d he writes again — fearing that his letter of a day or two before had fallen

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 342; *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, 105.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 341; *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, 213; *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 290.

into the hands of the Tories — that he had the mortification to learn that the South Carolina Royalists had, the day before, thrown themselves into Camden; that he must depend entirely upon him for security against parties from Ninety Six. Neither of these letters appear to have reached Sumter for some days — that of the 23d certainly did not until the 27th. But on the 25th, the day of the date of Greene's order, and of the battle, Sumter, of his own motion, had written a long letter to Greene, giving him a full account of his movements, telling him that he had gone into the Mobley settlement to relieve their friends in that section; that he would march to-morrow with all speed for the Congaree; that he had detached Colonel Hampton to the Wateree with wagons for provisions to be sent to him; that Hampton would also keep small parties from going into or coming out of Camden. Sumter received Greene's letter of the 23d on the 27th, and again writes fully.¹ On the 28th Captain Pierce, aide-de-camp, writes to Sumter, "General Greene has received your letter of the 25th, and desires me to return his thanks for your exertions."² And yet in a letter, which from its context is supposed to have been written on the 29th, Greene complains to Lee: "General Sumter has got but few men; he has taken the field and is pushing after little parties of Tories towards Ninety Six. Mayor Hyrne is gone to him, if possible to get him to join us, *but this I know he will avoid, if he can with decency, for the same reason that you wish to act separately from the army.*"³

This correspondence discovers, to say the least, great want of candor on the part of the commanding general.

¹ Sumter MSS., Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 10-12.

² *Ibid.*, 92.

³ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 64.

In pushing towards Ninety Six himself, and sending Hampton with wagons for supplies for Greene's army, Sumter had but obeyed the general's own orders as far as received, and anticipated those not received. He was endeavoring to do just what Greene's letters directed him to do, to secure Greene against parties from Ninety Six. Upon his report of what he had done, Greene returns bare thanks for his exertions, and the next day writes to Lee, implying that Sumter was contravening his wishes in going on expeditions for his own personal ends. Lee falls at once into the general's humor, and replies:—

"You do me great honor in calling the adopted plan mine. I have no pretence to such distinction. It gave me pleasure to know that my sentiments coincided with yours, and this honor I claim. I am so convinced of the wisdom of the operations that no disaster can affect my opinion. Hitherto all is well, and nobody to blame but General Sumter. I do not conceive how you can assimilate any part of my conduct to this gentleman's, especially when you recollect that by my own request I am under General Marion," etc.¹

Thus Greene, desiring to get out of the business, and Lee, anxious to keep him to it by flattery or otherwise, unite in putting the blame of failure at Hobkirk's Hill upon Sumter. And yet the facts were that Sumter had promptly replied to Greene's request to collect a force and join him, writing on the very day the request was received, to wit, the 25th, and that in such a manner that Greene on the 28th—only the day before he complains to Lee—returns thanks for his exertions, telling him that Major Hyrne has been sent to acquaint him with the situation.² Major Hyrne returned to Greene the morning of the 30th, with a letter from Sumter of the 29th, to which Greene writes in reply on the 30th:³—

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 290.

² Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 92.

³ *Ibid.*, 93.

“Both by the Major’s report and your letter I find you think it will be prejudicial to the public service for you to cross the Wateree and join me. Our situation requires it; but you press so many objections, and I am so desirous to rouse the people in that quarter, I have thought it most advisable to revoke the order and leave you at liberty to prosecute your original plan. General Marion and Col. Lee had orders to cross the Santee, and one or both undoubtedly will. If both cross, I am afraid Watson, who is now in Georgetown, will throw himself into Camden. If they separate, I fear one part will be too weak to oppose him. You will keep yourself informed of both his and Major McArthur’s movements, the latter of whom, with the Hessian Horse, I fear got into Camden last evening. However, this is not certain.”¹

On the 2d of May Sumter acknowledged the receipt of this letter of Greene’s of the 30th. “I am glad,” he writes, “you are so circumstanced as to permit the troops with me to remain in this quarter.” He reports that Hampton had returned from the Wateree, that he had killed thirteen of the enemy’s guard at Friday’s Ferry, five of another party going to the fort (Granby), and had taken a number of horses and several negroes. He reports also that Colonel Thomas had just returned from Bush River, in what is now Newberry County, where he fell in with a party of Tories, killed three, and took twelve prisoners, four wagons, and several negroes; that while he was not well informed as to McArthur’s movements, he had no apprehensions that he could get into Camden without his knowing of it; that he had ten wagons on their way to Greene with meat, and that he could furnish more. He thought that if he had a six-pounder this place (Granby) might be taken.²

¹ Major McArthur, it will be recollected, was at Cowpens, commanding the Seventy-first Regiment, where he was taken, surrendering his sword to General Pickens. He now appears again in the field, but we have no account of his release or exchange.

² Sumter’s Letters, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1889, Appendix, 13.

From these letters it appears that Sumter had so convinced Greene that his withdrawal from the Wateree would be prejudicial to the service as to induce him to revoke the order requiring him to do so. Sumter was reporting to him daily, and they were apparently acting in the fullest accord. On the 4th of May Greene writes Sumter of intelligence he had received that Lord Cornwallis had moved up towards Cross Creek, and, it was thought, was on his way to Camden, which, however, was uncertain. Cornwallis's movements would oblige him to collect all his regular forces, for which purpose he sends to Sumter letters to be forwarded to Marion and Lee. He was glad to hear that the people were joining him, but was afraid it was little to be depended upon. He wished to know what force Sumter had, and what Marion could join them with. "If our collective strength would warrant an attack upon Lord Cornwallis," he writes, "I should be glad to make it, for defeating him will be next to an entire recovery of the country, and anything else a partial business." So far from disapproving Sumter's course at this time, he continues: "If you can possess the forts upon the Congaree with a field-piece, it can be sent you immediately. But then, whatever is done must take place immediately, or the enemy will in all probability be soon upon our tracks." Writing to Lee, he had expressed distrust of Sumter, and now, writing to Sumter, he complains of Marion in a matter which came near losing that officer's indispensable services to the country. "Don't fail to get us all the good dragoon horses that you can, for we are in the utmost distress for want of them. Genl. Marion, I am told, has a considerable number of them, on which he has mounted his militia. It is a pity that good horses should be given into the hands of people who are engaged for no limited time." Though Sumter, because of his wound in

the shoulder, wrote with great pain, letters were passing between these two officers daily, sometimes twice a day. On the 6th of May Greene acknowledges the receipt of two letters of the 4th, and, giving Sumter the latest information of Cornwallis's movements, discussing with him their probable object, thanking him for the supplies he is furnishing, and sending him arms and ammunition, the General continues, "I fully agree with you that vigorous measures are necessary to strike terror into our enemies, and give spirit to our people." And the next day he again writes, "Be in readiness to join us if necessity requires it, but you may depend upon not being called from the Congaree but from the most pressing necessity; *for I am as fully impressed with the advantages of your continuing there as you can be.*" So diligent was Sumter in his reports to his general at this time, that he appears to have made some apology for troubling him with his communications, for Greene writes to him in this letter: "Your writing needs no apology, rely upon it. I understand you perfectly, and meet with no difficulty in reading your letters. On the contrary, they are plain, clear, and intelligible." It thus appears that both Lee and Sumter urged upon Greene the importance of striking beyond the Congaree, and that Greene expressed himself to both of them as convinced in regard to it. Sumter's course at this time is thus fully vindicated by Greene himself. The general, through his own mistake, had deceived himself as to the number of men Sumter had hoped to bring into the field, and suffered much under the disappointment, the blame for which he continued to visit upon him. Then Sumter had taken position as agreed upon between himself and Major Hyrne, sent by the commander to arrange it with him. Then he orders Sumter, Marion, and Lee to join him upon his defeat at Hobkirk's Hill. The order to the two

latter he himself revokes, and yields to Sumter's remonstrances, again made through Major Hyrne, as to him; and now, ten days afterwards, he declares himself as fully impressed with the advantages of Sumter's course as Sumter himself could be. All this is fully explained by Johnson, and yet, in a subsequent summary of the causes of complaint which Greene had against Sumter, that author enumerates Sumter's failure to join him at this time as one of them, and adds to it another. "When," says this author, "he was ordered to march toward Camden and form a junction with the main army, General Greene yielded to his remonstrances, and revoked the order, substituting for it a particular charge to watch the movements of Colonel Watson to the west of the Wateree, and prevent his junction with Lord Rawdon, when, instead of bending his whole attention to this object, . . . Watson was suffered to pass him, and Rawdon again acquired the command of the field."¹

This additional charge against Sumter is best answered by the previous narration of the same author. Thus he says² it appears that Sumter was not only released from the order to form a junction with the commander at this time, but particularly charged with the execution of most important services. The punctuality with which they were executed is attested by the numerous communications of this period, not only daily as required, but repeated as often as the occurrences of the day rendered it proper. Provisions were sent, the communications of the enemy assiduously watched, swamps explored to cut off the enemy's supplies, and particular attention paid to the approach to Camden, by the west side of the Wateree. Yet Watson managed to elude all their preparations to cut him off. Major McArthur appears on this occasion to have exhibited

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 213.

² *Ibid.*, 109.

the character of an active and enterprising soldier. He commanded a corps of indifferent cavalry formed of drafts of the Hessian troops at the time in Charlestown. Scouring the country in front of Watson, he appears to have completely masked his advance, and, after throwing twenty-five of his command under Doyle into Camden, to have returned to Fort Motte, and succeeded in getting into that place a piece of artillery.

No intelligence reached Sumter of the approach of Watson until the latter was discovered crossing the Wateree. Immediately, as he was apprised of the fact, he despatched 250 of his mounted men with orders to harass and detain him until he could advance with the infantry on his left whilst Marion came up in his rear. But Watson, by a rapid and unremitting march, succeeded in crossing the ferry opposite the present Stateburg and, with the Wateree between himself and his enemy, proceeded in safety to join Rawdon with 500 men.¹

Johnson's defence of Sumter for not joining Greene is coupled, it will be observed, with the allegation that he was particularly charged with the duty of watching Watson and preventing his junction with Rawdon. But this is scarcely just. It was Marion and Lee who had been opposing Watson, and who, as soon as released from Greene's order to join him, returned at once to intercept him. It was only incidentally that Sumter was charged to look after him. Greene writes to Sumter his apprehension that if both Marion and Lee crossed the Santee as he had ordered them to do, that Watson would evade them, and directs Sumter to keep himself informed as to the movements of both Watson and McArthur. Colonel Lee himself, so prompt as he always was to put blame upon Sumter, does not in this case think of doing so, but assumes

¹ Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 360.

upon Marion and himself the miscarriage. He says:¹ "Had these two officers [Marion and himself] confined their attention entirely to the north side of the river, the much-desired interception would have been effected: for with horse, foot, and artillery it was not to be expected that a corps of infantry only could make good its landing in the face of an equal foe, and secure its arrival into Camden. Mortified with the result of their unceasing exertions, the deranging information was immediately forwarded to General Greene, and the disappointed commandants moved upon Fort Motte."

On the 3d of May Greene had received information of the delay which had attended Marion's movements to cut off Watson on the south of the Santee, and he foresaw that not a moment would be lost by Lord Rawdon in striking a blow at the main army should Watson succeed in reaching Camden. Information had also been received of the advance of the Virginia militia which he had been so impatiently expecting. He resolved, therefore, to wait in covert whilst his detachments were overrunning the State. For this he had to thank Sumter's wisdom, as the whole country down to the mouth of the Congaree was now commanded by Sumter's parties, protecting him against any attack from that quarter, and securing to him the provisions which had been husbanded by the enemy in that fertile part of the State, and from which he immediately began to draw supplies of meat, the great want in the American camp.²

Anticipating Rawdon's advance as soon as joined by Watson, Greene had chosen a position nine miles in the rear of his encampment on Twenty-five Mile Creek. This was at a point just beyond the present dividing line

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 343.

² *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, 111.

between Kershaw and Fairfield counties, in the latter, where the road, running parallel with the Wateree on its western side, crosses Colonel's Creek, the north bank of which was commanding. Here, he had determined, the enemy were to be met.

On the 6th of May Greene wrote Sumter from Twenty-five Mile Creek:—

"I am exceeding sorry that Col. Watson has found means to get into Camden. This reënforcement, if Col. Small¹ is with Watson, will enable Lord Rawdon to attack us. I am also a little apprehensive for the safety of Col. Lee's detachment who is ordered to join the army on this side of the river. Should the enemy attempt anything against you or him you will form a junction, and for this purpose you will advise Col. Lee of your situation and point out to him the safest and best route to form a junction with me. Don't run any great hazard until the Virginia militia come up, which will enable you to push your operations with rapidity and safety."²

The date of this letter, the original of which is now before us, is undoubtedly the 6th; and yet on the 7th Greene writes to Marion: "Col. Watson I find *is on his way to Camden*. This is a rather unfortunate circumstance, as the enemy will begin to be impudent and to show themselves without their works, which they have never ventured upon since the morning of the 25th."³ There is no doubt that it was on the 7th that Watson reached Camden, for Lord Rawdon so reports to Cornwallis.⁴ On that night his lordship crossed the Wateree at Camden Ferry to turn the flank and attack the rear of Greene's army, where the ground was not strong.⁵ Greene had, however, moved

¹ In the MS. it appears to be "Small" or "Smole." There was no officer of such a name. It is doubtless Colonel Doyle who is meant.

² Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 96, 97.

³ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 67.

⁴ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 476; *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 481.

⁵ *Ibid.*

early that afternoon. Breaking up his camp upon an hour's notice, he had fallen back to a safe position beyond an intermediate stream called Sawney's Creek and encamped for the night. Rawdon approached, drove in his pickets and examined his position, but, finding it so strong that he could not have forced it without much loss, he recrossed the Wateree and returned to Camden that evening.

Upon the publication of Johnson's *Life of Greene*, a bitter controversy took place between Mr. Henry Lee, the son of Colonel Lee, and the author of that work in regard to the course and views of General Greene at this time;¹ but it is difficult now to perceive why Mr. Lee, the author of the *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, so warmly assailed the account given by Judge Johnson upon the authority of Colonel Davie, as his own differs with that rather in regard to the motives of the American commander upon the occasion than as to his conduct. They agree that at this time General Greene had determined to give up his attempt for the recovery of the State, as Colonel Lee himself intimated that he intended to do, and to leave it to its fate. Johnson's authority for this is a circumstantial and detailed account of a conference between Greene and Colonel Davie, who was then serving upon Greene's staff, as given by Davie himself.²

"This evening" [the 9th], says Davie, "the General sent for me earlier than usual; I found the map on the table, and he introduced the business of the night with the following striking observations: 'You see we must again resume the partisan war. Rawdon has now a decided superiority of force—he has pushed us to a sufficient distance to leave him free to act on any object within his reach. He will strike at Lee and Marion, reënforce himself by all the troops that can be spared from the several garrisons, and push me back to the mountains.

¹ *The City Gazette*, Charleston, April, May, and June, 1822; *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 1824.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 116-118.

You acted in this quarter in the last campaign. I wish you to point out the military positions on both sides the river ascending to the mountains, and give me the necessary information as to the prospect of subsistence. You observe our dangerous and critical situation. The regular troops are now reduced to a handful, and I am without militia to perform the convoy or detachment service, or any immediate prospect of receiving any réenforcement. . . . North Carolina dispirited by the loss of her regular troops in Charleston, stunned into a kind of stupor by the defeat of Gates, and held in check by Major Craig and the loyalists, makes no effort of any kind. Congress seems to have lost sight of the Southern States and have abandoned them to their fate, so much so that I am even as much distressed for ammunition as for men.

“We must always calculate on the maxim “that your enemy will do what he ought to do.” We will dispute every inch of ground in the best manner we can, but Rawdon will push me back to the mountains. Lord Cornwallis will establish a chain of posts along the James River and the Southern States thus cut off will die like the tail of a snake.’

“These are his very words,” says Davie. “They made a deep and melancholy impression and I shall never forget them.

“After expressing an anxious desire to remain as near as possible to cover the retreat of Lee from Fort Motte, we recurred again to the map where I had it in my power to assure him from personal knowledge that the country abounded in strong positions; and as to subsistence there would be no difficulty, as we should be falling back on our depots or magazines in North Carolina; that if he was obliged to retreat further he must permit me to resume my original plan, as I was morally certain a respectable force could be raised in the western districts of that State.” . . .

“General Greene possessed, in an eminent degree, those high energies requisite to conquer appalling difficulties, united with that cool and moral courage which resists the anguish of disappointment and the pressure of misfortune. I never observed his mind yield but at this gloomy moment when he conceived himself not only abandoned by all the constituted authorities of the confederacy, but even by that portion of the population of the Southern States who had everything to hope from his success and everything to fear from his failure. I employed the whole night in writing until an orderly sergeant summoned me to headquarters about daylight. On entering the General’s

tent I soon perceived some important change had taken place. 'I have sent for you,' said he, with a countenance expressing the most lively pleasure, 'to inform you that Lord Rawdon is preparing to evacuate Camden — that place was the key of the enemy's line of posts, they will now all fall or be evacuated — all will now go well. Burn your letters, I shall march immediately to the Congaree. Arrange your convoys to follow us. And let me know what expresses and detachments you want.'

Mr. Lee, while severely criticising this statement, and doubting either the accuracy of Colonel Davie's recollection, whose veracity he, however, declares is beyond imputation, or of Judge Johnson's recording, the inaccuracy of which he does not hesitate to charge as more probable, declares that the conversation, if correctly remembered by Colonel Davie, will show a surprising mutability of mind in General Greene and a variation of views on the same day which cannot be accounted for. But this is assuming the very matter in question. Was not this the very fault of General Greene's mind? Was he not subject alike to fits of confidence and despondency? How confident he was on the morning of the 25th of April, not only of defeating Lord Rawdon, but of capturing his whole army; and yet by night was he not calling upon Sumter, Marion, and Lee, each and all, to hasten to his rescue? Irresolution and indecision of mind were characteristics which his enemies attributed to him, and to which they considered their victory at Hobkirk's Hill was owing.¹

But, however that may be, Colonel Davie's statement, which was, no doubt, correctly given by Judge Johnson, presents the conduct of Greene in its most favorable aspect, for it represents him contemplating a retreat upon public grounds alone, and then only from position to position as he might be forced, after vigorous resistance; while that of

¹ *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 81.

Dr. Irvine and Judge Peter Johnston represent him as bent upon a hasty and unconditional abandonment of the State, in which personal ambition was in a great measure the ruling motive; and, strange to say, Mr. Lee greatly strengthens the latter view by the publication of a letter from General Greene to his father, Colonel Lee, written on the very day in the evening of which General Davie states his interview with General Greene to have taken place.¹ It is as follows:—

“COLONEL’S CREEK, May 9, 1781.

“*Dear Sir*:—I have not time to write in cyphers.² Yours of the 8th by Captain Davis was delivered me last evening. We have no further intelligence from Lord Cornwallis, and therefore I am persuaded he has gone northerly. General Philips is at Petersburg, and our army beaten back; but whether the Marquis or the Pennsylvania line has arrived I am not informed. Keep this a secret, as it is not known here. We moved our camp night before last from Twenty-five Miles Creek to Sandy Creek,³ five miles higher up the river. Lord Rawdon came out yesterday morning as I expected he would, and I suppose with an expectation of finding us at the old encampment. I did not like our new position to risk an action in, and ordered the troops to take a new position at this place, four miles still higher up the river, leaving on the ground the horse, the pickets, and infantry. The enemy came up in front of our encampment and drew up in order of battle, but did not dare to attempt to cross the creek, and, after waiting an hour or two, retired suddenly towards Camden. Major Hyrne having made you fully acquainted with my general plan of operations it will be unnecessary for me to be more explicit on that head. It gives me great pleasure to find that your sentiments so perfectly correspond with mine in all points *except the duty of*⁴ 310 [Gen-

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 355–357.

² General Greene, it will be observed, was then in the habit of corresponding in cipher with Colonel Lee, and in cipher discussing Sumter and Marion, under whom he was yet placing Lee to operate. It will be seen, too, that he used the “alphabet of figures,” which he had used in correspondence with his partners of Barnabas Deane & Co., while quartermaster.

³ Sawney Creek.

⁴ Italics the author’s.

eral Greene ¹]. This I suppose you mean as a compliment, upon your general principles that all men are fond of flattery. *But you will give me leave to tell you that if 306 [Lord Cornwallis] is gone to the northward great abilities will not be wanted here. The plan being laid, and a position taken, the rest will be a war of posts, and the most that will be left to be performed by the commanding officer until we come to Camden, is to make proper detachments and give command of them to proper officers. The plan being laid, the glory will belong to the executive officers executing the business.* The benefit resulting from our operations will in a great measure depend upon the proper management of affairs in Virginia. If the principal officer in the enemy's interest is there, who should be opposed to him? Which will be more honorable, to be active there or laying, as it were, idle here? From whence comes our supplies to the quarter, and who is most likely to give timely and necessary support to all parts of the department; one that has but a partial interest or one that is interested equally in all the parts? I am confident nothing will come to this army, and all things be in confusion if 310 [General Greene] was not to go to the northward. *Therefore, whether taken up in a military, personal, or public view, I am decided it is his interest and duty to go, nor can I conceive the great inconveniences will arise from it you mention. I am confident B——s² will arrange matters very well and 310 [General Greene] will take care to direct him to the proper objects to employ. Much is to be done in Virginia, and without great prudence on our part matters may be reduced to great extremity there; and depend upon it the enemy's great push will be against that State, as it may be said in some sorts to sever the continental interest asunder. More advantage will result from 310's [General Greene] going than staying; for he can serve them more effectually yonder than here; and vanity will lead him to think that he can oppose the enemy more effectually there than those that will command if he don't go. I perceive that 312 [General Marion] is not satisfied, and I think you are not mistaken respecting 311 [General Sumter].* However, be careful, be cautious, be prudent, and, above all, attentive. This with men as well as with ladies goes a great way," etc.

¹ The names in brackets are those given in the text of Mr. Henry Lee's work.

² Supposed to refer to General Isaac Huger, who was next in command to General Greene, and with whom he would naturally leave any part of the Continentals he would not take with him to Virginia.

What a change had apparently come over this officer. When, adopting Lee's plan, he was about to return to South Carolina, he had written to General Washington from Deep River, March 29th: —

“In this critical and distressing situation I am determined to carry the war immediately into South Carolina. The enemy will be obliged to follow us or give up his posts in that State. If the former takes place it will draw the war out of this State and give it an opportunity to raise its proportion of men. If they leave their posts to fall, they must lose more than they can gain here. If we continue in this State, the enemy will hold their possessions in both. All these things considered I think the movement is warranted by the soundest reasons both political and military. The manœuvre will be critical and dangerous, and the troops exposed to every hardship. *But as I share it with them*, I hope they will bear up under it with that magnanimity which has already supported them, and for which they deserve everything of their country.”¹

He had thus contemplated both contingencies, and determined upon the move as a wise one, whether Cornwallis followed him into South Carolina, or left South Carolina to its fate and moved northwardly. In either event he would share with his troops the danger to which he would expose them in so critical a moment. The movement was made, and now, upon the first reverse, he determines to abandon the great enterprise he had so confidently inaugurated, and to desert the troops whom he had led upon so inglorious an expedition. “This letter,” *i.e.* the letter to Lee of the 9th, says the author of the *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, “reveals a disposition of mind and a direction of views not only at variance, but incompatible with the sentiments contained in the statement given from Colonel Davie. In the latter General Greene is desponding, intent upon projecting his retreat, and solicitous for the safety of Lee. In the former his mind is buoyant and lively, his views ambitious and

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 37.

extensive; he considers the war in Carolina, whose prospective magnificence had tempted him from Deep River as curtailed in extent, limited in consequences, pale in reputation, and subordinate in dignity — deems the field which was soon to wave with laurels of Eutaw as destitute alike of danger and glory and no longer worthy of his abilities, and is decided, in spite of the remonstrances of Lee — always attentive to his general fame — to seek a more splendid theatre in Virginia and support and direct his lieutenant in Carolina, and, as he says, *to satisfy in so doing his interests and duty in a military, personal, and public point of view.*"¹

However wavering Greene's conduct was in this campaign, his views as represented by Davie and by his own letters do not appear as inconsistent as Mr. Lee contends. In either case his declared purpose was to abandon South Carolina. With Colonel Davie he discusses the movement in its public and military aspect. With Colonel Lee he considers it in its personal bearing upon his own reputation. In regard to the latter Mr. Lee observes: "It is impossible to foresee the extent or to be blind to the magnitude of the mischief which the execution of Greene's project would have produced. Had he proceeded to Virginia and abdicated the honors of the scene before him, however fine and generous his motive, the spirit and organization of his army, already greatly impaired, would have been abolished; the comparative strength of the enemy doubled; the Loyalists encouraged to a fearful preponderance; the desultory ardor and dangerous activity of Marion and Pickens would have subsided; the three Southern States been lost without a blow and the issue of the struggle, if not changed, at least grievously protracted. Recent from a *defeat at Camden* he would have appeared in Virginia with

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 359.

the disgrace, but without the grandeur, of Gates's reverse — would soon have been superseded by Washington, and either retained as an inferior in command or ordered back to the South with less reputation and worse prospects than he had left behind him.”¹

From all of this the author of the *Campaigns in the Carolinas* claims that it was Lee's advice and remonstrance which saved his commander, and with a sneer at the desultory ardor and dangerous activity of Marion, without even the mention of Sumter, he attributes to the plan of which we think he has shown his father to be the author, all the success which followed. “And so irresistible was the design,” he writes, “that although its execution was defeated in two cardinal points by the wonderful spirit and vigor of Lord Rawdon; although Greene with the main army did not succeed in a single effort incident to it, yet the enemy, twice demonstrated to be masters of the field, were rebuked by its genius, and vanquished by its strength. They drove Greene from Camden with disgrace and slaughter — they offered and he declined battle; but the power of the plan, aided only by the swift though subordinate successes of Lee, either combined with Marion or alone, forced Lord Rawdon to yield the upper district and leave Ninety Six and Augusta to their fate.”²

Thus complacently does this author claim for his father all the results of the partisan warfare which had been carried on by the volunteers in South Carolina under Sumter, Davie, Marion, Pickens, and Harden! to say nothing of what had been done by Shelby, Sevier, Cleveland, Campbell, Clarke, and McCall. The important point to be noted here, however, is that Greene, who has been held up as a reconqueror and redeemer of South Carolina, had determined upon, and was on the point of, abandoning

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 362.

² *Ibid.*, 331–332.

the State; and was only deterred from doing so by an event which he had but little part in bringing about. As far as General Greene is concerned, he had deliberately made up his mind to forsake South Carolina for a field in which he thought greater personal reputation could be achieved.

CHAPTER X

1781

LORD RAWDON declares that he had always reprobated the station at Camden, not merely from the extraordinary disadvantages which attended it as an individual position, but from its being on the wrong side of the river and covering nothing, while it was constantly liable to have its communication with the interior district interrupted. Lord Cornwallis, he says, did not consider how much he augmented this objection, often urged to him, by an arrangement whereby he (Rawdon) was debarred from any interference with the district from which alone he could be fed, the country in front of Camden, as well as that between the Wateree and Broad River, being so wasted as to afford nothing beyond precarious and incidental supplies.¹ Sumter, Marion, and Lee each perceived this as well as Rawdon. Greene alone seems not to have appreciated its importance. Acting upon it during Greene's absence in North Carolina with the Continental troops, the volunteer bands under Sumter, Marion, Postell, and Harden had kept a continual warfare in Lord Rawdon's rear, had fought, as we have seen, twenty-six engagements, had taken his posts, seized upon his trains, captured his garrisons and convoys, and had killed, wounded, and taken prisoner many of his men. Colonel Lee is justly entitled, we think, to the credit of suggesting to and urging upon

¹ Letter to Colonel Lee, Appendix to *Memoirs of the War of 1776*, 615.

General Greene his return to South Carolina, and operations here which would engage Lord Rawdon's attention at Camden while these attacks should be continued in his rear. But for the scheme of carrying on the war in this way as low down in the country as possible he has no claim to originality, as that was in successful operation before he proposed his plan to the commander. Sumter had pushed across Rawdon's rear to within fifty miles of Charlestown, besieged his posts, destroyed convoys, and captured prisoners. Marion had beaten and pursued McLeroth, had fought Watson and driven him across the country to Georgetown; Pickens had cut to pieces Dunlap's party in Ninety Six; and Harden, carrying the war almost to the gates of Charlestown, had advanced still farther into the Low-Country and captured Fort Balfour, and when Lee returned to the State with Greene, was moving to form a junction with Pickens on the Savannah. Rawdon's communications were thus completely broken up before Lee's suggestion to Greene. This, indeed, was the very point of difference between Greene and Sumter. From his first assumption of the command Greene had discouraged and disparaged this system of warfare. The salvation of the army didn't depend upon "little strokes," he had written to Sumter. Partisan affairs in war, he said, were "like the garnish to a table,—they gave splendor to the army and reputation to the officers, but they afforded no substantial national security." This war was not one of posts, he said, but of contests of States. Sumter, on the other hand, believed in the system of constant attrition, by which the invading army would be worn away piece by piece. Greene wished to see a battle in grand array. He wished to collect all his forces on some great field, and then lose or win it all in some famous action of which he would be the hero. He did not like this business in which his sub-

ordinates were achieving fame. Urging upon Colonel Lee the reasons of his wish to abandon South Carolina for what he thought a more conspicuous field, he makes this significant observation: "The plan being laid," that is, of partisan war on South Carolina, "and a position taken, the rest will be a war of posts, and the most that will be left to be performed by the commanding officer until we come to Camden is to make proper detachments, and give the command of them to proper officers. *The plan being laid, the glory will belong to the executive officer executing the business.*" It was this jealousy of Sumter, of Marion, and of Lee himself, which induced Greene to desire to have them under his immediate personal direction. But the British at home, as well as Lord Rawdon in the field, appreciated, as we have seen, very differently what had been accomplished by the "little strokes" of one partisan leader.¹

There was another aspect of vast importance in this system of warfare, which Greene overlooked. The breaking up of his posts and the interruptions of communication were the material results to the enemy; but of far greater consequence was the moral effect upon the people of the State. The first fruit of Lord Rawdon's victory in his front, it was said in England,² was the general revolt of the whole interior country at his back; so that the difficulties of his situation, instead of being removed or lessened by success, were increased to such a degree as to render them insurmountable.

Greene's determination to abandon the State for a field of greater fame, as has been seen, was suddenly changed by the information that Lord Rawdon was preparing to evacuate Camden. To this necessity his lordship had been reduced, not by the advance of Greene's army, for that he had so beaten on the 25th of April that it declined to

¹ *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 83.

² *Ibid.*

meet him again when he moved out to invite action on the 7th of May, but by the operations in his rear. With his communications then entirely broken up, Lord Rawdon, on the 9th, published to the troops and to the loyal militia his design of abandoning Camden, and offering to such people of the latter place as chose to accompany the army all possible assistance. He spent the night in destroying the works, and in sending off, under a strong escort, his baggage. To cover the movement, the remainder of the troops continued at Camden until the following day was far advanced. The most valuable part of the stores were brought off and the rest destroyed. The mill, prison, courthouse and other buildings were burnt, many private buildings sharing the same fate. Camden was left a heap of ruins. The sick and wounded who were unable to bear a removal were of necessity abandoned, and the American prisoners left to remain with others as an exchange. The army brought off, not only the militia who had been attached to them at Camden, but the well affected to the Royal cause, who were afraid to fall into the hands of the Americans, with their families, negroes, and movables taken equally under his lordship's protection.¹ The loyal families who accompanied his lordship, were, however, cruelly neglected after their arrival in Charlestown. They built themselves huts without the line of fortifications, in a settlement called Rawdon Town, which, because of its poverty and wretchedness, became a term of reproach. Many women and children who had lived comfortably on farms near Camden soon died of want in their miserable habitations.²

Brilliant successes to Sumter and Marion with their partisan bands and Lee's Legion now followed in rapid suc-

¹ *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 85.

² *Ramsay's Revolution*, vol. II, 232, 233.

cession. The 10th, 11th, 12th, and 15th of May were distinguished by the fall of the British posts of Camden, Orangeburgh, Fort Motte, and Granby in the order of date. The assertion of Greene that Sumter had promised to join him with one thousand men by the 8th of May, it has been seen, was a mistake. But his old leaders, Taylor, Lacey, Winn, Bratton, Henry Hampton, and Mydelton, at once responded to his call, and were soon joined by the two other Hamptons, Richard and Wade; while McCall, Purvis, Brandon, and Hammond came out under Pickens, and were soon reënforced by Harden from Marion's corps, working his way across from the Pee Dee to Combahee and thence up the Savannah.

Although disappointed greatly in the number of men and the provisions and stores he expected to collect, Sumter actually commenced operations by the time he proposed. His first blow was aimed at a party collected in force on the Tyger River, but they fled before him; whereupon, dividing his force into detachments, he simultaneously struck at several of the disaffected settlements, whilst a party was pushed down to the main army with the pittance of provisions he was enabled to collect, consisting only of about ten wagon loads. The country between the Broad and Saluda rivers and the Broad and Wateree was soon swept over; and on the 2d of May he laid siege to Fort Motte and Fort Granby on the south side of the Congaree. To assist in the investment of these places, Sumter had applied to Greene, while he lay at Twenty-five Mile Creek, for a six-pounder, which, on the 4th, Greene wrote, promising to send him.¹ The piece did not arrive, however, until after Marion and Lee, finding that Watson had eluded them, had appeared at Fort Motte. This post thus provided

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 94, 95.

against, deeming the reduction of Granby secured, Sumter left Colonel Taylor there, in command of a strong party to keep up the investment¹ while he made a dash at Orangeburgh, taking with him the six-pounder Greene had sent him; the sound of which he did not doubt was to bring that post to terms. The effort was crowned with success; on the 11th the garrison surrendered, and some supplies, with a large stock of provisions and nearly one hundred men, were the fruits of victory.

On the 11th Sumter was in readiness to return from Orangeburgh; but, intercepting one of Rawdon's expresses, he learned of his lordship's retreat from Camden, before Greene's despatch of the 10th, informing him of it, could reach him. Perceiving immediately that there was service to be performed on the line of Rawdon's communication between Camden and Charlestown, which he could very soon reach from his present position, he struck across the country towards Fort Motte for the purpose of uniting with Marion and Lee in front of Lord Rawdon, not doubting that, with two field-pieces and their united forces, greatly to embarrass his lordship in the passage of the river at Nelson's Ferry. The south bank of the Santee was defended by a small fort, which he hoped to carry before Rawdon could approach the river.

On arriving at Fort Motte, he found the place had fallen, that Marion had already proceeded upon the line of Rawdon's retreat, and Lee was advancing upon Fort Granby. There was still abundant time for Sumter to have returned and harvested the laurels that he had anticipated from the fall of that place, upon which he had so much set his heart, and for which his faithful lieutenant, Colonel Taylor, had prepared the way during his absence

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 121; *Life of General Edward Lacey*, 24; Mills's *Statistics of So. Ca.*, 716; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 251.

by so harassing the garrison that they were ready to capitulate upon the firing of the first cannon-shot. But, regarding the ultimate fall of Granby as secured, Sumter turned his immediate attention to another matter of more pressing importance. The commanding officer of the British post at Nelson's Ferry had issued orders for the inhabitants to drive down their cattle, and to bring to the line of retreat to Charlestown all the means of transportation that they could command. All the country was in motion in pursuance of these orders. This Sumter determined to interrupt. Anticipating the purposes of the British commander, for two days he scoured the country around, seizing upon the means of transportation and securing all the horses to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.¹

In the meanwhile, as soon as Marion and Lee ascertained that Watson had eluded them, the disappointed commanders moved upon Fort Motte, and on the 8th of May besieged it. Preparatory to Lord Rawdon's retreat, orders had been sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger to abandon Ninety Six and to join Browne at Augusta, and to Major Maxwell, commanding at Fort Granby, to fall back upon Orangeburgh. But these orders had been intercepted. As soon as Greene was informed of the retreat of the enemy, persuaded that Rawdon's first effort would be directed to relieve Fort Motte, he advanced towards the Congaree, determined to pass that river if necessary, and to cover the operations of the besieging corps.

This post was the principal depot of convoys from Charlestown to Camden, and sometimes of those destined for Fort Granby and Ninety Six. The fort consisted of

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 121-122; Mills's *Statistics*, 276, 716; Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 20-21.

field works around a large new mansion house belonging to Mrs. Rebecca Motte. A deep trench, along the interior margin of which was raised a strong and lofty parapet, surrounded the dwelling. To this post had been assigned an adequate garrison of about 150 men, which was now accidentally increased by a small detachment of dragoons which, on its way to Camden with despatches for Lord Rawdon, had arrived from Charlestown a few hours before the appearance of the American troops. Lieutenant McPherson, an officer highly and deservedly respected, commanded the British post. Opposite to Fort Motte, to the north, stood another hill, where Mrs. Motte, having been turned out of her mansion, resided in an old farmhouse. On this height Colonel Lee, with his corps, took post, while General Marion occupied the eastern declivity of the ridge on which was the fort.

The fort was soon completely invested ; the six-pounder was mounted on a battery erected in Marion's quarter for the purpose of raking the northern face of the enemy's parapet, against which Lee was preparing to advance. McPherson was unprovided with artillery, and depended for safety upon timely relief, not doubting its arrival before the assailants could complete their preparations.

The valley which ran between the two hills admitted safe approach within four hundred yards of the fort. This place was selected by Lee to break ground. Relays of working parties being provided for every four hours, and negroes from the neighboring plantations brought by the influence of Marion to their assistance, the works advanced with rapidity. Such was their forwardness on the 10th that it was determined to summon the commandant. A flag was accordingly despatched to McPherson, stating to him with truth their relative situations, and admonishing

him in the phrases of the time to avoid the disagreeable consequences of an arrogant temerity. To this McPherson calmly replied that, disregarding consequences, he should continue to resist to the last moment. The retreat of Rawdon was known in the evening to the besiegers, and in the course of the night a courier arrived from General Greene confirming the report, urging redoubled activity, and announcing his determination to hasten to their support. Urged by these strong considerations, Marion and Lee persevered throughout the night in pressing the completion of their works. On the next day Rawdon reached a position opposite Fort Motte; and in the succeeding night, encamping on the highest ground in his route, the illumination of his fires announced his approach to the despairing garrison. But in vain.

The large mansion in the centre of the trench left but a few yards of the ground uncovered; burning the house must therefore force a surrender. Confident that their trenches would be within reach before noon of the next day, Marion and Lee determined to adopt the plan of setting fire to the buildings in the fort. This measure was reluctantly adopted. The devoted house was a large, pleasant edifice, intended for the summer residence of Rebecca Motte, whose deceased husband, Jacob Motte, a prominent citizen, had taken an active part in the earlier Revolutionary movement, and whose daughter was the wife of Major Thomas Pinckney, then a prisoner, since Gates's defeat, in the hands of the British. In addition to these considerations Lee had made the farmhouse in which Mrs. Motte resided outside the works his quarters, at her pressing invitation, and with his officers had shared her liberal hospitality. Not only the lieutenant colonel, but every officer of his corps off duty had daily been entertained by Mrs. Motte, while she had also visited and ministered to the

sick and wounded in the American camp. Nevertheless it was determined that the house must be burned. Taking the first opportunity which offered, the next morning Colonel Lee informed Mrs. Motte of the intended measure, lamenting the necessity, and assuring her of the deep regret which it occasioned. The smile with which the communication was received gave instant relief to the embarrassed officer. Mrs. Motte not only assented, but declared that she was "gratified with the opportunity of contributing to the good of her country, and should view the approaching scene with delight." Shortly after, seeing accidentally the bow and arrows which had been prepared, she sent for Colonel Lee, and presenting him with a quiver of arrows imported from India, which ignited on percussion, she requested his substitution of these as probably better adapted for the object than those he had provided. Colonel Lee gladly accepted the offer, and everything was prepared for the concluding scene. The lines were manned and an additional force stationed at the battery, lest the enemy should determine to risk a desperate assault as offering the only chance of relief. As the troops reached their several points a flag was again sent to McPherson, summoning him to surrender. Dr. Irvine of the Legion was charged with the message, and instructed to communicate frankly the inevitable destruction impending, and the impracticability of relief, as Lord Rawdon had not yet passed the Santee. But the gallant young British officer in command of the post remained immovable, repeating his determination of holding out to the last.

It was now about noon, and the scorching sun had prepared the shingle roof for an easy conflagration. The return of Irvine was immediately followed by a flight of the arrows. The first struck and communicated its fire; a second was shot at another quarter of the roof; and a

third at still another part of it. This last also took effect, and like the first soon kindled a blaze. McPherson, still undaunted, ordered a party to repair to the loft of the house, and by knocking off the shingles to stop the flames. This was stopped as soon as perceived, by Captain Finley, who was directed to open his battery, raking the loft from end to end. The fire of the six-pounder posted close to one of the gables soon drove the soldiers down, and no other efforts to stop the flames being practicable, McPherson hung out the white flag. To the charge that he had subjected himself to punishment by the idle waste of his antagonist's time and neglect of opportunities which had been presented to him of saving himself and garrison from unconditional submission, the British officer frankly acknowledged his situation, and declared his readiness to meet any consequence which the discharge of his duty, according to his own conviction of right, might entail. His gallantry was rewarded and terms were accorded him. His officers and himself accompanied their captors, and partook with them a sumptuous dinner, at which Mrs. Motte herself did the honors with unaffected politeness to friend and foe alike, regardless of the injury the necessities of one and the duty of the other had caused, in the attempted destruction of her mansion.¹ At the request of McPherson his officers and himself were paroled and sent off that evening to Lord Rawdon, then crossing the Santee at Nelson's Ferry.

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776*, 345-348. The author has followed closely Colonel Lee's account of this interesting and romantic incident, and as Colonel Lee was present and a principal participator in the events, he must be deemed the best authority. James, in his *Life of Marion*, however, denies that the house was fired by arrows. He states that it was fired by a private in Marion's brigade, who slung a ball of rosin and brimstone on the roof (p. 120). Mrs. Ravenel in her *Eliza Lucas*, of Scribner's *Women of Colonial and Revolutionary Times* (p. 299), tells that

Soon after the capitulation Greene, anxious for its success, attended by an escort of cavalry, reached Fort Motte for the purpose of learning precisely the situation. Finding the siege concluded, he returned to camp, having directed Marion, after placing the prisoners in security, to proceed against Georgetown, and ordering Lee to advance without delay upon Fort Granby, to which place his army would also move. Lee set out immediately with his detachment, composed of horse, foot, and artillery, and, marching without intermission, he approached the neighborhood of Fort Granby before dawn of the second day.

Fort Granby was erected on a plain which extended to the southern banks of the Congaree, near Friday's Ferry,¹ on what is now the Lexington side of the river. Protected on one side by that river, it was accessible on every other quarter with facility. Colonel Lee in his *Memoirs* states that, being completely furnished with parapet, encircled by fosse and abatis, and being well garrisoned, it could not have been carried without considerable loss except by regular approaches, and in this way would have employed the whole force of Greene for a week at least, in which period Lord Rawdon's interposition was practicable; that he therefore determined to press to the conclusion of his operations with all possible celerity. As soon as he reached the neighborhood, relying upon the information of the guides,

the quiver of arrows had been given many years before to Mrs. Motte's brother Miles Brewton by the captain of an East Indiaman. Mrs. Ravenel is a great-granddaughter of Rebecca Motte. The late Rev. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, D.D., a grandson of Mrs. Motte, in his *Life* of his grandfather, *General Thomas Pinckney*, states that the arrows were fired from rifles, not shot from bows, and in this Mrs. Ravenel's account agrees. Immediately upon the surrender the flames were extinguished and the house saved. See also note by A. S. Salley, Jr., editor *So. Ca. Hist. and Gen. Mag.*, vol. II, 149-150.

¹ Sometimes spelt Fridig's Ferry.

he began to erect a battery in the margin of the woods to the west of the fort. The morning was uncommonly foggy, which fortunate circumstance gave time to finish the battery before it was perceived by the enemy. Captain Finley with his six-pounder mounted in battery, was directed, as soon as the fog should disperse, to open upon the fort, when the infantry, ready for action, would advance to gain the ground selected for the commencement of their approaches. The garrison consisted of 350 men, chiefly loyal militia commanded by Major Maxwell (a Loyalist from the eastern shore of Maryland) of the Prince of Wales's Regiment. This officer is represented as the exact opposite of McPherson, one disposed to avoid rather than to court the daring scenes of war. Zealous to fill his purse rather than to gather military laurels, he had during his command pursued his favorite object with considerable success, and held with him in the fort his gathered spoils. Lee states that, solicitous to hasten the surrender of the post, he determined to try the effect of negotiation with his pliable antagonist, and prepared a summons, couched in pompous terms, calculated to operate upon such an officer as Maxwell was represented to be. The summons was intrusted to Captain Eggleston of the Legion, who was authorized to conclude finally upon the terms of capitulation if he found the enemy disposed to surrender.

The fog disappearing, Finley's gun announced the unexpected proximity of Lee's command, and in the fort alarm and confusion followed. The Legion infantry advanced at the same time, and took possession of the desired ground without opposition, cutting off the enemy's pickets in that quarter of the fort. Eggleston, now setting out with his flag, caused a suspension of the fire, whereupon the enemy's pickets and patrols, so cut off, attempted to regain the fort. This effort was partially checked by the rapid move-

ment of the cavalry, and an officer was despatched to Captain Eggleston requiring him to remonstrate with Major Maxwell upon the impropriety of the conduct of his pickets and patrols, and to demand that he would order them to resume their stations. Eggleston's remonstrance was respected, and Maxwell sent his adjutant with the required orders. Negotiations were then begun, and Maxwell was himself inclined to accept the proposition submitted to him by Captain Eggleston; but after consulting with some of his officers, in turn he offered to deliver up the fort upon condition that private property of every sort, without investigation of title, should be confirmed to its possessors; that the garrison should be permitted to return to Charlestown prisoners of war until exchanged; that the militia should be held in the same manner as the regulars, and that an escort charged with the protection of persons and of property should attend the prisoners to the British army.

The first condition, as it prevented the restoration of plundered property, Captain Eggleston did not think proper to accept, but submitted by letter the enemy's demands to Colonel Lee, with one from Major Maxwell requiring two covered wagons for the conveyance of his own baggage free from search. In reply Eggleston received directions to accede to the proposed terms, with the single exception of all horses fit for public service, and to expedite the conclusion of the business. This exception was not approved by many of Maxwell's officers, but was not resisted by him. Finding that the capitulation would be thus concluded, the Hessian officers in the garrison came in a body to Eggleston, protesting against proceeding with the negotiation unless they were permitted to retain their horses — a protest not to be overruled by the authority of Maxwell. The negotiation was suspended and a second time Eggleston found it necessary to refer to Lee. About

this time, says that officer, a dragoon arrived with the information that Lord Rawdon had crossed the Santee, and was advancing towards Fort Motte. Had he determined to resist the requisition of the Hessian officers, he adds, this intelligence would have induced a change in his decision. He directed Captain Eggleston to make known to the officers that he took pleasure in gratifying them by considering all horses belonging to individuals in the fort as private property, and claiming only such, if any, as belonged to the public.

This obstacle being removed, the capitulation was signed, and the principal bastion was immediately occupied by Captain Rudolph with a detachment of the Legion infantry. Before noon Maxwell with his garrison, consisting of 340 men (60 regulars, the rest Loyalists), the baggage of every sort, two pieces of artillery, and two covered wagons, moved from the fort, and the major with the garrison protected by the stipulated escort proceeded on their route to Lord Rawdon. The public stores, consisting chiefly of ammunition, salt, and liquors, were secured, and presented a valuable supply to the American army. The moment Maxwell surrendered Lee despatched an officer with the information to General Greene, who was then within a few miles of Friday's Ferry, just opposite the fort. The army continued its march to Ancrum's plantation near the ferry and the general, crossing the river, joined his light corps.

The tide of affairs had indeed turned in favor of the American cause. The posts of Camden, Orangeburgh, Fort Motte, and Balfour had all fallen within a few days. And yet it was in the midst of these brilliant achievements that the cause of liberty had nearly lost the services of its two principal supports in South Carolina. Both Marion and Sumter tendered to General Greene their resignations dur-

ing these movements. In each instance the conduct of Colonel Lee was the cause of dissatisfaction.

Greene's greatest necessity and most pressing want was for horses upon which to mount his dragoons. As Congress had practically abandoned the Southern Department to its fate, he could obtain no horses to supply Washington's and Lee's men from that source; while the hard service to which the cavalry had been exposed in a country infested with Loyalists, and in which it was necessary to forage at a distance, had exhausted those he had. Thus it was that at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill but thirty-one out of eighty-seven dragoons could be mounted for service. As all the drafts made upon the States at this time were for specific supplies, Virginia, the great mart for good horses, had been called upon to supply a great number; and Greene's effort to obtain these animals had caused the interference of the legislature of that State, that put an end to all hopes of a supply from that quarter. From North Carolina he could get none. And so his despatches announcing his return to the State were accompanied with calls upon Sumter and Marion, not only to raise men to join him without pay or reward, but to find horses for his Continental troops. Every letter which he addressed to these officers contained a demand to collect horses by impressment or otherwise. But from the very nature of the service horses were as essential to Sumter and Marion as they were to Greene himself. Their followers were volunteers with families, dependent upon them for support, who mounted their plough horses to ride upon expeditions, and when the immediate occasion was over returned to their fields. It was impossible to take these horses — indeed, to have attempted to do so would have driven their owners into the British camps. It was scarcely less politic or practicable to take the horses of

those friends of independence whom age or necessity compelled to remain at home, for upon those depended the crops, the sole means of the support alike of the friendly inhabitants of the country and of the army. The only horses, therefore, available for general military purposes were those which could be taken from the British army or Loyalists. But neither Sumter nor Marion were disposed to be used in this matter as foragers and purveyors for the use of the Continental troops, who might at any time abandon the State to their care, as they had twice done before in the last year — and upon doing which for a third time Greene indeed was then actually determined. If Washington and Lee needed horses, let them get them from Congress or themselves take them from the enemy. The horses Sumter and Marion captured they needed to mount volunteers or men who enlisted in the regiments they were endeavoring to raise for service in the State, upon which they could rely. Besides all this, they naturally resented the implication of haughty superiority with which they were thus ordered to furnish supplies for those who had not done more for the service of the country than themselves. While these sentiments were entertained the first open cause of offence was given to Marion.

Colonel Lee, in a letter to General Greene, wrote: "General Marion can supply you, if he will, with 150 good dragoon horses, most of them impressed horses. He might, in my opinion, spare 60, which would be a happy supply." Upon the receipt of this letter Greene became very excited, and wrote to Marion a communication in which he is said to have made no effort to conceal or suppress his indignation that Marion, knowing his necessities and possessing the power to relieve them, should have failed to do so. In reply Marion repelled the

charge, and requested leave to resign, firmly but respectfully intimating his determination to retire from the service as soon as he should have seen Fort Motte reduced, before which he was then lying with Lee. Greene perceived the mischief he had done, and by earnest and flattering solicitations, with difficulty succeeded in overcoming Marion's resolution. "My reasons for writing so pressingly respecting the dragoon horses," wrote Greene, "was the distress we were in. It is not my wish to take the horses from the militia if it will injure the public service; the effects and consequences you can better judge than I can."¹

Marion was pacified, turned the affair off upon grounds that proved his feelings soothed, and his answer to Greene's letter was accompanied with a fine horse for the general's own use. But from that time he gave up the siege to Lee, coöperating more to cover his operation than to direct him. In the meanwhile, his followers, taking the alarm at the idea of being dismounted, soon began to scatter, until his command was reduced to 150. With these, as soon as Fort Motte surrendered, he struck down towards Monck's Corner, and hung upon Rawdon's flanks during the whole of his retreat to that place.²

Having thus offended and repelled Marion, Lee's conduct gave still greater offence to Sumter. The plan of operating against the posts on the west of Congaree, that is, Ninety Six, Granby, Motte, and Orangeburgh, had been Sumter's scheme, to which he was devoted, and in favor of which he had, with some difficulty, obtained the Commander-in-chief's concurrence. As early as the 2d of May, while Marion and Lee were endeavoring to intercept Watson, Sumter had commenced operations against Fort

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 115, 116; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 68.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 115, 116.

Granby and Fort Motte. Regarding the fall of Granby a mere matter of time, he had left Colonel Taylor to cut off Maxwell's supplies and to continue the investment while he struck below, at the post at Orangeburgh. This he had successfully done, and had then been led away to secure the supplies in the country through which Rawdon must pass on the retreat which he had commenced from Camden. While thus engaged, Lee, having offended Marion, had carried off the honor of the reduction of Fort Motte, and Sumter now learned had proceeded to anticipate him in that of Granby. Sumter's disposition was not one which would brook interference; nor was he without good reason in objecting to the regulars coming in at this time and taking from his followers the advantages and glory of a successful issue of the efforts they had made for the recovery of these posts, while the Continentals had been solicitous only of the security of their retreat after the loss of Hobkirk's Hill. Successes achieved by the volunteer soldiery, he thought, were far more efficacious in arousing and sustaining the spirit of resistance in the people of the States than victories by regulars. The former encouraged the wavering to side with their fellow-citizens who had thus shown themselves able to cope with the enemy without assistance. The latter, while good in themselves, added nothing to the confidence of the inhabitants in their own resources. Sumter had set his heart upon the capture of this post by his own troops without Continental assistance, not only for the material advantages to follow for them, but far more for the moral effect such achievement would produce. Not at all improbably there were mingled with these just sentiments for the public good, personal resentment that another should step in and deprive him of the honor which the plans he had so conceived and so steadfastly maintained were just about to bestow upon

him. It was probably with these mixed motives and sentiments that on the 14th he wrote to Greene: "I hope it may not be disagreeable to recall Colonel Lee, as his services cannot be wanted at that place [Granby]; and as to his taking command, *as at the post at Motte*, I cannot believe it would be your wish. And notwithstanding I have the greatest respect for Colonel Lee, yet I could wish he had not gone to that place, as it is a circumstance I never thought of; his cavalry can be of no service there, and may be of the greatest here. I have been at great pains to reduce that post — I have it in my power to do it — and I think it for the good of the public to do it without regulars."¹ Having written thus to the general commanding, he hurried on to Granby, to learn, before he reached the post, that Lee had accepted the capitulation.

The fact that Lee had thus snatched from Sumter's men and himself the honor of the recovery of the post was provoking enough to a man of his temperament; but his indignation knew no bounds when he learned the terms which had been given to Maxwell. The fort had been the depot of all the plunder that Maxwell and his party had been rioting in for months past, and the place of refuge of the most obnoxious Loyalists. It had now been invested for some time by Colonel Taylor's command, the very men who had suffered under the rapine of its garrison, and they had been solacing themselves with the hope of restitution, indemnity, and revenge. In all these they were disappointed, and compelled to look on and see covered wagons, drawn by their own horses, crammed with plunder from their farms, and their own slaves, all carried away before their eyes by Hessians and Tories, under the escort of Lee's Legion. Feeling ran high at the sight, it may well be imagined; but when, the next morning,

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 122.

Colonel Lee's own men paraded, equipped in new clothing, while the patriot soldiers were left to prosecute the war in rags, then even Colonel Lee's motives were drawn into question, and a bitterness engendered which was never allayed.

Sumter had surely no right to expect that the taking of the post would be delayed by Greene to suit his convenience or to gratify his ambition; but, on the other hand, he had cause for just indignation if the capitulation had been hurried merely to deprive him of its honor, especially if, in order to hasten it for this purpose, improper terms had been granted to the enemy. That Maxwell obtained every advantage in the negotiation for surrender is clear. The conditions allowed were such that, though Captain Eggleston was intrusted with the fullest powers to conclude finally upon the terms if he found the enemy disposed to surrender, he declined to act upon his authority, and required the sanction of Lee himself to them. The first, as Lee himself declares, was diametrically repugnant to the course contemplated by him, as it prevented the restoration of plundered property. And yet Lee allowed them, and permitted Maxwell to march off under escort, carrying off the property of men who stood by with arms in their hands. The hasty granting of such terms certainly demands some explanation, and this Lee has attempted to give; the fact of the receipt of information of Lord Rawdon's advance, he declares, would have determined him had he not already decided upon his action. But the facts of the situation will scarcely justify his precipitancy.

Maxwell's garrison did not actually number 350 men, but 60 of whom were regulars, the rest loyal militia. Lee's own corps numbered about 300¹ when he returned to South Carolina, and they had since lost but few

¹ See authorities cited, *ante*.

men in action. If we exclude for the present Colonel Taylor's regiment, whose presence Lee does not mention, but which was doubtless at hand, it must be remembered that Greene's army was just across the Congaree River at Friday's Ferry, while at this time, the 14th of May, Lord Rawdon was but crossing the Santee at Nelson's Ferry, more than sixty miles distant, with Marion upon his flanks, and Sumter between Lee and himself. It turned out that Rawdon was not coming that way at all, that in fact he was retreating in the opposite direction, to Monck's Corner. But Lee did not know that; his information by Captain Armstrong was that Rawdon was advancing towards Fort Motte, which was on the way to Granby. Still, even had that been so, Rawdon could scarcely have reached Granby before two days were Sumter and Marion not in his way. There was, therefore, no cause for any precipitancy; and it can scarcely be doubted that Lee's ambition to add another to his list of captures had induced him to grant terms to Maxwell which should never have been allowed.

Sumter, in his anger at Lee's conduct, tendered his resignation, and sent on his commission to General Greene. It has been asserted that Greene compelled Lee to apologize to Sumter.¹ This is probably an exaggeration of what did take place.

Whether through apology or explanation, it is more than probable that Lee exerted himself to reconcile Sumter, who was pacified, if not convinced and satisfied. On the 17th of May General Greene wrote to Sumter:—

“I take the liberty to return you your commission which you forwarded me yesterday for my acceptance & to inform you that I cannot think of accepting it & to beg you to continue your command.

“I am sorry for your ill health and shall do everything in my

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 123.

power to render your command as convenient as the nature of your service will admit.

“It is unnecessary for me to tell you how important your services are to the interest and happiness of this country and the confidence I have in your abilities and zeal for the good of the service. Your continuing in command will lay the public in general, and me in particular, under very great obligations & tho’ it may be accompanied with many personal inconveniences yet I hope you will have cause to rejoice in the conclusion of the business from the consideration of having contributed so largely to the recovery of its liberty.”

Well, perhaps, it might have been had General Greene accustomed himself usually to write in this strain in regard to Sumter to others as well as to Sumter himself, especially to Colonel Lee. But, as it has appeared, the general wrote to others in very different terms of this officer, repeatedly and querulously referring, as the author of the *Campaigns in the Carolinas* observes, to the failure of Sumter to join him with one thousand men as the cause of his defeat at Hobkirk’s Hill.¹ General Greene was indeed unhappy in his correspondence during the campaign. Johnson, commenting upon the fact that, from April 14th until the siege of Fort Motte, Lee acted under the command of Marion, observes that Greene’s official correspondence was exclusively with Marion “as commander of the party.” “Colonel Lee,” he says, “often writes also to General Greene, but if answers were returned they must be considered as private, since no copies of such answers are to be found among the official papers.” Unfortunately, though no official copies may have been kept, Greene not only received, but invited, communications from Lee, while under Marion’s command by his orders, and appears regularly to have replied to them.² No more uncomforta-

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 363.

² See Greene’s letter to Lee, *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, Appendix, x, xii, xiii; Gibbes’s *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 51, 61, 63.

ble relation could possibly have been created, nor one more certain to lead to misunderstanding, if not to rupture. And so the result proved. Writing to Lee, Greene criticises and expresses doubts of Sumter's good faith, and in reply Lee complains against Marion who, he charges, is withholding supplies due the Commander-in-chief. Such a correspondence was in violation of the most essential principles of military rule, and should never have been allowed. Once Lee was put under Marion's command, no communication should have passed between the Commander-in-chief and Lee except through Marion himself.

CHAPTER XI

1781

LORD RAWDON, on his retreat from Camden, was met at Nelson's Ferry by Colonel Balfour, the commandant of Charlestown, who came to represent to him, and to consult upon, the affairs of the city, as well as of the province in general. He stated that the revolt was now universal, and so little had this serious and alarming turn of affairs been apprehended that the old works of the town had been levelled to make way for new, which had not yet been constructed;¹ that he had the fullest conviction of the disaffection in general of the inhabitants; and that under these circumstances his garrison was inadequate to its defence against any force of consequence that might attempt the city. The royal militia in the city were in such a state of mutiny that a part of them had to be disarmed; they were ready, it was said, to seize the gates of the town if Greene would present himself suddenly before them.² The conclusions drawn from this untoward state of affairs were that, if misfortune happened to the corps under Lord Rawdon, the probable

¹ The old works had been levelled by order of Lord Cornwallis in January, 1781, before he moved into North Carolina. New ones designed had not been erected. This was one of the strongest points made by Sir Henry Clinton against his lordship in their bitter controversy. (*Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 484.)

² Letter from Marquis of Hastings, *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), Appendix, 613; *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 484.

consequence would be the total loss of the province, including the capital; but that, although the highest degree of prudence and caution were upon that account indispensably necessary, yet, as he was just joined by Major McArthur with about three hundred foot and eighty dragoons, Lord Rawdon conceived he might, without hazarding too much, endeavor to check the operations of the enemy on the Congaree.¹

And now was manifested the excellent work that Sumter had done while Lee was snatching from him the laurels at Fort Motte and Granby. So completely had he cleared the country that, it is stated, for five days after Lord Rawdon had passed the Santee not a single person of any sort whatever, whether with intelligence or on any other account, came near the army, although he had advanced directly from Nelson's Ferry that night and the following day to a point where the roads from Nelson's and McCord's ferries met. Nor could the scouts and spies which he detached on all hands procure him any reliable intelligence as to the situation of the enemy or the state of the country. A number of reports, however, which were contradictory in other respects, seemed to concur in one point, which was that Greene had passed the Congaree and was pushing down the Orangeburgh road with a strong force. This report was of too great moment to be slighted, and not only obliged the British commander to relinquish his design of advancing to the Congaree, but caused him to fall back to the Eutaws and thence to Monck's Corner, for the protection of Charlestown and of the rich intervening country. So meagre was his intelligence and so difficult to be obtained, that it was not until after his arrival at Monck's Corner that

¹ *Annual Register*, 1781, vol. XXIV, 85; *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 484, 485.

Lord Rawdon discovered it was not General Greene, but Sumter only, who had taken possession of Orangeburgh.¹

Sumter's genius at once took in the situation. He perceived that now had occurred the opportunity for striking a blow with Greene's united forces. The audacity of his own attack upon Granby and Orangeburgh, of Marion's upon McLeroth, Doyle, and Watson, and Harden's brilliant strokes in the Low-Country during the absence of Greene in North Carolina, and the fall of all the British posts on the Congaree since his return, had turned the popular tide in favor of the American cause, had strengthened the weak and determined the wavering, and, as he conceived, had prepared the way for decisive action. Delighting in vigorous enterprise, says Johnson, and appreciating the effect of these successes upon the spirit of the enemy as well as upon that of the people of the country, Sumter strenuously urged upon Greene that, united with Lee, Marion, and himself, he should now fall upon Rawdon. The British force outside of Charlestown, he believed, could now be destroyed and the campaign ended.² The respective numbers of the two armies now warranted the attempt. Greene had present at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill 939 men. He had lost in that engagement 268 men, leaving him 671; Major Eaton had soon after joined him with 220 North Carolina levies; Lee's Legion numbered 300. Putting Marion's men at but 150, to which number they were said to have been reduced by the apprehension that their horses were to be taken from them, and Sumter's at 500, Greene at this time must have had between 1800 and 1900 men. On

¹ *Annual Register*, 1781, vol. XXIV, 86-87; *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 480, 486.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 124.

the other hand, Lord Rawdon, at the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, had but 900 men, of whom 258 had been lost, and his only reënforcement since had been Watson's corps, which the Americans estimated at 600, but the British at 500,¹ and McArthur's, which joined him when he crossed Nelson's Ferry, of 380.² His lordship had therefore probably not more than 1600 or 1700 men present with him at the Eutaws in May. When the decisive action did take place, four months afterwards, these proportions were changed, and General Greene was compelled then to meet a force equal, if not superior, to his own in numbers, and from which the effects of the disasters in the spring had been in a measure at least removed. But he who had been so anxious for united action at Camden, and so confident there of capturing the whole British army, now hesitated and shrank from the risk of an attack when it promised such great results.

In defence of Greene's course at this time it was said that Lord Rawdon had gained at least a day's march, and, commanding all the means of transportation the country afforded, could sweep along with him or destroy all the provisions; and having gained the banks of the Santee, a few field-pieces could have stopped the advance of a very superior army through the passes of the river swamp should Greene have pursued him on the eastern side of the Wateree. And what, it was asked, was to be expected from the descent on the west side? The route was so circuitous that the British army could have thrown itself on the American front; nay, reënforcements might have advanced from Charlestown to Nelson's Ferry in the time the American army could have reached the latter point. What, then, would have been Greene's situation?

¹ Stedman's *American War*, vol. II, 360.

² *Annual Register*, 1781, vol. XXIV, 84.

The reënforcements from Ireland might have arrived and joined their forces to Lord Rawdon's, and Greene must have risked everything on a battle with a superior enemy, etc.¹

No battle would ever be fought if the attacking party should run no risk. But these objections are easily answered. If Rawdon had started with at least a day's march before Greene could move, he had showed no disposition to take advantage of his start and was proceeding very leisurely. He began his movement on the night of the 9th of May, but did not begin to pass the river until the night of the 13th, nor was he safely across until the evening of the 14th, when he met Balfour with his alarming report of the condition of the country, and learned that Fort Motte had fallen, and that Maxwell was besieged at Granby. Hoping to relieve Maxwell, he moved a day's march up the river, on the 15th, but, learning of the surrender of that officer, he retraced his steps.² During the four days of Rawdon's leisurely retreat from Camden, Sumter had made his masterly raid through the country down to Dorchester, sweeping away horses and everything in the way of transportation that could assist the British in their retreat. In the meanwhile Greene, who, Lee says, had pressed on with much expedition, was on the 15th within a

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 427, 428. It is said that the subject was fully discussed by Williams, Lee, and Carrington before the public in 1792, and that it was fully proved that the movement in the pursuit of Rawdon would not only have been visionary and hazardous, but impossible. No doubt it was so to Lee's satisfaction, for he claimed the credit of having advised Greene, instead, to move against Ninety Six (*Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 382). But Sumter was by no means convinced, and stoutly maintained the soundness of his advice upon the floor of the House of Representatives in Congress, when the subject was broached there, upon the occasion of relief sought for by General Greene's widow.

² Rawdon to Cornwallis, *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 482, 483.

few miles of Friday's Ferry or Granby. So far, therefore, from there being any difficulty in Greene's overtaking Lord Rawdon, the two armies were within striking distance on that day; Rawdon, believing that Greene had already crossed the river and was at Orangeburgh, was not yet disposed to abandon the line of the Congaree, and could easily have been brought to battle had Greene so desired. Nor will it do to say that the reënforcements from Ireland, that did arrive soon after, might have arrived and joined Rawdon; for while it was true Rawdon was hoping for the arrival of some force that might put Charlestown out of danger,¹ and that Greene himself had received information that British reënforcements might be expected in Charlestown, it behooved Greene all the more to strike before Rawdon received such assistance. The reënforcements did not, in fact, arrive until the 3d of June, near three weeks after, and it was in this time that Sumter urged that the battle should be given. But a still more conclusive answer to the objections against Sumter's advice on this occasion is that four months after, when the British *had* been reënforced by three fresh regiments from Ireland, had defeated Greene at Ninety Six and released Cruger, and had to some extent at least recovered from the demoralization which Balfour had reported to Rawdon on his arrival at Nelson's Ferry, Greene was at last compelled to fight the battle which might have been fought with so much more chance of victory at this time. Sumter was over-

¹ Lord Rawdon writes to Cornwallis from Monck's Corner on the 24th of May: "I am using every effort to augment our cavalry in hopes that the arrival of some force which may put Charlestown out of danger will speedily enable us to adopt a more active conduct. But the plundering parties of the enemy have so stripped the country of horses and there is such difficulty in getting swords and other appointments that I get on but slowly in this undertaking." — *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 486.

ruled. "Greene never ventured on a hazardous game when he could play a safe one," says his biographer.¹ The posts in the interior country, he now thought, presented the most desirable object. There appeared to be no doubt of their falling, and with them might be acquired supplies, provisions, and the country they commanded. This was certainly a very different view from that expressed to Sumter on his assuming command of the department, when Greene wrote to that officer that the salvation of the country did not depend upon little strokes — that it was not a war of outposts. It would have been well if he had now recalled and acted upon the advice he had then given. "If we can introduce into the field a greater army than the enemy, all their posts will fall themselves; and without this they will reëstablish them though we should take them twenty times." A greater army than that of the enemy had not been introduced; but by the repetition of little strokes the partisan bands had reduced the enemy to inferiority, and the remaining outposts were about to be abandoned by him, when to their surprise Greene, instead of advancing upon Rawdon, turned aside to besiege Ninety Six and Augusta. With the fall of the posts on the Congaree the fall of Ninety Six was assured, for, as Greene himself had written to his friend Governor Read, on the 4th of May, all the fertile parts of the State around Camden, Ninety Six, and Augusta had been laid waste in such a manner that an army could not subsist in the neighborhood of any of these posts.² Cut off, therefore, from its supplies from Charlestown, Ninety Six must have been evacuated.³ And this indeed had been determined upon by Lord Rawdon, who considered the risk too great to be hazarded for the purpose of protecting the place or even of extricating

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 124.

² *Ibid.*, 57.

³ *Ibid.*, 57.

the troops; nor would he venture to its relief without other means of subsisting his army on the march than the gleanings of a wasted and hostile country. Thus circumstanced, Lord Rawdon despatched several messengers by different routes, and, to guard as much as possible against mischance, applied to Colonel Balfour to send others from Charlestown, with instructions to Colonel Cruger, who commanded at Ninety Six, to abandon that place and to remove with the garrison as speedily as possible to Augusta.¹ It was not among the least vexatious freaks of fortune, says Johnson, that Greene owed all the mortifications he experienced before Ninety Six to the successful activity of the Whig militia. Had they been less diligent, he would have been saved the necessity of this expedition, and would have found himself, without a struggle, in command of the whole upper country. Nor is it probable, observes that author, that Cruger, after uniting with Browne at Augusta, could have made good his retreat to Savannah,² for General Pickens, with about four hundred of Anderson's regiment, was lying between Augusta and Ninety Six to prevent his junction with Browne;³ and Harden, with his party, was in the neighborhood. But why put the blame of the failure before Ninety Six, and the loss of all that had been gained by the partisan bands during the year, upon their excessive zeal in the simple performance of their duty, rather than upon the true source of Greene's misfortune, his rejection of Sumter's advice to advance upon Rawdon, rather than turn aside towards Ninety Six? It is nevertheless a curious fact that the evacuation of Ninety Six, and the consequent abandonment of the whole upper country by the

¹ *Annual Register*, 1781, vol. XXIV, 87; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 484; *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. I, 485.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 140.

³ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*

British, was only prevented by the interception of Rawdon's messages on land; and the surrender of the place was only prevented, as we shall see, by the interception of Sir Henry Clinton's despatches on the sea.

There is, however, another view to be taken of Greene's conduct in turning back to Ninety Six instead of pressing on towards the recovery of Charlestown. He was still hankering after the field in Virginia, to which he had learned that Cornwallis had gone. He was still asking himself: "If the principal officer in the enemy's interest is there (*i.e.* in Virginia), who should be opposed to him? Surely the commander of the Southern Department!"¹ The fact is that Greene was not contemplating the further prosecution of the war in South Carolina. He yearned to go to Virginia, where he thought more honor was to be won. He was again about to leave the protection of what had been regained to the partisan bands which had secured it, and with his Continentals to abandon the State. The day after he reached Ninety Six he wrote to Lafayette, "If we are successful here *I shall move northwardly immediately with a part of our force if not all.*"² That is, if Ninety Six fell, he would leave Sumter, Marion, and Pickens to contend with Rawdon.

We must now turn our attention to another part of the field. Major Harden, who, it will be recollected, had crossed the country and successfully carried back the war into the Low-Country, after the capture of Fort Balfour, when last mentioned was endeavoring to form a junction with General Pickens. He had not since been idle, and it is time now to look after his movements in connection with the Georgians who had survived the struggle on the other side of the Savannah. After the affair at Beattie's Mill,

¹ Letter to Colonel Lee, *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 356.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 141.

upon the return of Pickens, Clarke, and McCall from North Carolina, Clarke proceeded into Georgia with his troops, accompanied by McCall with a part of his regiment from South Carolina. About the 12th of April both these officers were seized with the small-pox. Clarke took a retired situation with a suitable guard until he recovered, during which time the command of the troops in Georgia was confided to Lieutenant-Colonel Micajah Williamson. McCall returned to Carolina, and unfortunately for his people and their cause, died from the disease.

When the Georgians returned to their country, they dispersed into parties of ten or twelve men each, so as to spread themselves over the settlements, appointing a place of rendezvous. When these small parties entered the settlements where they had formerly resided, says the historian of Georgia, general devastation was presented to their view; their aged fathers and youthful brothers had been hanged and murdered, their decrepit grandfathers were incarcerated in prisons, where most of them had been suffered to perish in filth, famine, or disease; and their mothers, wives, sisters, daughters, and young children had been robbed, insulted, and abused, and were found by them in temporary huts more resembling a savage camp than a civilized habitation. There is damning proof of the truth of this unvarnished tale, says this author, and the reader may imagine the feelings of the Georgian of that day and the measure of his resentment. Mercy to a Loyalist who had been active in outrage became inadmissible, and retaliation and carnage ensued.¹ The Whig captains, Johnson and McKoy, with a few active followers, had taken a position in the swamps of the Savannah River, and were employed in watching the communications between Augusta

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 362.

and Savannah. They had frequently intercepted boats laden with provisions and other stores, which they secured or destroyed. To put a stop to this, Colonel Browne, who commanded the British garrison at Augusta, detached Lieutenant Kemp of the King's Rangers with ten soldiers and twenty militia to dislodge them. McKoy, hearing of the advance of the party, took an advantageous position near Mathews's Bluff and attacked them, though much superior in number to his own, killed the officer in command and fifteen of his men, and compelled the remainder to retreat precipitately to Augusta.

Hearing of Colonel Harden's party in the neighborhood of Coosawhatchie, Colonel Browne ordered his royal militia to repair to Augusta to defend it; but they, covered with crimes, had no inclination to be cooped up in a garrison, lest they might be taken and receive the punishment due to them for their criminal offences. Many of them fled to the Indians and joined them in warfare against the frontier settlements.

Having called his troops, Browne determined to strike at Harden. He marched with the greater part of his own force and a number of Indians to drive him from the neighborhood.¹ Guided by one Wylley, he encamped in a field at Wiggins's Hill for the night.² Harden, joined by Johnston and McKoy, had advanced within a mile of the place where Browne was encamped, unaware of his approach. The two parties were then in striking distance, each ignorant of the other's position. Harden, first learning

¹ Colonel Browne states his force to have been one hundred soldiers and seventy Indians, and that he was joined by four hundred loyal militia (Curwin's *Journal*, 653).

² McCall, the historian of Georgia, represents Wylley as a captain in the British service, but Browne states that he was one of those who had taken the oaths and obtained protection, and on this occasion acted as guide and betrayed them (Curwin's *Journal*, *supra*).

of Browne's position, decided to attack at once, hoping to carry Browne's encampment by surprise. Browne, it is said by McCall, had been warned by Wylley of the dangerous position he had taken, and the necessity to be on the alert when opposing an officer of Harden's enterprise, but, imprudent, and possessing no quality of an officer but courage, he had retired to a house some little distance from the camp and had gone to sleep. By some intelligence Browne's officers were apprised of Harden's approach, and were forming their ranks when Harden's troops commenced the attack. The contest lasted half an hour, when, overpowered by superior numbers and discipline, Harden was compelled to retreat, which he effected in good order and carried off his wounded. The American loss was seven killed and eleven wounded. The loss of the enemy was about the same.¹ Colonel Harden returned to an island in Coosawhatchie swamp, upon which, like Marion at Snow Island in the Pee Dee, he had established his headquarters. There his wounded were left until recovered. These wounded were for some time sheltered and furnished with food and other necessaries by three Whigs, William Rawls, Colton Rawls, and Leonard Tanner. Unfortunately Tanner was taken prisoner by some neighboring Loyalists while he was engaged in this service, and murdered because he would not discover the place where the wounded were concealed. Still greater atrocities followed. Among the prisoners taken at Wiggins's Hill was Wylley, who had piloted Browne's detachment to Mathews's Bluff, and who they alleged had treacherously led the detachment into that difficulty. He was

¹ Colonel Browne states that the militia under his command during the action deserted to a man and joined Harden, who, thus reënforced, the next morning renewed the attack, but was again repulsed (*Curwin's Journal*, 654).

turned over, it was said, by Browne to the Indians, who ripped him open with their knives in Browne's presence and tortured him to death. They stripped the inhabitants, both men and women, of their clothes, and then set fire to their houses.¹ But the most tragic story of the time is that of Mrs. McKoy. This lady, a widow, whether a relative of Captain McKoy, who took so active a part here at the time, does not appear, had fled from her residence at Darien in Georgia into South Carolina for refuge. Her elder son, Rannal McKoy, a youth of seventeen years of age, was with Harden at Wiggins's Hill and was taken prisoner. His mother, hearing of his captivity, repaired at once to Browne's camp, having furnished herself with some refreshments which she presented to Browne as a means of obtaining more ready access. Browne accepted the refreshments, but turned a deaf ear to her entreaties, and would not permit her to have an interview with her son, whose fate she already foresaw. She was forced out of the camp. Captain McKinnon, a Scotch officer, a soldier of honor, unused to such murderous warfare, is said to have remonstrated with Browne against hanging the youth, and to have given Mrs. McKoy some assurance that her son would be safe. Browne that night caused a pen to be made of fence rails about three feet high, in which he placed his prisoners and covered it over with the same materials. Mrs. McKoy, following her son, had come again to the camp, but was not permitted to enter it. Captain McKinnon, the advocate of humanity, was ordered out of the way. The next morning the prisoners, Rannal McKoy, Britton Williams, George Smith, George Reed, and a Frenchman

¹ This is the story as told by McCall; but it is due to justice to say that Colonel Browne denies it, and states that Wylley (or Willie as he spells the name) was killed instantly by an Indian chief with a tomahawk, because of their betrayal by him.

whose name is not known, were ordered forth to the gallows; and, after hanging until they were nearly dead, they were cut down and delivered to the Indians, who scalped them and otherwise abused their bodies in their accustomed savage manner.¹ But notwithstanding these cruelties the people were not subdued. Captain McKoy soon returned to his station on the banks of the Savannah, and had the address to keep together a party sufficient to intercept supplies going up the river to the British garrison at Augusta.²

In the meanwhile General Pickens, since his return from North Carolina, had been engaged in rousing the people in Ninety Six District, in which he was most zealously and ably seconded by the two Hammonds, Colonel Samuel Hammond and Colonel Le Roy Hammond. Colonel Samuel Hammond, joined by Major James Jackson of Georgia, was charged to pass into Georgia for similar purposes. Passing through Ninety Six District, they arrived on the Savannah River near Pace's Ferry, in what is now Edgefield County, about twenty-four miles above Augusta; there they were joined by Captain Thomas Kee of Colonel Le Roy Hammond's regiment, with a number of men. The next day Captain Kee was detached to attack a party of Tories assembled under a Captain Clarke at his residence on Horner's Creek, a branch of Stevens's Creek, in what is now Edgefield County. Clarke was killed and the company all made prisoners. The party then marched to Colonel Le Roy Hammond's mill on the Savannah, attacked the British post there, broke up the mill, and took all the provisions belonging to the enemy.

¹ Colonel Browne admits the execution on the gallows of McKoy and eleven others, but alleges that they were executed because of the murder of Kemp and his party. He also admits that he ordered the horses of the plunderers of the king's stores to be burnt (*Curwin's Journal*, 654).

² Ramsay's *Revolution*, vol. II, 236-238; McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 362, 366.

Joined by two or three hundred men from Colonel LeRoy Hammond's regiment in a few days, Colonel Samuel Hammond's force was now so increased as to justify the detachment of Major Jackson to cross into Georgia and to join the troops collecting on that side of the river.¹

On the 16th of April, that is three days after Harden had captured Fort Balfour, and the day after Marion and Lee had laid siege to Fort Watson, Lieutenant-Colonel Williamson of Georgia, in the absence of Colonel Clarke, who was ill with the small-pox, having reassembled their men at the appointed rendezvous on Little River, marched to Augusta, where he was joined by some militia from the southern part of that State with a few men from Burke County. Williamson took position at twelve hundred yards distance from the British lines, and fortified his camp. If Browne had moved out at once and attacked him, the issue would probably have been favorable to the British, as they had the advantage of the artillery. But Browne was deterred by the exaggerated reports of Williamson's strength. General Pickens at this time, as before mentioned, with about four hundred men of Anderson's regiment, was manœuvring between Augusta and Ninety Six, to prevent the garrison of that place, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, from reënforcing Browne, having Colonels Brandon and Hayes hovering on the eastward of Ninety Six to recruit their forces and intercept supplies from that quarter.²

About the 15th of May Colonel Clarke, having so far recovered from the small-pox as to resume his command, came into camp, bringing with him a reënforcement of one hundred men. About this time a Major Dill collected a party of Loyalists, with the intention of joining Browne and

¹ Memoirs of Colonel Samuel Hammond, Johnson's *Traditions*, 507.

² McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 367.

forcing the Americans to raise the siege, but Clarke despatched Captains Shelby and Carr with a party of mountaineers and Georgians, who surprised them on Walker's bridge on Brier Creek, killed and wounded a number, and dispersed the rest without sustaining any loss.¹ Believing himself now secure against the necessity of a retreat, Clarke sent the horses of his troops with a guard of six men to Beech Island, below Augusta, on the Carolina side. Browne, learning of this, despatched a party of regular troops, militia, and Indians down on the river bank and in canoes to cut off the guard and bring off the horses. Clarke ordered Shelby and Carr at once in pursuit, but too late; Browne's detachment succeeded in the enterprise, killed the guard, and were returning with the booty when Shelby and Carr, lying in wait in a thicket, attacked them, and following their example, spared the life of none that fell into their hands. Nearly half of the detachment of the enemy were killed and the rest ran away. The horses were recovered without loss.² Thus had Pickens been gathering his forces around Augusta, which was practically in a state of siege from the 15th of May.

General Greene having determined upon the investment of Ninety Six, his first object was to prevent the garrison's escape into Georgia, and for this purpose ordered Colonel Lee thither with all despatch; and thus it was that, while Lord Rawdon was sending message after message to Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger to abandon the post, Pickens on the one side and Greene upon the other, independently of

¹ Captain Moses Shelby was a brother of Colonel Isaac Shelby; he had served at the siege of Savannah and at Cowpens (*King's Mountain and its Heroes*, 171, 417). Captain Patrick, or Paddy, Carr had been an Indian trader, a reckless and brutal man, who had served at King's Mountain (*Ibid.*, 124, 125, 340, 341).

² McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 368.

each other and with different motives, were alike manœuvring to prevent his doing so. Lee, with his usual promptness and vigor, began his march in the course of a few hours after the surrender of Maxwell, proceeding thirteen miles that evening. Resuming his march at a very early hour next morning, he pressed forward with the utmost expedition, relieving his fatigued troops by occasionally dismounting his dragoons and mounting his infantry. Approaching Ninety Six in the course of his march, he detached a squadron of horse under Major Rudolph towards the post with the hope by his sudden dash of seizing prisoners, from whom information could be obtained of the state of the garrison. Rudolph, concealing his approach, appeared suddenly near the town, but was not so fortunate as to find a single individual of the garrison without the lines. From two countrymen whom he seized he learned that Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, hearing of Greene's advance upon Camden, had been industriously engaged in strengthening his fortifications and was determined not to abandon his post. This information Lee at once forwarded to Greene, thus removing any apprehension on his part that Cruger would attempt to reënforce Browne. Lee reached the vicinity of Augusta on the third day of his march, having covered seventy-five miles from Fort Granby in that time. And now again Lee met with his usual fortune of reaping where others had sown.

The British continued, during the war, the customary sending of annual presents to the Indians, and thus securing to the Royal government their allegiance and assistance. It happened that this was just about the time for the presents to be sent, and Clarke, on the lookout for their coming, had ordered some of his men down the river to intercept them. The boats containing the goods appeared as expected, and were at once attacked by the party Clarke

had sent who drove their guard into Fort Galphin, or Fort Dreadnought, as it was sometimes called, the boats lying under cover of its guns. This fort, as it was called, was, like Fort Motte, a small stockade around the farmhouse of George Galphin, who had been a deputy superintendent of Indian affairs. It was situated on the north, or South Carolina, side of the Savannah River, twelve miles below Augusta, and was garrisoned by two companies of Colonel Browne's infantry. The stream, though narrow here, is deep, and riflemen among the trees which covered its bank swept the decks of the boats not provided against such an attack. Here Clarke was carefully guarding this invaluable prize when joined by Pickens and now some days after by Lee.¹ This latter officer had been preceded by one of his officers, Captain O'Neill, with a light party of horse charged with the collection of provisions and information, and from this officer he learned the pleasing intelligence when at some distance. Upon reaching the neighborhood, Colonel Lee was complimented with the request to undertake the reduction of the post, and he detached Major Rudolph of the Legion upon the enterprise. A strong detachment of Georgia and South Carolina troops, the latter consisting of Colonel Hammond's regiment except one company and what of Colonel Harden's regiment was with him, marched to cover and coöperate with Major Rudolph; but the fort capitulated on the 21st of May after little resistance and slight loss to the Americans; one man died of heat and fatigue, and 8 or 10 were wounded. The British lost 3 or 4 killed and 126 prisoners, including 70 commissioned officers and privates in the regular service. But the most valuable acquisition was a quantity of clothing, blankets, small arms, rum, salt, and other articles which were much

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 370; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 131.

needed, and some ammunition and articles of military equipment.¹

Colonel Lee, whose ambition and selfishness in the interests of his own command had embroiled himself and the Commander-in-chief with two of the three South Carolina generals, had now entered upon a service which brought him into contact, without bringing him under the command, of the third. Fortunately for the service, General Pickens possessed both a modesty and a tact which were at once illustrated upon his again coming to act with the Continental troops after serving with them in North Carolina. He appealed at once to Greene, representing the destitute condition of the men under his command, and begged that they might be permitted to share in some part of the goods taken at Fort Galphin. He had been a favorite of Greene's in the North Carolina campaign, and Greene at once responded to his appeal, and authorized him to divide the whole according to his sense of justice and the good of the service. Pickens set aside the military stores for the public service, sent thirteen wagons with rum, salt, sugar, medicines, etc., for the main army, and divided the clothing into three equal parts, one of which he assigned to Georgia, another to South Carolina, and the third to the Continental troops. At Greene's suggestion the fowling-pieces, of which the number was considerable, were divided among the militia, only making the distribution the means of retaining them for a specified time in service.² It having been arranged between Gen-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 131; McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 371. Colonel Lee's account of this affair has not been followed, because Judge Johnson shows that he was not present; and this is admitted by Mr. Lee in his reply to Judge Johnson (see *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, 390).

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 132.

eral Pickens and Colonel Lee that the latter should conduct the operations against the post at Galphin's plantation while the former made the necessary arrangements and preparations for the complete investure of Augusta, upon the return of Rudolph from Fort Galphin General Pickens prepared for the purpose.

The post at Augusta was defended by two works, called Fort Cornwallis and Fort Grierson, constructed near the river bank, about half a mile distant from each other. Fort Grierson was erected near a ravine that falls into the Savannah about half a mile above the town, and Fort Cornwallis lower down the river. The forts were supplied with water from the river, but, situated on a plain not much elevated above the river bed, water could be obtained only by digging. Colonel Browne, commanding the British forces in upper Georgia, had his headquarters in Fort Cornwallis, which was garrisoned by about 320 provincials, with 200 negroes, who, if not armed, relieved the regular troops of fatigue duties and work upon the fortifications. Fort Grierson was defended by about 80 militia and two pieces of artillery. At a point equally calculated to act upon either fort, Pickens constructed a small work for the purpose of using his artillery with security and effect. On the 23d of May a junction was formed by Pickens, Lee, and Clarke; and after reconnoitring the ground and the British works, it was determined to dislodge Colonel Grierson and to destroy or intercept him in his retreat to Fort Cornwallis. General Pickens and Colonel Clarke were to attack the fort on the north-west, while the militia and Major Eaton's North Carolina battalion,¹ and some Georgia militia under Major Jackson,

¹ Major Pinketham Eaton began his military career as a captain in the Third North Carolina Continental Regiment. His commission as captain was dated 16th of April, 1776, and on the 22d of November, 1777, he was

were to pass down the river and attack the work upon the northeast, while Lee, with his infantry and artillery, took a position south of the fort, so as to support Eaton or keep Browne in check if he should come out to attempt to save Grierson's command in case he should evacuate his works and retreat to Fort Cornwallis. The cavalry, under Eggleston, were posted on the skirt of the woods to the south of Lee, ready to fall upon Browne's rear if he attempted to sally out. Discovering that Grierson was in a critical situation, Browne drew out a part of the command and advanced with two field-pieces with the appearance of giving battle to save Grierson, who was warmly assailed by Pickens and Eaton. Lee opposed Browne, who, not deeming it prudent under existing circumstances to persevere in the attempt, confined his interposition to a cannonade, which was returned by Lee, with very little effect on either side. Grierson, finding that resistance would be vain, determined to abandon the position and throw his command into Fort Cornwallis. He attempted to retreat under cover of the river bank, but Colonel Clarke intercepted him, and his whole party were killed, wounded, or taken. The opportunity of revenge upon any of Browne's men was not avoided; and, indeed, it is said that Grierson had likewise rendered himself peculiarly odious to the Georgians by his cruel practices.¹ In Georgia the war between Whig and Tory was now waged without quarter, and in this affair the Georgians bore the

promoted to be major. He had been General Jethro Sumner's most active assistant in raising the new levies, and was the first officer assigned to active service in the campaign of 1781. His early promotion, and the admiration which General Sumner had for him, is sufficient evidence of his skill and courage as a soldier; and Lee testifies to his great amiability of temper, which had endeared him to his comrades. — *No. Ca. in 1780-81* (Schenck), 418.

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 274.

principal part. The killed were far beyond the usual proportion to wounded and prisoners — thirty were killed and only forty odd made prisoners. A few only of the Americans were wounded, and fewer still killed; but, unfortunately, among the latter was Major Eaton of North Carolina, who some accounts represent as falling gallantly at the head of his battalion, while others intimate that he was made a prisoner and put to death in cold blood.¹ He had been but a short time in this service, but long enough, it appears, to have endeared himself to his comrades.

Pickens and Lee now pressed forward their measures against Fort Cornwallis, into which Browne had retired without rendering any assistance to Grierson. On his return to the fort, finding that he would be closely invested, he applied himself to strengthen his position in every part. It is said that he placed a prisoner, an aged citizen named Alexander, and others whom he had long in captivity, in one of the bastions most exposed to the fire of the American batteries, one of which was manned by Captain Samuel Alexander's rifle company, thus exposing the father to be killed by the hand of his son, but which fate fortunately the father escaped. The Americans had but one field-piece, a six-pounder; and they found great difficulty in the use of this, as the surrounding ground presented no swell or hill which would enable them to bring it to bear upon the enemy. At Lee's suggestion resort was had to the Maham tower which had been used so successfully at the reduction of Fort Watson. This tower, consisting of a pen of logs raised about thirty feet high, was thrown up under cover of an old frame house which Browne had allowed to remain near the fort. Browne made two sorties, one on the night of the 28th and one on that of the 29th; but both of these were successfully met by the infantry of Lee's Legion.

¹ Johnston's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 134.

On the 1st of June the tower was raised as high as the enemy's works, seeing which and recognizing its fatal consequence, Browne attempted its destruction, but found the besiegers alive to its defence, and ready with their whole force to receive him. Pickens took command of one division of the militia in person, supported by Captain Handy's infantry company of Lee's Legion, while Clarke took command of the other, supported by Rudolph's. About ten o'clock at night Clarke's division were charged upon by about one-third of the British troops, and for some time the conflict was furious, but Rudolph's bayonets forced the enemy to retire. While the detachment was engaged against Clarke and Rudolph, Browne sallied out with his remaining force against Pickens, where the contest was equally severe until Handy pressed the bayonet, which forced Browne to retreat. Upon this occasion the loss on both sides exceeded all which had occurred during the siege except in the evacuation of Fort Grierson.

Failing in this attempt, Browne now resorted to a stratagem which very nearly proved successful. He sent out a sergeant — a Scotchman — under the cloak of desertion, with instructions to find an opportunity of setting fire to and burning the tower. Lee received the pretended deserter and was for a time completely deceived by him. To such an extent had the adventurer succeeded that Lee had actually arranged for the deserter's station on the tower, with a view to his directing Captain Finley's gun upon Browne's magazine, when his suspicions became in some way aroused, and he countermanded the order and put him under charge of the guard. Another threatened disaster to the Americans was but just avoided. Between Lee's quarters and the fort there stood four or five deserted houses, some of them near enough to the fort to be used with effect by riflemen from their upper stories. It had

been the intention of Pickens and Lee to use these houses to aid in covering the attack when the enemy should be assaulted. Early on this night all but two of the houses were burned by Browne. The besiegers were at a loss to conjecture why the two houses were spared, especially that nearest the fort; but the general impression was that they had been purposely spared with some view of advantage. The fire from the tower had now dismounted the enemy's guns from the platform and raked the whole interior of the fort, and it was determined to prepare for the assault at the hour of nine on the 4th of June. In the course of the night of the 3d a party of the best marksmen were selected from Pickens's troops and sent to the house spared by Browne and nearest to the fort. The officer commanding the detachment was ordered to arrange his men in the upper story for the purpose of ascertaining the number which could with ease use their rifles out of the windows or any other convenient apertures, then to withdraw and report to Pickens. It was intended before daylight to have directed the return of the officer to the house with such riflemen as he should have reported to be sufficient. All other preparations had been made for the assault, when about three o'clock in the morning of the 4th of June a violent explosion occurred, and the house which was to have been occupied by Pickens's riflemen was blown to atoms. Browne had pushed a sap to the house, which he correctly presumed would be occupied by the besiegers when ready to strike their last blow; and hearing the noise made by the party the evening before in arranging for their stations, assumed that the approaching morning was fixed for the general assault. Then accidentally the building was prematurely blown up, and the party destined for it escaped.

On the 31st Colonel Browne had been summoned to

surrender, but had replied that it was his duty and inclination to defend the post to the last extremity. On the morning of the 3d the summons was repeated, but again refused in similar terms. The hour of nine o'clock of the 4th now approached and the columns for assault were in array, waiting the signal to advance. But Pickens and Lee, to spare further bloodshed, offered still another opportunity to the besieged to avoid unnecessary sacrifice. They wrote, proposing to Browne that the prisoners in his possession should be sent out of the fort, and that they might be considered his or theirs as the siege might eventuate. This was declined. But the storming of the fort was still deferred, probably because, as the 4th of June was the king's birthday, it was supposed that as a point of honor Browne, as a king's officer, would be less inclined to surrender on that day than on any other. And so it proved to be. For on the morning of the 5th Browne himself opened negotiations which resulted in the surrender of the fort. The fort and garrison were surrendered to Captain Michael Rudolph,¹ who was appointed to take possession, and the British troops marched out and laid down their arms. The British loss during the siege was 52 killed, and 334, including the wounded, were made prisoners of war. The American loss was 16 killed and 35 wounded, 7 mortally.

Measures were immediately taken for the protection of Colonel Browne, who, from his notorious character and the barbarities committed by him, it was assumed would be in danger, surrounded as he now was by men who had been so long the victims of his atrocities. He was placed, for safety, under a strong guard of Continental troops commanded by Captain Armstrong. The precaution was necessary, for young McKoy, the brother of the one who was

¹ A brother of Major John Rudolph.

but a few days before so cruelly executed by Browne, was present, seeking an opportunity of putting him to death; and doubtless there were others equally bent upon the same purpose. The American officers, unfortunately, had not been so careful in regard to Colonel Grierson, probably because they were not aware that he, too, was scarcely less odious to the Georgians than Browne himself. He was killed the afternoon of the day after the surrender of Fort Cornwallis. General Pickens, on the 7th of June, thus reports the affair to General Greene:—

“A very disagreeable and melancholy affair which happened yesterday in the afternoon occasions my writing to you at this time. I had ridden down to Browne’s fort where I had been but a few minutes when information was brought to me that a man had ridden up to the door of a room here, where Colonel Grierson was confined and without dismounting shot him so that he expired soon after, and instantly made off; and though he was instantly pursued by some men on horseback he effected his escape. Major Williams, who was in the same room, immediately ran into a cellar among other prisoners; but standing in view was soon after shot at and wounded in the shoulder. I have given orders for burying Colonel Grierson this afternoon with military honors, but as Colonel Browne was also insulted yesterday, though the man was for some time confined for it, and the people are so much exasperated against some individuals I have found it necessary to give orders to cross the river with the prisoners under the care of Colonel Hammond’s Regiment, and Captain Smith’s detachment of North Carolinans and march them to Ninety-Six or till I meet your order respecting them, being fully persuaded that were they marched for Savannah they would be beset on the road, but think they may go to Charlestown by way of Ninety-Six if you should so order.”¹

This cotemporaneous report explains a matter about which Stedman, the British historian, becomes very indignant, namely, the bravado, as they allege, of marching the

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781–82), 91; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 135.

British prisoners taken at Augusta by way of Ninety Six, and passing them in full view of the garrison there besieged by Greene's army. This, Stedman says, was done with all the parade of martial music and preceded by a British standard reversed.¹ Colonel Lee states that the exhibition before Ninety Six was owing to the mistake of the officer in taking the nearest road to the town, and that he reprimanded him for exposing the corps, in charge of the prisoners, to the guns of the garrison.² How it came to Lee to do so is somewhat curious, as from General Pickens's letter it appears that the guard was under the command of Colonel Hammond, sent by General Pickens to report to General Greene. But however that may be, it is clear from General Pickens's report at the time that, as a matter of fact, the prisoners were sent by the way of Ninety Six from motives of humanity, and not with a view of intimidating the British garrison there. It does not, however, appear what cause of indignation would justly have been given, had that been the view with which the prisoners were despatched by way of that post.

Strange to say, while the rest of the prisoners were for their greater security sent by the way of Ninety Six, Colonel Browne himself was safely guarded on the road to Savannah, though, says Ramsay, he had lately hanged thirteen American prisoners and delivered to the Indians some of the citizens of the country, who suffered from their hands all the tortures which savage barbarity had contrived to add poignancy to the pains of death. And this, though on his way he had to pass by the inhabitants whose houses he had lately burned, and whose relations he had recently hanged. The only adventure recorded was that at Silver Bluff. Mrs. McKoy, having obtained leave of the officer

¹ Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 309.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 371.

in command of his guard to speak to Browne, addressed him in words to the following effect: —

“ Colonel Browne, in the late day of your prosperity I visited your camp and on my knees supplicated for the life of my son. But you were deaf to my entreaties. You hanged him, though a beardless youth, before my face. These eyes have seen him scalped by the savages under your immediate command, and for no better reason than that his name was McKoy. As you are now a prisoner to the leader of my country, for the present I lay aside all thought of revenge; but when you resume your sword I will go five hundred miles to demand satisfaction at the point of it for the murder of my son.”¹ But, though Browne was exchanged soon after and was again in the field in Georgia,² he survived the war, and when peace was restored retired first to Florida and thence to the Bahamas.³

This unfortunate affair, of the murder of Grierson and the attack upon Williams, says Johnson, was the subject of the most sensible regret of all the American officers. A similar outrage had but a short time before been committed upon the person of Colonel Dunlap, and although Pickens made every effort to discover the murderer, he had failed of success. A large reward was offered by proclamation for the discovery of the murderer of Grierson, but principle in some, and fear and fellow-feeling in others, effectually precluded information. It has since appeared, says the author, that the attack originated in individual revenge, from the sons of some of the old men confined in Fort Cornwallis. Their children had now had access to

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution*, vol. II, 240. It is quite safe to say that this speech of Mrs. McKoy has been doctored, — to use an expressive if not an elegant phrase, — and prepared after the event.

² McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 406.

³ *Am. Loyalists* (Sabine), 180.

them, and received from the palsied lips of their parents such tales of insult and oppression as instigated men otherwise correct and respected to the commission of these disgraceful acts. Human passions are ever carrying on the work of deception, and the violation of the sanctity of age or female delicacy will, in precedence to all others, be deemed justifiable causes for the more bloody revenge. Perhaps the suspicion at that time entertained with regard to the fate of Major Eaton may not have been without its influence in suppressing information. Indignation and thirst for revenge because of a recent excursion of a party of Cuninghams, in which, as General Greene expresses himself, "savage cruelty never equalled the conduct of this party," was, it is said, at that time in full operation on the feelings of the Whigs. Many an eye was streaming for the murders that had been committed by that party.¹ It is curious that, in commenting upon the murder of Grierson, no comment is made by the author upon the recent monstrous conduct of Browne in turning over the captives to the knives of the Indians, if indeed he had really done so.

Upon the capitulation on the 5th Colonel Lee immediately moved forward with the valuable accession of artillery to aid in the reduction of Ninety Six. General Pickens remained at Augusta until transportation for the stores taken there and at Fort Galphin could be provided, which being accomplished in a few days, he also marched to join General Greene.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 136. We do not, however, know to what this allusion refers.

CHAPTER XII

1781

GENERAL GREENE, having determined to proceed against Ninety Six and Augusta, from his camp at Ancrum's plantation, on the east side of Friday's Ferry, on the 17th of May, the day upon which he returned to Sumter the commission he had resigned, issued to him the following instructions:—


“You will continue your command at this place and encourage the militia in all parts of the State in the best manner you can for coöperating with the American army. You will carefully watch the motions of the enemy below this place & advise me of all their movements & should they come out in force towards Ninety-Six you will take such route as to effect a junction with us at that place.

“You will have the fortifications at this place levelled & those of Motte's and Orangeburgh, if not already compleated, and also those of Camden.

“We shall leave part of our spare stores at this place, should the enemy make any movements this way or towards Ninety-Six, you will give the officer having them in charge orders to move up to Wynsborough & as much higher up into the country as you may think necessary.

“Such of the negroes as were taken at this garrison (as are not claimed by good Whiggs & their property proved) belonging to the Tories or disaffected, you will apply to the fulfilling your contracts with the ten-months troops; such parts of the arms and stores, as the commissary general of Military stores & the Quarter Master General shall deliver over to you you will apply as justice and the good of the service shall require.

“But above all things pay particular attention to the arranging the militia as the safety of the country in a great measure depends thereon.



“You will direct General Marion to take such a position & employ him in such a manner as may most effectually annoy the enemy & at the same time coöperate with us should occasion require it.”¹

Having thus left Sumter in the entire charge of the operations in the lower country, and to guard him against Lord Rawdon, General Greene only continuing his camp at Friday’s Ferry (or Fort Granby) long enough to give time for Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington, his quartermaster, to procure means of transportation, took up the direct road for Ninety Six, which he reached on the 22d.

Ninety Six, it will be remembered, was the scene of the first bloodshed of the Revolution in South Carolina, that of the siege of the 19th to the 21st of November, 1775,² — a struggle between the Whigs and the Loyalists of the State, which had resulted in a treaty between the parties, scarcely made before broken. Since that time it had been the stronghold of Royalists, and the point from which the beautiful and rich country around had been desolated. It had been originally a post against the Indians, and had been surrounded with a stockade as a defence against their incursions. The stockade was still remaining; and upon the fall of Charlestown it had been immediately garrisoned by the British. Its situation rendered it of great importance to them, as it maintained the communication with the Indians; indeed, it had derived its name from the circumstance that it was ninety-six miles distant from the principal town of the Cherokee Indians, called Keowee. It was, too, the most advanced post occupied by the enemy, and supported Camden and Augusta. As such, as we have seen, it had been an object of great solicitude by Sumter, Clarke, and McCall, and afterwards by Morgan under Greene.

Upon the fall of Charlestown the post had been com-

¹ Sumter MSS.

² *History of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrady), 89-92.

manded for some time by Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour, upon whose removal to the command of the town he had been succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Harris Cruger. This officer was a native of New York, a son-in-law of General Oliver De Lancey, and commandant of one of the three battalions known as De Lancey's corps or brigade.¹ His garrison of 550 men was composed entirely of Americans. His own battalion, raised in New York, numbered about 150, and the second battalion, New Jersey volunteers, 200. These Northern Tories were regulars and were as good troops as any in the British service. To these were added about 200 South Carolina loyal militia.² Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger was totally ignorant of the situation of the army under Lord Rawdon; nor had he any information of the action of Hobkirk's Hill and the evacuation of Camden but from an American officer who happened to be taken prisoner. But he was aware of the growing disaffection of the people of Ninety Six and of a great change in the condition of affairs, even in that hitherto most loyal region. The absence of all communications with the rest of the province could not but warn him of danger. Fortunately for the king's cause, Colonel Cruger was equal to the exigencies of the occasion; and, unable to obtain information or supplies, he set about at once to put his post in the best possible state of defence. As soon as the post had come into the possession of the British, the year before, works had been added to the stockade, under Lieutenant Haldane of the engineers, an aide-de-camp to Lord Cornwallis. The principal of these, which from its form was called a star, was on the right or southeast of the village of Ninety Six, as the county town

¹ Sabine's *Am. Loyalists*, 234, 253; "The Battle of Eutaw Springs," De Peyster, *United Service Magazine*, September, 1881, 312.

² Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 366.

of Ninety Six was called. It consisted of sixteen salient and reëntering angles, with a dry ditch and abatis. But none of the works were in a finished condition at this time. In this state of uncertainty the whole garrison was immediately set to work, the officers cheerfully sharing in the labor with the common soldiers; a bank of earth was in a short time thrown up round the stockade and the whole strengthened by abatis. Blockhouses were also erected in the village, traverses made for the security of the troops, and covered communications between different parts of the work. On the north of the village was a valley through which ran a rivulet that supplied the place with water. The county prison, having been fortified, commanded this valley on one side and a stockade covered it on the other. Such was the condition of this post and garrison, which by accident and fortitude alike were to employ almost the whole of the American army, between three and four times its numbers, for a month in a useless and unsuccessful siege, while Lord Rawdon with the rest of the British army recovered from the effects of the loss of the other posts, received timely reënforcements and regained the ground it had lost.

Greene reached Ninety Six with his army of between one thousand and eleven hundred men on the night of the 22d of May.¹ It was dark and rainy, and so favorable to the purposes of reconnoitring, Colonel Lee asserts, that General Greene committed the determination of the course and mode of approach to Count Kosciuszko, the famous Pole, who was then serving at the head of the engineers in the Southern army; and that he, not regarding the importance of depriving the enemy of water, for which they were dependent on the rivulet, applied his undivided atten-

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 358; *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, 142.

tion to the demolition of the star, the strongest point of the enemy's defence.¹ Johnson questions this statement, and, upon the authority of a member of the general's staff at the time, states that the general himself directed the operations of the engineers, that he reconnoitred the position under cover of the favorable weather the night of their arrival, with Kosciuszko and Captain Pendleton, his aide; and that the project of cutting off the water was well weighed and considered, and rejected on mature deliberation because another supply could easily be obtained by digging, as was done during the siege of Williamson's men by the Tories under Robinson in November, 1775, when a well was dug and water obtained on this very spot. It was also considered, he adds, that the star commanded the other works, and that the approaches against the water would be useless against the star, while on the other hand, by the efforts to defend the rivulet the enemy weakened himself at the principal point—the star.² But an obvious answer to the suggestion was the apparent fact that the enemy had gone to much trouble in the construction of a covered way to the rivulet, and incurred so great an increase of duty in defending it. This spoke for itself the importance Cruger deemed its protection. Moreover, as Johnson himself points out, the British historian Stedman asserts that the attempt was made by the garrison with great labor, but that no water was found. Nor, upon a careful perusal, does the account of the siege of 1775 warrant the assurance that any great quantity of water was then obtained; for Drayton, the historian, states that there was a total want of it from Sunday morning, the 19th of September, to Tuesday afternoon, the 21st. True, he adds, that the fatigue parties, with great labor, after

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 359.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 142.

penetrating through a very tenacious clay soil forty feet deep, obtained a supply which relieved the necessities of the garrison.¹ But as the siege was terminated on Wednesday, the 22d, the water obtained on that occasion may not have been more than enough for the emergency of a few hours. But however that may be, Greene now commenced his operations on the other side without attempting or even threatening interference with the supply of water, upon which, as it really happened, the garrison depended. Whether General Greene himself decided upon this plan of the siege, or left it entirely to the direction of Kosciuszko, is not in the question now under consideration a matter of importance, as in either event the responsibility for its consequence and result must rest upon Greene as the commander.

An undulation in the ground seventy yards distant from the star works, at a point which the enemy's artillery did not cover, was chosen as the position from which to commence operations. Work upon a mine at this point was begun on the night of the 22d, but from this the Americans were quickly driven. Guns were at once mounted by Cruger on one of the salient angles opposite, and under their fire a party of thirty sallied out, entered the works, and put to the bayonet every one they found. Finding from this experience that the position was within the range of the enemy's fire, Greene withdrew his parties to a more secure distance. Here they broke ground on the 23d. On completing the first parallel, a mine directed against the star was commenced under cover of a battery erected on the enemy's right. Day and night the work was pressed by the besiegers, and sallies were constantly made by the besieged. The besiegers, alternately laboring in the ditches or guarding those who labored, slept only on their

¹ Drayton's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 122.

arms; yet so zealously and expeditiously did they work that, although frequently interrupted by daring attacks of the enemy, scarcely a night passing without loss of lives on both sides, by the 3d of June the second parallel was completed.

Greene now summoned the garrison to surrender. Singularly, the message was not only carried, but signed, by the adjutant general instead of himself. To it Cruger promptly replied:—

“I am honored with your letter of this day intimating Major General Greene’s immediate demand of the surrender of his Majesty’s garrison at Ninety Six; a compliance with which my duty to my Sovereign renders inadmissible at present.”¹

While boldly determined to maintain his post at all hazards, Cruger was not aware how serious a matter this his defiance was to the American general. The latter had now been for some time in possession of intelligence that a reënforcement of three regiments of British troops had sailed from Cork, and were probably destined for the port of Charlestown. Greene did not know, however, what was the fact, that Lord Cornwallis had sent from Wilmington a despatch boat to Charlestown, directing Lord Rawdon not to permit these troops even to cross the bar, but to forward them directly to New York, nor that that despatch boat had been interrupted by American cruisers.² Looking out for such a reënforcement to the British army in South Carolina, as early as the 26th of May Greene had learned that a fleet had appeared off Charlestown bar, and wrote to Sumter to make the strictest inquiry who or what they were.³ While anxiously waiting for information confirm-

¹ Johnson’s *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 144.

² Johnson’s *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 146; *Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. II, 37.

³ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 103.

ing or denying this report, Greene was impatiently expecting the arrival of fifteen hundred Virginia militia for which he had called. He had hoped for their coming in time to have taken part in the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, and their failure to do so was one of the causes to which he attributed his defeat on that occasion. Now he had been calculating with certainty on their joining him before Ninety Six, and enabling him to press the siege with vigor and bring it to a close. But day after day elapsed under this last hope, when the astounding intelligence arrived that their march had been countermanded by Governor Jefferson. It had been Greene's intention, it appears, to hasten through the work in South Carolina with this help, that he might march with his more efficient troops to reënforce and supersede Lafayette in Virginia. But this the action of the governor of that State had prevented, and he was obliged to remain in South Carolina in this uncongenial service, and to wait the slow progress of the siege.

In the meanwhile Marion had written to him that Lord Rawdon lay at Monck's Corner, and asking permission to make an attack upon Georgetown. This request, in his letter of the 26th, he referred to Sumter for answer, upon two conditions: first, that Lord Rawdon was making no preparations which had the appearance of interrupting the sieges of Augusta and Ninety Six; and second, that Marion's moving to Georgetown would not expose Sumter's own position or interfere with his movements. Colonel Brandon, he writes, had called at Ninety Six on his return home, and shown him Sumter's orders to bring his men to his aid below, but that, for particular reasons, which he would afterwards explain, he had interfered with that arrangement and had desired Brandon to join him with all the force he could collect, to expedite the reduction of Ninety Six.¹

¹ Sumter MSS.

To this Sumter replies, acquiescing in this diversion of his troops, and expressing his gratification that they could be of service to the general.¹ The particular reason, which he would not risk committing to the possibility of falling into the enemy's hands, was doubtless his disappointment as to the coming of the Virginia militia, and the difficulties he began to realize in the siege he had undertaken. Johnson, indeed, states that on first reconnoitring the post General Greene predicted his failure in the attempt to reduce it, and wrote to Lafayette that the fortifications were so strong and the garrison so large that success was very doubtful.² But why had not this been ascertained before turning aside from the pursuit of Rawdon? The post was well known. Sumter or Pickens could no doubt have informed him minutely as to its works and its garrison, without the waste of men and time to ascertain its condition himself. But now that he had come to Ninety Six and sat himself down before the post, disappointed in the reënforcements he expected from Virginia, he had no other reliance but upon the men of three States which had borne the brunt of the war for the last year. He immediately issued orders for the North Carolina levies to join him, and appealed to Governor Rutledge, Generals Sumter, Marion, and Pickens in South Carolina, and to Colonel Clarke in Georgia for assistance.³

While General Greene was thus engaged, Marion, having obtained Sumter's consent, marched on the 3d of June to Georgetown, and, appearing before it on the 5th,⁴ began his approaches; but these were rendered unnecessary, for on

¹ Letter of the 7th June, Nightingale Collection.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 141.

³ *Ibid.*, 145.

⁴ This date is usually given as the 6th, but in Marion's letter to Sumter of the 6th he wrote, "*Yesterday* I levelled all the works." — Sumter MSS.

the night after the British garrison evacuated the town, taking shipping for Charlestown, whereupon Marion immediately levelled the works. Thus it was that three sieges were in progress at the same time, to wit, from the 3d to the 5th of June, that is, at Augusta, Ninety Six, and Georgetown. Augusta and Georgetown were taken possession of on the same day. It was while at Georgetown that Marion, on the 6th of June, received intelligence from one of his officers near Haddrell's Point that seventeen transports with troops, said to be two thousand in number, had crossed the bar and gone into Charlestown. The moment Marion received this information he wrote at once, informing Sumter.¹ Johnson observes that the fleet arrived on the 2d of June, and that some idea will be formed of the efficiency of General Greene's arrangement for procuring intelligence, when it is told that on the 6th he received, at Ninety Six, Charlestown papers of the 2d containing the news — the distance is near two hundred miles. He cites also, as an instance of Marion's vigilance and capacity in procuring intelligence, that he received this paper the same day that it was printed, and forwarded it through Sumter, who by some fatality did not receive the intelligence, though it passed through his hands, until the enemy had commenced his march. But in this statement there is some confusion in dates from which Sumter suffers to the advantage of Greene and Marion.

The Royal Gazette, published in Charlestown at this time, was issued in the afternoon twice a week. In the issue "From Wednesday, May 30, to Saturday, June 2," under date of June 2, we find this item: —

"We have the happiness to congratulate our readers on the safe arrival of a large fleet from Corke with a powerful reënforcement for the Royal Army. *They came to anchor this afternoon off our bar.* Mr.

¹ Sumter MSS.

Greene, we are well assured, lately took occasion to announce in general orders to the army that the fleet above mentioned had been captured by the French."

This notice in the *Gazette* establishes the date of the arrival of the fleet off the bar, which had been some days before in the offing, as of the 2d, and not as of the 3d, as stated by most authors.¹ The paper might have reached Greene some time before the 10th, possibly on the 6th, as stated by Johnson, but it did not come from Marion; it is apparent that Marion knew nothing of it, nor did it give Greene any information as to the reënforcement brought, nor assure him that the fleet off Charlestown bar would land any troops which it may have brought. Indeed, had not Lord Cornwallis's despatch boat been captured by the American cruisers the fleet would not have crossed the bar, but would have sailed for Virginia. Greene writes to Sumter on June 10th: "By a Charlestown paper of the 2d I find a fleet has lately arrived at that place and it is said with a large reënforcement. As you do not mention anything of it in your letter I imagine you have not received an account of it. *Please to make particular inquiry into the matter.*"² When Greene wrote this, on the morning of the 10th of June, he certainly had no special information from Marion. It was the paper of the 2d which had informed him of the arrival of the fleet off the Charlestown bar. If, indeed, it was remarkable that the paper should have reached Greene two hundred miles away from the place of its publication within four days, it would have been more wonderful, if not impossible, that it should have done so through the hands of Marion, who then was before Georgetown, thus adding many miles more at least

¹ Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 371; *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 91; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 480; *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 370.

² Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 108.

to its journey. The information which Greene received from Marion, and upon which he acted, he received through Sumter on the 10th, after he had written the letter just quoted. The next issue of the *Gazette*, that published on the 6th June, announces: "*Yesterday afternoon* the flank companies of the regiments lately arrived were landed in town. Their appearance was truly elegant, martial, and healthy." The troops landed, therefore, on the 5th. Marion at Georgetown, on the 6th, while writing to Sumter on other matters, received intelligence of the landing of these troops, — but from an official at Haddrell's Point, and not by the *Gazette*. He writes: "*This moment I rec'd intelligence* from one of my off^{rs} near Haddrell's point that seventeen transports with troops, s^d to be two thousand, had arrived in Ch'stown, which information he had from two of our officers who sa they had seen the vessels go in." Marion himself, therefore, received the information, not from a newspaper, but from his officers, and did not receive it until the day after the landing of the British troops. The information he immediately forwarded to Sumter on the 6th, and Sumter forwarded it as soon as received, on the 8th, to Greene, who received it on the 10th, after he had despatched to Sumter the letter of the same date already quoted, instructing him to make particular inquiry in regard to the fleet. On the receipt of this information Greene writes again to Sumter on the 10th: "I received your letter of the 8th accompanying a letter from Gen^l Marion. I wrote you this morning respecting the reënforcements mentioned having got intelligence thereof before the arrival of your letter."² From these facts it is clear that Sumter was at no fault in this matter, and that Greene did not receive the information of the disembarkation of the troops directly from Marion, but

¹ Sumter MSS.

² Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 106.

through Sumter, who forwarded it to him. Nor can we agree with the biographer of Greene, that the incident exhibits any very great efficiency in his arrangements for procuring intelligence. The receipt of the paper four days after it was published, if it was then received, was certainly no great accomplishment. Still less was the receipt of the information of the landing of the troops five days after it had occurred. But the inference is strong that Greene had not received *The Royal Gazette* of the 2nd before the 10th. It is only on that day that he mentions so important a matter to Sumter, and directs him to make particular inquiry in regard to it. Surely, if he had received the paper on the 6th or any time before, he would not have delayed to the 10th to inform Sumter and to instruct him to make inquiries and report. On the 11th Sumter writes that he has received no further report upon the subject.¹

In the meanwhile Colonel Lee, with the cavalry of his Legion, had reached Ninety Six from Augusta on the 8th, and Greene, on the receipt of Sumter's and Marion's letters, at once put Washington's horse and the cavalry of Lee's Legion in motion to join Sumter to meet the new danger; and in his letter to Sumter he writes that it is his wish that, if the enemy should advance into the country, he should collect all his force and skirmish with them, moving out of their way all the cattle, means of transportation, and subsistence — that it was his intention to fight the enemy before they got to Ninety Six. "Collect all the force you can," he writes, "and give positive orders for Gen^l Marion to join if the enemy attempt to penetrate the country. The force from Augusta," he adds, "has arrived at this post, and I think when we are collected we can fight a good battle, and if the enemy's force do not exceed

¹ Letter of 11th, in Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 26.

twenty-five hundred we shall have a fair prospect of victory." ¹

The British reënforcement which arrived from Ireland consisted of the Third, Nineteenth, and Thirtieth regiments of foot, a detachment of the Guards, and a considerable body of recruits, the whole under the command of Colonel Gould of the Thirtieth. Lord Cornwallis's despatch ordering the fleet to repair at once to Virginia had been intercepted, as has been stated; but it appears that under previous instructions Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour had been directed to send these troops on to that State unless the service in this required their presence here. These officers made known to Colonel Gould the power which Lord Cornwallis had given them for detaining such part of his command as they might deem necessary, and he at once concurred in the view that the immediate defence of this province was the more urgent service, and disembarked his troops. Lord Rawdon about this time was enabled also to add to the efficiency of his force in a manner which relieved him of one of his greatest difficulties. Since the movement of Cornwallis into North Carolina, taking with him Tarleton's Legion and the remains of the Seventeenth Dragoons, his greatest deficiency had been cavalry. To remedy this in a measure the loyal inhabitants of Charlestown made a subscription amounting to near 3000 guineas, which sum they requested his lordship to apply to the purpose of equipping a corps of dragoons in the manner he should judge most expedient. In compliment to the loyalty of the gentlemen who had made this subscription, Rawdon determined to use it in connection with the men of the province, and accordingly ordered the South Carolina Regiment of Royalists to be converted into

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 107.

cavalry.¹ The cavalry thus raised was put under the command of Major John Coffin, a Loyalist officer from Boston, who commanded the few cavalry at Hobkirk's Hill.

With his force thus increased, now consisting of something more than 1700 foot and 150 horse, Lord Rawdon marched on the 7th for the relief of Ninety Six. He was joined on his way by Colonel Doyle with the troops he had left at Monk's Corner, and pressed his march with all the rapidity which the excessive heat of the weather would permit.² With Doyle's detachment Lord Rawdon's force now amounted to a total of 2000 men.³

In the meanwhile Greene had pressed the siege of Ninety Six. His approaches continued to be pushed in the hope that they might be completed in time to force the submission of the garrison before Lord Rawdon could come to its assistance. Upon the arrival of the infantry of Lee's Legion that officer was directed to take post opposite the enemy's left, and on the 12th he began regular approaches against the stockade which protected the garrison's supply of water.

Two attempts were made by the besiegers to bring matters to a crisis. The different plans which had been adopted with so much success at Fort Watson and Fort Motte were each now in turn again tried. The attempt was made to fire the buildings by means of arrows bearing combustible substances, as at Fort Motte. Cruger unroofed his houses and put an end to that danger. Then it was tried to fire the stockade, as had been done at Fort Watson. A sergeant and nine brave men of the Legion approached the stockade from the most concealed direction, and when exposed to view crawling upon their bellies, reached the

¹ Rawdon's letter to Cornwallis, June 5, 1781, Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 480-481; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 89-90.

² *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV, 92.

³ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 373.

ditch, but unfortunately the sergeant was discovered while in the act of applying his fire, and, with five of his men, was killed. The remaining four escaped unhurt, although many muskets were discharged at them before they reached cover. These attempts failing, nothing remained to the besiegers but the slow progress of regular approaches.

About this time it was that one evening a countryman, says Lee, was seen riding along the lines south of the town, conversing familiarly with the officers and soldiers on duty. There was nothing in this, he adds, to attract particular attention, as from the beginning of the siege friends in the country were in the habit of visiting camp, and were permitted to go wherever their curiosity led them. This man was supposed to be one of these; but when he reached the great road leading to the town, in which quarter were only an embankment thrown up for the protection of the guards, he put spurs to his horse and rushed with full speed into town, receiving the ineffectual fire of the American sentinels and guards nearest him. The gate was opened, and he was received with loud expressions of joy. He was the bearer of a verbal despatch from Lord Rawdon to Cruger, announcing his arrival at Orangeburgh in adequate force, and informing him that he was hastening to his relief.¹ This information infused new life and determination in the garrison, and was correspondingly depressing to the besiegers.

The Americans, however, continued to push on their works. Maham towers were erected, but Major Green of the garrison, who commanded in the star redoubt, finding

¹ Lee states that this messenger held in hand a letter as he rode into the garrison, but Stedman asserts that he bore only a verbal message, which would be most probable under the circumstances (*Memoirs of the War of 1776*, 374; Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 371; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 148).

that one of these would soon overlook his parapet, very judiciously covered it with sand-bags, leaving between each bag an aperture for the use of his riflemen, and thus rendered the towers in a great measure ineffectual. The regular approaches had been carried on with so much vigor that, notwithstanding repeated interruptions from sallies by the enemy, the stockade fort was now so completely enfiladed by a triangular fire that, being no longer tenable, it was on the 12th evacuated in the night. The loss of this work was a great blow to the garrison. It cut off the supply of water. This had been anticipated by Colonel Cruger, who had tried the digging of a well, but without success. The sufferings of the garrison on this account now began to be extreme. Water could only be obtained from the rivulet at night; and Stedman relates that this was done by sending out naked negroes, whose bodies in the darkness were not distinguishable from the trees surrounding them. The garrison could not much longer have endured this condition of things, but cheered with the hope of Lord Rawdon's approach, they yet held out.

It was General Greene's hope that, with the reënforcement of Pickens and Clarke from Augusta, and the junction with him of Sumter and Marion, he might be able to meet Lord Rawdon and give battle without raising the siege of Ninety Six. And for this purpose he was calling upon Sumter for information in regard to his lordship's movements. Sumter was at Granby on the Congaree, with Colonel C. S. Mydelton in command of the greater part of his brigade at McCord's Ferry, some thirty miles below. General Greene, it must be observed, had reluctantly given his consent to Marion's expedition to Georgetown, and in this instance he was undoubtedly right in hesitating to allow Marion to put himself so far out of the way of the line of present operations. He had cautioned Sumter only

to allow it in case Lord Rawdon was making no preparations which had the appearance of interrupting the sieges then going on at Augusta and Ninety Six. There had been no such appearances at that time, nor indeed had Lord Rawdon then any such purpose, as the fleet had not arrived. Still, the capture of such a detached post as Georgetown, out of the way of any line of communication, and so only valuable for what it itself contained, scarcely warranted the risk necessary upon so long a separation of Marion's command from coöperation with Greene's army upon a sudden emergency. And so it happened that his position at Georgetown had greatly delayed the information of the landing of the British reënforcements; nor could he now rejoin Sumter in time to interpose before Lord Rawdon's advance.

On the 14th of June Colonel Mydelton, at McCord's Ferry, reported to Sumter that he had certain accounts of the enemy's marching up in force by way of Orangeburgh; that the prevailing report was that they were going to Ninety Six; that he had ordered all his baggage and unarmed men across to the north side of the Congaree, while with the armed men he would change his position to one farther up the river, as a defeat in his present situation would prove ruinous. He reported also that Colonel Lacey had just joined him.¹ This report Sumter at once communicated to Greene, but the latter could not believe that Rawdon's movement was against Ninety Six. "I cannot persuade myself," he wrote to Sumter, on the 15th, "that the enemy mean to pay a visit to the place. If they attempt it, and we can collect our forces, it may prove difficult for them to get forward or backward. Keep in front of the enemy that we may have an opportunity to fight them with our collective strength," etc.² By the 17th, however, he be-

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 110-111.

² *Ibid.*

came more alarmed, and wrote to Sumter in reply to his of the 15th, that, as the enemy continued to advance, and by Marion's reports the reënforcement was so much more considerable than he expected, it was possible they meant to raise the siege. He urged Sumter, if possible, to secure prisoners, from whom he might learn what troops were out on this expedition, the names of the corps, and the commanding officers. Captain Rudolph, who commanded the cavalry of Lee's Legion, he informed Sumter, was only thirty miles from his own headquarters that evening, having delayed his march through a mistake of his orders. Ammunition was getting scarce with him, but he would try to forward seven or eight thousand cartridges to him. General Pickens had arrived, and his militia would be in that evening, and would advance to his support.¹ Later that day he received another report from Sumter of the 16th, and again wrote him that he could only repeat his wishes to have the militia constantly employed in galling the enemy as they advanced. Where can the enemy, he asks, have collected such a numerous cavalry as you mention? He informed Sumter that it would be impossible to reduce the place for several days to come, and that there was no chance therefore of effecting its reduction unless they could first beat the enemy.²

But this was now impossible. The opportunity which Sumter had seen and urged had been lost. Cruger's courage and fidelity had enabled his little force to neutralize for weeks Greene's whole army; and Marion's expedition to Georgetown, Rudolph's delay under mistaken orders, and probably Sumter's own inaction, caused by his exhaustion from his wound, all united in preventing a junction before his lordship's column, which might possibly have somewhat delayed its march. But even this is doubtful.

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 112.

² *Ibid.*

Lord Rawdon had now two thousand excellent troops, part of them fresh and vigorous, and the rest well seasoned and disciplined. And though Lee declares the cavalry raised by the Loyalists in Charlestown were but poorly mounted,¹ it appears that on this march at least they had so well covered the movements of the army as to cause Greene's wonder where so numerous a cavalry could have been collected. So far from beating the advancing British, Sumter's men themselves incurred a great disaster.

Lord Rawdon's direct course from Orangeburgh to Ninety Six was in a northwesterly direction, nearly parallel with the North Edisto and Congaree rivers. Instead, however, of following this road, he bore to the right. This threatened the post of Granby, Sumter's headquarters and the depot of the American stores, as well as the position of a detachment recently established there. General Sumter therefore, had remained there, and to that point ordered up his reënforcement of militia until he had ascertained that Lord Rawdon on the 15th had passed Orangeburgh. Sumter then moved slowly up the Congaree and Saluda, so as to keep up his communications with the detachment below and Ninety Six above. But Lord Rawdon, passing Granby, pushed on, and having the shorter route, crossed the present county of Lexington, entered that of Edgefield, and crossed the Little Saluda near its junction with the greater river of that name. By this movement Rawdon had placed himself directly between Greene and Sumter. In his letter to Sumter of the 17th Greene had directed that officer to detach a small party into the enemy's rear to cut off supplies and pick up stragglers. As soon, therefore, as Lord Rawdon appeared, Colonel Mydelton, who was at McCord's Ferry, moved out to harass his rear and to cut off his parties engaged in collecting cattle. Mydelton suc-

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 379.

ceeded in giving considerable trouble in this way, but unfortunately he allowed himself to be led into an ambuscade by Major Coffin and his cavalry, and his party was so completely cut to pieces and dispersed that only 45 out of 150 could be collected. Some stragglers rejoined their commander, but many were killed, and more too much demoralized to return to the service.¹

The shouts of the garrison as Lord Rawdon's messenger rushed into the gates not only confirmed Sumter's reports of his lordship's approach, but assured Greene that Cruger was now also aware of it, and that the garrison would endure their thirst until the expected relief should arrive. It now became necessary, therefore, to hazard an assault, to meet Rawdon, or to retire. Greene was disposed to turn upon Rawdon. But his regular force did but little exceed the half of that of the relieving army, which, added to the partisan bands of Sumter, Marion, and Pickens, still left him numerically inferior to the British general. Compelled to relinquish this plan, he determined to storm the fort, although his works were yet unfinished. This determination seems to have been influenced largely by the troops themselves, who demanded to be led to the assault.²

Orders were issued to prepare for storming, and the hour of twelve on the next day, 18th of June, was appointed for the assailing columns to advance by signal from the centre battery.

On the left of the besiegers their third parallel was completed, two trenches and a mine were nearly let into the enemy's ditch, and the Maham tower was finished. On their right the trenches were within twenty yards of the enemy's ditch. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the First

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 153; Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 487; Sumter's letter to Greene in Nightingale Collection.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 375.

Virginia Regiment, with a detachment of the Maryland and Virginia line, was charged with the attack on the left, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lee with the Legion infantry and Kirkwood's Delawares with that on the right. Lieutenants Duval of Maryland and Seldon of Virginia commanded the forlorn hope of Campbell, and Captain Rudolph of the Legion that of Lee. Fascines were prepared to fill up the enemy's ditch, long poles with iron hooks were furnished to pull down the sand-bags, with every other requisite to facilitate the progress of the assailants. At eleven o'clock the third parallel was manned, and the sharpshooters took their station in the tower. Upon the signal as ordered, the assailing columns entered the trenches. At the second cannon, which was discharged at the hour of twelve, Campbell and Lee rushed to the assault. Cruger, always on the alert, received them with his accustomed firmness. His works were manned and bayoneted pikes bristled above the parapet, while from the loopholes between the sand-bags poured an incessant stream of fire, making dreadful havoc among the assailants. The form of the redoubt gave complete command of the ditch, and exposed the storming party to a cross fire, the effects of which increased as the abatis was removed. Duval and Seldon had entered the enemy's ditch at different points, and Campbell stood prepared to support them in the rear of the party, furnished with hooks to pull down the sand-bags. This party had also entered the ditch and began to apply the hooks. Uncovering the parapet now, says Lee, would have given us victory, and such was the vigorous support afforded by the musketry from the third parallel, from the riflemen in the tower, and from the artillery mounted in battery, that sanguine expectations of this happy issue were universally indulged. The moment the bags in front were pulled down, Campbell would have mounted the parapet, where

the struggle could not long have been maintained. Major Green, commanding in the star redoubt, perceiving the danger to which he was exposed if this lodgement was effected, determined to put a stop to the assault. Two parties of thirty men each, one under Captain Campbell of the New Jersey volunteers, and the other under Captain French of De Lancey's, issued from the sally port in the rear of the star, entered the ditch, and, taking opposite directions, charged the Americans who had made the lodgement with such impetuosity that they drove everything before them until they met in the opposite quarters. The bayonet being the only weapon used, the carnage was great. Two-thirds of the Americans who had entered the ditch were killed or wounded. The few survivors escaped with the hookmen to the trenches where Campbell yet remained. On the other side Rudolph gained the enemy's ditch and, followed by the column, soon opened his way into the stockade fort which the enemy had previously evacuated, but in which there were now a few remaining, who, giving their last fire, retreated precipitately. Lee was preparing to follow up this blow by passing the rivulet entering the town, when Greene, recognizing that the effort to reduce the place by storm could only succeed at a sacrifice he could not afford, called off the assailants.

Greene's loss during the siege was 185 killed and wounded,¹ the enemy's loss 27 killed and 58 wounded,² in all. Captain Armstrong of the Maryland line was the only American officer killed, and Lieutenant Roney the only one on the other side.

Greene reluctantly resolved to abandon the siege, and in the night of the 19th moved off across the Saluda, having first issued orders to Sumter to move up within the fork of the

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 377.

² *Stedman's Am. War*, vol. II, 373.

Broad and Saluda, and to form a junction with him. The retreat from Ninety Six was pressed without intermission beyond Bush River, a distance of twenty-two miles on the route that crosses the streams at their lowest fords, in what is now Newberry County. Here Greene halted to observe the movements of the enemy. On the morning of the 23d intelligence was received that Lord Rawdon had entered Ninety Six at two o'clock on the 21st, and the American army was immediately put in motion. Crossing the Enoree, Tyger, and Broad rivers, it halted on the 25th at a place called Tim's Ordinary, eleven miles beyond Lyle's Ford, on Broad River, in what is now Fairfield County, near Winnsboro. Greene's army thus now occupied the very position from which Lord Cornwallis had advanced in January.¹

Lord Rawdon did not move from Ninety Six until the morning of the 24th, believing from the reports of deserters that the American army was still encamped at Bush River. On that day, taking with him the troops of the garrison and all the force capable of sustaining the fatigue, in all about two thousand effectives, and without even their knapsacks or a wheel carriage except his ammunition wagons, he made a vigorous push to overtake the retreating army. He did not, however, extend his pursuit beyond the Enoree. Washington and Lee covered the rear of

¹ It was while Greene was between the Enoree and Broad rivers that he is alleged to have sent Miss Emily Geiger with a despatch to Sumter, *over a hundred miles away, on the Wateree River*. But the despatches which passed almost daily between Greene and Sumter, and the evidence of all contemporary historians, show that Sumter was never on the Wateree at any time that Greene was west of the Congaree or Broad rivers, but that he was on the west side all the time that Greene was, and that he crossed to the east side of the Broad at the same time that Greene did, and that Emily Geiger could not have borne such a message as she is alleged to have borne.

Greene's army and prevented any foraging on the part of the British, whose newly raised cavalry under Major Coffin were inadequate to oppose the veteran cavalry of these officers. Nor were the British troops in a condition to press the pursuit after their recent march of two hundred miles in ten days, to which they had now added thirty-seven in a day and a half. They suffered too greatly under the intense heat of the season, especially the newly arrived European soldiers, clad in thick cloth uniforms. Lord Rawdon on the 24th retraced his steps and returned to Ninety Six.

Such was the disastrous end of the siege of Ninety Six—a post which would have been evacuated but for the unfortunate move against it. It was, of course, not by any means impossible that had Greene followed Sumter's advice and followed Lord Rawdon to Monck's Corner in May, and forced him to battle there, he might have been beaten, for indeed, such was his ill fortune that he gained no single victory throughout his Southern campaigns. But if fight he must, as he was obliged afterwards to do at Eutaw, it was surely better to have offered battle in open field, while his own troops were flushed with success, and his ranks, full in consequence, were ready to be led on; while the British, reduced in numbers and dispirited, were in no condition to oppose him. The chances of success immediately after the fall of Orangeburgh, Fort Motte, and Granby were infinitely greater than when he was afterwards obliged to risk them in September. The last two weeks in May, from the fall of Granby to the arrival of the British fleet off Charleston bar on the 2d of June, presented the great opportunity to Greene of striking a decisive blow which might have ended the campaign and covered him with glory. With Sumter's and Marion's corps then full in numbers and buoyant with victory, he might with the rest of his Conti-

nentials have risked battle, even had he sent Lee with his Legion to assist Pickens in reducing Augusta. Ninety Six would have fallen without a blow, and the garrison met in the open field rather than behind fortifications which proved impregnable. As it was, by turning aside to besiege the post at Ninety Six, Greene allowed Cruger's small garrison to engage exclusively the attention of his Continental army, and thus to neutralize it until Lord Rawdon, reënforced by the newly arrived troops, could come to Cruger's relief. The siege of Ninety Six had caused the loss of all that had been gained in May by Sumter, Marion, and Lee. The country below the Congaree and the Saluda was again in the possession of the British.

But Greene had his usual consolation. The miscarriage of the siege was somebody else's fault, not his. The battle of Guilford had been lost by the North Carolina militia, that of Hobkirk's Hill by Gunby's mistake and Sumter's absence, and now it is Governor Jefferson who plucked away his laurels. "*Had the Virginia militia joined us, agreeable to orders, success would have been complete,*" he wrote to the President of Congress, and adds, "Our movement to the southward has been attended with very great advantages, and had not this reënforcement arrived so soon, *or had not the Virginia militia failed me, the manoeuvre would have been crowned with complete success.*"¹

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 151.

CHAPTER XIII

1781

LORD RAWDON had now driven Greene back across the great rivers, and recovered the country lately wrested from him by Sumter, Marion, and Lee. He had raised the siege of Ninety Six, and relieved its garrison of Northern Tories, who had emulated the conduct of the best British troops of the line. But could he hold the territory which the accidental reënforcement he had received had enabled him to recover? This question pressed upon his consideration, and demanded an immediate determination. It had, in fact, as we have seen, been decided by him before Greene's advance upon Ninety Six; and that movement alone had prevented the evacuation of the post and the consequent abandonment of the country. Had his reënforcements and Greene's forced retreat altered the conditions of the situation to such an extent as to change his policy? Clearly not. The evacuation of the post had been resolved upon before Greene had crossed the Congaree, because of the loss of his intermediate posts of Granby, Motte, and Orangeburgh. These, it is true, were not now held by the Americans, but they were just as liable to recapture if garrisoned again as they had been to the first assaults made upon them. It was these "little strokes" which Greene so much despised that had broken up the British line of communication and decided Lord Rawdon to abandon the country. True, Rawdon had received a reënforcement of three regiments, but this was in part

neutralized by the loss of the king's American Regiment, which, at the demand of Sir James Wright, he had sent as a reënforcement to Savannah; and to a greater extent by the loss of the garrisons captured. If, then, he should attempt to hold this part of this province, he must use his new troops to reëstablish the garrisons he had lost. But here another consideration presented itself, causing him to hesitate to call upon Balfour for more troops from Charlestown, and possibly to doubt if such call would be answered if made. The expectation and apprehension of a French fleet and army on the coast in order to coöperate with Greene and to put a final end to the war in this quarter had a great influence on the operation of this campaign, and on the conduct and movement of the commanders on both sides.¹ While this apprehension existed, would Balfour consent that the newly arrived troops should leave the town and be marched into the country, out of reach in case the French should appear? This he could scarcely expect, unless, indeed, for the temporary purpose of facilitating his own retreat to the town. For this purpose he determined to apply to Balfour at Charlestown, urging the expediency of sending a strong corps to Orangeburgh as a provision against any immediate attempt upon that place. The result of the application will presently be seen.

But however manifest was the policy of withdrawing into closer lines in a military point of view, the political aspect of the question was most embarrassing. The districts of Ninety Six and that between the Saluda and Broad had been overwhelmingly loyal to the king, and had been supported in their opposition to the Whigs by the garrison at Ninety Six. The Tory sentiment in this region had been greatly strengthened by Colonel Cruger,

¹ Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 504.

who was as wise an administrator as he was a gallant officer. What, then, was to become of the king's friends in this region, who had stood so loyally to his cause? In this dilemma, Lord Rawdon convened the principal Tories of the region, and made proposals to them that, if they would keep together and undertake the defence of the district against their fellow-countrymen, a small party should be left to keep them in countenance, with the further encouragement that detachments from the Congaree should at all times be sent to their support, equivalent to any force which Greene might despatch to invade their territory; and that, on the other hand, care should be taken to provide for the removal of such families as should prefer to be settled upon the abandoned plantation within the new frontier which was now intended to be established. The Loyalists decided, for the security and preservation of their families, to bring them away under the protection of the army, determining also that, when settled within the assigned limits, the men should be embodied in order to make incursions into the abandoned territory.¹

Lord Rawdon did not wait, however, even for the determination of the Loyalists in this matter, but, leaving Colonel Cruger behind with much the greater part of his force for the purpose of carrying his orders into execution, on the 29th of June he marched, himself, with eight hundred infantry and sixty horses, for the Congaree. As has been stated, he had previously written to Colonel Balfour, urging the expediency of sending a strong corps to Orangeburgh, and that he expected to meet it at that place. Upon Balfour's application to Colonel Gould, who still retained the independent command of the troops he had brought with him, that officer had immediately granted a battalion of his corps for

¹ *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV (1781), 94.

that purpose; and Lord Rawdon, before his departure from Ninety Six, had received advice from Balfour, not only of Gould's compliance, but that the Third Regiment was under orders to arrive at Orangeburgh by a specified day, and there to wait his instructions, and, as if to remove every possibility of doubt, he received a subsequent letter from Colonel Alexander Stuart,¹ who commanded the regiment sent, informing him that he was already considerably advanced on his way to Orangeburgh. This information and a full confidence in the expected support were the grounds upon which Lord Rawdon based his immediate plan of operations, and were particularly the cause of his leaving so great a part of his force with Colonel Cruger at Ninety Six. Assured of Colonel Stuart's advance, his lordship despatched a number of messengers to meet him, appointing their junction at the Congaree on the 3d of July.²

In the meanwhile Greene had sent Lee with his Legion to hover about the post of Ninety Six, observing Rawdon's movements, and to keep him informed of minutest occurrences. Washington, with his cavalry and Kirkwood's infantry, was directed to move down between the Broad and Wateree — the present county of Richland — to Granby, and, throwing himself between that post and Orangeburgh, to pursue the same course as pointed out to Lee. General Sumter at the time was preparing for an expedition lower down the country, and Marion was instructed to coöperate with him in that quarter.³ Having made these arrangements, Greene recommenced his march, quieting the apprehension

¹ In the American histories this name is usually spelled Stewart, but we prefer to follow the English authorities, Tarleton, and Stedman's *American War*, in which it is spelled Stuart. In the *Annual Register* it is, however, spelled Stewart.

² *Annual Register*, *supra*.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 158; Greene's letters to Marion and Lee, Gibbs's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 100-101.

of the country by advancing a day's journey on the route to Granby. Here he halted, as well to ascertain the ultimate view of the enemy as to await the arrival of a detachment of two hundred North Carolina levies under Major John Armstrong, and remained for two days at Big Spring on Rocky Creek, in the present Fairfield County. He had learned from a deserter who came in on the evening of the 28th of June, that a quantity of stores, under an escort of four hundred infantry and forty cavalry, was moving slowly up the Orangeburgh road for Rawdon's army, not making more than ten miles a day. This, no doubt, was the party which Rawdon had appointed to meet him on the 3d of July at Orangeburgh. Lee was at once ordered to form a junction with Washington at Ancrum's plantation, near Granby, and intercept this body. Sumter was also directed to detach Mydelton's regiment to join Washington.¹ This last officer, however, who had been pushing his observations towards Orangeburgh, had fortunately intercepted a letter of Colonel Stuart informing Rawdon of his advance towards Orangeburgh, but stating the impracticability of reaching Granby by the 3d of July. Lee, at the same time, that is, on the evening of the 1st, informed him that Rawdon had marched from Ninety Six with less than half his force. Greene determined at once to seize the opportunity of striking Rawdon before Stuart reached him. The American army was put in motion, but had proceeded no farther than Winnsboro by the 3d of July; here it was stripped of everything which could impede its march, and was left under the command of General Huger with orders to press on to the Congaree, while Greene himself, attended by a small escort of cavalry, pushed on to find Colonel Washington and to observe more particularly the indications by which his measures should be directed. Lord Rawdon appears to have been informed of this hurried

¹ Sumter MSS., *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 117.

movement of Greene, and, at once apprehending danger to the reënforcement he had sent for, he too hastened to reach Granby in advance of the American army. This brought him to Granby two days before the time appointed, and his appearance there had no small effect upon the issue of Greene's scheme, for the seizure of this post was all important to its success. Greene's failure to secure this position between Rawdon and his reënforcement was in some degree compensated by a successful blow struck by Lee on his lordship's arrival at Granby, but rendered less important by the recall of Stuart, a knowledge of which neither party at the time possessed.

Colonel Lee had, with his usual zeal and activity, obeyed Greene's order and kept close watch upon the movements of the British army. From his knowledge of the adjacent country, he was satisfied that, upon his arrival at Granby, Lord Rawdon would be compelled to send out foraging parties to the south of that place, as nowhere else in the neighborhood could he obtain supplies. Determining to avail himself of any opportunity which might thus arise, he detached Captain Eggleston of the cavalry to proceed, with thirty dragoons, along the enemy's right, and, taking with him Captain James Armstrong, previously despatched in that quarter with a reconnoitring party, to make, in the course of the night, a proper disposition of his force for the contemplated purpose. Eggleston immediately joined Armstrong, and placed his party in a covered and convenient position. As Colonel Lee had anticipated, a foraging party, consisting of fifty or sixty dragoons and some wagons, soon after daylight of the 3d of July, were discovered approaching the very farm to which Eggleston had directed his attention. As soon as the wagons and escort had advanced within reach of Eggleston, he rushed upon the enemy, broke up the foragers, routed the party,

and brought off forty-five dragoon prisoners, including a captain, without any loss whatsoever to his party.¹ This was quite a serious blow to Rawdon, as it deprived him of almost his entire cavalry, and so rendered him incapable of either collecting supplies or obtaining information.

Learning nothing of Stuart, who had in fact been recalled by Balfour to Charlestown upon some alarm of French invasion, and had retraced his steps as far as Dorchester,² but convinced by Lee's appearance of the approach of the American army, Lord Rawdon delayed only to destroy the boats for some distance down the river, and immediately pressed on to reach Orangeburgh. His route lay across Congaree Creek, a branch of the river of that name, at about three miles distant, a broad piece of water in some parts deep, and enclosed by difficult banks. Lee made some opposition to the crossing of this stream. He destroyed the bridge and felled trees to render the fords impracticable. But after a few ineffectual shots between the parties he withdrew, and the British crossed and pressed on. In this march from Ninety Six to Orangeburgh, more than fifty of the British army fell dead from heat, fatigue, and privation.³

Johnson observes that it is curious to follow out the well-concerted measures of the American commanders to their final failure; that in common with the Commander-in-chief, General Greene had often to dissemble his feelings, and to bear with his officers because the service could not well bear their loss. In this instance, he states that neither Mydelton nor Lee ever joined Washington, and that Lee, instead of directing his views against Stuart, thought proper to throw himself in front of Rawdon, in prosecution of a feeble and fatal effort to embarrass his march. As to

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 380-381.

² *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV (1781), 95.

³ *Ibid.*, 97.

Sumter, he observes, that the express despatched after him, after three days' search, found him at Hanging Rock on the Catawba in prosecution of some measure connected with his command, which he did not abandon, and which detained him until the 8th or 9th of July. This criticism of his officers to cover the misfortune of the commander is scarcely just. For it must be remembered that Lord Rawdon's prompt and vigorous movement to Granby had disconcerted all of Greene's plans, and had Lee received the order to join Washington, he must have hesitated to do so, and thus to deprive his commander of all information as to the enemy's movement, under an order which he knew to have been issued under the supposition of a condition of things which no longer existed. He certainly did, in fact, render much more important services to Greene in destroying the enemy's cavalry force than he could possibly have done in going in search of Stuart, who at that time had fallen back to Dorchester. For Sumter, it must be said that he was daily in communication with Greene, and had informed him by letter of the 2d of the necessity of his movements,¹ in reply to which, Greene writes to him from his headquarters, which were still at Winnsboro, on the 3d of July:² "Your letter of yesterday overtook me on the march for the Congaree. I doubt not material advantages will result from your visiting the upper regiments, but I fear the opportunity for striking the posts at Monck's corner and in that neighborhood is past." So too, Captain Pierce, A.D.C., writes to him by General Huger's direction as late as the 7th,³ "No barriers will be thrown in your way to obstruct the execution of your plan & our best wishes attend you for your success."⁴ When, therefore,

¹ Sumter's letters, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 36, 37.

² *Ibid.*, 118.

³ *Ibid.*, 121.

⁴ Sumter MSS.

Greene reached Washington, he did not expect to find Sumter there, but knew that he was busy recruiting his forces preparatory to striking the post at Monck's Corner, which was in accordance with his previous orders to him to penetrate lower down the country. True, in his letter of the 3d from Winnsboro, and in a second the same day from a point at which he was encamped, having left Winnsboro that day, he had urged Sumter to join him at Friday's Ferry, opposite Granby, as he had just learned that Lord Rawdon had reached that point. And this Sumter proceeded to do as soon as he had collected his force, though in doing so he abandoned his favorite plan of striking at the enemy's posts below. He joined Greene on the 8th, the day after Huger wrote him that no barriers would be thrown to obstruct his plan, for the success of which the best wishes of all attended him.

Washington, in the meantime, anxious to prosecute the enterprise against Stuart, despatched a courier to Marion, who was below with four hundred men, pressing him to hasten to unite in the undertaking. When Greene reached Washington, Marion had joined him, and at the head of these two corps he resolved to lead the enterprise in person. Passing down the Orangeburgh road on the 6th, he succeeded in avoiding Lord Rawdon, and there, watching the progress of the British army, at the head of a company of Washington's cavalry, lest relief should be pushed forward to Stuart, he detached Marion to attack and seize this important convoy, not only with relief for Lord Rawdon's army, but with the various supplies necessary to reestablish the post at Granby. Hourly communications were kept with Marion, and positive information obtained that Stuart was still below and approaching. Everything now promised success, when at one o'clock on the morning of the 8th Marion sallied forth from his covert to seize

upon his prey, but to his utter discomfiture Stuart, unconscious of his danger and influenced only by a choice of roads, had turned aside into one while Marion had pursued another, and they had passed each other in the night. On the morning of the 8th Rawdon and Stuart formed a junction at Orangeburgh.¹

Greene was greatly disappointed upon his failure to intercept Stuart, but summoning Sumter, Marion, Lee, and Washington to form a junction as soon as possible, he resolved to march upon Orangeburgh and offer the enemy battle. The militia under Pickens was not included in this order, for that officer was at this time employed on the important mission of watching the motions of Cruger. Reënforced already by Stuart, if joined now by Cruger, Lord Rawdon's force would have been overwhelming, lacking only in cavalry, Colonel Stuart, to his lordship's great disappointment, having brought none with him. But Cruger was approaching.²

That officer, it will be recollected, had been left at Ninety Six to cover the retreat of the Loyalists' families. Whilst waiting their assembling, says Johnson, it would have been happy for his reputation, and that of the British arms, had he confined his efforts to the demolition of the defensive works that had been constructed at that post. But this last opportunity of wreaking vengeance on the unfortunate Whigs could not be suffered to pass away. A swarm of Tories, supported by a regular force, were permitted to carry fire and sword into the Long Cane settlement. The ravages sanctioned in this quarter gave countenance to the assertion that orders had been issued to lay the whole country waste. This dreadful calamity

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 162.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 163; *Annual Register*, vol. XXIV (1781), 96.

is sometimes justified or excused by the necessities which war imposes ; but what was there to justify it here? They were abandoning the country, there was no army to be starved into a retreat, and the country was entirely too remote to furnish supplies to that which must be the seat of war. There is but too much reason to believe that the measure was one of revenge, perhaps of plunder or the petulance of disappointment. Fortunately Pickens and Clarke were at hand to check the ravages, and reënforced by the enraged inhabitants, whose smoking dwellings still stimulated their vengeance, the enemy were once more forced within their intrenchments or under the protection of their guns. Recent advices from Rawdon of his increasing difficulties hurried on the evacuation of the post of Ninety Six. And now the scene was changed.

Cruger, says the same author, at the head of a cavalcade not unlike the pictures of an exodus, commenced his march on the 8th of July. Many had been the distressing scenes that the country had exhibited, but few had equalled this. And to add to the mental and bodily sufferings of the miserable Loyalists, parties gathered from the recently desolated settlements, and reënforced by those habitual plunderers who had disgraced the American cause, hunted and cut off the small parties as they moved towards the rendezvous appointed on Cruger's line of march. Nor were their sufferings destined to terminate with this dangerous and distressing journey to which every age, sex, and condition were exposed, but after reaching the tract of country to which they were ordered to retire, and their land of promise, — the rich estates of the banished Whigs, — they soon found that all the remuneration and protection promised them ended in delusion. If they were fortunate to survive the diseases of the climate, they were soon driven from their new homes by the wandering parties of Whigs,

or perhaps excluded by some prior possessors who did not find it convenient to relinquish their hold. At length they gathered in great numbers in the wretched settlement called Rawdon Town, in the suburbs of Charlestown, which had been formed by their predecessors, the Loyalist refugees from Camden, whose miseries were now to be increased by their coming. Here many perished. Some who had brought with them their slaves removed to some of the British settlements in the West Indies, where their descendants still live. Others, resolved to brave the dangers of returning to their native homes, secretly stole back and finally cast themselves on the clemency of their neighbors. None, it is said, who had not rendered themselves infamous by their crimes, were repulsed. In Pickens they found a zealous and benevolent protector.¹

Though encumbered with this caravan, old men, women, and children, laden with household goods, besides the ordinary impediments of an army, Cruger, nevertheless, pressed forward with astonishing celerity, fear of being left behind and losing his protection aiding his efforts to hasten his convoy on the march. Lord Rawdon had written, urging his utmost speed, and by travelling by moonlight he was enabled to mitigate the sufferings attendant upon marching over barren sands in such a climate at such a season. He approached by a route which led between the great forks of the Edisto, crossing into that place, at a bridge to the west of the town, thrown across the northern branch of the river. For a great distance above and below that point the river was impassable, so that he proceeded in security from attack by the troops to its east. Pickens, with all his exertions, could not collect together a force sufficient to retard his march. As soon as Cruger had reached a point so far down the fork as to relieve him from fear for

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 163-164.

the safety of the refugees, he left them under the protection of their own mounted men, with instructions to pursue their journey down the southwest side of the Edisto, so as to keep that river between them and the American parties.

On the 10th of July, General Greene, having been joined by Sumter and all his different detachments, moved within four miles of Orangeburgh, and offered the enemy battle. The ground he chose is on the north side of the creek which crosses the old Orangeburgh road to Granby, four miles from the town. The force he had with him amounted to about two thousand, but there were scarcely eight hundred regular infantry. Lord Rawdon's force after the junction with Stuart was estimated at fifteen hundred, all disciplined men. In artillery the two armies were nearly equal; in cavalry the preponderance was greatly in favor of the Americans. The advantages upon the whole were decidedly in favor of the latter, unless Cruger should rejoin Lord Rawdon before the issue of the battle. But it was known that Cruger was approaching, and his lordship had taken possession of the courthouse, a strong brick building of two stories, not inferior in the estimation of Greene to a strong redoubt, with some other buildings commanding his approach, and securing his retreat over the bridge in case of misfortune.¹

If, therefore, an attack was to be made, it must be made at once, before Cruger arrived. Recognizing this, General Greene reconnoitred the position in person at the head of cavalry, and reluctantly concluded that an attack was injudicious. In this view Lee asserts that some of his officers, in whose opinions he properly confided, did not concur. They advised that an attempt should be made.²

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 166.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 385.

But Greene adhered to his opinion, and having offered battle for two days, he moved off with his infantry on the night of the 13th, and, crossing the river, retired to the High Hills of Santee.

Sumter had abandoned the repetition of his favorite plan of operations, the striking at the posts of the enemy upon the line of his communications in his rear, and had at Greene's call joined him before Orangeburgh; and when it is known that some of Greene's officers were opposed to retiring from Lord Rawdon's front without striking a blow, it may be safely assumed that Sumter was one of those who were for making the attempt. But now that that was given up, Greene turned over all the mounted men to him, and gave him leave to start upon that memorable incursion into the lower country which drove the enemy in all quarters into Charlestown, and for a while prostrated every appearance of Royal power beyond its limits.

There had been great activity as well in other parts of the State. While Marion was before Georgetown he had detached Colonel Peter Horry with a force against the Loyalists upon the Pee Dee. The repeated struggles between the contending parties in that country, also, had now nearly reduced it to desolation, and Colonel Horry was sent to endeavor in some way to put an end to the murderous strife. As he was authorized to do, Colonel Horry, on the part of General Marion, on the 17th of June, negotiated a treaty with Major Gainey, who styled himself "commanding officer of the Tories or king's subjects, inhabitants lying between the great Pee Dee River and North Carolina," by which it was agreed that from that time all hostilities on both sides should cease; that both parties should have free intercourse to traffic together unmolested; that in case of injuries committed on persons or property on either side, the captain or officer commanding the injured party

should make complaint to the officer commanding the wrong-doer, whereupon a jury composed of two Whigs and two Tories, with an officer from the side of the complainant, should be called on to sit as a court-martial, and determine the matter between them and to inflict such punishment as should appear reasonable and just; that property not taken in action (but plundered), on being proven by either party, should be restored.¹ This treaty afforded some pacification to the country, but was not strictly complied with until Marion, ten months after, found leisure to impose another, more humiliating, upon Gainey and his followers.²

A few days after General Marion had forced the evacuation of Georgetown, *i.e.* on the 10th of August, one Manson, an inhabitant of the country, who had joined the British, appeared in an armed vessel before the town, and demanded permission to land his men. General Marion, it will be remembered, had been recalled to join Greene, and there was only a small party of militia left in the place. These refusing the permission asked, Manson sent a few of his men ashore under cover of his guns, and set fire to some of the houses next to the water. He then directed his crew to fire on the burning houses in such a direction as prevented the inhabitants from either extinguishing the flames or removing their property. Forty-two houses in this flourishing town were on this occasion reduced to ashes.³

In the meanwhile, however, Colonel Harden had not been idle in the Low-Country, and had established a camp at the Horse Shoe on the Ashepoo River. Here Hayne joined him, having at length yielded to the wishes of those

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 98.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 122; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 128.

³ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 236.

of his neighbors who had revolted from the British authority, and upon their petition he had been appointed by Pickens to the command of their regiment. Having committed himself to the cause and resumed his arms, Hayne at once entered the field with boldness, enterprise, and vigor. Taking with him a small party of mounted men, he dashed into the immediate vicinity of Charlestown, penetrating to within five miles of the town, and on Thursday night, the 5th of July, he there surrounded the house occupied by General Andrew Williamson, who, when Pickens took the field the fall before, had returned from Ninety Six, then to become the scene of struggle, and had gone to the British in Charlestown. Here he was living, as he no doubt supposed, in security, away from the danger of inroads by Clarke or McCall, or any other of the partisan bands of his former party. But he had not counted upon Harden and his followers, still less upon Hayne, who, like himself, had refused to take any part in the struggle since the capitulation of the city. He was seized in bed, and, without allowing him time even to put on his clothes, he was carried away a prisoner. Great indignation and mortification was excited in the British lines when they learned that Williamson had been thus snatched away from their protection under their very guns. The honor of the British army, they felt, demanded his rescue, and Major Fraser, with ninety dragoons, was detached next day in pursuit. After a circuitous march of more than seventy miles through the woods, with the most profound secrecy, on Sunday morning, the 8th, Major Fraser surprised the camp at Horse Shoe, to which Colonel Hayne had retreated with his prisoner. The British slew fourteen of the party on the spot and wounded several others. Colonel Hayne was taken prisoner, Lieutenant-Colonel McLauchlan was killed, and his brother, Captain McLauchlan,

dangerously wounded. The rest of the party were dispersed.¹

The circumstances of the capture of Colonel Hayne are interesting not only because of its tragic end. As has been intimated, Colonel Hayne was fond of horses, and, like many of the gentlemen in the State, had a stock of thoroughbred animals. In this disastrous expedition he was mounted on a very fine horse of his own breeding called King Herod; but the animal, during his master's inactivity, had become too fat and heavy for great exertion, and in this raid had been foundered. Upon his return Colonel Hayne, deeming himself secure, with Mr. Charles Glover and a few followers, had turned into the plantation of Mrs. Ford, about four miles beyond Parker's Ferry across the Edisto; the rest of his party, apparently, proceeding to the camp at Horse Shoe under Lieutenant-Colonel McLauchlan. While resting here, on Sunday morning, a company of British cavalry was seen galloping up the avenue. Colonel Hayne endeavored to escape by crossing the rice fields at the back of the plantation, but Captain Campbell, who commanded the company of cavalry, saw and pursued him. Mr. Glover and most of the party escaped. Colonel Hayne soon found that his horse was giving out, and coming to a fence, the horse balked; whereupon, instead of pressing him to take the leap, he dismounted and took down the fence, and thus facilitated the crossing of his pursuers. Captain Campbell, of Major Fraser's party, seeing this, knew his success was sure, and steadily gained on his flying foe. Shortly after, in leaping a ditch, the side of it caved. Colonel Hayne's horse fell, and he was captured. It is said that Captain Campbell — who was known in the garrison and town as "Mad Archy," and who was himself to fall before the end of the war — was

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, July 11, 1781.

very indignant at the ultimate fate of his captive, and declared that if he had thought such would have been his end, he would have killed Hayne in the pursuit, with his own hand, that he at least might have died the death of a soldier.¹

¹ Johnson's *Traditions*, 361, 362.

CHAPTER XIV

1781

IN the expedition which Sumter had planned and which he was now allowed by Greene to undertake against the posts in the rear of Lord Rawdon, and in the neighborhood of Charlestown itself, he had under his command, besides his own brigade, that of Marion, and the Legion of Lee, with a detachment of artillery of one piece. In his own brigade he had his old comrades of Hanging Rock, Fishdam, and Blackstock—Taylor, Lacey, Mydelton, and Henry Hampton, with whom he had first checked and turned back the tide of British conquest, and who were still his devoted followers. To these were now added two other Hamptons, Wade and Richard. With Marion were the heroes of the Pee Dee, Peter Horry, Maham, and Baxter, the leaders under him in many brilliant affairs. The command thus consisted of all the State troops, with the exception of Pickens's brigade, which was still hovering in Cruger's rear, and Harden's small party, ranging upon the Ashepoo and Combahee. These State troops were not regulars, but they were now veterans, who had seen more actual service and fought more battles than probably any Continental troops in the service, with the exception of the Legion, which now accompanied them. It was a splendid body of men, most of whom were volunteers, though veterans, fighting purely for patriotism and not for pay. The best of horsemen, unerring shots, and well disciplined in their rude way, they were most excellently fitted, alike

by character and experience, for the service upon which they now entered. With such a body of men Sumter had every reason to expect the most substantial results. He had even enlisted some enthusiasm upon the part of Greene in the prospect of its success.

And Sumter did accomplish much. Perhaps it is not too much to say that he shook the fabric of the Royal authority to an extent which caused greater alarm than had yet been experienced, and demonstrated to a greater degree than had yet been done the impracticability of the British possession of the State. But the expedition, nevertheless, did not accomplish what it should have done. Had it succeeded, it is not probable that the battle of Eutaw would have been fought.

It is not an agreeable task to a historian of the State to dwell upon the foibles of her great men, but the truth of history as it affects the current of events requires the observation, which may not have escaped the reader, that there had been a persistent and growing jealousy between the three great leaders, Sumter, Marion, and Lee. Lee's dislike of Sumter was open and avowed, and most improperly encouraged by Greene himself in their private correspondence. Indeed, notwithstanding the expressions to Sumter personally of the greatest confidence in and reliance upon his wisdom and conduct, it can scarcely be doubted that Greene himself depreciated Sumter's character quite as much as did Lee. If we are to accept Lee's own account of this expedition, he studiously ignored, not only Sumter's command, but even his presence. This, however, was not altogether unnatural. Sumter's commission, though superior to that of Lee by two grades, was but that of the State; while Lee's was from Congress, and his command regulars, or Continentals, as they were called. On the other hand, Lee should have remembered that not

only was Sumter much older than himself, not only that he had been fighting the French and the Indians before Lee was born,¹ but that he too had been a Continental officer, and as such had greatly outranked him. Lee had been restless under the command of Marion or Pickens, and was still less willing to serve under Sumter.

Had jealousy only existed on the part of Lee to Sumter, it would not have been so unfortunate as that it should also be entertained by Marion as well. But this cannot be doubted. Marion's letters all disclose an impatience of Sumter's control, and it will be recollected that during Greene's absence from the State, while Sumter was exercising superior command under the direct and explicit orders of Governor Rutledge, communicated directly to Marion himself, Sumter in vain appealed to Marion, if not for obedience, at least for coöperation. It cannot, however, escape the observation of even a panegyrist of the great leader that it was the misfortune of Sumter to incur in succession the hostility of Morgan, Greene, and Lee, as well as the want of cordiality upon the part of Marion. There may then have been something in Sumter's manner, if not in his conduct, which failed to conciliate those with whom he was called upon to act. And yet, in the correspondence between Greene and Sumter, now made public, we look in vain for the slightest want of cordiality and respect on the part of Sumter; instead, we find the most constant attention to Greene's wishes, and an entire absence of even a suspicion of the hostile feeling we now know to have been early entertained by Greene in regard to him. Nor must the devoted adherence of those with whom he entered the service in the darkest days of the struggle be forgotten. It is proper also to observe that when Sumter first

¹ Sumter at this time was forty-five years of age, Lee was but twenty-five.

came in communication with Greene and Morgan he was an ill man, suffering intensely from his wound received at Blackstock; that he was little better when leading his expedition to Granby and Orangeburgh in February, being scarcely able to write for pain, and yet in his saddle day and night; and that but three weeks before he started upon this expedition, Colonel Polk, who had just been with him, informed Greene that his health was worse and his wound more troublesome. Probably Sumter was not in a physical condition to have undertaken this expedition. But who besides himself could have led it?

When Colonel Stuart resumed his advance to join Lord Rawdon with the Third Regiment, or "Bufs," as they were called, Lieutenant-Colonel Coates was sent in command of his regiment, the Nineteenth, and a body of mounted infantry of the South Carolina Rangers of 150, with one piece of artillery, to the post at Monck's Corner. This post, it will be remembered, is about forty miles from Charlestown, little more than a half-mile to the west of the western branch of Cooper River, near its source,—the point at which the Santee Canal was subsequently made to enter it,—and near, also, to Biggin Church, in which a large amount of supplies were stored, about the same distance from the river on the eastern side. The direct road from Monck's Corner to Charlestown ran some twenty miles through the pine woods, until it met, at the Eighteen Mile House, the road from Dorchester; then, crossing the Goose Creek bridge, a mile or two below, it continued, passing the Quarter House, situated at the commencement of the peninsula of Charlestown Neck, five miles, to the gates of the town. There was, however, another road, much travelled, which lay to the east of the western branch of Cooper River, which, after passing Biggin Church, crossed Fair Forest Swamp, another branch of the Cooper River, at Wadboo bridge, at the

plantation belonging to Mr. J. N. Colleton, from which point there was a choice of two routes: one, keeping close to the river, passed Childsbury Church and crossed the eastern branch at Bonneau's Ferry; the other, turning still farther to the east, crossed the eastern branch of Cooper River much higher up, at Quinby bridge, at Colonel Shubrick's plantation. Both of these roads passed through St. Thomas' Parish and ended at Hobcaw, on the river, nearly four miles from the town, the point, it will be remembered, at which communication was so long maintained during the siege of the city. There was also a British post at Dorchester, and an outpost and guard at the Quarter House. This latter place, five miles from the town, was quite a resort for the inhabitants upon their pleasure drives, and for social parties — a custom kept up during the occupation of the town by the British. It was upon these posts, thus situated and garrisoned, that Sumter was now about to raid.

In a letter to him on this occasion, written on the 14th of July, General Greene advised him "that by a letter from General Pickens, he finds that Cruger must have formed a junction with Lord Rawdon the evening before;" therefore, he says, "there is no time to be lost; push your operations night and day; keep a party to watch the enemy's motions at Orangeburgh as they move down. Should they move in any other direction, I will advise you. Keep Colonel Lee and General Marion advised of all matters from above, and tell Colonel Lee to thunder even at the gates of Charlestown. I have high expectations from their force and enterprise. Nothing can deprive you of complete success but the want of time. Do not neglect to have your boats in readiness for crossing your artillery over Santee, should it be necessary."¹

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 166. (This letter is not in the Sumter MSS.)

At the date of this letter General Sumter's detachments were sweeping by every road that led direct to Charlestown, whilst he, with the main body, was pursuing the Congaree road leading down the south of that river and the east of the Cooper, towards Monck's Corner and Biggin Church. To Colonel Lee, with his legion, was assigned the service of carrying Dorchester, and then pressing on to carry terror to the gates of Charlestown, as Greene had directed. Colonel Wade Hampton, at the head of a detachment of Sumter's cavalry, was ordered to coöperate with Lee, whilst Colonel Henry Hampton seized and held the bridge at Four Holes Creek, a branch of the Edisto, to watch the enemy's motions from Orangeburgh, and to guard that pass, should Rawdon return. But as it was expected that Dorchester would offer some resistance, Henry Hampton, after posting a party at the bridge, had orders to proceed on and support Lee in the attack on that post. Colonel Wade Hampton, also acting in concert with Lee, passed on east of Dorchester, by the Wassamasaw Road, to Goose Creek bridge, thereby cutting off the communication between Dorchester and Monck's Corner, and between the latter place and Charlestown by the direct route. A detachment of Marion's men, under Colonel Maham, passing the head of Cooper River, penetrated below to the eastward of Biggin Church and Fair Forest Swamp, and seized the Wadboo bridge over that creek, which he was directed to destroy, and thus cut off the retreat of the garrison over that route. Thus admirably were the plans laid for this incursion, and the movements begun with promptness and zeal.

Contrary to expectation, Colonel Lee encountered no resistance at Dorchester. The garrison at the time had been greatly reduced by the draft made on it by Stuart, and recently by a very serious mutiny, in which it was said

many were killed and wounded. The sudden appearance of Wade Hampton at Goose Creek bridge seems to have alarmed the garrison of Dorchester, and in their then demoralized condition caused the post to be abandoned. But Colonel Lee arrived in time to seize a number of horses, variously estimated at from fifty to two hundred, and four wagons, three of which were empty, but the fourth contained a valuable supply of fixed ammunition.

Whilst Lee was securing and sending off his prize, Wade Hampton's patience, it seems, became exhausted at his post at Goose Creek bridge, and hearing nothing from the former, and fearing that the opportunity of striking would be lost by the alarm that the knowledge of his appearance would occasion, or perhaps, as Johnson observes, apprehending that Lee meant to appropriate to himself the glory of the dash into the vicinity of the town, on Sunday morning, the 15th, he moved rapidly down the road, and, reaching the church at the time of service, he found a large congregation there, whom he surrounded and made several prisoners, whom he paroled, capturing also a number of horses.¹ About two o'clock, Captain Read, who commanded Hampton's vanguard, reached the Quarter House, where he encountered a patrol of twelve of the Royal South Carolina Dragoons, under Lieutenant Waugh, who had just mounted and were setting out to reconnoitre. These Read immediately charged and made prisoners. Captain Wright of Wassamassaw was cut down in the scuffle by Lieutenant Waugh, who himself was also killed. The British claimed that Waugh was shot after he surrendered.² Upon Hampton's approach, the guard posted at this place, after exhibiting themselves on the advanced re-

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, July 18, 1781, speaks of this raid as having been commanded by Richard Hampton, but it was by Wade Hampton.

² *Ibid.*

doubts, surrendered. Several Loyalists, gentlemen of the town, were spending the morning at the Quarter House, some of whom were taken and paroled, and some escaped. But poor William Trusler, the butcher, who had been one of Gadsden's Liberty Tree party, and whose meddling with politics had so offended William Henry Drayton,¹ and who had, like Drayton, changed sides, but, reversing the example, was now a good Tory, in attempting to make his escape was shot.² Hampton's party retired, carrying off with them fifty prisoners, among whom were several officers. The news of this inroad as it reached the town created the greatest alarm and confusion. The bells were rung, the alarm guns were fired, and the whole city was under arms.³

If Hampton, determined that Lee should not get ahead of Sumter's cavalry on this occasion, as he had at Fort Motte and Granby, anticipated that officer's course, the latter, as an author, has avenged himself for the opportunity thus snatched from him; for in his account of these transactions, which have been recorded and preserved by Johnson, and mentioned in *The Royal Gazette*, he speaks of Hampton's success as trivial, and without any allusion whatsoever to Hampton's surprise and temporary possession of the post at the Quarter House, he states that a party of the Legion horse was pushed down below the Quarter House, on the Neck, from the confidence that in a place so near Charlestown an advantageous stroke might be made; but that it so happened, he says, that on that day none of the usual visits to the Quarter House took place, nor was even a solitary officer picked up in their customary morning rides.⁴

¹ *History of So. Ca. Under Roy. Gov.* (McCrary), 591, 651, 656, 752.

² *The Royal Gazette*, *supra*; Johnson's *Traditions*, 33.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 167, 168.

⁴ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 357.

This movement of Colonel Lee's was made the day after Hampton's attack upon the place. Is it possible that Colonel Lee did not know this, nor understand the cause of a desertion of a place usually not only well guarded, but full of life? The two parties, Lee's and Hampton's, after this united and returned to join Sumter, as Johnson suggests, probably in no very good humor with each other.

It is not unworthy of observation, in passing, that the two blows which had been struck the nearest to the town since its fall—indeed under its very guns—had each been delivered by one who was fighting, it may be said, in the language of the times, truly, if figuratively, with a halter around his neck; for Hayne and Hampton had taken their lives in their hands and were fighting without hope of quarter if taken. This truth Hayne was soon to experience.

The first cause of the partial failure of the expedition so auspiciously begun is to be found in an unfortunate occurrence which drew Sumter's attention away from the main objects, and occasioned a loss of that precious time of which Greene had warned him, and on which no doubt he fully appreciated that his success must depend. On his march he received intelligence that the enemy had appeared in force at Murray's—that afterwards known as Gourdin's—Ferry, across the Santee. This lay to the left of his line of march, but he thought it advisable to send off a strong detachment of three hundred men to strike at this hostile party. The intelligence was erroneous; nor can it be understood from whence Sumter could have supposed any formidable body could have been drawn in that quarter. There certainly were no regular British forces in what is now Williamsburg County at this time. But, however it was, this action caused delay, as Sumter considered himself too weak in the absence of his detachments to approach the enemy at Monck's Corner, within striking

distance. In the meantime the garrison at that place recovered from the alarm, and preparations were made for destroying the stores and evacuating the post.

Colonel Coates had already, at the first intimation of the movements of Sumter, crossed from Monck's Corner to the church on the other side of the river, thus determining the course of his retreat, should that be necessary, by the circuitous route by Wadboo bridge across Fair Forest Swamp, and then by Quinby bridge across the eastern branch of Cooper River, and through St. Thomas' Parish to Hobcaw. Biggin Church was a strong brick building and had been fortified; and to this the enemy's supplies had all been removed from Monck's Corner.

On the 16th, Sumter's force being collected, with the exception of Colonel Henry Hampton's regiment, which was still watching Cruger's movements, he moved forward so as to support Maham's detachment, which had been sent to make an attempt upon Wadboo bridge in Coates's rear. This detachment having been reënforced with another under Colonel Peter Horry, with whom was Colonel Lacey, Horry, ranking Maham, assumed command of the whole party, and proceeded to effect the desired destruction of the bridge. This Coates sent out his mounted men to prevent, who advanced with a great show of confidence, but were received with firmness and driven back in confusion, Colonel Lacey, with his mounted riflemen, breaking entirely through their line, some were killed and a number taken prisoners. Horry then despatched an officer to destroy the bridge, and remained to cover the party engaged in the work; but the enemy, who had actually begun their retreat, soon made their appearance in such force that Horry, unfortunately, considered it proper to call in the party engaged in destroying the bridge, and to retire before them to the main body.

Sumter, on the other hand, misconceiving Coates's movement, and believing that he had moved out to give him battle, retired behind a defile in his rear, and prepared for receiving the enemy. But Coates's purpose was only to delay him; and accordingly, retiring in the evening, he gathered his stores in the church, set fire to them, and moved off on the road to the eastward, crossing the Wadboo bridge, which Horry had abandoned.

The flames bursting through the roof of the church about three o'clock in the morning announced to Sumter that the enemy had flown. The pursuit was immediately begun, but unfortunately Lieutenant Singleton, with his piece of artillery, was ordered to remain on the ground that he might not delay the movement of the infantry. Lee and Hampton led the pursuit and, passing Wadboo bridge, discovered that the mounted men of the enemy had separated from the infantry. The British account in *The Royal Gazette* states that the mounted men—the loyal South Carolina troop which had just been raised—were sent off because they could not longer be brought into use. This party took the road to the right nearest the river, while Coates, with the Nineteenth Regiment, turning to the left, pursued that by Quinby bridge. Hampton struck off in pursuit of the mounted party, hoping to overtake them before they could cross either at Bonneau's or Strawberry ferries, but he was disappointed; they crossed at the former before he could reach them, and secured the boats on the opposite side. Hampton had then to make his way back to witness the escape of the remaining object of pursuit; the enemy's infantry, lost, as it has been observed, perhaps because the first—the enemy's cavalry—had divided the attention of the pursuers.¹

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 170.

Marion's cavalry under Colonel Maham had meanwhile joined Lee in pursuit of the infantry. It was very important to overtake Coates before he reached Quinby bridge, as it was well known that the stream there, the eastern branch of Cooper River, was only passable at the bridge, which it was certain Coates would destroy as soon as he crossed. The pursuit was therefore pressed with the utmost speed, and about a mile to the north of the bridge the rear guard of the retreating party was overtaken with nearly the whole of their baggage. The rear guard, commanded by a Captain Campbell, consisted of one hundred men of the Nineteenth Regiment; they at first exhibited a show of resistance, but, terrified at the furious onset of the cavalry, having as yet seen no service, being all recruits, it is said, they threw down their arms without firing a gun. Indignant at their conduct, Captain Campbell attempted to make his men resume their arms, an effort which unfortunately recalled Lee for a few moments from the pursuit of the body of the regiment, which he had resumed. The surrender of the rear guard, however, nearly proved fatal to the whole British regiment.

Colonel Coates had passed Quinby bridge and had made dispositions for its destruction as soon as his rear guard and baggage should have crossed in safety. The planks which covered the bridge had been loosened from the sleepers, and a howitzer placed at its opposite end to protect the party left to complete its destruction after the rear guard should have passed. As neither alarm gun nor message had apprised Coates of an enemy's approach, and believing that his rear guard was still between him and the enemy, he was not prepared for immediate action. But fortunately for his command he was present at the bridge when the American cavalry came in view, and his measures were promptly taken to avert the threatening danger. His main

body was at the time partly on a causeway on the south side of the bridge, and partly pressed into a lane beyond it, huddled together in such a position as to prevent their forming for action. Coates took immediate steps to extricate his men, and put them in such a position of defence as the emergency allowed.

The Legion cavalry as they approached the bridge were in advance of Maham's command, Captain Armstrong leading their first section. Upon coming in sight of the bridge and of Coates's force, unguardedly reposing on the other side, but knowing that Lee, his commander, had been misinformed of the proximity of the bridge and of the situation, Armstrong sent back for orders. Lee, ignorant of the condition of affairs, sent his adjutant, warmly reminding him of the order of the day, which was to fall upon the foe without respect to consequences. Stung with this answer, the brave Armstrong put spur to his horse at the head of his section, and dashed across the bridge though the planks were sliding into the water and the lighted port fire approaching the howitzer at its end. So sudden was his charge that he drove all before him, the enemy abandoning the howitzer. Unfortunately, some of the loosened planks were thrown off by Armstrong's section, as they galloped across, thus forming a chasm in the bridge and presenting a most dangerous obstacle to their followers. Nevertheless, the second section of the Legion, headed by Lieutenant Carrington, took the leap and closed with Armstrong, then engaged in a personal combat with Colonel Coates, who, placing himself on the side of a wagon which, with a few others, had kept up with the main body, was enabled effectually to parry Armstrong's sabre strokes at his head. Most of his soldiers, panic-stricken at the sudden and daring attack, had abandoned their colonel and were running through the field, some with,

some without arms, to take shelter in a farmhouse.¹ The third section of the Legion, under Captain O'Neill, had followed Carrington, but faltered, whereupon Maham charged by the third section, but the killing of his horse arrested his career. Captain McCauley, however, who led the front section of Maham's men, pressed on, crossed the treacherous bridge, notwithstanding its dangerous condition. The causeway was now crowded, and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict ensued. Two of Lee's dragoons fell dead at the mouth of the howitzer, and several were severely wounded. Lee himself had now come up, and alighting, was engaged with Maham and Dr. Irvine, his surgeon, in endeavoring to repair the bridge. At this moment Armstrong and McCauley, perceiving what was before them, and cut off from retreat by the broken bridge, with a presence of mind which belongs exclusively to consummate bravery, dashed through the flying soldiers on the causeway, and, wheeling into the woods on their left, escaped by heading up the stream.

From whatever cause or motive, it is quite certain that Lee did not on this occasion act with his usual decision and vigor. Sumter reported that if the whole party had charged across the bridge they would have come upon the enemy in such confusion, while extricating themselves from the lane, that they must have laid down their arms.² It was Lee's delay, caused by his returning to the captured party upon Campbell's attempt to retake their arms, and the consequent hesitation of Armstrong when finding himself in a position which he knew his commander had not contemplated, that allowed Coates the opportunity of loosening the planks on the bridge. And even then, it was considered

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 390.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 171-172; Sumter's letter to Greene, 22d of July, 1881, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, Appendix, 46.

that with more energy he might have rescued his brave men from their dangerous position. It is due, however, to him to give the reasons he assigned for his failure to do so. He stated that the dragoons who dismounted for the purpose of replacing the planks could not, even though clinging to the studs of the bridge, keep from sinking, there being no foothold to stand upon; nor was it possible to find any firm spot from whence to swim the horses across.¹ This is very plausible to all who are familiar with the swamps of this region. But Lee's vindication of himself in this particular would be accepted the more readily and cordially were it not that, though Sumter was present and directing the movements of his troops in the action which followed, in the account which he has given of it, he ignores that officer's presence and represents himself as directing the movements of Marion as well as his own.

Colonel Coates, leaving the bridge in an impassable condition, retired to the adjoining plantation of Captain Shubrick, and, not daring to trust himself to the open country in the face of such an active cavalry, took cover under the shelter of the buildings, which afforded him many advantages. These were situated on a rising ground; the dwelling-house was of two stories, and contiguous to it a number of outhouses and rail fences, affording security from the cavalry and a covering from the marksmen of the enemy.

As the Americans had now to make a considerable circuit to approach the house in consequence of the destruction of the bridge, it was three o'clock P.M. before General Sumter's force arrived on the ground. He found the enemy drawn up in a square in front of the house and prepared to receive him. As he had few bayonets it would have been folly to have made a direct attack, and the precedent of King's Mountain furnished him with his order of battle.

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 391.

His own brigade, under Colonels Mydelton, Polk, Taylor, and Lacey, advanced in front under shelter of a line of negro houses, which they were ordered to reach and occupy. General Marion's brigade, which was very much reduced, was thrown into two divisions and ordered to advance on the right of the enemy, where there was no shelter but fences, and those within forty or fifty yards of their position. The cavalry not being able to act, was stationed in a secure position remote from the scene of action, but near enough to cover the infantry from pursuit. The attack was made against the opinion of Marion,¹ and though Lee by his own account was present late in the evening, he took no part in the affair.²

Notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, Sumter would not forego the attempt. It was four o'clock when the parties reached their respective positions and the signal was given to advance. With the utmost alacrity they moved to the attack. Sumter's brigade soon gained the negro houses in their front, and from these directed their rifles with certain effect. Colonel Thomas Taylor, with about forty-five men of his regiment pressed forward to the fences on the enemy's left, and delivered a fire which drew upon him a charge of the British bayonet, before which he retreated.

Marion's men, says Johnson, were resolved not to be idle spectators, and, seeing the danger of Taylor's party, with a firmness of veteran troops, rushed through a galling fire up to the fences on their right and extricated Taylor; and, notwithstanding that the open railing afforded but a slender protection, continued to fire from this slight cover as long as a charge of ammunition remained in the corps. The brunt of the battle fell upon Marion's party, and they maintained

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 126.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 392.

to the last the reputation they had acquired in many a rude conflict. Most who fell in the action were of Marion's command. Among these Captain Perry and Lieutenant Jones were killed, and Lieutenant-Colonel John Baxter, who was very conspicuous from his gigantic size and full uniform, received five wounds. Major Swinton was also severely wounded.¹ When their ammunition was expended these brave men were drawn off in perfect order. Very early in the action the enemy retired into the house and within a picketed garden, from the windows and fence of which the action was maintained.

The sun was down when the assailants were withdrawn, and this at this season of the year would make the combat at Shubrick's farm to have lasted three hours. Is is, says Johnson, confidently asserted that not a man left the ground while there remained to him a charge of ammunition; all were ready to return to it if supplied; but there was none; unfortunately that captured at Dorchester by Lee had been forwarded directly to Greene's headquarters. Still Sumter had hope. The artillery had been ordered up, and it was possible that Captain Singleton had with him some spare powder. Pewter balls, Sumter reported, could have been made in plenty. The army was drawn across Quinby bridge, which had been repaired during the action, and encamped at the distance of three miles, leaving the cavalry to watch and control the movements of the enemy, and intending to renew the combat in the morning.

But, says the author from whom we have so much quoted and who has given the only full account of this unfortunate affair, the demon of discord was now working the ruin of the expedition.² When the parties who had been engaged met and compared their losses and the cir-

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 126.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II. 173.

cumstances under which they fought, it was suggested to Marion's men that they had been exposed, whilst Sumter's own, with the exception of Colonel Taylor's command, had been spared, and the idea furnished, it was said, a sufficient pretext for disgust and retiring. Many of them moved off in the night; the infection was communicated to Sumter's men; and to complete the catastrophe, in the morning early Colonel Lee with his Legion took up the line of march for headquarters without consulting the wishes of the commanding general.¹

It is difficult to understand Colonel Lee's account of this affair. He states that Marion, under his direction or suggestion, pressed his march, and having united with him, Lee, late in the evening, in front of the house, and seeing that no point of Coates's position was assailable with probable hope of success, reluctantly gave up the attempt.² Besides ignoring Sumter's presence altogether, ignoring an action that had lasted for hours before he took part in it, he represents Marion as only coming on the field late in the evening with him, and retiring without firing a gun, while in fact Marion had been fighting all the afternoon and had lost heavily. The most charitable view which can be taken of such misstatement is that suggested by Johnson, that his recollection had failed him.³ The expedition termi-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 173.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 391-392.

³ Mr. Henry Lee, in his work in defence of his father's conduct in answers to Judge Johnson's strictures, admits that Lee's account of these affairs is not accurate. "However," he says, "it must be allowed that this branch of his narrative is defective." — *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 433. In General Robert E. Lee's edition of his father's *Memoirs*, he puts a note, "The author forgot to relate that after his retreat from this position of Coates's it was attacked by Sumter and Marion with considerable spirit and some loss, but without success, in consequence chiefly of Sumter's failure to bring up his artillery." — *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 393.

nated in still widening the breach which already existed between the distinguished officers engaged in it. Sumter directly charges Lee with having failed in everything he undertook during its course, a charge which the facts go far to sustain.

The numbers engaged in the battle have never been accurately ascertained. The British returns of commissary issues found in the baggage train gave 900 rations and forage for 250 horses. Estimating for the cavalry at 150, there could not, says Johnson, have been less than 500 or 600 infantry. This is probably a correct estimate. The regiment was no doubt a full one, as it had recently arrived from Europe; but the two flank companies, it must be recollected, were with Lord Rawdon, so that but eight remained with Colonel Coates. Allowing for the ordinary deductions of details and sick, between 500 and 600 would probably be the strength of the regiment under Coates. On the other side, Sumter, having all his own brigade, with the exception of Henry Hampton's regiment, and all of Marion's, it would be supposed that he must have had more than that number. He appears to have had five regiments of his own, Mydleton's, Polk's, Taylor's, Lacey's, and Wade Hampton's, and Marion to have had four, Horry's, Maham's, Swinton's, and Baxter's; but these regiments, as they were called, were not usually even good-sized companies. If we take Colonel Taylor's as the average, 45, he had little over 450 exclusive of Lee's Legion, 150 strong. And, indeed, no doubt overestimating the British force, Sumter asserts that their infantry alone was superior to his whole force; and that he attacked them with half of their number. From these insufficient data it is perhaps safe to conclude that in the fight at Shubrick's house there was no great disparity in the forces engaged. We may assume that, on the morning of this day, British and American forces numbered

each about 600 or 700 men. The losses on the American side fell upon Lee's Legion, Maham's regiment at the bridge, and upon Marion's infantry and Taylor's regiment at the house. Marion's and Taylor's men together lost more than 50 killed and wounded.¹ Two of Lee's Legion were killed at the bridge and several wounded.² The American loss was therefore probably at least 60 killed and wounded. Sumter, however, reported but 38 killed and wounded.³ In the account of this battle published in *The Royal Gazette* "by authority," the British loss is admitted to have been 6 men killed, with an officer and 38 wounded. No mention is made of the loss of their rear guard, which numbered 100 men.⁴

If these figures are at all correct, it is a mistake to say, as does Johnson, that even after the departure of a part of his troops and the retirement of the Legion, Sumter still had a sufficient number to have held the enemy in a state of investment whilst he tried the effect of his artillery. Could he have induced Coates to come out and meet him in the field, he might well have counted upon a favorable result; but he was in no position for an investment. He was, as Johnson admits, but twenty miles from Charlestown, at a place accessible by tide-water. Lord Rawdon was known to be moving down in force from Orangeburgh, and he himself fifteen miles below Monck's Corner, which is but sixteen miles from Goose Creek, where Lord Rawdon's force might already have arrived. There being, therefore, serious grounds for apprehending disaster, General Sumter resolved to retreat across the Santee.⁵

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 125.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 173. Lee gives no numbers.

³ Letter to Greene, 25th of July, 1781, in Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 48.

⁴ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 170.

⁵ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 175; Sumter's letters, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 49.

The failure of this part of the expedition was doubtless primarily attributable to the withdrawal of Horry and Maham from Wadboo bridge without destroying it. It is said their failure to do so was owing to the appearance of Coates in force, whom they could not withstand. But this does not explain why it was not destroyed before. Sumter had despatched Maham, a bold and enterprising officer, to effect this before he began his advance, and yet it was not attempted until Horry's arrival. The next cause was Lee's delay in securing the prisoners taken on the road, under the mistaken belief that the bridge was at least a mile distant. Nor is it explained why the artillery was not brought into action. Then there was the want of coöperation, not to say insubordination, of Lee; and lastly, the jealousy between Sumter and Marion, which had unfortunately extended to their men. It is doubtful, however, in view of the whole situation, whether, under any circumstances, Sumter could have risked a further delay so near the British lines, when once his first attack had failed.

Yet, though the principal object was not attained, observes Johnson, considerable benefits resulted from the expedition: the British interest was materially shaken, their party alarmed and humbled; the spirit of the Whigs raised; and the fact was announced to the world that the country was not conquered. Nor was it without serious injury to the enemy in actual loss: 150 prisoners were taken and 9 commissioned officers killed or wounded, besides the loss at Quinby, where one officer and 38 privates had been wounded and 6 privates killed. Stores to a large amount as well in the church as in four schooners that were captured were destroyed; horses, wagons, and stores to a respectable amount were captured and carried off.

Among the latter was a prize remarkable for its extreme rarity in the American army. This was the sum of 720

guineas in the paymaster's chest taken with the baggage at Quinby's bridge. Sumter that evening divided it among the soldiers, and so much hard money had perhaps never before been in possession of the army at one time. Had the general been more politic than liberal, the detention of it a day or two, continues the same author, might have prevented the departure of some who left him who were the better able and the more desirous to leave him after the receipt of the glittering guinea which fell to the share of each soldier.

Sumter recrossed the Santee and took post as directed by Greene, near Friday's Ferry, opposite Granby, leaving Marion to take charge of the country on the Santee. Marion took post at Cordes and afterwards at Peyre's plantation, near where the Santee canal afterwards opened into that river.

Thus ended the campaign which General Greene rather followed than led, from his return to South Carolina in April. He established a camp in the salubrious and delightful region of the High Hills of Santee on a plain at that time known as James Oldfield's, afterwards the plantation of Colonel John Singleton. There he went into repose during the extreme heat of the season, while Sumter and Marion watched below.

CHAPTER XV

1781

THERE had been no exchange of prisoners, except in a very few special cases, in the Southern Department, since the commencement of the war. The large number taken by the British at Charlestown and Camden in 1780 had rendered them indifferent in the matter — if indeed it was not against their policy to enter into any agreement looking to the release of the Continental officers and soldiers they held in Christ Church Parish and on the prison ships, as well as the distinguished exiles in Florida.

The prisoners taken upon the capitulation of Charlestown, civil and military, were treated at first with no great severity; but as the war went on and others fell into the hands of the British, the treatment of all became harsh, and often cruel and infamous. It has been seen that many of the prominent citizens were exiled to St. Augustine. By the terms of the capitulation of Charlestown the Continental troops and sailors were to be conducted to a place to be agreed upon, where they were to remain prisoners until exchanged, and to be supplied with good wholesome provisions in such quantity as served out to the troops of his Britannic Majesty. In pursuance of this, contiguous buildings in the town were appropriated for the private soldiers, and the officers of the army and navy were sent to the barracks at Haddrell's Point in Christ

Church Parish, just opposite the town. And as the barracks there were not sufficient for the number, 274, some of the officers obtained lodgings in the houses, and some built huts within the limits of their paroles, six miles from the point. General Moultrie and Colonel C. C. Pinckney were in excellent quarters at Colonel Charles Pinckney's place, called Snee Farm. In a very little time all were comfortably settled with little gardens about them. At first General Patterson, the commandant, seemed inclined to treat the prisoners with courtesy and leniency — especially General Moultrie, whom he put in personal charge of all his co-prisoners. Nor can it be denied that these were a troublesome set to deal with. Moultrie states that they were ungovernable, which was not to be wondered at, when more than two hundred men from different States, of different dispositions, some of them very uncouth gentlemen, as it was said, were huddled up together in idleness in barracks. He adds that it was not surprising that there should be continued disputes and frequent duels. General McIntosh, who was the senior officer, complained to Moultrie of the disorderly conduct of some of those quartered with him in the barracks; whereupon Moultrie wrote to him to inform them that he considered himself authorized, notwithstanding they were all prisoners of war, to order court-martial upon any who should misbehave, and to forward the sentences with his approval or disapproval to Congress; that in this the British commandant agreed with him, and would send a flag to Congress for this purpose. At first four officers from each State line were allowed to remain in town to superintend and look after the sick and wounded of their respective commands; but the privilege was withdrawn, as it was alleged, because of the escape of Justice Pendleton, but probably from some other motive.

Judge Pendleton's case was this.¹ He was informed of a plot of a party of Tories to take him from his quarter, at night, and hang him at the town gate, for what cause is not told. Upon this information he counterfeited Major Benson's, the brigade major's, handwriting, and made out a pass by which he escaped. Upon this Lord Cornwallis sent for Moultrie and required him to order Pendleton back, or that the prisoners at Haddrell's Point would suffer for it. The general promptly replied that he was not responsible for any man's parole but his own; especially for that of a civilian over whom he had no control. Cornwallis, however, insisted that he had the right to discriminate, and to place some one in confinement in Judge Pendleton's place. Whereupon General Moultrie undertook to write to Congress and lay the matter before that body, which he did, Lord Cornwallis forwarding the letter to its destination.

The next cause of complaint was the hilarious celebration of the Declaration of Independence on the 4th of July by the officers in the barracks, for which Moultrie was again called upon to answer. This he did with great firmness and dignity. After giving an account of the affair, and regretting to find that some pistols had been fired, he replied that it was by no means inconsistent with their paroles to have celebrated the day. "I go no farther back than the present war," he wrote; "the British troops have given us several precedents of it; the Seventh Regiment, now in Charlestown, celebrated the anniversary of St. George's Day, when prisoners at Carlisle; and the

¹ Henry Pendleton, a Virginian, who came to South Carolina and was a member of the bar in 1771. — See *Hist. of So. Ca. under Roy. Gov.* (McCrary), 481. He was elected a judge under the constitution of 1776, with Chief Justice William Henry Drayton, John Mathews, and Thomas Bee. He had been captured at the taking of Charlestown.

convention troops [*i.e.* Burgoyne's army] kept the birthday of his Britannic Majesty both in the year '78 and '79, without the harsh animadversion of 'indecent abuse of lenity' and 'gross outrage.' ” The result was, however, an order requiring the officers to deliver up all their firearms, and a general curtailment of their privileges, which, it must be admitted, had up to this time been very considerable.

Upon seeing, in the paper of the 29th of August, 1780, an account of the arrest of the citizens, who were soon after sent to St. Augustine, General Moultrie promptly protested against it, and asked leave to send an officer to Congress to represent this grievance. But to this Balfour's reply was: “The commandant will not return any answer to a letter wrote in such exceptionable and unwarrantable terms as that to him from General Moultrie dated the 1st instant. Nor will he receive any further application from him upon the subject of it.”¹ But General Moultrie was not to be silenced in the face of wrong, even though he was in the power of those to whom he wrote. When Camden and Fishing Creek multiplied the number of prisoners, and there was no more room for them in the barracks and contiguous buildings in the town, the Continental soldiers who had been taken in Charlestown, and whose treatment had been expressly stipulated for in the terms of capitulation, were removed from the quarters provided under the terms of surrender, and were crowded on board the prison ships in such numbers that some could not find room even to lie down. The newly taken prisoners shared the same fate. Against this violation of the terms of the capitulation Moultrie fearlessly and indignantly protested. To Colonel Balfour, the commandant since the removal of General Patterson, he wrote, on the 16th of October, 1780:—

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 138-139.

“SIR: However my letter may be thought by you ‘to be wrote in exceptionable and unwarrantable terms,’ yet I cannot be deterred from representing matters of such consequence as I am now constrained to do in the strongest manner. Though it is indifferent to me whether I write to you or to the commissary of prisoners on trifling applications, yet when my duty calls upon me loudly to remonstrate against a proceeding of so high a nature as a violation of a solemn capitulation, I then think it necessary to make my application as near the fountain head as possible. I therefore, sir, address myself to you to complain of a great breach of the capitulation in sending the Continental soldiers on board prison ships (the truth of which I have not the least doubt of), as part of the agreement for which the town was delivered up to Sir Henry Clinton was that the Continental soldiers should be kept in some contiguous building in the town, as appears by the following extract from their Excellencies, Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot’s letter of the 12th of May, 1780, antecedent to the surrender:—

“‘SIR: We have to request that you will propose some proper contiguous building in the town for the residence of the private soldiers, prisoners of war not to be on parole. These will be, of course, such as may in discretion be asked.’

“The barracks and some adjacent houses were then proposed and agreed upon; as a proof of which the soldiers have been confined in those buildings from the very instant of the surrender till this present removal, which I do most solemnly protest against, and complain to you, sir, of a direct violation of the third article of capitulation, and demand that the Continental soldiers be ordered back to the barracks and other houses in which they were first confined.”

This was no doubt true; the third article of capitulation had expressly provided that the Continental troops and sailors with their baggage should be conducted *to a place to be agreed on, where they shall remain prisoners of war until exchanged*. But Balfour did not deign to discuss the matter. He curtly replied, “That he would do as he pleased with the prisoners for the good of his Majesty’s service, and not as General Moultrie pleases.”¹

¹ Moultrie’s *Memoirs*, vol. II, 142; Ramsay’s *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 257, 258.

“After the defeat of General Gates,” says Doctor Peter Fayssoux, the Continental surgeon left in charge of the American prisoners,¹ “our sufferings commenced. The British appeared to have adopted a different mode of conduct towards their prisoners, and proceeded from one step to another until they fully displayed themselves void of faith, honor, or humanity, and capable of the most savage acts of barbarity.

“The unhappy men who belonged to the militia and were taken prisoners on Gates’s defeat, experienced the first effects of the cruelty of the new system. These men were confined on board prison ships in numbers by no means proportioned to the size of the vessels, immediately after a march of 120 miles in the most sickly season of this unhealthy climate.

“These vessels were in general infected with small-pox; very few of the prisoners had gone through that disorder. A representation was made to the British commandant of their situation, and permission was obtained for one of our surgeons to inoculate them — this was the utmost extremity of their humanity. The wretched objects were still confined on board of the prison ships and fed on salt provisions without the least medical aid, or any kind of proper nourishment. The effect that naturally followed was a small-pox with a fever of the putrid type, and to such as survived the small-pox a putrid dysentery, and from these causes the deaths of at least 150 of the unhappy victims. Such were the appearances and such was the generality of the cases brought to the general hospital after the eruption of the small-pox; before the eruption not a single individual was suffered to be brought on shore.”

Upwards of 800 of these prisoners, nearly one-third

¹ Gibbes’s *Documentary Hist.* (1781–82), 117, 121.

of the whole, exhausted by a variety of suffering, expired in the short space of thirteen months' captivity. When the general exchange took place in June, 1781, out of 1900,¹ there were only 740 restored to the service of their country. But it was not by death alone, says Ramsay, that the Americans were deprived of their soldiers. Lord Charles Greville Montagu, the former Governor of South Carolina, who, after leaving the province in 1773, had frequently declared himself warmly attached to the liberties of America, and had actually, it was said, offered his services to Dr. Franklin in Paris to take a command in the army of Congress, failing to find employment on this side of the contest, had entered the service on the other and obtained leave to raise a regiment from among the rebels taken prisoners.² He arrived in Charlestown after the capitulation, and applied himself to the task of inducing the Continental soldiers to desert the cause in which they were enlisted, and to join his regiment. Indeed, it is believed that this was one of the objects in view which induced the vigorous treatment of the prisoners, in violation of the terms of capitulation. His lordship succeeded in enlisting 530 of them in the British service.³ His return

¹ Ramsay's *Hist. of the Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 288. This is Ramsay's statement; but which troops constituted the 1900 of which he speaks we do not know. The Continental troops surrendered at Charlestown on the 12th of May, 1780, numbered 2650.—*Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution* (McCrary), 507.

² Lord Charles Greville Montagu, son of Robert, third Duke of Manchester, Governor of South Carolina from 1766 to 1773.—*Hist. of So. Ca. under Roy. Gov.* (McCrary), 587 *et seq.* Appointed captain of the Eighty-eighth Foot 12th of December, 1780; major in the army 12th of June, 1782.—*Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy*, vol. II, Index.

³ These recruits for the British army from the American prisoners were from the Continental line; and, considering the character of the men of the rank and file of that body, in which were forced, by way of punishment, all men convicted of being idle, lewd, disorderly, or sturdy beggars,

to South Carolina seems really to have been more with the purpose of seducing the upholders of the American cause from their allegiance to it than any military service of his own in the field, for not only did he use the distressed condition of the Continental soldiers to induce them to accept his offer in preference to the horrors of a prison ship by the specious promise that they should be employed in the West Indies and not against their countrymen in the United States, but he aimed higher, — to seduce even the noble Moultrie himself from the cause of his country. The first attempt in this direction was made by Colonel Balfour upon General Moultrie's son. On the 14th of January, 1781, this officer wrote as follows: —

“Mr. Moultrie, your father's character and your own have been represented to me in such a light that I wish to serve you both; what I have to say I will sum up in a few words. I wish you to propose to your father to relinquish the cause he is now engaged in, which he may do without the least dishonor to himself; he can only enclose his commission to the first general officer (General Greene, for instance); the command will devolve on the next officer, which is often done in our service; any officer may resign his commission in the field if he chooses; if your father will do this he may rely on me he shall have his estate restored to him, and all damages paid him; I believe you are the only heir to your father. As for you, sir, if your father continues firm I shall never ask you to bear arms against him. These favors you may depend I shall be able to obtain from my Lord Cornwallis, and you may rely on my honor this matter shall never be divulged by me.”

Mr. Moultrie refused to make any such proposal to his father.¹ Thereupon Lord Charles Montagu himself undertook the matter, and thus addressed Moultrie under the

—see *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution* (McCrary), 299, 300, 301, 302–309, —it is not surprising to find them willing to exchange service from Congress to the King, or *vice versa*, as indeed did many of those who remained, without the excuse which these could plead.

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 149, 150.

guise of disinterested friendship. On the 11th of March, 1781, he wrote :¹—

“SIR: A sincere wish to promote what may be to your advantage induces me now to write. The freedom with which we have often conversed makes me hope you will not take amiss what I say.

“My own principles respecting the commencement of this unfortunate war are well known to you, and of course you can conceive what I mention is out of friendship: you have now fought bravely in the cause of your country for many years, and in my opinion fulfilled the duty every individual owes to it: you have had your share of hardships and difficulties; and if the contest is still to be continued, younger hands should now take the toil from you. You have now a fair opening of quitting that service with honour and reputation to yourself by going to Jamaica with me. The world will readily attribute it to the known friendship that has subsisted between us, and, by quitting this country for a short time, you would avoid any disagreeable conversations, and might return at leisure to take possession of your estates for yourself and family. The regiment I am going to command, the only proof I can give you of my sincerity is, that I will quit that command to you with pleasure and serve under you. I earnestly wish I could be the instrument to effect what I propose, as I think it would be a great means towards promoting that reconciliation we all wish for. A thousand circumstances concur to make this a proper period for you to embrace: our old acquaintance: my having formerly been governor in the province: etc., etc., the interest I have with the present commander.

“I give you my honour what I write is entirely unknown to the commandant, or to any one else, and so shall your answer be if you favour me with one. Think well of me.

“Yours sincerely,

“CH: MONTAGU.”

No further comment need be made to this letter than that contained in the temperate but admirable reply of General Moultrie. He wrote :²—

“MY LORD: I received yours this morning by Fisher; I thank you for your wish to promote my advantage, but am surprised at your proposition; I flattered myself I stood in a more favourable light with

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 166.

² *Ibid.*, 168.

you : I shall write with the same freedom with which we used to converse, and doubt not, you will receive it with the same candour : I have often heard you express your sentiments respecting this unfortunate war, when you thought the Americans injured ; but am now astonished to find you taking an active part against them ; though not fighting particularly on the continent ; yet seducing their soldiers away, to enlist in the British service, is nearly similar.

“ My Lord, you are pleased to compliment me with having fought bravely in my country’s cause for many years, and in your opinion, fulfilled the duty every individual owes to it ; but I differ widely with you, in thinking that I have discharged my duty to my country while it is still deluged with blood and overrun by the British troops, who exercise the most savage cruelties. When I entered into this contest I did it with the most matured deliberation, and with a determined resolution to risk my life and fortune in the cause. The hardships I have gone through I look back upon with the greatest pleasure and honour to myself : I shall continue to go on as I have begun, that my example may encourage the youths of America to stand forth in the defence of their rights and liberties. You call upon me now, and tell me I have a fair opening of quitting that service with honour and reputation to myself by going with you to Jamaica. Good God ! Is it possible that such an idea could arise in the breast of a man of honour. I am sorry you should imagine I have so little regard for my own reputation as to listen to such dishonourable proposals. Would you wish to have that man, whom you have honoured with your friendship to play the traitor ? Surely not. You say by quitting this country for a short time I might avoid disagreeable conversations, and might return at my own leisure and take possession of my estate for myself and family ; but you have forgot to tell me how I am to get rid of the feelings of an injured honest heart, and where to hide myself from myself. Could I be guilty of so much baseness I should hate myself and shun mankind.

“ This would be a fatal exchange from my present situation, with an easy and approving conscience of having done my duty and conducted myself as a man of honour.

“ My Lord, I am sorry to observe, that I feel your friendship much abated or you would not endeavour to prevail upon me to act so base a part. You earnestly wish you could bring it about, as you think it will be the means of bringing about that reconciliation we all wish for. I wish for a reconciliation as much as any man, but only upon honourable

terms. The repossessing of my estate, the offer of the command of your regiment, and the honour you propose of serving under me, are paltry considerations in the loss of my reputation. No. Not the fee simple of that valuable Island Jamaica should induce me to part with my integrity.

“ My Lord, as you have made one proposal, give me leave to make another, which will be more honourable to us both. As you have an interest with your command I would have you propose the withdrawing of the British troops from the continent of America, allow the independence, and propose a peace. This being done I will use my interest with my commander to accept the terms, and allow Great Britain a free trade with America.

“ My Lord, I could make one more proposal, but my situation as a prisoner circumscribes me within certain bounds; I must, therefore, conclude with allowing you the free liberty to make what use of this you may think proper. Think better of me.

“ I am, my Lord, your Lordship’s most obedient, humble servant,
 “ WILLIAM MOULTRIE.”¹

Failing thus to seduce the chief of the imprisoned officers, another course was now adopted to compel their submission. Under the flimsy pretext that Lieutenant-Colonel Grimké and Major Habersham had been corresponding with the enemy, because they had written letters to an adherent of the American cause in Beaufort, — within the British lines, — there being nothing improper in the let-

¹ Moultrie’s *Memoirs*, vol. II, 166–171; Ramsay’s *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 289–294; Garden’s *Anecdotes*, 13–16.

Mrs. Ravenel, in her *Eliza Pinckney*, 296–297, states that similar advances were made both to Major Thomas Pinckney and to Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, both of whom were prisoners. Family legend preserves a few of the answers of the latter to such overtures. To one Colonel Pinckney wrote: “ I entered into this cause after reflection and through principle; my heart is altogether American, and neither severity nor poverty nor affluence can ever induce me to swerve from it.” To another he answered: “ The freedom and independence of my country are the Gods of my Idolatry. I mean to rejoin the American army as soon after my exchange as I possibly can. I will exert my abilities to the utmost in the cause I am engaged in, and to obtain success will attempt every measure that is not cruel or dishonourable.”

ters themselves, these officers were placed in close confinement until the pleasure of Lord Cornwallis, who was then in North Carolina fighting Greene, should be known. In communicating the imprisonment of these officers to General Moultrie, Colonel Balfour also took occasion to add: ¹—

“I am now to address you on a subject with which I am charged by Lord Cornwallis, who, having in vain applied to General Greene for an equitable and general exchange of prisoners, finds it necessary, in justice to the King’s service and those of the army who are in this disagreeable predicament, to pursue such measures as may eventually coerce it; and his Lordship has consequently ordered me to send all the prisoners of war here forthwith to some of the West India Islands, which I am particularly directed to inform you cannot be delayed beyond the middle of next month; and for this purpose the transports are now allotted, of which an account will soon be transmitted to you.”

Colonel Balfour added complaints against the treatment of British prisoners by Marion.

Moultrie replied with his usual spirit. He declined to discuss the matter of the treatment of Colonel Grimké and Major Habersham, as he was himself a prisoner, and must leave that to those who were more at liberty. He addressed himself with vigor to the subject of the transportation of the Continental officers.²

“The subject of your next clause,” he wrote, “is of a very serious nature and weighty consequences indeed. Before I enter particularly into that, I must request you will be so kind as to inform me whether you deem the capitulation dissolved? You tell me Lord Cornwallis has frequently applied to General Greene for an equitable exchange of prisoners. I can also assure you that General Greene, in a letter to General McIntosh, mentions that he proposed such a measure to Lord Cornwallis; and I can assure you that by a letter from a delegate in Congress we are warranted to-day that Congress has proposed a plan for a general exchange, which Sir Henry Clinton approved, and signified to General Washington his readiness to proceed on it, and for ought

¹ Moultrie’s *Memoirs*, vol. II, 171.

² *Ibid.*, 173.

we know is at this moment taking place. However, the sending of us to the West Indies cannot expedite the exchange one moment; neither can the measure alleviate the distresses of those of your officers who are prisoners, as you must be well assured such treatment as we receive will be fully retaliated by General Washington."

This remonstrance met with no respect further than that General Moultrie was allowed to send copies of Balfour's notice and of his reply to General Greene. Preparations for the transportation continued through the month of April. On the 2d of May Moultrie was informed "that the Continental and militia officers were, at the particular request of General Greene, to be sent to Long Island instead of the West Indies, as had been threatened."¹ The day after this, however—that is, on the 3d of May, 1781—a cartel for a general exchange of prisoners was agreed to at the house of Mr. Claudius Pegues, on the Pee Dee, between Captain Cornwallis on the part of Lord Cornwallis, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington on the part of Major-General Greene, and this put an end to the proposed removal of these prisoners.

As soon as Colonel Grimké was released from confinement he made his way at once from the British lines to the American army, and reported himself to General Greene, from whom he solicited a court of inquiry upon his conduct. This court was unanimously of opinion that he had not violated his parole in corresponding with one within the lines to which he was confined, and that, on the contrary, his arrest having been in violation of the terms of his surrender, he was justified in escaping. This finding was approved by General Greene, who was so strongly impressed with the justice and propriety of Colonel Grimké's conduct, and further that the conduct of the British had absolved the paroled officers, that he readily consented to

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 171, 198.

let him have a party of troops to bring off all his brother officers at Haddrell's Point. To this end General Greene gave Colonel Grinké a letter to Marion, who, also fully approving, furnished him with a detachment. With this Colonel Grinké proceeded forthwith to Haddrell's Point, made a prisoner of the British commissary within sight of the town, and took possession of the barracks and all the officers. A number of these had proceeded on their way as far as the church, five miles from the barracks, near Snee Farm, where General Moultrie and Colonel Pinckney were quartered, where they halted and sent for these officers to join them. They, however, refused to do so, not doubting the right or propriety of the measure, as they too held that the terms of their capitulation had been violated by the British, but because they were now soon to be exchanged, and thought it best to remain rather than run any risk.¹

The terms of this cartel included political as well as military prisoners of war. It is well, therefore, at this time briefly to relate the treatment of the former, both of those remaining at home on their paroles and of those exiled to St. Augustine. The citizens of the town who adhered to their paroles, rather than renew their allegiance to the king and accept protection, were treated with great severity. Though they were not allowed the rations of military prisoners, they were debarred from trade and employment, and the exercise of any profession of whatever kind to procure subsistence. On the 25th of March, 1781, Balfour issued the following order:²—

“Whereas, divers persons who are prisoners on parole in Charlestown do exercise their professions trades and occupations and avail themselves of their emoluments and advantages incidental thereto which should be enjoyed by those only who have returned to their allegiance

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 200, 201.

² *The Royal Gazette*, March 28, 1781.

and are desirous of supporting his Majesty's government which affords them protection. For prevention whereof in future it is ordered that no person now a prisoner on parole in Charlestown shall have the liberty of exercising any profession trade mechanick art business or occupation. And his Majesty's subjects are hereby strictly enjoined not to employ such person or persons on any pretence."

Upon the application of one thus deprived of the means of living, for rations, the valiant officer replied in the following order: ¹—

"All difficulties with regard to provisions ought to have been considered before the people entered into rebellion or in the course of these twelve months, while they have been allowed to walk about on parole. All militia officers and others on parole are to keep their paroles and remain in their houses."

But as the sequestration of their property and the deprivation of their means of support did not quell the spirit of these people, resort was again had to the prison ships. On the 17th of May, that is, just after the fall of Forts Watson and Motte and the post at Orangeburgh, and while Granby was besieged, one hundred and thirty militia officers, prisoners on parole in Charlestown, were seized and sent on board these ships.² In justification of this measure Balfour

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 295, 296.

² Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 541; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 75-76.

LIST OF PRISONERS ON PRISON SHIPS

On Board the Prison Ship Torbay. — William Axon, Samuel Ash, George Arthur, John Anthony, Ralph Atmore, John Baddeley, Peter Bounetheau, Henry Benbridge, Joseph Ball, Joseph Bee, Nathaniel Blundell, James Bricken, Francis Bayle, William Basquin, John Clarke, Jr., Thomas Cooke, Norwood Conyers, James Cox, John Dorsus, Joseph Dunlap, Rev. James Edmonds, Thomas Elliott, Joseph Elliott, John Evans, John Eberley, Joseph Glover, Francis Grott, Mitchell Gargie, William Graves, Peter Guerard, Jacob Henry, David Hamilton, Thomas Harris, William Hornby, Daniel Jacoby, Charles Kent, Samuel Lockhart, Nathaniel Leby, Thomas Listor, Thomas Legaré, John Lesesne, Henry Lybert, John Michael, John Minott, Sr., John Moncrief, Charles McDonald, John

addressed the prisoners a communication which he required Messrs. R. Wells & Son, printers to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, to publish in *The Royal Gazette*, in which, charging ill treatment of the prisoners taken by the Americans, and declaring it his duty to try how far a more decided line of conduct would prevail, and whether the safety of avowed adherents to their cause might not induce the American troops to extend a proper clemency to those whose principles armed them in defence of the British government, he wrote:—

“Induced by these motives I have conceived it an act of expediency to seize on your persons and retain them as hostages for the good usage of all the loyal militia who are or may be made prisoners of war resolving to regulate in the full extent your treatment by the measure of theirs, and which my feelings make me hope may hereafter be most lenient.

“And as I have thought it necessary that those persons who some time since were sent from thence to St. Augustine should in this respect be considered in the same point of view as yourselves I shall send notice there that they be likewise held as sureties for a future propriety of conduct towards our militia prisoners.

Minott, Jr., Samuel Miller, Stephen Moore, George Monck, Jonathan Morgan, Abraham Mariette, Solomon Milner, John Neufville, Jr., Philip Prioleau, James Poyas, Job Palmer, Joseph Robinson, Daniel Rhody, Joseph Righton, William Snelling, John Stevenson, Jr., Paul Snyder, Abraham Seavers, Ripley Singleton, Samuel Skottowe, Stephen Shrewsbury, John Saunders, James Toussiger, Paul Taylor, Sims White, James Wilkins, Isaac White, George Welch, Benjamin Wheeler, William Wilkie, John Welch, Thomas You.

On Board the Schooner Pack Horse.—John Barnwell, Edward Barnwell, Robert Barnwell, William Branford, John Blake, Thomas Cochran, Joseph Cray, Robert Dewar, H. W. De Saussure, Thomas Eveleigh, John Edwards, Jr., John W. Edwards, William Elliott, Benjamin Guerard, Thomas Grayson, John Gibbons, Philip Gadsden, John Greaves, William H. Hervey, John B. Holmes, William Holmes, Thomas Hughes, James Heyward, George Jones, Henry Kennon, John Kean, Stephen Lee, Philip Meyer, George Mosse, William Neufville, John Owen, Charles Pinckney, Jr., Samuel Smith, William Wigg, Charles Warham, Thomas Waring, Sr., Richard Waring, John Waters, David Warham, Richard Yeadon.

“Reasons so cogent and which have only the most humane purposes for their objects will I doubt not be considered by every reasonable person as a sufficient justification of this most necessary measure *even in those points where it may militate with the capitulation of Charleston*, though indeed the daily infractions of it by the breach of paroles would alone warrant this procedure.”

Admitting thus that the measure was a violation of the terms of their capitulation, he added :—

“Having been thus candid in stating to you the causes of this conduct I can have no objections to your making any proper use of this letter you may judge to your advantage and will therefore should you deem it expedient grant what flags of truce may be necessary to carry out copies of it to any officer commanding American troops in these parts, and in the mean time the fullest directions will be given that your present situation be rendered as eligible as the nature of the circumstances will admit.”

To this communication Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Moore, of North Carolina, Major John Barnwell, Samuel Lockhart, John Baddeley, Benjamin Guerard, and Charles Pinckney, Jr., on the 19th addressed the following temperate and admirable reply :—

“SIR: Yesterday we transmitted to you a letter enclosing a copy of yours, with a list of one hundred and twenty-nine prisoners of war confined on board this ship which we hope is forwarded to Major-General Greene agreeable to your promise, and make no doubt but that your feelings as a gentleman will upon this occasion induce you to do everything in your power to liberate from a most injurious and disagreeable confinement those against whom there can exist no charge of dishonor, and whose only crime if such it can possibly be termed by men of liberal ideas is an inflexible attachment to what they conceive to be the rights of their country, and who have scorned to deceive you by unmeaning professions.

“In justice to ourselves we must say that if the Americans have at any time so far divested themselves of that character for humanity and generosity which ever distinguished them we feel ourselves most sensibly mortified, but are induced from the generous treatment of Colonels Lechmere, Rugeley, Fenwicke and Kelsall and their parties

and from a number of other instances which might easily be adduced to believe that the outrages which you complain of must be the effect of private resentment (subsisting between British subjects and those who after having availed themselves of the royal proclamation, have resumed their arms in opposition to that government), and totally un-sanctioned by any American officer, and which we are well convinced they would reprobate and would punish in the most exemplary manner could the perpetrators of such horrid acts be detected.

“In a war circumstanced as the present there will be some instances of enormities on both sides. We would not wish to particularize, but doubt not there are acts of cruelty frequently committed by the irregulars of your army and are convinced that on your part as well as our own they are generally to be attributed to an ignorance of the rules of warfare, and a want of discipline; but the idea of detaining in close custody as hostages a number of men fairly taken in arms and entitled to the benefits of a solemn capitulation is so repugnant to the laws of war and the usage of civilized nations that we apprehend it will rather be the means of increasing its horrors than answering those purposes of humanity you expect.

“As a most strict adherence to the terms of our paroles and a firm reliance on your honor, have been the only reasons of our being in your power at present, we trust that upon equitable proposals being made for our exchange by General Greene, no objections will be raised but every thing done to bring the matter to the most speedy issue.”

To General Greene these officers wrote, inclosing a copy of Balfour's letter, and saying that should it fall to the lot of all or any of them to be made victims agreeable to the menaces therein contained, they had only to regret that their blood could not be disposed of more to the advancement of the glorious cause to which they had adhered.¹

The cartel for the exchange of prisoners which had been agreed on on the 3d of May was very general in its terms. It provided that regular troops should be exchanged for regulars, and militia for militia. That men enlisted for six

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 535; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 72-77; *The Royal Gazette*, May 19, 1781.

months and upwards in Continental or State service should be looked upon as regulars. But the practical working of the exchange was left to the commissaries of prisoners on either side. The first delivery of American prisoners were to embark at Charlestown on or before the 15th of June for Jamestown on the James River, where the first delivery of British prisoners should embark on or about the first week in July, and sail immediately to the nearest British port.¹ This arrangement was no doubt made for the benefit of the Virginia and North Carolina Continental troops, who had been imprisoned since the capitulation of Charlestown. Upon the execution of the cartel Major Hyrne, the American commissary of prisoners, proceeded to Charlestown, where he met Major Fraser, the British commissary.

One better qualified for the duties of this mission than the American commissary could not have been selected. He was liberal in all his ideas, and where reason would justify concession, willing to yield and conciliate; but against the encroachments of arrogance and injustice, firm as adamant.

The British, appreciating the great advantage which they had in the character and influence of many of the individuals within their power, were little disposed to liberate them, and so to encounter the effect of their return to their compatriots. Especially was this the case in regard to the exiles at St. Augustine, and those in the prison ships in the harbor. These latter Major Hyrne was in the constant habit of visiting, and at last informed them that his efforts to relieve them would, according to appearances, prove altogether abortive; and that they must endeavor to support with patience and fortitude the evils they were destined to endure. But one hope remains, he added, of bringing the business to a happy conclusion, and that should be made without delay.

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 198, 200.

The British officers who had been captured by Sumter, Marion, and Lee had all been paroled and allowed to return to Charlestown. Of these there were a very considerable number, and they all were enjoying the comforts and society of the town; while our officers were confined, some to narrow limits at Haddrell's Point, without society, and with scarcely the means of support, others to the horrors of the prison ships, while the civil prisoners were exiles far away. Returning to his quarters, Major Hyrne addressed a note to every British officer in the town enjoying the benefit of a parole, desiring that preparation should be made to accompany him immediately to the American camp, as every effort to accomplish an exchange had proved fruitless. It could not be expected that liberty should be longer granted to them while men of the first character and highest respectability in the State were subjected to all the miseries and inconveniences of the most rigorous confinement.

The effect of this notice was instantaneously perceptible. The doors of the commandant were besieged by petitioners, many of high rank and powerful connection, soliciting him to relinquish his opinions, and by relaxing in due season his severity, save them from the horrors and destruction which they deemed inevitable should they be compelled in the month of June to remove into the sickly interior country. The clamorous and reiterated remonstrances of these officers could not be resisted; the dictates of policy yielded before them. The terms of exchange were speedily adjusted.¹ On the 22d of June Major Hyrne and Major Fraser, the commissaries, gave notice that in pursuance of power delegated to them to carry into execution the articles of cartel made on the 3d of May, they had agreed "that all

¹ Garden's *Anecdotes*, 407, 408; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 200.

the militia, prisoners of war, citizens of America taken by the British arms in the Southern Department from the commencement of the present war to the 15th day of this present month of June, shall be immediately exchanged for all the militia, prisoners of war, subjects of Great Britain taken by the American army in the said department within the above-mentioned term.”¹

There is no allusion, it will be observed, in this agreement as to the regulars on either side. These, it is to be supposed, were regarded as coming under the general terms of the cartel itself. It is further to be observed that the exchange was only provided for those taken prior to the 15th of June. One cause of delay in the execution of this agreement was that the British insisted upon excepting from the cartel five individuals, three of whom, Captain Postell, Messrs. Smith and Skirving, like Pickens, Hampton, and Hayne, had resumed their arms after having been paroled and taken protection. Who the others were is not known. Postell's case was by the consent of the commissaries referred to General Greene, but he does not appear ever to have been released.²

Notice of the exchange was immediately sent to St. Augustine, where it was received on the 7th of July. It is time, therefore, to recur to the exiles there, and to inquire how they had fared in the ten months of their imprisonment at that distant place.

¹ Gibbes's *Doc. Hist.* (1781-82), 122, 123; *The Royal Gazette*, June 29, 1781.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 201; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 128; James's *Life of Marion*, 113.

CHAPTER XVI

1781

UPON the capitulation of Charlestown in May, 1780, a military government had been established by the British. A commandant was appointed to superintend the affairs of the province. His powers, says Ramsay, were as undefined as those of the American committees, which took place in the early stages of the dispute between Great Britain and America, while the Royal governments were suspended and before the popular establishments were reduced to system. To soften the rigid and forbidding aspect of this new mode of administration and as far as possible to temper it with the semblance of civil authority, a Board of Police for the summary determination of disputes was instituted. James Simpson, the attorney-general at the breaking out of the Revolution,—one of those who had refused to sign the Association when ordered by the General Committee in July, 1775, and consequently had been compelled to leave the province,—had returned and was put at the head of the board as Intendant. One of the first measures of this board was the preparation of a table ascertaining the depreciation of the paper currency at different periods, from which the friends of the Royal government who had sustained losses by paper payments were induced to hope for reimbursement.¹

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 261, 263; *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 226, 228.

This measure, observes the author from whom we quote, though just in itself, was productive of unexpected and serious consequences, fatal to the reviving fondness for the Royal interest. Among the new-made British subjects many were found who had been great gainers by the depreciation of the American bills of credit. These, when a second payment of their old debts was proposed, by this scheme, were filled with astonishment and dismay. From the circumstances of the country a compliance with it was to the most opulent extremely inconvenient, and to the multitudes absolutely impracticable. The paper currency, before the reduction of Charlestown, had supplanted the use of gold and silver and banished them from circulation. The ravages of war had desolated the country and deprived the inhabitants of the means of payment. Creditors became clamorous from their long arrears of interest, and debtors had either lost their property or could not exchange it for one-half of its value. Many suits were brought and great numbers ruined. The distresses of the reclaimed subjects within the British lines were in many instances greater than those of their unsubdued countrymen who had forsaken all in the cause of liberty. Then, when the Americans had recovered possession of a considerable part of the State, it began to be feared that upon their ultimate success the proceedings of the board would be reversed. This redoubled their difficulties. Creditors became more pressing, and at the same time the increasing uncertainty of British titles induced a depreciation of real property not far behind that of the American paper currency. Fear and interest, says Ramsay, had brought many of their new subjects to the British standard; but in consequence of the plans they adopted in a little time both these powerful motives of human actions drew in an opposite direction. The Americans pursued a different line of conduct. In every period

of the contest they sacrificed the few creditors to the many debtors. The true Whigs who suffered on this score consoled themselves with the idea that their country's good required it, and that this was the price of independence. A disposition to suffer in behalf of the Royal interest was not so visible among the professed adherents to British government. That immediate justice might be done to a few great distress was brought on many, and the cause of his Britannic Majesty injured beyond reparation.¹

General Patterson, as has appeared, had been the first commandant at Charlestown. Upon his removal from the province Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet Balfour, who at first had been sent to the command of the District of Ninety Six, was recalled to Charlestown and placed in command there. Of the character and services of this officer we have before spoken.² Between himself and Lord Rawdon there was no good will. He established his headquarters in the house of Miles Brewton, the same in which Josiah Quincy had been entertained in 1773, as related in a former volume;³ and there, it was said of him, in the exercise of his new office, he displayed all the frivolous self-importance and insolence which are natural to little minds when puffed up by sudden elevation, and employed in functions to which their abilities are not equal. By the subversion of every form of the popular government, which had been set up without any proper civil establishment in its place, he with a few coadjutors assumed and exercised legislative, judicial, and executive powers over citizens in the same manner as over the common soldiery under their command. A series of proclamations and

¹ Ramsay, *supra*.

² *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution* (McCrary), 715.

³ *Hist. of So. Ca. under Roy. Gov.* (McCrary), 706.

orders were issued, not only in violation of the terms of capitulation of the city, but as little in accord with the principles of the British constitution as of those of justice, equity, and humanity. Upon the surrender of the city it had been stipulated, it will be remembered, that the militia should be regarded as prisoners upon parole, which parole, so long as they observed it, should secure them from being molested *in their property* by the British troops. The spirit and intent of this stipulation unquestionably was that as long as the prisoners observed their paroles they might pursue their business and avocations, and be protected in so doing in their property. But, presumably, now drawing a distinction between one's property and one's calling or business, Balfour, as we have seen, now ordered that no paroled prisoner should be allowed to work at any trade or profession for the support of himself or his family. A more iniquitous measure can scarcely be conceived. Prisoners on parole confined to the town were thus denied the right to make a living in the town, unless they would forswear the cause and return to the allegiance of the king. For light offences and upon partial and insufficient information citizens were arrested and confined without trial of any kind.

The middle part of the cellar under the Exchange—now the old post-office in Charleston—was the place chosen for the imprisonment of those arrested. It was called the provost. The dampness of this unwholesome place, without any means of warming its temperature, caused great sickness and suffering and some deaths among those confined within its walls. It was in this place that the citizens arrested in August, 1780, and sent to St. Augustine, were first confined. Citizens marched from distant parts of the interior in irons were thrown into this prison. Among these were Colonel Starke, Colonel Beard, Captain Moore, and Mr.

Pritchard.¹ So, too, were here confined Major Peter Bocquet, Samuel Legare, Jonathan Sarrazin, Henry Peronneau, and Daniel Stevens. Not only men, but women also were indiscriminately cast into this place. Among these, two young ladies of most excellent character and respectable connections, on a groundless suspicion of giving intelligence to the Americans, were for a short time subjected to the same indignity. These were crowded, together with the sick laboring under contagious diseases, with negroes, deserters, women of infamous character, to the number of fifty-six, within narrow limits. So little regard was paid to decency that the calls of nature could not be satisfied but in the open view of both sexes promiscuously collected in one apartment. The American state prisoner and the British felon shared the same fate. The former, though for the most part charged with nothing more than an active execution of the laws of the State, or having spoken words disrespectful or injurious to the British officers or government, or of corresponding with the Americans, suffered indignities and distresses in common with those who were accused of crimes tending to subvert the peace and existence of society. Such was the administration of police by Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour. His conduct on the whole tended greatly to strengthen the Whig interest and to diminish the number of Royalists.²

Far from subduing the spirit of those whose circum-

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 264. Colonel Robert Starke, who had commanded the lower regiment of militia in the fork of Saluda and Broad rivers. (See *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* [McCrary], 123.) There were two other Starkes, or Starks, who fought in the Revolution under Sumter, Captain John Starke and a lad, Robert Starke. Johnson's *Traditions*, 502, 503. Colonel Jonas Beard, who had succeeded Colonel Starke in command of his regiment. James Pritchard had been sheriff of Ninety Six District.

² Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 301-302; Ramsay's *Revolution*, 261, 265; Gibbs's *Documentary Hist.*, 121.

stances had compelled their remaining in the town, Balfour's treatment but strengthened them in the cause of freedom. This was especially the case with the women. In this crisis of danger to the liberties of America, says Ramsay, the ladies of South Carolina conducted themselves with more than Spartan magnanimity. They gloried in the appellation of rebel ladies; and though they withstood repeated solicitation to grace public entertainments, yet they crowded on board prison ships and other places of confinement to solace their suffering countrymen. While the conquerors were regaling themselves at concerts and assemblies, they could obtain very few of the fair sex to associate with them; but no sooner was an American officer introduced as a prisoner than his company was sought for and his person treated with every possible mark of attention and respect. On other occasions the ladies in a great measure retired from the public eye, wept over the distresses of their country, and gave every proof of the warmest attachments to its suffering cause. In the height of the British conquests, when poverty and ruin seemed the unavoidable portion of every adherent to the independence of America, the ladies in general discovered more firmness than the men. Many of them, like guardian angels, preserved their husbands from falling in the hour of temptation when interests and convenience had almost got the better of honor and patriotism. Among the numbers who were banished from their families and whose property was seized by the conquerors many examples could be produced of ladies parting cheerfully with their sons, husbands, and brothers, exhorting them to fortitude and perseverance; and repeatedly entreating them never to suffer family attachments to interfere with the duty they owed to their country. When in the progress of the war they were also comprehended under a general sentence

banishment, with equal resolution, they parted with their native country and the many endearments of home, — followed these husbands into prison ships and distant lands, where, though they had long been in the habit of giving, they were reduced to the necessity of receiving charity. They renounced the present gratification of wealth and the future prospects of fortunes for their growing offspring, adopted every scheme of economy, and, though born to affluence and habituated to attendance, betook themselves to hard labor.¹ The foreign historian, Botta, concludes a paraphrase of this passage from Ramsay with the observation that to this heroism of the women of Carolina is principally to be imputed that the love and even the name of liberty were not totally extinguished in the Southern provinces.²

The exiles in St. Augustine, though with the exception of Christopher Gadsden, who was still immured in the dungeon, because of his refusal to give another parole, and for a part of the time also of Jacob Read, for some alleged offence, upon their paroles were allowed some freedom, but within very narrow limits, in the inner square of the town. They were obliged to attend roll-calls twice a day at the State House. Their correspondence which they were allowed to carry on with their friends and families in Carolina had all to pass under the eye and examination of the commandant of the garrison. The inhabitants of the town were advised by the military authorities to have no communication with them, which advice, coming from the source it did, was scarcely less than an order, and was so regarded and obeyed. Soldiers were forbidden to associate with them under penalty of court-martial. The lieu-

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 123, 125.

² Botta's *History of the Independence of the U.S. of Am.*, vol. II, 261, 262.

tenant-governor of East Florida, John Moultrie, the brother of General Moultrie, though closely connected with some of the prisoners, and doubtless well known to most of them, kept himself aloof. The fourth Sunday after their arrival the different messes met together for religious worship, and Mr. James Hamden Thomson, the schoolmaster, read some prayers from the Book of Common Prayer of the Church of England, and a sermon from a printed collection, no way relating to their present position. The next Sunday the Rev. Mr. Lewis delivered a very moving discourse, it is said, of his own from the text, "If I am bereaved of my children, I am bereaved." These services it was proposed to continue every Sunday; but on the following Friday evening Mr. Brown, the commissary of prisoners, informed the gentlemen that the governor had taken offence at their having public worship, and that it was his pleasure they should discontinue it in the future. This they refused to do unless prohibited in writing. Upon this Governor Tonyn wrote to Mr. Brown, the commissary, that having been informed that the rebel prisoners, forgetful of their parole, had very improperly held private meetings for the purpose of performing divine service agreeable to their rebellious principles, and as such proceedings were thought highly injurious to his Majesty's government, and of a seditious tendency, and an infringement of their pledge of honor, he desired the commissary to acquaint them that such meetings would not be allowed, that seats would be provided for their reception in the parish church, where it was expected that they would observe the utmost decency. The commissary was also directed to say that messages delivered by him were of sufficient authenticity; that it was in compliance with his request only that the governor condescended to write this letter. The exiles were then put in the position of having to

forego all religious services or joining in the prayer for his Majesty the king, and against their own cause.

But upon the whole, as matters usually go with prisoners, they had little cause of complaint beyond the fact that they were deprived of their liberty and exiled from their families and homes. The commissary of prisoners, Mr. William Brown, a Scotchman by birth, was an upright, honorable king's man, faithful to his Majesty, but ever kind and indulgent to the prisoners under his care as far as was consistent with his duty. When entire satisfaction could not be afforded, he would soothe their feelings and console them in a friendly and gentlemanly manner.¹ The messes into which they were divided were furnished with rations. Their servants whom they were allowed to retain were permitted to fish for their subsistence; and they were allowed to purchase other supplies in Charlestown, where they had agents for the purpose, who shipped the goods to them. The mention of a few items from one of the orders to the agent of one of the messes will indicate that their living at first was by no means that of anchorites. "Hh^d of Old Jamaica Rum, divided into 2 or more small casks, &c., to be packed up in Rice Barrils among corn &c." "A quarter Pipe Port wine," "8 dozen Fowls full grown and as many laying hens among them as possible." "Two gross Fresh Laid Eggs to be packed up in Fine Salt." "A Cheshire Cheese," "6 Quart bottle Sweet oil." "A case of 5 gallons French Brandy." "12 Packs Playing cards." "Fish Hooks, &ct., &ct."² The order amounted to £85 sterling, to be paid by their friends and families in Charlestown.

But all this was very much changed before their release. Their estates were confiscated under the orders elsewhere mentioned, and their families and friends at home had no

¹ Johnson's *Traditions*, p. 321.

² Diary (MS.) of Josiah Smith, Jr.

means with which to supply their necessities, still less their luxuries.

By the spring of 1781 the condition of the exiles had changed very much for the worse, the sequestration of their estates had cut off supplies from home, and deprived them of the means of paying for the lodgings they had been allowed to have for themselves at great expense. Upon the arrival, therefore, of Colonel Allured Clarke, the Commandant-in-chief of the provinces of Georgia and East Florida, with reënforcements, under an expectation of an invasion of the Spaniards, the exiles memorialized him, stating their inability longer to pay for their lodgings, — that they had been informed by the commandant of Charlestown, both previous to their removal, and since their arrival, that they should be supplied with full rations ; but those received were found to be insufficient, not only for their comfortable, but even necessary, support, and submitting to him whether from this state of matters they might not reasonably expect to be accommodated with quarters and competent supplies. They represented that the paroles given were effectual ties upon their honor without the annoyance of daily roll-calls, and asked for an extension of their limits. This application was partly answered by a permit to any ten of them to fish daily upon the river within certain limits at any time between gun-fire in the morning and four o'clock in the afternoon.

The information of the execution on the 3d of May of the cartel for a general exchange of all prisoners had reached St. Augustine, and the exiles were all in hopes of a speedy release, when on the 5th of July they received an order to prepare themselves to march to the St. John River, where they would be provided with boats to take them to Savannah. Great consternation was caused by this order. The exiles met and again memorialized the

commandant, now Colonel Glazier, to consider the distress the execution of such an order must necessarily involve — that many among them were aged and infirm, and all since their captivity more or less enervated by an inactive and sedentary life, that in such circumstances a fatiguing march in that sultry season, through a wilderness destitute of every accommodation, even of water, and now to be confined for near a fortnight on small boats exposed to every inclemency of the weather, would be attended with fatal consequences to many.

To this memorial no other answer was given than a verbal declaration of the commissary, that as official orders might be on board a man-of-war then off the bar, the commandant deferred their journey until such orders should come to his hands. Early Saturday, the 7th, signals were hung out that several vessels were in sight, but the winds being contrary they did not get up to the town until Sunday evening, when, to the great joy of the exiles, they brought the intelligence of the exchange agreed upon on the 22d of June.¹ But the joy at the prospect of their near release was greatly embittered when, upon receiving *The Royal Gazette* of the 27th, they found published therein the following order by Colonel Balfour : —

“As many persons lately exchanged as prisoners of war and others who have long chose to reside in the colonies now in rebellion, have notwithstanding (such there absence) wives and families still remaining here the weight of which on all accounts is equally impolittick as inconsistent should longer be suffered to rest on the government established here and the resources of it:

“The commandant is therefore pleased to direct that all such women and children and others as above described should quit the town and province on or before the first day of August next ensuing; of which Regulation such persons are hereby ordered to take notice and to remove then accordingly.”

¹ Diary (MS.) of Josiah Smith, Jr.

On Monday morning Mr. Brown, the commissary, informed the exiles that Colonel Glazier had received directions from Colonel Balfour to permit the whole of the company to depart from St. Augustine as prisoners exchanged either for Virginia or Philadelphia as they should choose, but by no means to grant them liberty to stop or even to touch at Charlestown. And that for their accommodation he was to furnish them with one small schooner, which was not large enough even to carry their baggage.

The exiles thus found the day of their deliverance to which they had looked forward with so much joy a day of lamentation and distress. What was to become of their families, turned out of their habitations which had been secured to them by the terms of capitulation? How were the helpless women and children to find the means of obeying the order for their departure? And as if purposely to cut off all remaining means of doing so, Balfour followed up his former cruel orders with the following, issued on the 11th:—

“The commandant is pleased to direct that no person living under the rebel government shall have liberty, or grant power to others for so doing to let or lease any house within this town without a special licence for so doing as it is intended to take all such houses as may be wanted for the publick service, paying to the owners of those secured by the capitulation a reasonable rent for the same, as by those means government will be enabled to reinstaté its firm friends in possession of their own houses.”

In consequence of this mandate, those who adhered to the cause of America were turned out of their houses, which were taken possession of by the British in violation of public faith, and there was scarce an instance of compensation being allowed for the seizure of their property. Scenes of the greatest distress ensued. More than a thousand persons, says Ramsay, were exiled from their homes,

and thrown on the charity of strangers for their support. Husbands and wives, parents and children, some of whom had been for several months separated from each other, were not permitted to soothe their common distress by being together, but were doomed to have their first interview among strangers in a distant land.¹

The exiles represented to Colonel Glazier the insufficiency of the vessel which had been designated for their voyage to Philadelphia, who the next day offered instead that he would let them have another schooner, the *East Florida*, about sixty tons, on condition they would consent to pay £100 sterling towards her hire. He ultimately agreed, however, to let them have the vessel free of charge, the government assuming its hire; and that he would order four weeks' provisions to be laid in for the passage. Whereupon the exiles secured another vessel, a brigantine, the *Nancy*, at an expense of 200 guineas, made up amongst them all, and divided their party into two bodies of thirty and thirty-one, keeping as near as could be the arrangement of their messes. They then cast lots for the vessels; the brigantine *Nancy* fell to the lot of the party of thirty-one, of whom Christopher Gadsden was the chief, and the schooner *East Florida* to that of the lot of thirty, of whom John Neufville was the chief. Both vessels dropped down the river with the prisoners aboard on the 17th of July, but did not get over the bar until the 19th. The schooner reached the capes of Delaware on the 28th and the brig on the 2d of August.

On the 25th of July many of the families who had been banished by the order of the commandant of the town embarked for Philadelphia in a brig commanded by Captain Downham Newton, with a passport making her a flag of truce. How the funds were raised to provide for their

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 300-301.

removal is illustrated in a copy of the petition of Mrs. Mary De Saussure, wife of the exile, Daniel De Saussure. It is addressed "To the Honorable Lieutenant-Colonel Nisbet Balfour, Commandant at Charlestown," and is as follows:—

"The humble petition of Mary De Saussure wife of Daniel De Saussure showeth that your petitioner is unable in her present circumstances to provide for the expense that must necessarily attend the removal of herself and family from their Province; therefore prays your honor will be pleased to grant her the indulgence of making sale of the furniture belonging to her dwelling house and kitchen, also a riding chaise and to grant her such further indulgence as to your honor shall seem meet and your petitioner as in duty bound will ever pray," etc.

The petition was by the commandant referred to the Board of Police, which after a week's consideration graciously indorsed, "Mrs. De Saussure has permission to sell her furniture and chaise as requested."

The brig, containing ten or twelve families, numbering nearly one hundred and thirty souls, had a prosperous voyage, and reached the capes on the 2d of August, and with a fair wind continued its course up to New Castle. Another brig had been in sight all day pursuing the same course a little behind them. The two brigs came to anchor in the evening close together; when William Johnson, on that from St. Augustine hailed that from Charlestown, and was answered, "From Charlestown" in the well-known voice of the captain. They immediately recognized each other. "Is that you, Downham Newton?" "Ay; is that you, William Johnson? we have your family on board." Many other manly voices, says the *Traditions*, immediately and anxiously inquired each for his own family, and a joyful meeting then took place of many dear ones thus providentially brought together.¹

¹ Johnson's *Traditions*, 332-333.

Balfour's cruel edict, banishing from the town the wives and families of those who would not sully their honor and conscience by taking protection, compelled the removal of a large number of men, women, children, and servants to Philadelphia, besides the exiles. These took with them such of their movable property as they could by permission and convenience remove. In all they numbered 670 men, women, and children, and 71 servants. To meet the necessities of these exiles, Congress on the 23d of July came to the following resolution:—

“Resolved that five suitable persons be appointed and authorized to open a subscription for a loan of Thirty Thousand Dollars for the support of such of the States of South Carolina and Georgia as have been driven from their country and possessions by the enemy; the said States respectively by their delegates in Congress pledging their faith for the repayment of the sum which shall be received by their respective citizens as soon as the legislatures of the said States shall severally be in condition to make provision for so doing and Congress hereby guaranteeing this obligation.”

The commissioners under the resolution, Colonel John Bayard, Dr. James Hutchinson, Mr. George Meade, Mr. William Bingham, and Mr. George Barge wrote letters to the executives of Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and the New England States, soliciting their help towards the filling up of this loan and engaging the interest to be paid on the money so lent. But from the general scarcity of hard cash in these several States, — as it was said, — no assistance was obtained from any other State than Massachusetts, whose executive, issuing an appeal to be published in all the churches, raised the sum of \$6296, including Governor Hancock's own subscription of \$400. There were also two special donations of \$100 each from this State. There being more money in the State of Pennsylvania, \$15,132 were by 86 persons subscribed on the loan

and \$3312 by 236 persons on donation chiefly obtained by the address of Messrs. Bayard and Hutchinson, to whom the necessitous Carolinians and Georgians were greatly indebted for their existence. But these subscriptions, amounting together to \$24,940, were by no means all paid. By the 13th of November following, Mr. Meade, the treasurer of the commission, had received and turned over to the committee of the exiles appointed to receive it, \$7568.72. But great or small, these contributions were of great service to the exiles, particularly so to those who could not get into any kind of business so as to earn their support, and without which some would have been near to starvation.¹

Most of the officers, Continental and militia, released by the exchange, who were landed at Jamestown immediately proceeded overland to rejoin their countrymen, — and when they could their former command, — to carry on the war, which had now taken a more favorable turn for the cause on account of which they had so long endured captivity.

The question as to the condition of those who had given paroles or taken Royal protection and afterwards resumed their arms on the American side became more and more important to the British authorities. As Sumter, Marion, and Harden appeared again and again within their lines, each time they carried off with them new recruits, those who seized the opportunity of avenging themselves for injuries received or faith broken while in the power of the enemy to whom they had surrendered upon terms. It could not have escaped the observation of Balfour that the two inroads which had been made nearest to the lines of the town were each led by an officer who had renewed his allegiance to the king since the capitulation of Charlestown, and had lately gone over to the American side and, taking his life in his hands, had accepted a commission in the

¹ Diary (MS.) of Josiah Smith, Jr.

field. Colonel Hayne had surprised the outpost within seven miles of the lines of the town, and Wade Hampton had dashed in even two miles nearer, and, like Hayne, had carried off his prisoners. Some great example must be made to strike terror into those who, yet remaining quiet under their parole, might be contemplating similar conduct. Wade Hampton had escaped with his spoils, but unfortunately Hayne had fallen into their hands. Postell's case had in some way been referred to General Greene by the respective commissaries of prisoners, and must for the present at least be held in abeyance. The question was, What should be done with Hayne? Balfour had now time to give his attention to the matter, and he was prompt in deciding it.

CHAPTER XVII

1781

COLONEL HAYNE had been captured on the 8th of July. But Balfour, the valiant officer whose services during the campaign in South Carolina were confined within the gates of the town, had been too busily engaged issuing edicts for the government of the citizens under his power, annoying the American prisoners in their exchange, banishing the families of the exiles, and harassing them in their departure, to give the time and attention to this case which its importance demanded. He held it back, as it were, as a choice morsel on which the cruel vindictiveness of his nature should have full leisure to expend itself. There was also a stronger motive for delay. Balfour had risen to his high position in the British army through the influence of Sir William Howe; but he had no such interest with Sir Henry Clinton, who succeeded Howe, nor with Lord Cornwallis, who commanded the Southern Department. On the other hand, Lord Rawdon was a favorite with both of these, while between his lordship and himself there existed no kindly relations, nor was the question as to their respective commands in the province free from doubt. There was a question, too, it will be remembered, as to rank between Lord Rawdon, who was a full colonel in a provincial regiment, and Balfour, who was a lieutenant colonel in the regular line. Colonel Balfour deemed it important, therefore, before he proceeded to the extremity he contemplated, to commit Lord Rawdon to his

purpose. His lordship, after withdrawing from Ninety Six, had halted, it will be recollected, at Orangeburgh, where he remained at the time. To him, therefore, Balfour wrote, telling of the rising under Hayne in the rear of his army, and how luckily it had been crushed. He represented the imperative necessity of repressing the disposition to similar acts of treachery, as he termed them, by making an example of the individual who, he said, had planned as well as headed this revolt, and who had fallen into his hands; and solicited Rawdon's concurrence that it might vouch to Sir Henry Clinton, with whom he was on ill terms, for the public policy of the measure.¹

For nearly three weeks Hayne lay in the provost — the basement of the Exchange — awaiting his fate, about which the two British officers were corresponding. The result he must have anticipated. Doubtless he fully realized, as did his other compatriots who acted similarly, when at last he accepted Governor Rutledge's commission, raised his regiment, and joined Harden, that he dared the gallows as well as the guns of the enemy, and that for him there would be a short shrift if taken. It was a curious coincidence that, while he lay there in the provost among the common felons, awaiting his doom, his friend, Dr. Ramsay, to whom he had been so careful to explain the circumstances under which he had been compelled to renew his allegiance to the king, and Richard Hutson, his brother-in-law, together with the other exiles, most of whom were his friends and associates, were at sea passing Charlestown bar on their voyage to Philadelphia, just released from their long detention at St. Augustine, but still exiles from home.

Lord Rawdon declares that he had no conception that

¹ Letter of Marquis of Hastings, Appendix to *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 616.

a question could possibly be raised as to the justice of Hayne's execution, and that he replied to Balfour that there was no doubt as to the necessity of making the example, to which he would readily give the sanction of his name. He very soon followed this reply and came himself to Charlestown. Garden, in his *Anecdotes*, charges on the authority of a British subject of great respectability, then in the town, that Lord Rawdon's retirement at this time, when his services were most required to contend against the increasing difficulties of the situation, leaving the conduct of the army to those who were altogether unequal to meet the exigencies of the time, was much criticised; and that the plea of ill health upon which it was based was seriously questioned.¹ But the gallant career of this nobleman throughout the last year's campaign renders the truth of such a charge extremely improbable, while the arduous services he had rendered, much of which had been in the swamps of the Congaree and Wateree, might well have affected his health. To add to

¹ Lord Rawdon, Lieutenant-Colonel Doyle, and his lady sailed for England on the 21st of August, 1781 (*The Royal Gazette*). "Lord Rawdon applied, but in vain, to Dr. Alexander Garden, a physician of high reputation, for a certificate, testifying to his inability to continue in the field. This statement is made on the authority of Mr. James Penman, a British subject of great respectability, who further assured the author of these *Memoirs*, that the anger of Dr. Garden was so highly excited by the scandalous dereliction of duty by Lord Rawdon that, on the manifestation of a design by many Tories to pay him the compliment of a farewell address, he boldly protested against it, declaring that if they would draw up a remonstrance reprobating his determination to quit the army at a moment that he knew that there was not, in the Southern service, a man qualified to command it, *his name* should be the first inserted." — *Garden's Anecdotes*, 254.

Dr. Alexander Garden, referred to by the author of the *Anecdotes*, was his father; the father and son espousing opposite sides, Dr. Garden refused any association with his son, the author, and left the province, going to England, where he spent the rest of his life.

which his subsequent career at home and abroad precludes the idea that he would without good reason have deserted the Royal cause at such a time. But however brilliant his military conduct in America, on the Continent, and in India, and notwithstanding the character for humanity which he afterwards established in Parliament, his command in South Carolina was signalized by the greatest severity. The difference between Balfour and himself was that he braved the dangers of the field, in which he exercised his vigorous discipline upon friend and foe alike, while Balfour indulged his cruelty in the security of the walls of the city. It must be added that in this matter, from whatever motive, or under whatever influence, his lordship's conduct was characterized by indecision and want of candor, both at the time and in his subsequent justification of his connection with it.

Lord Rawdon left the field immediately after the action at Quinby Bridge, and the withdrawal of the American forces to the Congaree. He states that on his arrival application was at once made to him by a number of ladies to save Colonel Hayne from his impending death, and that, ignorant of the complicated nature and extent of the crime, he incautiously promised to use his endeavors towards inducing Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour to lenity; that in pursuance of this promise a petition to be signed by the ladies was drawn up by one of the officers of the staff, he believed by Major Barry, the deputy adjutant general,¹ to serve as a basis for his address to the commandant. It thus appears that the petition of the ladies was prepared with his knowledge and concurrence by a staff officer. Is it not curious then that the paper so drawn should be addressed, "*To the right honorable Lord Rawdon, Commander-*

¹ Henry Barry, captain Fifty-second Regiment, serving as deputy adjutant general in South Carolina.

in-chief of his Majesty's forces in South Carolina, and to Colonel Balfour, commandant at Charlestown," if so be that he was not in fact the ranking and commanding officer over Balfour as he asserts.¹ The petition, which was generally signed by the ladies, appealed most earnestly to these officers for the life of the unfortunate gentleman. The paper was drawn up, as Lord Rawdon declares, as "a step gratifying to me . . . to serve as a basis for my address to the commandant." But his lordship had already committed himself to Colonel Hayne's execution by his letter from camp. Well, therefore, might Colonel Balfour be surprised at his lordship's conduct. "When I opened the matter to him," says Lord Rawdon, "he appeared much astonished, detailed to me the circumstances of the case with which I had been completely unacquainted, requesting me to inform myself more minutely upon them, and earnestly begged me to ponder as to the effect to which forbearance from visiting such an offence with due punishment (sure to be ascribed to timidity) must unavoidably produce on the minds of the inhabitants. It was a grievous error in me," he continues,

¹ Letter of Marquis of Hasting, formerly Lord Rawdon, to Colonel Henry Lee, Appendix to *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 615. The Marquis writes: "Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour was my senior in the army list, and my provisional rank of colonel held for the purpose of connection with the regiment raised by me did not alter that relation, as the colonels of the provincial establishments were subordinate to the youngest lieutenant colonel of the line. Sir Henry Clinton, in order to give me the management of affairs in South Carolina, subsequently promoted me as a brigadier general of provincials, but we had no intimation of this till the commission arrived after I had actually embarked for England. Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour would, therefore, at all events, have commanded me." This letter was written the 24th of June, 1813, thirty-odd years after the execution of Colonel Hayne, and in this time the marquis had certainly forgotten the facts. As we have before seen, he was recognized by Lord Cornwallis as commanding all the other officers in South Carolina, and so the adjutant general of the department understood.

“that I did not at once yield to the reasoning . . . and to the conviction which it could not but impress, instead of still attempting to realize the hope which I had suffered the ladies so loosely to entertain. I unluckily persevered in the effort to reconcile a pardon with some appearance of propriety.” There was an interview between Mrs. Peronneau, Colonel Hayne’s sister-in-law, the wife of Henry Peronneau, who was a Loyalist, and Lord Rawdon, in which he says he frankly told her what had passed between himself and Colonel Balfour, stating the embarrassment in which he found himself from the enormity of the transgression, but adding that, unless there should be an intervention from General Greene he would try if the difficulty could be removed. He states that, as a mode of gaining time, he solicited Colonel Balfour to have the particulars of the case ascertained by a court of inquiry for his (Rawdon’s) satisfaction, alleging the chance — though, he declares, he did not really believe the existence of any such — that circumstances might have been distorted by the animosity of Hayne’s neighbors.

This was the situation when, on Thursday morning, the 26th of July, Colonel Hayne received a note from Major Fraser, the town major, 26th, saying:—

“SIR: I am charged by the commandant to inform you that a council of general officers will assemble to-morrow at ten o’clock, in the hall of the Province, to try you.”

It will be observed that the first notice was of the sitting of a court *to try* Colonel Hayne. This is important in view of what follows. For in the evening of the same day, he received another notice as follows:—

“SIR: I am ordered by the commandant to acquaint you that instead of a council of general officers,¹ as is mentioned in my letter

¹ No doubt field officers were meant. This note is dated Thursday evening, 27th July, 1781, but it is evident that this was a mistake; it should have been 26th.

of this morning, a court of inquiry, composed of four general officers and four captains, will be assembled to-morrow at ten o'clock in the province hall, *for the purpose of determining under what point of view you ought to be considered.*

"You will immediately be allowed pen, ink, and paper, and any person that you choose to appoint will be permitted to accompany you as your counsel at the same hour and place."¹

Colonel Hayne was entirely misled by the change in the tenor of these notices. He assumed that the purpose was to interpose a court of inquiry, the military form of proceeding in the nature of the civil proceedings of a grand jury, to ascertain if there really existed any ground for putting him upon trial at all, instead of putting him at once upon trial, as was intended by the first notice. Alas! he was terribly mistaken. Lord Rawdon's letter suggests the explanation and significance of the change. "This tribunal, although a court of inquiry," he says, "*was the same form of investigation as had been used in the case of Major André.*"² And so it was. General Greene, now commanding in South Carolina, had been president of the board before which André had been taken, and that board had been ordered "to report a precise state of his case, *and to determine in what character he was to be considered,* and to what punishment he was liable."³

Had he known these circumstances and understood the change, Colonel Hayne would at once have read in it his death sentence. He would have understood that he was to receive the same measure as André had. Before that court he was accordingly taken on Saturday, the 28th.

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 511, 512; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 109.

² Letter of Lord Rawdon, then Earl of Moira, to Colonel Lee, Appendix to *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 617.

³ Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 263.

Of the proceedings before it he has left the account in his letter of protest to Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour.

“. . . Having never entertained any other idea of a Court of Enquiry, nor heard of any other being formed of it, than of its serving merely to precede a council of war or some other tribunal for examining the circumstances more fully, excepting in the case of a spy, and Mr. Jarvis, lieutenant marshal to the Provost, not having succeeded in finding the person whom I named for my council, I did not take the pains to summon any witnesses, though it would have been in my power to have produced many; and I presented myself before the council without any assistance whatever. When I was before that assembly I was farther convinced that I had not been deceived in my conjectures; and I found that the members of it were not sworn nor the witnesses examined on oath, and all the members as well as every person present might easily have perceived by the questions which I asked and by the whole tenor of my conduct that I had not the least notion that I was tried or examined upon an affair in which my life or death depended.”

An American staff officer, it is said, then a prisoner on parole, present at the court, stated that the proceedings before the board were the most summary imaginable, and the proofs confined exclusively to the fact that Colonel Hayne had taken protection, and afterwards resumed his arms. An address made by Colonel Hayne to his troops, breathing, as this officer declares, the noblest sentiments of patriotism and humanity, and the testimony of the officer who took him, were almost the only evidence offered in the case.¹ The address referred to, made by him to his officers, was that made, it is said, when at the solicitation of his neighbors and the inhabitants generally of the district, to resume a hostile position and become their leader, he at last consented to do so. It contained this honorable and open declaration, “That he could only be induced to

¹ Article entitled “Execution of Colonel Isaac Hayne,” *Southern Review*, Charleston, 1828, vol. I, 92. The name of the staff officer quoted is not mentioned.

comply with their wishes by obtaining a solemn promise from all who were to serve under him that an immediate stop should be put to every unnecessary severity; a desideratum the more to be insisted upon as he was resolved that exemplary punishment should be inflicted on every individual who should indulge in pillage or commit any act of inhumanity against his foe." When this paper was presented to Major McKenzie,¹ who sat as president of the tribunal, it is said that, with great expression of sensibility, he requested the prisoner "to retain it till he was brought before the court-martial that was to determine his fate," assuring him "that the present court were only directed to inquire whether or not he acknowledged himself to be the individual who had taken protection."²

It appears, therefore, that the court and the prisoner alike supposed that this tribunal was in fact as well as in name a mere court of inquiry, making a preliminary examination upon what further proceedings were to be had. But in this they were both mistaken—if not intentionally misled. Lord Rawdon declares that it was held at his suggestion, and that his purpose was to gain time. But his conduct on the occasion will scarcely bear out this (his) recollection thirty years after. The court sat on Friday the 27th, when it had Colonel Hayne before it, and apparently again on Saturday, probably to consult. What it actually did determine is not known, for Lord Rawdon took the record of its proceedings with him when he sailed shortly after for Europe, and, being captured at sea, he threw it overboard. If the story be true that the president of the court of inquiry returned to Colonel Hayne

¹ Probably Andrew McKenzie, mentioned in list No. 3 of the Confiscation Acts (*Statutes of So. Ca.*, vol. VI, 631), i. e. as one who had accepted a commission in the Royal Militia (*Ibid.*, vol. IV, 519).

² Garden's *Anecdotes of the Revolution*, 252. The author regrets exceedingly that no copy of this address can now be found.

his address to his regiment, that he might present it before the court which would try him—and Colonel Hayne's possession of the paper after appearing before the court of inquiry is strong corroboration that it was so—it is scarcely probable that the finding of the court was sufficient of itself to warrant the execution which followed. And indeed this was admitted by Rawdon and Balfour as will directly appear. So far from availing himself of the opportunity for delay which might easily have been obtained by allowing the investigation which Lord Rawdon declares his purpose was to have made, on Sunday, the day after the court had apparently adjourned, he promptly joined Balfour in the following judgment:—

“TO MR. HAYNE IN THE PROVOST PRISON

“*Memorandum*

“Sunday 29 July 1781

“The Adjutant of the town will be so good as to go to Colonel Hayne in Provost Prison and inform him that in consequence of the court of enquiry held yesterday and the preceding evening Lord Rawdon and the commandant Lieutenant Colonel Nisbet Balfour have resolved upon his execution on Tuesday the thirty-first instant at six o'clock, for having been found under arms raising a regiment to oppose the British government, though he had become a subject and had accepted the protection of that government after the reduction of Charlestown.”

Availing himself of the permission to be represented by counsel, as he supposed before a court yet to sit, Colonel Hayne had engaged the services of Mr. John Colcock a lawyer then practising in the town. Upon learning of this order Mr. Colcock immediately prepared a written opinion denying the authority of these officers thus to pass upon the life or death of the accused. He advised (1) that in the notice given of an examination before a court of inquiry there was not, even according to the rules of martial law, a sufficient certainty nor any express accusation which might be the object of the court's inquiry or

of the accused's defence; (2) that no enemy can be sentenced to death in consequence of any military article, or any other martial process, without a previous trial, except spies, who by the articles of war were expressly debarred from that right; (3) that no subject could or ought to be deprived of his life, liberty, or fortune unless by the award of his peers; that there was no law which could authorize a judgment like that which these officers had taken upon themselves to pronounce; that every man was deemed innocent until his guilt was proved; that being taken in arms did not argue criminality so far as to hinder the culprit from making his defence, either by proving a commission or upon any other ground; that many of those who had taken up arms had been acquitted on such proofs. (4) "In consideration of the principles above adduced," Mr. Colcock concluded, "I am positively of opinion that taking you in the light of an enemy (not of a spy), the process carried on against you is not lawful; but if you are to be considered as a subject, such proceedings militate against and are diametrically contrary to all laws."

This opinion Colonel Hayne sent to Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour, with an earnest but dignified remonstrance against this summary proceeding. As already quoted, he declared that he had entertained no idea that he was before a court for trial when taken before the court of inquiry. He admitted that in case of spies a court of inquiry is all that can be necessary, because the simple fact whether the person is or is not a spy is all that is to be ascertained; but that no such accusation as that had been made against him.

"Judge then, my Lord and Sir," he urged, "of the astonishment I must have been in when I found that they had drawn me by surprise into a procedure tending to judgment without knowing it to be such, and deprived me of the ability of making a legal defence, which it

would have been very easy for me to have done, founded both in law and in fact; when I saw myself destitute of the assistance of counsel or of witnesses; and when they abruptly informed me that after the procedure of the court I had been condemned to die, and that in a few days. Immediately upon receiving this notice I sent for the lawyer whom I had originally chosen for my counsel. I here inclose his opinion concerning the legality of the process against me; and I beg that I may be permitted to prefer myself to him. I can assure you with the utmost truth that I both have and had many reasons to urge in my defence if you will grant me the favor of a regular trial; if not (which I cannot however suppose from your justice and equity) I earnestly entreat that my execution may be deferred that I may at least take farewell of my children and prepare myself for the dreadful change. I hope that you will return me a speedy answer," etc.

The last request of Colonel Hayne was complied with at one o'clock on Monday, the 30th. Major Fraser brought him the fatal answer. It was this:—

"I have to inform you that your execution is not ordered in consequence of any sentence from a court of enquiry, but by virtue of the authority with which the Commander-in-chief in South Carolina and the commanding officer in Charlestown are invested. And their resolves on the subject are unchangeable."

Here it will be observed that Lord Rawdon allows himself to be styled officially Commander-in-chief in South Carolina, repudiates the court which he suggested, and promptly joins Colonel Balfour, the commanding officer in Charlestown, in assuming the responsibility of the execution, upon which he declared they were inexorably determined. The terseness, vigor, and temper of this paper is scarcely compatible with the tenderness he appears at first to have exhibited to Mrs. Peronneau, and for which he subsequently claimed the credit.

Colonel Hayne, upon receiving this curt reply, appealed again to Major Fraser that he would seriously entreat these officers to grant a respite that he might have time to send for his children, and take of them the last farewell. This ap-

peal was promptly and sternly refused. At three o'clock the town adjutant, Mr. Cooper, brought him for answer that his request was rejected; and on Tuesday, the 31st, at one o'clock in the morning, the deputy provost marshal brought him word, says Hayne, "that it was time for me to prepare for death, as he had just received orders to that effect, and that I was to leave my apartment at five o'clock."

In less than half an hour, however, Major Fraser came in and delivered the following message:—

"Colonel Hayne, I am to acquaint you that in consequence of a petition signed by Governor Bull and many more, as also your prayer of yesterday and the humane treatment shown by you to the British prisoners who fell into your hands, you are respited for forty-eight hours."

Colonel Hayne thanked the officer for the respite, as affording him the opportunity of seeing his children once more, which he so much desired. The major had gone but a few moments when he returned to say that he had forgot part of his message; this was, says Hayne, that if General Greene "should offer to expostulate in my favor with the commanding officer, from that instant the respite would cease, and I should be ordered for immediate execution."¹

During the solemn period of his reprieve which ensued, the unfortunate gentleman bore himself with dignity and composure, and on his last evening declared that "he felt no more alarmed at death than at any other occurrence which is necessary and unavoidable." In the meanwhile the most earnest efforts had been made to move the two officers upon whom depended his life or death. Mrs. Peronneau, his sister-in-law, accompanied by his children, waited on Lord Rawdon in the great parlor of the Brewton

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 511, 517; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 111-112.

mansion, and on their bended knees implored him to spare their father and brother.¹ Lieutenant-Governor Bull, who had recently returned from England, and a great number of inhabitants, both Loyalists and Americans, interceded for his life.² There was one exception to this generous effort, and that was in the case of Sir Egerton Leigh, who, having been absent since the commencement of the war, and who for his conduct in the preceding troubles had received his knighthood in 1772, had now returned on the fleet which brought the timely reënforcement to the British cause in June.³ Lord Rawdon gives this statement of the origin and failure of the appeal. He states that, in compliance with his wishes, two gentlemen of known and just influence undertook to try whether a petition for pardon might not be procured from a respectable number of Loyalists. That they first applied to Lieutenant-Governor Bull, who consented to sign the petition provided *the attorney-general*, Sir Egerton Leigh, would do so. The answer of Sir Egerton Leigh was *that he would burn his hand off rather than do an act so injurious to the king's service*. That Lieutenant-Governor Bull's conditional promise of course fell to the ground, though he subsequently, from some dupery practised upon his age, joined his name with those of certain of the most active and avowed partisans of the American cause.⁴ A very different account of the affair was given upon the appearance of this statement by his lordship. It is that Governor Bull, who was in a very feeble condition, suffering from a chronic malady which had afflicted him for many years, caused himself to

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 455.

² Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. 282.

³ For the career and character of Sir Egerton Leigh, see *Hist. of So. Ca. under Roy. Gov.* (McCrary), 471, *et seq.*

⁴ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), Appendix, 617.

be carried in a litter to the quarters of Lord Rawdon, personally to intercede for the pardon of Colonel Hayne, but that on his return home the dejection of his countenance too plainly spoke the ill success of his influence, and that he exclaimed, "The die is cast, the unfortunate prisoner must suffer, *Lord Rawdon is inexorable.*"¹ Both of these particular and circumstantial statements were made many years after the event. Neither, therefore, is entitled to greater weight than the circumstances better established warrant. Judged in this way, Lord Rawdon's account cannot be accepted. A matter of small consequence, except that it furnishes somewhat of a test of the accuracy of his lordship's memory in connection with these events, is the fact that he speaks of Sir Egerton Leigh as attorney-general, as if he then held that office; when in fact he did not. James Simpson, the lieutenant of police under the military government, was at that time the attorney-general of the province. But besides the weight of authority against this story, — besides the fact that, though feeble in health, Governor Bull, who, as it has been remarked, had himself but recently returned from Europe, to which it may be added he soon again went, and lived there for ten years, was by no means so old a man as to have lost the full possession of mind and judgment, being at this time not more than seventy years of age, — the intrinsic evidence is clearly against it. Lord Rawdon's statement of his conduct is itself inconsistent with it and is contradicted by the record. He denies that he had authority over Colonel Balfour, and claims that he suggested the court of inquiry to gain time. But the record shows that immediately upon the adjournment of the court, Colonel Hayne is informed by the town major of the sentence of execution "*by virtue of the authority with which the Commander-in-*

¹ Execution of Colonel Hayne, *Southern Review*, vol. I, 103, 1828.

chief and the commanding officer in Charleston are invested." He represents that he was instigating the petition for mercy while his adjutant informs the prisoner that the resolutions of the *two* officers "on this subject are *fixed and unchangeable.*" He represents that Governor Bull from old age was duped into signing a petition which all other Loyalists refused to do; and yet his adjutant is instructed to inform the prisoner "*that in consequence of a petition signed by Governor Bull, and many more,*" he is granted a respite. His lordship is thus contradicted in every particular; his denials and explanation fix all the more positively the responsibility for the execution.

At three o'clock in the morning of August 1, Mr. Cooper, the town adjutant, came in and read the following written message, "Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour have consented to grant to Mr. Hayne a respite for forty-eight hours." His answer was that he thanked them. Colonel Hayne made one more request, and that was that his death might be that of a soldier; but this was not granted, though it appears that he was not informed that it would not be. During his respite he was now allowed to see his children and his friends; and his few remaining hours were spent in their society and in the preparation of the statement and correspondence from which these facts are taken.

On the morning of the fatal day, the 4th of August, on receiving his summons to proceed to the place of execution, he delivered the statement and paper he had prepared to his oldest son, a youth of about thirteen years of age. "Present," said he, "these papers to Mrs. Edwards with my request that she should forward them to her brother in Congress. You will next repair to the place of execution, receive my body, and see it decently interred among my forefathers." The father and son then took a final leave. The colonel's arms were pinioned, and a guard placed

round his person. The procession moved from the Exchange—now the old Post-office, at the foot of Broad Street—in the forenoon of the 4th of August. The streets were crowded with thousands of spectators. Colonel Hayne walked to the place of execution with such firmness, composure, and dignity as to awaken the compassion and to command the respect of all. When the barrier of the town—the town gates¹—was passed, the gibbet appeared in sight. To this moment he had hoped that his last request as to the mode of his execution would have been granted, and when he saw the instrument of ignominious death, for a moment he paused, but immediately recovering his wonted firmness, moved forward. As he did so a friend whispered his confidence “that he would exhibit an example of the manner in which an American can die.” To this he answered with modesty and tranquillity, “I will endeavor to do so.” Neither arrogating superior firmness nor betraying weakness, he ascended the cart, unsupported and unappalled. Upon some movement of the executioner, Colonel Hayne inquired what he wanted, and upon being informed that he wished to pull the cap over his eyes, the colonel replied, “I will save you that trouble,” and adjusted it himself. Then, asked whether he wished to say anything, he answered, “I will only take leave of my friends and be ready.” He then affectionately shook hands with three gentlemen, recommending his children to their care, and gave the signal for the cart to move.²

¹ Mr. Charles Fraser, in his *Reminiscences*, p. 22, writing in 1854, says, “I remember also two large brick pillars which stood in King Street between George and Liberty, the history of which I do not know, but remember they were town gates.” Tradition holds that the place of execution was somewhere near where Pitt Street now reaches Vander Horst Street in Charleston.

² Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 282-284; *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 452-456.

“After the execution his young son was permitted to carry his father's

The execution of Colonel Hayne aroused the utmost indignation throughout the American camp. The information of it was received by General Greene in a letter from Colonel Harden on the 10th of August, nearly a week after it had taken place. There had been charges and counter charges of ill treatment of prisoners passing between Marion and Balfour for some time.¹ Marion, for injuries which he had received, had already vowed retaliation; and Colonel Hayne, being an officer of Harden's command and therefore under Marion, Greene was anxious lest he should proceed at once to extremities in avenging his death.² Fortunately the messenger that brought the letter of Harden could not find Marion, and so took it at once to Greene, who was at the High Hills of Santee. The general immediately wrote to Marion to withhold action on his part, and informing him of the course he proposed to pursue. "You will see by Colonel Harden's letter," he wrote, "that the enemy have hanged Colonel Hayne; don't take any measure in the matter towards retaliation, *for I don't intend to retaliate on the Tory officers, but the British.*" He informed Marion of his intention to demand the reasons of the colonel's being put to death, and if they were unsatisfactory, as he was sure they would be, and if they refused to make satisfaction, to publish his intention of giving no quarter to British officers of any rank that might fall into his hands.³ He wrote accordingly to Colonel Balfour, who replied that "the execution of Colonel Hayne took place by the joint order of Lord Rawdon and himself; but in

body and inter it at his plantation at Ponper (Pon Pon), which was done on Sunday evening last 9th." *New Jersey Gazette*, September 26 and October 10. Moore's *Diary*, vol. II, 468.

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 172.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 189.

³ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 125; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 519.

consequence of the most explicit directions of Lord Cornwallis 'to put to death all those who should be found in arms after being at their own request received as subjects since the capitulation of Charlestown, and the clear conquest of the Province in the summer of 1780, more especially such as have accepted of commissions or might distinguish themselves in inducing a revolt of this country.' To his lordship therefore as being answerable for the measure the appeal will more properly be made."¹ General Greene wrote to Lord Cornwallis, but it does not appear that his lordship ever answered the letter addressed to him upon the subject.² The sentiment of the army was impatient for immediate retaliation. Without a knowledge of the resolution of General Greene or of his correspondence, and surprised at his supposed hesitation, the officers of his army, on the 20th of August, addressed him a memorial, which was in the handwriting of Colonel Williams, urging retaliation, professing their consciousness of the danger to which it exposed them, and their readiness to encounter it. At the head of their list of self-devoted soldiers was the name of Isaac Huger; while William Washington's signing for himself and his officers closed it. The only known name of the army not upon it was that of Colonel Lee, and in justice to his reputation, says Johnson, it is proper to remark that he had for some days previous been detached to the banks of the Congaree.³

On the 26th General Greene issued the following proclamation: ⁴—

"Whereas Colonel Isaac Hayne commanding a Regiment of Militia in the service of the United States was taken prisoner by a party of

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 520; *Memoirs of War of 1776* (Lee), 457; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 133.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 193.

³ *Ibid.*, 192-193.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 190, 191.

British troops, and after a rigorous detention in the poorest prison at Charlestown was condemned and executed on the 4th of this month in the most cruel and unjustifiable manner, in open violation of the cartel agreed upon between the two armies for the release and exchange of all prisoners of war; and it being no less the duty than the inclination of the army to resent every violence offered to the good citizens of America, to discountenance all those distinctions they have endeavored to establish in making a difference between the various orders of men found under arms for the support of the independence of the United States; and further considering that these violences are committed with a view of terrifying the good people, and by that means preventing them from acting in conformity with their political interest and private inclinations; and that this method of trying and punishing in consequence of those distinctions is no less opposite to the spirit of the British, than it is inclusive of an unwarrantable infringement of all the laws of humanity, and the rights of the free citizens of the United States.

“From these considerations I have thought proper to issue the present proclamation expressly to declare that it is my intention *to make reprisals for all such inhuman insults as often as they take place.* And whereas the enemy seem willing to expose the small number of the deceived and seduced inhabitants who are attached to their interest if they can but find an opportunity of sacrificing the great number who have stood forth in the defence of our cause, I further declare *that it is my intention to take the officers of the regular forces and not the inhabitants who have joined their army for the objects of my reprisal.* But while I am determined to resent every insult that may be offered to the United States for having maintained our independence, I cannot but lament the necessity I am under of having recourse to measures so extremely wounding to the sentiments of humanity, and so contrary to the principles on which I wish to conduct the war. Given,” etc.

All of which was more forcibly and tersely expressed in his letter to Marion, when he wrote, “*I don't intend to retaliate on the Tory officers; but on the British.*” But General Greene did not retaliate at all. For when the first burst of horror and indignation had subsided and reason asserted itself, the difficulties and complications of the case were realized.

The tragic circumstances of Colonel Hayne's case from its inception to his death, the cruel conditions under which he had given his allegiance to the King, his honorable conduct in adhering to his word under the strongest inducements to have renounced its obligation, his decision at last that he was released from its obligation, and the gallant and brilliant action with which he at once accompanied that decision, the romantic incidents of his capture, his quiet, gentle, and dignified bearing throughout his imprisonment and trial and while waiting only the pleasure of his judges as to his doom, his firm and heroic conduct in meeting the ignominious death to which he was devoted, all tended to excite the deepest interest and to call for the most heartfelt sympathy for the noble gentleman who thus died for his country. Colonel Hayne was indeed a martyr to its cause. But his martyrdom was not in the incidental circumstances of his death, however much these appeal to the nobler sentiments of humanity. It was rather that, though fully understanding the consequences of his action, he determined that, the British having themselves broken the term of his compact of allegiance, as he conceived, he would repudiate its bond and take the field, knowing that in doing so he could neither ask for nor expect any quarter if taken. In doing this, like Pickens, Hampton, Postell, and others, he ventured his life not only against the military but the civil power of the enemy; and dared for his country's cause to die even upon the gibbet.

The striking tragedy of Colonel Hayne's execution not only aroused the sympathies of all engaged in the cause of liberty in this country, but excited almost as much indignation in England. The subject was taken up in the House of Lords in the January following, and made there a party question. In the debate which then took place the Earl of Huntingdon, Lord Rawdon's uncle, in

answer to the demand for the production of the proceedings of the court before which Colonel Hayne had been given such trial as he had, explained that the papers had been thrown overboard previous to the packet being captured that was bringing them to England. His lordship also made this statement as to the singular condition of the military command in South Carolina. He stated that Colonel Balfour was commandant of the town of Charlestown at the time in question, that Lord Rawdon had only a partial command, and that Colonel Gould, who commanded the three regiments just arrived, was the senior of both. He gave the House this information, he said, not as an argument either in favor of Lord Rawdon or against him, but merely to put the House in possession of the facts.

The Earl of Abingdon bitterly denounced the execution. "It is," said he, "the case of a cruel and barbarous murder of an individual. But what," he continued, "is this cruel and barbarous murder of an individual compared with the cruel and barbarous murders which the whole of the American war has occasioned? What is this case when compared with that of a noble peer of this House solemnly protesting on the records of the House against the principles of this war, and yet going forth himself, and in his own person, to counteract these principles and to perpetrate such acts as these?"¹

The Duke of Manchester, commenting upon the fact that the idea of the court of inquiry was an afterthought, suggested subsequently to the intention of bringing

¹ Referring to Earl Cornwallis, who, in the House of Lords, opposed the ministerial action against Wilkes and in the case of the American colonies. (*Encyclopædia Britannica*.) It is remarkable that both Lords Cornwallis and Rawdon were at first in support of resistance on the part of the Americans. The language of Lord Rawdon was altogether favorable to the cause of liberty. (Garden's *Anecdotes*, 253.)

Hayne to trial in the usual form of a court-martial; and upon the further fact that after all he was not executed in consequence of the decision of the court of inquiry, but in pursuance of a power in which the officers were vested, declared there must have been something very singular in the case of Hayne, or something precipitate on the part of Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour. This was a point he wished to have explained. In answer to this Lord Stormont, stating however his opinion with deference as he was no soldier, declared "he had always reckoned it a maxim established upon the most unquestioned authority that an officer having broken his parole who should afterwards fall in the hands of the enemy was deprived by his breach of faith of the advantage of a formal trial, and subjected to be executed *instanter*."

The Earl of Shelburne (afterwards Marquis of Lansdowne) denied the doctrine. "The noble Lord in the green ribbon," he said, "had advanced a doctrine which to him seemed totally new. He had stated to their lordships that an officer who had broken his parole was liable to be put to death *instanter* without the form of a trial. This idea he considered as erroneous, and one which ought to be reprobated. He would not, however, dwell upon the subject; a fact which had fallen from his lordship perhaps deserved a more serious consideration. It appeared very plainly from what he had said that in America the power of taking away the lives of the people was delegated by his Majesty to the Commander-in-chief, and by him delegated to the next officer in authority, and by him to his inferiors. Sir H. Clinton was the officer vested with the supreme authority in America. He intrusted the power reposed in him to Cornwallis, and he in his turn had transferred it to Lord Rawdon and Colonel Balfour. His lordship begged to know by what authority so important a

jurisdiction over the lives of mankind was thus wantonly delegated from one person to another?"

The Lord Chancellor, Lord Thurlow, is said to have had a great contempt for his audiences in the House of Peers, and to have reckoned often with daring confidence upon their ignorance. An instance of this is given in the *Memoirs of Bishop Watson*, in which, with his usual unscrupulous insolence, Thurlow bore down the bishop, insisting that a quotation by the latter from Grotius was erroneous, when it turned out, in fact, that the bishop was perfectly correct and he was wrong.¹ But that was not the first time his lordship had misquoted the same author. It was in this debate that he did so; but here his false quotation was not allowed to pass without exposure. In answer to the Earl of Shelburne he said, "He would now offer a word or two as to the justice of his (Hayne's) execution. He was no soldier, but he fancied he was not totally unequal to the task of comprehending an author whose opinions were universally assented to by all civilized nations; and, of course, whose writings were deemed the true standard by which persons in military situations were to conduct themselves; he meant that learned man, Grotius, who had written on the law of nations, necessarily including the law of war and open hostility which are particularly laid down in that celebrated work." Here his lordship quoted several passages from that author, and from Cocceius and Vattel, the two last of whom wrote much later than Grotius, in which he said it was clearly laid down that all prisoners, as among common enemies, when taken in battle are at the mercy of their captors, but that a more civilized and refined way of thinking had prevailed by the accepting

¹ *Lives of the Lord Chancellors* (Campbell) vol. VII, 162; *Anecdotes of the Life of Richard Watson*, vol. II, 359.

surrender at discretion, or upon capitulation which entitled the prisoner to his life and to future release upon conditions; *but then it was allowed universally, and asserted without reserve, that a prisoner breaking his parole forfeited all title to mercy, and it was only necessary to prove his personal identity to subject him to death instanter.*

The absurdity of quoting Grotius, who wrote in 1623, more than a century and a half before, on this novel and anomalous subject, was at once exposed by the Earl of Effingham. This nobleman, after observing that the sum of the Lord Chancellor's information had been that America was under martial law; that the same martial law vested prodigious authority in the commanding officers, and that the usual administration of the martial law had been of the most easy and liberal kind, having had no other rule than the appointing a court of inquiry, consisting of three officers of the provincial Loyalists who looked over the prisoners at any time brought before it by the King's forces, and whoever was by this new contrived court declared to have broken parole, was immediately ordered for execution; thus proceeded:—

“If this improvement upon the *jus gentium* had rested solely on the authority of the noble Lord, I should have left it to refute itself as I think it would have done by its manifest repugnancy to the common rights of mankind, and the consideration of the noble Lord being under no particular professional obligation to render himself master of the subject. But in the present case two of his Majesty's ministers have stepped forth and laid down some doctrines so contrary to what I take for truth, that I feel myself under an obligation to make some observations upon them. The noble Lord in the green ribbon has asserted that it is a known rule that a prisoner of war having broken his parole has thereby forfeited his life, and is to be executed like a spy without any other form than what may suffice to identify his person. This I will venture to deny ever to have been laid down in any book of authority or ever practised in civilized countries. The learned Lord indeed in confirming this doctrine has quoted Grotius. I wish

his lordship had been more explicit, for it is with great diffidence I can oppose my knowledge of Grotius to his lordship, and yet I am clear that Grotius never wrote one word about prisoners upon parole; he never heard of such a thing. It is a very modern civility introduced into some countries. And it more resembles what we call bail, than anything else; and whoever runs away from it may be closely confined, but not put to death by any rule I ever heard," etc.¹

The motion for the production of the papers was defeated by a vote of nearly three to one. But the debate serves to show the views taken of the case in England. Lord Rawdon was surprised and mortified to find, on his return to Europe, how generally condemned as unpolitic and unjust was the execution of Colonel Hayne. It is evident that he smarted under reflections which his connection with the case had elicited. Nor is it creditable to him that, in order to avoid his share of the responsibility, he, both in private and public, endeavored to put the blame upon Balfour. When captured at sea by the French fleet and sent to France, he met at Paris a Carolina family with whom he had been previously intimate in Italy, and hearing in every society the severity towards Colonel Hayne reprobated, he insinuated, "that contrary to his opinion it had been urged and insisted upon by the commandant of Charlestown."² His uncle, the Earl of Huntingdon, it will be observed, while declaring that he gave the information not as an argument either in favor of Lord Rawdon nor against him, but merely to put the House of Lords in possession of the facts, states that he was at the time ranked in command, not only by Colonel Balfour, but by Colonel Gould as well, clearly intimating thereby that his nephew was not responsible in the matter. How this suggestion aids Lord Rawdon's reputation will be judged by

¹ *Parliamentary History*, 1781 to 1782, vol. XXII, 963-984; *Annual Register*, 1782, vol. XXV.

² *Garden's Anecdotes*, 254.

those perusing the foregoing pages. An officer receiving a paper drawn by one of his staff at his own suggestion, addressed to him as "Commander-in-chief," can scarcely be heard to deny or qualify his action upon it as such.

So sensitive was his lordship upon the subject, that he made a personal affair of the Duke of Richmond's speech in the House of Lords, in introducing an inquiry in regard to it, and succeeded in obtaining from that nobleman an apology on the floor of the House of Lords, in words dictated by himself.¹ And yet afterward in a letter from

¹ *Parliamentary History, supra* Garden's *Anecdotes*, 253: "About this time his lordship's conduct in the affair already alluded to the execution of Colonel Hayne, was mentioned in such a manner as to give great umbrage — sufficient indeed to induce Lord Rawdon to call upon his Grace for an explanation. After several messages through the interference of friends the Duke of Richmond agreed to read such a recantation in the House of Lords as Lord Rawdon should think proper to dictate.

"It has been a matter of doubt among persons of cool and deliberate reflection, whether the peremptory step which his lordship took on this occasion was more advantageous to his character than a thorough investigation of the business might have proved in Parliament." — *British Military Library*, London (1799), vol. I, 86. The Duke of Richmond's conduct upon this occasion, it was said, laid him under very general suspicion of want of courage in not standing to his charge. (*Wraxall's Memoirs*, vol. II, 499, 500.) "The Duke of Richmond," says Garden, "called the attention of the House of Lords to the inhuman execution of Colonel Hayne, the particulars of which had been forwarded to him by Mr. John Bowman. Lord Rawdon, arriving in Europe, denied the justice of the charge, threatening to call on the Duke for personal satisfaction unless an immediate apology should remove the stain from his injured honor. The Duke knew full well the justice of the charge. He was personally acquainted with Mr. Bowman, had often sought information from him relative to American affairs, and had never had any cause to question his veracity; but his courage at the moment must have been at a low ebb. He hesitated, indeed, on the inconsistency of his conduct, but ultimately averred 'that he had received his information from *one Bowman* whom he knew nothing about. He was, he confessed, rash in his charge, and solicited pardon for having made it.'" — Garden's *Anecdotes*, 253. Mr. John Bowman was a highly educated and accomplished gentleman who had recently settled

which frequent quotations have hitherto been made, he again endeavors to shield himself from the responsibility, upon the plea of his inferiority in rank to Colonel Balfour.

But after all, notwithstanding the intense feeling which this unfortunate affair excited at home, and the indignation with which it was regarded by all the friends of America in Europe, notwithstanding the bitter denunciations with which it has been treated by the historians of America, if a state of war warrants the infliction of death whenever necessary to secure its ultimate object, it can scarcely be questioned that it was a military necessity in this instance. It was not only the case of Colonel Hayne, however pitiful that may appear. It was the vital question, to the British rule, as to the condition of those in the country of which the Whigs were now rapidly regaining the possession, who had given their paroles or taken protection. Were these persons released from the binding efficacy of the pledges given by them because the Americans had recovered possession, though temporary it might be, of the territory in which they lived? If so, every raiding force was a recruiting party to the rebels. It was the practical reversal of Sir Henry Clinton's policy of conquering America by the Americans. It was conquering the British by the means of these reclaimed subjects. An example was necessary. Postell had been in close confinement since his capture in January; but his confinement had not arrested the conduct of others when opportunity presented of resuming their arms.

It must be observed also that Colonel Hayne's execution was not in violation of the cartel agreed upon for the exchange of prisoners, as asserted in General Greene's

in South Carolina. He married a daughter of Thomas Lynch, member of the Continental Congress, and sister of Thomas Lynch, Jr., the signer of the Declaration of Independence.

proclamation. The cartel agreed to in May was most general in its terms, and, without specific provision to that effect, must have been construed as relating only to such prisoners as had already been captured on both sides. And so it was construed and acted upon in that negotiated by the commissaries on the 22d of June, which was expressly limited to those taken from the commencement of the war to the 15th of June.¹ Colonel Hayne was not captured until the 8th of July, three weeks after, and did not therefore come within its terms. Moreover, the British had expressly refused to recognize prisoners of this description as coming within the terms of the cartel. Postell's case, it is true, had been referred for some purpose, not disclosed, to General Greene, but he was still held as a close prisoner. Balfour, in a letter to General Greene, dated August 18, points this out in regard to Postell's case, and justly expresses his surprise that a claim could be made for the exchange of Mr. Cooper, who had been taken on the 17th of July.²

Strange to say, in all the bitter controversy in regard to the execution of Colonel Hayne, the British authorities failed to point out that the Americans themselves established the precedent, justifying the execution of those taken under similar circumstances. Not to dwell upon the general massacre of the prisoners after the battle of King's Mountain, one instance would at least have justified their conduct in Colonel Hayne's case. One Green, taken there, was tried before a drum-head court-martial, — if the court could be dignified even by that name, — upon the charge that he had violated the oath he had taken as an officer to support the government of North Carolina and of the United States by accepting a British commission and fighting on that side at King's Mountain. Some

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 123.

² *Ibid.*, 128.

of the British officers remonstrated at the course taken, when Colonel Cleveland, then in command, cut them short, saying, "Gentlemen, you are British officers and shall be treated accordingly — therefore, give your paroles and march off immediately; *the other person is a subject of the State.*" The prisoner was accordingly condemned to be executed the next morning.¹ Fortunately, he escaped during the night, which probably accounts for the overlooking of the case; but it none the less closes the mouths of Americans who would represent the conduct of the British officers in Hayne's case as without precedent in its barbarity.

The question as to the legality of the proceedings under which Colonel Hayne was executed was a proper one for discussion in the British Parliament, for it was one involving the due administration of the law of the kingdom, whether at home or in a foreign country covered for the time by its flag. It was, so to speak, a domestic question. But it was not one in which Americans claiming to be citizens of another government could join in discussing. The only question which they had to consider was as to the right of the British authorities, be they who they might, to inflict death upon one claiming to be an American citizen. It was in the execution itself, not in the manner in which they proceeded to the execution, that the country at large was interested. It was not consistent to repudiate allegiance to the British government and then complain that the prisoner was not tried according to British laws. Meddling with the discussion upon this point deprives Colonel Hayne of the honor of martyrdom, to which he was justly entitled. For if his execution was a mere accident of his falling into the hands of cruel

¹ Gordon's *Am. Revolution*, vol. III, 466-467; *King's Mountain and its Heroes*, 853.

men, who, disregarding their own laws, put him to an unexpected death, however much we may pity the individual, it is, in the end, only our pity which is called for. But if Colonel Hayne, fully aware of his doom, if in the chances of battle he should be taken, nevertheless regarding himself honorably released from the allegiance he had subscribed, determined to face even an ignominious death for the cause of his country, then was he a martyr indeed, and is entitled, not only to our pity, but to our admiration for his heroism. Such, indeed, we submit the case of Colonel Hayne to have been.

CHAPTER XVIII

1781

GENERAL GREENE had recrossed the Congaree on the night of the 13th of July and taken post on the High Hills of Santee, where with his continentals he went into a camp of rest or of "Repose," as it was called, while Sumter with Marion and Lee made their incursion into the Low-Country.¹ Greene himself, however, had not been idle during the repose of his troops. He had been busy appealing to Washington, appealing to Congress, appealing to North Carolina, for assistance and reënforcements. Such of the Pennsylvania line as had reassembled after its mutiny in New Jersey on the night of the 1st of January, and had been recruited, amounting to about one thousand men, had been ordered by Washington about the middle of February

¹ The last reference to General Greene's connection with the firm of Barnabas Deane & Co. is found in a letter to Colonel Wadsworth written from the "High Hills of Santee" on July 18, 1781, in which he asks: "How goes on our commerce? Please to give me an account by the Table [*i.e.* in cipher] as letters are frequently intercepted." In this letter he gives a humorous sketch of the Southern campaign — the only touch of humor found in his letters: "Our army has been frequently beaten, and like the stock-fish grows the better for it. . . . I had a letter some time since from Mr. John Turnbull (M'Fingal) wherein he asserts that with all my talents for war I am deficient in the great art of making a timely retreat. I hope I have convinced the world to the contrary for there are few generals that have run oftener or more lustily than I have done; but I have taken care not to run too far, and commonly have run as fast forward as backward to convince our enemy that we were like a crab that could run either way." — *Magazine of American History* (Lamb), vol. XII, 27.

to join the Southern army, and a detachment under the Marquis de Lafayette had also been directed to proceed thither. But these had been detained in Virginia upon the apprehension of the invasion of that State, and had of course been prevented from coming farther when Cornwallis had moved again towards Virginia, advancing from Wilmington, to which he had retreated after the battle of Guilford Court-house. But Lafayette, to whom the defence of Virginia had now been committed, having reason to believe that Cornwallis was about to take shipping to New York, had authorized General Wayne in command of the Pennsylvania line to resume his original design of marching to the relief of Greene. The latter general was therefore anxiously awaiting the arrival of this reënforcement, when he learned that Wayne's march had been again countermanded, as the British transports had been recalled, and that the fleet had proceeded up to Yorktown. This was his first disappointment at this time. The next was in the loss of a body of 150 troops raised by Colonel Jackson in Georgia, the whole of whom were taken with smallpox nearly at the same time, fully 50 dying, and the rest being too much reduced by the consequences of the disease to be in a state for service. Then, while he was retreating from Ninety Six, he had been assured that he might rely for support on the militia of Mecklenburg and Rowan counties of North Carolina, and 3500 men had been promised him; but when he had halted in his retreat and turned again towards the enemy, the martial ardor of these counties had in a measure at least subsided upon the removal of the immediate danger of their invasion, and less than 500 now joined him. So, too, upon his appeal to Shelby and Sevier, the heroes of the year before, they had promised him a reënforcement of 700 of their select followers; and with these they had actually advanced far on their way to

join him when intelligence reached them that he (Greene) had resumed the offensive, and had advanced towards Orangeburgh, and rumor added that he had driven the enemy into Charlestown, upon which Shelby and Sevier wrote that, as they supposed his recent successes had rendered their services unnecessary, they had returned and disbanded.¹

Greene had also conjured other causes of complaint against Sumter. It is disagreeable to the student of history, alike whether he be author or reader, to have his attention arrested and diverted from the contemplation of great public events by the small interfering personal jars of the great men who are the actors in such affairs. But these personal and otherwise insignificant quarrels cannot, nevertheless, be disregarded, for they often, as in this case, enter largely into and affect public affairs in a manner altogether disproportioned to their own relative importance. And so it is that we must now turn again aside to learn somewhat of the merits of the further differences between the leaders in the war in South Carolina. Greene found, he claimed, new causes of complaint against Sumter, and Lee stood by to aggravate their differences.

When Sumter had returned from his expedition to the Low-Country he had been directed to ascend the Congaree and to take post at Friday's Ferry, leaving Marion to take charge of the country on the Santee. Having been called to the upper part of the State in looking for supplies for his brigade, the command of his men in the field was committed to Colonel Wade Hampton. While thus away from the immediate command of his corps, Sumter's continued sufferings from his wound and general state of his health compelled him to rest for a while at a plantation near Charlotte. Colonel Henderson, who, it will be recol-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 208.

lected, had greatly distinguished himself during the siege of Charlestown the year before, had, it happened, just been released from Haddrell's Point on the general exchange of prisoners, and reporting for duty, ranking Hampton, he was put in command of Sumter's brigade over that officer. General Greene, it is said, calculated at this time on a permanent disciplined force under Sumter of four hundred or five hundred. Upon what basis or grounds this calculation was made is not stated. It is not surprising that Colonel Henderson was disappointed when, upon assuming command, he found, as he states, but two hundred men fit for duty — how many present he considered unfit, or for what cause, is not stated. How Sumter, any more than Marion, neither of whom had any government behind them to bring out their men or to keep them in the field when there, was to be held personally responsible for having or not having any given number of either volunteers or State troops, it is difficult to conceive. But just as Greene had blamed Sumter on his return from North Carolina because he had not found the force which, upon his own misconception of Sumter's letter, he had expected, so now he turned his wrath on that unfortunate officer; and as before he had indulged his resentments, not directly to General Sumter himself, but in his communication to Colonel Lee and to others, so too, now, instead of addressing Sumter upon the subject, General Greene's feelings at the time, as his biographer expresses it, were vented to Colonel Henderson. Sumter's offence this time, according to Greene's biographers,¹ was that when Henderson assumed command he received a communication from Sumter expressing his wish "that the troops should have a respite from service until the first of October, and as many of them furloughed

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 210, 212; Great Commanders Series, *General Greene* (Greene), 215.

home from time to time as the service would admit of, and that Colonel Henderson should apply to General Greene for that purpose, at the same time ordering that the horses of the brigade should be sent into the river swamps to pasture and committed to the care of detachments of militia." Henderson, who had been cooped up at Had-drell's Point for fourteen months, and was burning for an opportunity of distinguishing himself at the head of a band which had become famous while he was a prisoner, was naturally disappointed at the suggestion, and warmly and impatiently protested against it. "Have I come here," he wrote, "only to furlough a parcel of troops? and that too when the enemy is at our door, and their horses to be guarded by militia? No readier way to dismount [dis-band?] them could be devised."¹

Whether wise or unwise in itself, it will be observed that Sumter's communication was but a suggestion to General Greene himself, for in it Sumter requests Henderson to apply to the general for permission. The sending of the horses into the swamps for pasture was dependent upon Greene allowing the men to be furloughed. This he could at once refuse and end the matter; or if he had any reflections to make, Sumter was himself within reach and, though sick and suffering, was at that time in constant communication with himself and Governor Rutledge. But instead of addressing Sumter, if he must write at all upon the subject, General Greene again, against all military propriety — to say nothing more — wrote to Sumter's subordinate, Henderson, on the 16th of August, criticising his commander in the severest terms.

"I received," he wrote, "your favor of the 14th inclosing General Sumter's order for the disbanding of his brigade — for I can consider it in no other light. What can be his reason for such an extraordi-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 211.

nary measure I cannot imagine; nor can I conceive how he could think of taking such a step without consulting me or obtaining my consent for the purpose. If he supposes himself at liberty to employ those troops independently of the Continental army, it is time he should be convinced to the contrary. It is true I have granted every indulgence to those troops and given the General a latitude to act much at discretion. But this I did from a persuasion that his own ambition would prompt him to attempt everything that his force could effect; and it was never meant or intended to have any operations when the General was not in the field. By a measure of this kind the country will be left open for the enemy to ravage, and the Continental army exposed to any attack which the enemy may think proper to attempt while those troops are at home on furlough. . . . Upon the whole, sir, I cannot persuade myself that General Sumter gave himself sufficient time to trace out the consequence *he recommends, or rather orders, to take place*. Be that as it may, I can by no means give my consent to it, and therefore you will not furlough a man or officer unless for some particular reason; and you will give positive orders to have the whole collected as fast as possible and every man at home called to the field as soon as may be who are not employed as artificers," etc.¹

It will be observed that General Greene speaks of Sumter's having disbanded his brigade, adding, however, "for I can consider it in no other light," and upon this historians have generally assumed that Sumter had actually done so. Let us see if this charge was just.

On the 27th of July Major Burnet, aide-de-camp to General Greene, wrote to Sumter, by the general's direction, informing him that he had received intelligence which rendered it necessary for Sumter to take position at the Congaree, and to remove all grain from the south side of the river; that it was probable the enemy might make an attempt to reëstablish a post at that place before he could remove the corn.² Greene himself, it seems, wrote also to

¹ Sumter MSS., *supra*.

² Sumter's letters, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 122.

the same effect, for on the 30th of July Sumter replies, acknowledging the receipt of the two letters, and reporting his movements in obedience to them, and adding, "Agreeable to your directions, have ordered the militia of my brigade to hold themselves in readiness to march at the shortest notice."¹ Continuing, Sumter writes in further reply to Greene's letter: —

"With respect to drafting or engaging the militia to serve three or four months, notwithstanding the number required might be small, yet I doubt the measure would not take, as the law requires them to serve but two months, and short as the time is they seldom stay one-half of the time. My brigade turned out tolerable well upon the late occasion, but discovering the indolence of their neighbours and that the people of the adjacent states made them complain of injustice in point of service, and therefore uneasy to go home — in which by one means or another they are all gratified."

General Greene received this letter, and replies to it by letter of the 1st of August, in which, after discussing the enemy's movements, he writes:²—

"Governor Rutledge is arrived and I hope will take measures for regulating the militia upon a proper footing & also for raising Continental and State troops for a longer time than those engaged are serving with you. Something is necessary to be done to put a stop to the horrid practice of plundering."

Immediately after this correspondence, Sumter's continued sufferings from his wound required his temporary retirement, whereupon he wrote the letter to Henderson which Greene so censured. There was surely nothing in his correspondence with Greene himself that could be construed into disbanding his command, nor was it so construed. He writes to Greene complaining that his militia would not stay over two months, which was the term

¹ Sumter's letters, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1889, Appendix, 51, 52.

² *Ibid.*, 122, 123.

required by the Acts of Assembly. And, strange to say, Judge Johnson, who so willingly joins Greene in his condemnation of Sumter for his supposed dismissal of his men, thus tells of the retirement of Marion and his brigade at the same time. He says that immediately after the battle of Quinby Bridge, Marion retired to undergo one of those transformations to which he in common with other State commanders was constantly subjected, and he explains that by the State law the time of the militia service was but two months, and that, notwithstanding the prostration of civil government, that was still the law under which the men were called into the service, and that as often as the two months expired Marion had to retire until he could get a new set of men.¹ But if Marion had to retire for this purpose, should Sumter be blamed for having to do likewise?

At the battle of Quinby Bridge, it may be remembered, Sumter's and Marion's men together did not amount to more than 450. In his report Sumter states "that General Marion had but a few men with him, the remains (?) breaking off, which has furnished a pretext with my brigade that they ought to go home also — some has taken this liberty — I had a desire of employing for a few days upon another tour before they was discharged."² Sumter had in the battle of Quinby Bridge six regiments and Marion four. Taylor's regiment, so-called, numbered but 45; taking this as somewhat of a test, we may not be far out of the way in assuming that Sumter had in that engagement 300, and Marion 150. But while he reported that many of Marion's men went off, and some of his also, yet he was able to report, on the 30th of July, that in complying

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 177.

² Sumter's letters, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, Appendix, 49.

with General Greene's order to take position at Friday's Ferry, that all his best mounted state troops, except those on detached duty, had passed the river to the number of 230. This included probably Henry Hampton's regiment, which had not been with Sumter at Quinby Bridge. Sumter, therefore, when he left the brigade to look after his supplies, and turned over the command to Wade Hampton, had left it as strong as it was at that battle. What happened to it in the two weeks while under Wade Hampton's command to reduce its number — if its number was reduced — we do not know, but surely it had not disbanded.

From his sick-bed he had written to Colonel Henderson suggesting that, now Greene's army was going into a camp of repose, it would be a favorable time to furlough some of his men from time to time; and upon this General Greene, whose hostility to him was day by day more apparent, seizes to charge him with insubordination, and as one of his biographers informs us contemplated bringing him to immediate trial.¹ But on reflection, we are told, he saw that that would introduce dissension in the State, when he needed every available assistance. It was indeed a wise second thought. Was Sumter to be arrested and tried because he was so sick and suffering from his wounds as to be unfit for duty? Where were Marion's men at this time, when Sumter was to be arrested and tried for asking that his might be furloughed from time to time? They had scattered, and were recruiting for one of their most brilliant dashes, for which they were to receive the thanks of Congress!

A few lines of courteous reply to Colonel Henderson, firmly refusing the application made by him at General Sumter's suggestion, was all that was needed or properly justified. But unfortunately it was General Greene's

¹ Great Commanders Series, *General Greene* (F. V. Greene).

habit to discuss and criticise the conduct of officers to their subordinates in command. General Sumter seems to have heard indirectly something of this attack upon him, and to have written to Governor Rutledge, who was at Camden, upon the subject, for the Governor replies on the 4th of September:¹—

“I rec’d yours of the 1st instant last night after closing my letter of yesterday’s date to which I refer as an answer to the several parts of your letter to which it applies. You have been misinformed with respect to any complaint against you having been made to me, unless it is the petition from Bratton’s Regiment, and as to that, you see I have refer’d the matter to yourself, assuring the person [MS. illegible] who brought it that I had no doubt of their receiving justice from your hands. If any complaints had been made I certainly would have made it known to you and to no one else until I heard what you had to say about it. Candour, justice to your merits & services would require & my own disinclination to credit any matter to your prejudice would lead me to take such a step & I should most certainly have suspended my judgment or even suspicion of improper conduct until I had heard from you on the matter.”

Whether intentionally so or not, this letter of his Excellency the Governor was a severe commentary upon that of General Greene to Colonel Henderson. But was there anything so unreasonable in General Sumter’s request at this time that his followers should have a respite from service and “*as many of them furloughed from time to time as the service would admit of*”? It will be observed that Sumter did not ask, as Greene puts it, that all his brigade should be furloughed, but only as many as the service would allow. It was therefore in the end to rest with General Greene himself to say how many at a time, if any, could be spared.

But Sumter’s conduct has been severely criticised for even asking for the relief of his men at a time when he

¹ Sumter MSS.

knew that General Greene was expecting active service, and to sustain the charge a letter from Greene to him of the 24th of July is quoted, in which Greene had written, "As soon as reënforcements arrive and the troops have had a little relaxation we will draw our forces to a point and attack the enemy wherever he may be found."¹ But this, it will be observed, was written to Sumter just after his return from the expedition to the Low-Country, and it expressly deferred the proposed movement until the arrival of reënforcements which were then expected, but which never came; and after, also, the troops had "had a little relaxation." But it is said that Greene had again written to Sumter on the 28th, "Care should be taken to refresh your cavalry as fast as possible, as we shall no doubt have severe duty *in a few days*." But Sumter's suggestion for furloughing his men was made two weeks after this, when all the conditions had been changed, and the apprehended occasion of severe duty had passed, and when Greene himself had settled down on the High Hills of Santee in a "camp of repose" and rest for the remainder of the summer. For, strange to say, Judge Johnson, Greene's apologist, while discussing this matter and condemning Sumter for wishing at this time to rest and furlough his men, again and again speaks of Greene's camp on the High Hills of Santee as a "Camp of Repose," in which a few weeks' rest was necessary to relieve the American army after its exertion. Indeed, he heads his chapter of the time *Camp of Repose on the High Hills of Santee*.² The camp occupied, he says, a healthy, pleasant, and abundant station, while the posts of the enemy were wasting with disease. There was, he says, at this time no prospect of the enemy's being reënforced, he had been driven from the country where he could recruit, had manifested no

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 210.

² *Ibid.*, 179, 185, 189.

disposition for acting, and the swollen rivers from recent rains precluded all possibility of movements. Lord Rawdon had sailed for England on the 21st of August, and Colonel Stuart, upon whom the command of the British army in the field devolved upon his lordship's retirement, had moved up from Orangeburgh towards McCord's Ferry, but he had halted and gone into camp amidst the hills near the confluence of the Congaree and the Wateree. The two armies lay there, almost in sight of each other, but with two broad, deep rivers between them. The heat of the weather was excessive; both armies had suffered severely in the movements of June and July, but especially the newly arrived British regulars; and as in the latter part of August and beginning of September the climate of that part of the country is at its worst, as if by mutual consent, says Johnson, military operation was for a while suspended.¹ At what better time, then, could Sumter ask for rest for his men and horses than while Greene's Continentals had gone into a camp of repose, and the enemy had settled down for the summer? Were the partisan bands and State troops to be awake while the Continentals slept?

General Sumter's men consisted, it will be borne in mind, of two classes, (1) of those volunteers under Lacey, Winn, Bratton, Hill, Taylor, and formerly of Henry Hampton, who had been with him from the first, coming and going as the necessities of the times and the maintenance of the lives of their families demanded — "the unpaid gentlemen of Carolina." These, besides their heroic services of the last year, had now been constantly in the field since the first of the present. They had been in the campaign with Sumter in January, February, and March, while Greene was in North Carolina, had come out again in April when

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 206.

Greene returned to the State, and had since been continually in the field. They were exhausted and needed rest, both men and horses. (2) To these were added the new regiments of Mydelton, Wade Hampton, and Henry Hampton, and one now which Henderson himself was attempting to raise, enlisted under the scheme proposed by Sumter of payment in kind, to wit, negroes and supplies taken from the enemy. A more vicious scheme, as we have before observed, and the evils of which Sumter himself recognized, could scarcely have been devised, one which not even the high character of the field officers selected to organize the regiments could redeem. It incited plunder and aroused discontent when plunder was prohibited. All accounts agree as representing its practical working as most unfortunate. And among its worst features was that its practice extended not only to other troops, but to the lower classes of the people among whom the troops were quartered. Colonel Wade Hampton thus writes on the 27th of July, from Friday's Ferry :¹—

“The situation in which I found this neighborhood the day after I had the honor of seeing you is truly to be lamented. Almost every person who remained in this settlement after the army marched seems to have been combined in committing robberies, the most base and inhuman that ever disgraced mankind.

“Colonel Taylor who had arrived here a few days before me, had apprehended a few of the most notorious of these offenders, whilst the most timid of those who remained were busily employed in collecting and carrying into North Carolina and Virginia the very considerable booty they had so unjustly acquired. The more daring, but equally guilty part of this banditti seemed to threaten immediate destruction (by murder, etc.) to those who might presume to call the conduct of them or their accomplices into question. Matters becoming thus serious made it necessary that something decisive should take place immediately.

“With a few of the State troops and more of the militia who had

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 186.

spirit or inclination to engage in it we have secured all of those wretches that can be found, but we find a number of them, on finding matters more likely to terminate against them, have taken their flight towards the northward," etc.

Colonel Henderson's career up to the capture in Charleston had been with the Continentals or Regulars. He had entered the service as major of the Second Regiment of Riflemen under Sumter as lieutenant-colonel, which regiment after Sumter's resignation he had commanded, as the Sixth South Carolina Continental Regiment. Accustomed in this service to the strictest military discipline, he had no patience with the condition of the command over which he was now put, composed of a few purely volunteer soldiers, and the rest neither volunteers nor regulars. In this state of mind he thus reports to Governor Rutledge:¹—

“On my arrival to take command of them I found them the most discontented set of men I ever saw, both men and officers; a few individuals excepted who regardless of any pecuniary consideration are determined to serve their country. The thirst after plunder that seems to prevail among the soldiery makes the command almost intolerable. This circumstance is most disagreeable, as this infamous practice seems to be countenanced by too many officers. Until some very severe examples are made very little credit can be expected from them. The men are likely and brave, and want nothing but service and discipline to make them truly valuable; but this is impossible to bring about unless the necessary assistance is given by officers, most of them having no more idea of subordination than a set of raw militia.”

But what else was to be expected of a body raised as this was? It must be borne in mind that there was no government in South Carolina at this time. Governor Rutledge was about to return to the State, but had not yet arrived. At the time Sumter fell upon this plan, which he

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 211.

did with Greene's concurrence, the Governor himself was out of the State, nor was there any money, Continental or State, with which to pay the troops. It was a measure which Sumter himself characterized as "truly disagreeable, such as can only be justified by our circumstances and the necessity of the case." General Greene had been pressing for an organized body of troops to remain in the field for a given time. But he had no money with which to pay men for such service, nor supplies with which to support them. The truth is that the whole army, Continental and State troops, in South Carolina was living by plunder upon friends or foes under the name of impressment or spoils, the difference being that the State troops, being mounted and engaged upon raiding services, had better opportunities of appropriating the spoils to themselves. But whether wise or unwise, the contract with the State troops, as they were designated, was payment in kind from the spoils taken from the enemy, and "salvage," as it was called, from property of friends which could be rescued. They had been enlisted on these terms with the concurrence of General Greene. And it so happened that the negroes and stores which had been captured during the active operations of the last few months had been hurried to North Carolina for safety, and then distribution was to take place there. It can be readily imagined, therefore, the impatience of this class of troops, a considerable number of whom were from North Carolina, to obtain furloughs to secure respective shares of their compensation, and the restive and mutinous condition of those who were not permitted to go. What more opportune time could have been selected for the relief of the one class, the volunteer partisan followers of Sumter, or more necessary for the fulfilment of the terms of enlistment of the other, it is difficult to conceive.

If Sumter had been fully aware of what was going on at

headquarters, and the manner in which he was discussed in the correspondence between Greene and Lee, and of Greene's declared sentiments in regard to him, he might well have claimed in the language of the king of Israel of old, "Consider, I pray you, and see how he seeketh a quarrel against me," for Greene was at this time, with Lee, privately nursing still another grievance against him. He was now, at the instigation of Lee, charging to Sumter's account the burning of Georgetown. On the 29th of July, Colonel Lee wrote to General Greene:—

"I at this moment learn by certain authority that General Sumpter has detached Captain Davis to Georgetown to seize for public use the goods of every sort that may be found. It seems that the Tories left much linen cloth &c. &c. in the hands of Whigs on the evacuation of that place, and that these goods are now making their appearance for sale. Your officers are naked and I presume no order of men have greater claim to your attention."¹

The only plausible cause, it was said, ever given by the enemy for the destruction of the place was "that the Whigs were about to draw from it supplies for their army"; that the raking of the streets by the fire from a galley whilst the town was consumed was to prevent the merchants from saving their goods; that it was known that that place had begun to open a trade with Havana, and that fast sailing boats did afterwards actually contribute much to supply the wants of the army through this port; that General Greene was making arrangements at the time for drawing by purchase from Georgetown supplies to a considerable amount; that Captain Conyers was detached for that purpose, and arrived only in time to witness the melancholy conflagration. In short, most of the town was burnt because of Sumter's order to Captain Davis.²

When Judge Johnson wrote he had only the letter of

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 215.

² *Ibid.*, 216.

Lee to Greene which he quotes as authority for the fact that Sumter had sent Captain Davis upon such an errand, and so only hypothetically condemns Sumter if Lee's charge was true. There is no doubt that Sumter did send Captain Davis for the purpose. Nor was there at the time any concealment or mystery about the matter, Sumter reporting it to General Greene.¹ The original order is still extant in the possession of a descendant of Captain Davis, and is as follows: —

“CAMP AT GREAT SAVANNAH,

“25 July, 1781.

“DEAR SIR: With a detachment of the State troops under your command you are requested forthwith to proceed to George Town with all expedition & there by every possible means in your power secure all articles of property belonging to the enemy & all persons abetting or in any wise acting inimical to the interests of the United States of America.

“And all articles so obtained you'll be pleased to transport with the utmost expedition to this place. You are hereby authorized to impress negroes, teams, wagons, oxen & every other requisite to expedite & carry this business into execution.

“You are to move or cause to be removed all the Indigo salt hospital stores & all other articles suitable & wanted for the army from every person without distinction except so much as may be necessary for family use. You are to observe that all property or articles sold by the enemy still vests in the public which is to be taken & disposed of accordingly, the situation & nature of the service requires the utmost circumspection & vigilance — the worst of consequences is to be apprehended from delays.

“To the end that friends may not be injured or enemys go unpunished you'll endeavor to make the necessary discrimination & act inflexibly.

“You'll inform me as early as may be of your proceedings, the progress you have made & prospects in view so that if necessary hereby success & support may be afforded you.

“I am ever your most obdt. & h'l'b servt.

“CAPT. W. R. DAVIS.”

“THOS. SUMTER.

¹ Sumter's letters, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 52.

Wherein was the impropriety of this order it is difficult to conceive. Governor Rutledge had not, at this time, the last of July, yet returned to South Carolina, and Sumter was in command of all the militia and State troops, and was daily in communication with General Greene, who depended upon him in a great measure for supplies and horses which Sumter was taking from the Tories,¹ and the very day upon which he issued this order to Captain Davis, Sumter sends to General Greene an inventory of all the property taken from the enemy during his expedition in the Low-Country.² Surely, under these circumstances, independently of his own authority as commanding the State forces in South Carolina, he had every reason to suppose himself authorized and charged by Greene himself to seize and secure the enemy's property, and to impress all articles necessary for the support of the army, whether in the hands of friends or foe. If there really was any occasion for excepting Georgetown from Sumter's vigilance and action, it behooved General Greene to inform him of it. But why attribute the burning of Georgetown to Sumter's order, which there is no evidence that Captain Davis carried out, nor of which is there any that the enemy were even aware, rather than to the fact which Judge Johnson himself states, namely, that an attempt was being made to open this port to communication with Havana? The fact "that the Whigs were about to draw from it [Georgetown] supplies for the army" coming in from Havana, would very much more naturally account for the enemy's destruction of the place, than the mere fact that Sumter had sent an officer to seize the enemy's property

¹ See Greene's letters to Sumter, April 19, 1781, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 90; April 30, *ibid.*, 93; May 4, *ibid.*, 95; May 6, *ibid.*, 97; May 17, *ibid.*, 101-102; June 23, *ibid.*, 115-116.

² *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 48.

in the town. It is difficult to avoid the impression that this suggestion was nothing more than excuse for a quarrel, and was fitly concluded by a letter from Lee to Greene, joining in denunciation of Sumter, which ends with this extraordinary statement: ¹“*General Sumter is become almost universally odious, as far as I can discover. I lament that a man of his turn was ever useful, or being once deservedly great, shall want the wisdom necessary to continue so, and preserve his reputation.*”

The suggestion in regard to furloughing his men, and the order to Captain Davis for the seizure of property in Georgetown, were the two events, it is said, which led General Greene into that review of General Sumter's whole conduct since he had command in the department, from which General Greene imbibed the opinion that he had never been cordially supported by that officer, and from which he only doubted whether to attribute General Sumter's conduct to want of cordiality in contributing to the success of measures which should crown the commander of the Southern Department with honors, or an avidity for personal distinction which impelled him to a deviation from the plan of others that he might enjoy the undivided honor of his own achievements.²

There can be no doubt that Sumter differed radically with General Greene as to the conduct of military operation in the State; but so also did Marion and Lee. Greene was, with one notable exception, always for some grand general engagement, while Sumter, Marion, and Lee believed in the slow but surer process of attrition, in ceaseless activity upon the outposts and communications of the enemy. Greene, in his general engagements, was always defeated, as at Guilford, Hobkirk's Hill, and Ninety Six, and, indeed, again, as we shall soon see, at Eutaw;

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 450.

² *Ibid.*, 214.

while Sumter, Marion, and Lee, though not always victorious, achieved many brilliant results, and were uniformly successful in accomplishing their purpose of wearing away the enemy in smaller affairs. There was another point of difference as between Greene and Lee on the one side, and Sumter and Marion on the other. And that was in the assumed superiority of the former as regulars over the latter as militia. Sumter and Marion, as we have had occasion before to observe, had each begun his military career in the French War in expeditions against the Indians, and had both been in the service as Continentals, and in that part of the army Marion had probably seen as much service as either Greene or Lee, if not more. While in the volunteer line the two had kept up the war without Greene or Lee, and had accomplished more than either of them could boast. It was the just complaint of both Sumter and Marion that Lee was allowed to reap alike the honors and material advantages of their plans and work. To such an extent had they felt this, that within a few days of each other each had tendered his resignation. But there was no ground whatsoever to charge Sumter with standing off from Greene's support when he had it in his power to aid him. True, he was not able to furnish a thousand men himself, independently of Marion, when their united forces did not reach that number, with which to join Greene in a great battle upon his return to the State. True, too, he did urge that those whom he could bring out would be best employed in Rawdon's rear, and not in a general engagement; but in this Greene had yielded to his views as being sound, and Sumter, carrying them out, had compelled Lord Rawdon's evacuation of Camden, though his lordship had beaten Greene in the field. When the occasion did present itself for one decisive blow upon the retreating enemy, already well-nigh routed,

Greene had turned aside, against Sumter's advice, for the siege of a post in his rear, which was about to fall of itself, and which was only saved from doing so by his effort to take it.

Was it not Greene himself who, as appears by his correspondence, was avaricious of personal distinction, and jealous for the undivided honor of his achievements? It is in this spirit that he writes to Lee, when giving his reason for abandoning South Carolina and going to Virginia, that the plans being laid and the position taken in South Carolina, the rest would be a war of posts, and the most that would be left to the commanding officer would be to make detachments, and give the command of them to the proper officers, *to whom the glory would belong for executing the business.*¹ The same spirit prompted his letter to Governor Reed, belittling the achievements of Sumter and Marion, and declaring that they did little more than keep the dispute alive.

Though General Greene had been disappointed that the militia of Rowan and Mecklenburg counties had not joined him as he had expected, he nevertheless received a considerable reënforcement from North Carolina while at his camp of rest. When, before Ninety Six, he had become satisfied that he must no more rely upon drawing horses or men from Virginia, he despatched Colonel Malmedy, who, it will be recollected, escaped from Charlestown before its fall² and who had now recently joined him, to wait upon the legislature of North Carolina, then in session, and press upon them the necessities of his situation. The application was promptly met, and 200 horses, a monthly draft of militia to keep constantly in the field 2000 men, and an immediate draft of 1500 to march forthwith to the

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 356.

² *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 489.

army, and to serve there three months, were voted without hesitation.

While the main body of the army was resting on the hills, Colonel Washington was detached down the country across the Santee to strike all the communications between the enemy and Charlestown, and to coöperate with Marion and Maham in covering the country on the lower Santee. Lee was sent upwards along the north bank of the Congaree to operate with Colonel Henderson, in command of Sumter's brigade. Colonel Harden at the same time, with his mounted men collected beyond the Edisto, was keeping a watch upon the enemy in that quarter. Unfortunately, the execution of Colonel Hayne had much of its desired effect in detaining the inhabitants of this section from joining Harden. General Greene, in speaking of the efforts of the cavalry in their expeditions, asserts that their enterprise was never excelled in the world. Washington succeeded in falling in with two parties of the enemy's horse and making fifty prisoners. Lee, crossing the Congaree with the cavalry, penetrated between the main body of the enemy and his post at Orangeburgh, and in sight of the latter place dispersed or captured a number of their patrol parties.¹ Harden, on the other hand, was not so fortunate; a Captain Connaway of the Royal militia of Orangeburgh, about the 1st of August, attacked one of his parties in the forks of the Edisto, at the head of Four Mile Creek, and killed eighteen and dispersed the rest;² and two able and daring partisan leaders of the British Loyalists made their way to the upper country about this time, and began a series of the most sanguinary attacks upon the small posts in that region. One Hezekiah Williams, on the 6th of September, attacked a party of Whig militia in Turkey Creek, a branch

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 207.

² *The Royal Gazette*, September 12, 1781.

of the Savannah, in what is now Edgefield County, killing and wounding ten.¹ The other was the notorious Bloody Bill Cunningham, whose exploits will presently be related.

For some time after the removal of Colonel Stuart to his position near McCord's Ferry, his difficulties in obtaining provisions became very great. All the grain that could not be removed across the river had been destroyed; and every boat above and below the confluence of the Congaree and the Wateree was either removed or sunk and concealed. The consequence was that within arm's reach of plenty Colonel Stuart found himself obliged to depend on the country below for supplies. This compelled him to strengthen his post at Dorchester in order to cover his communication by Orangeburgh, and to post Major McArthur at the Colletons' place, Fair Lawn, near the head of the navigation of Cooper River, from which supplies received from Charlestown were transported by land to his headquarters. And as this communication was interrupted and watched by Washington, Marion, and Maham, in order to secure the means of communicating with the opposite bank of the Congaree and drawing supplies from thence, the British commander was under the necessity of transporting boats from Fair Lawn to the Congaree on wagon wheels.²

Both armies had thus settled down to comparative inaction for the rest of the heated season, when events at the North and in Virginia compelled General Greene to resume offensive operations before the season had half elapsed. It was not until the month of June that the army under General Washington moved out of winter quarters and

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, September 12, 1781. This officer's name is given in the *Gazette* as *Jeptha Williams*; but in the issue of October 13 this is corrected, and his name given as *Hezekiah*.

² *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, 208.

the campaign of 1781 was commenced in the North. Up to this time the French army, which had arrived in July, 1780, had remained quietly at Newport.¹ At an interview between General Washington and Count de Rochambeau it had then been agreed to inaugurate a campaign by offensive operations against New York; and the French army approaching the North River, the 2d of July was appointed for the attack, but the plan failed. The appearance of the combined armies had, however, induced Sir Henry Clinton to recall a large portion of the British and German troops from Virginia, when, on the other hand, the arrival of a reënforcement of three thousand men from Europe allowed Sir Henry to countermand this order; but in doing so he directed Lord Cornwallis (who, having marched from Wilmington and, notwithstanding the opposition of the Marquis de Lafayette, had overrun Virginia) to take some strong post on the Chesapeake from which he might either reënforce Sir Henry in New York, or proceed to execute the plans meditated against the States lying on that bay, as future events might demand. In this condition of affairs at the North and in Virginia it will be perceived how important a service to the country at large were the operations in South Carolina, which constrained Colonel Gould to land the three regiments appearing off Charlestown bar, and to employ them here in serving Lord Rawdon rather than reënforcing Lord Cornwallis as intended.

Early in August, Washington learnt that De Grasse, with the long-expected second division of the French fleet, was to have sailed from Cape François on the 3d of that month, with a squadron of the line having on board thirty-two hundred soldiers, but that he was under engagements to return to the West Indies by the middle of October.

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution* (McCrary), 846.

Whatever use was to be made of this force it was thus imperative should be determined on at once. The time allowed was deemed too short for operations against New York, and Washington turned his views to Virginia, and resolved to lead the Southern expedition in person. General Heath was placed in command of the force left before New York to employ the attention of Sir Henry Clinton, while Washington, with all the troops of Rochambeau and a strong detachment from the Continental army, on the 19th of August, began his march for Virginia. It was anticipated that, as soon as Cornwallis found himself cut off by the French fleet from communication with Sir Henry Clinton, he would attempt to escape by a sudden march to Charlestown. To meet this, Lafayette was requested to make such a disposition of his army as should be best calculated to prevent the movement, and Greene, receiving letters from the Commander-in-chief of the condition of affairs, determined to resume offensive operations in South Carolina so as to prevent any assistance from this quarter.¹ Thus was it that the Camp of Repose on the High Hills of Santee was broken up earlier than had been anticipated.

On the 22d of August Greene called in all of his detachments except those under Maham, Harden, and Marion, and appointed a general rendezvous at Friday's Ferry. Great rains had now laid all the swamps which border the Wateree four miles in width under water, and without great difficulty and some danger to his advance, Greene could not cross the river without ascending it to Camden. By that route he reached Howell's Ferry on the Congaree on the 28th, and ordered his detachments to join him at that place, intending immediately to cross the river and advance upon Colonel Stuart. That officer, however,

¹ Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 469, 541.

learning of the movement, fell back upon his reënforcements and took a position at the Eutaw Springs.

As the British army had moved by forced marches to a distance of forty miles below its position at the mouth of the Congaree, it was no longer in the power of the American commander to force it to action. He therefore determined for the present a discontinuance of the pursuit, and, crossing the Congaree, moved slowly down the south bank, intending to take post at Motte's and await events. Colonel Lee, in the meantime, was pushed forward to watch Stuart's movements, and General Pickens, who had now, in the absence of Sumter and Marion, taken command of all the State troops present with Greene, was ordered to move leisurely down and take a position to observe the British garrison still remaining at Orangeburgh. These slow movements, indicative of a want of confidence, probably induced Colonel Stuart to halt and give battle. He ordered up the detachment from Fair Lawn to reënforce him, while the garrison at Orangeburgh proceeded across the country below and replaced the garrison drawn from Fair Lawn.¹ This movement Stuart was enabled to make without fearing for the safety of his post at Fair Lawn, for Marion at that time had disappeared from that neighborhood. His movements now require our attention.

Harden, who was still operating on the Edisto, was at this time hard pressed by a British party of four or five hundred, recruited from the Loyalists who had been driven to Charlestown, while on the other hand his own party was dwindling under the necessity which the ravages of these men imposed upon his followers to look to the safety of their families, and the terror excited by the execution of Hayne. In this distress Harden appealed to Marion, who lay at Peyree's plantation in St. Stephen's

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 216, 217.

Parish. This officer at once applied to Greene to be allowed to undertake an enterprise for Harden's relief.

As soon as permission was obtained, Marion, collecting up his men who had been resting, detached a mounted party under Captain George Cooper to the neighborhood of Dorchester and Monck's Corner to create a diversion there, whilst he with about two hundred picked men by a circuitous route and forced march of at least one hundred miles, crossed the Edisto, joined Harden on the 31st of August, and approached the British. When sufficiently near he drew up his men in a swamp upon the road near Parker's Ferry, and sent out some of his swiftest horses to lead the British into the ambuscade. While lying there a small party of Tories crossed at the ferry, and passing on, one of them called out that he saw a white feather, and fired his gun. This occasioned an exchange of a few shots on both sides, but, as is supposed, it was thought by Major Fraser, who commanded the British, to be only Harden's party that was in the swamp; he pursued the horsemen sent out as a decoy, and led his corps in full charge within forty or fifty yards parallel to the ambuscade. A deadly fire from the swamp was the first notice he had that a greater force than Harden's was there. Fraser attempted to wheel and charge into the swamp, but only exposed his men the more, as they were thus delayed before the fire, and were wedged up on a causeway so closely that every shot had its effect. Finding all his efforts ineffectual, Fraser at length retreated along the road, and thus passed again the whole ambuscade. A large body of British infantry were now seen advancing, and Marion retreated without counting the dead, but men and horses were seen lying promiscuously in heaps on the road. Marion's retreat was probably owing more to the want of ammunition than to the advance of

the British infantry, accustomed as he was often to encounter the enemy with success. A party under Captain Melton went over the battle-ground next day and counted twenty-seven dead horses; the men had been buried. But though the loss could not be ascertained, the effect of this well-conducted affair soon became evident, for at the battle of Eutaw, nine days after, the enemy had but few cavalry in the field.

In the meantime Captain Cooper passed on to the Cypress swamp, and there routed a party of Tories, and then, proceeding down the road, he drove off the cattle from before the enemy's fort at Dorchester. Thence he moved down the Charlestown road, and finding a body of Tories in a brick church within twelve miles of the town, he charged and drove them before him. Then passing into the Goose Creek road he proceeded to the Ten Mile House, returned and passed over Goose Creek bridge, took a circuitous route around the British at Monck's Corner, and arrived in camp at Peyre's plantation, where Marion now lay, with many prisoners and without the loss of a man.¹

To cross the country from St. Stephen's to the Edisto, passing through both lines of the enemy's communication with Charlestown; to surprise and defeat and disperse parties much superior to his own; to return by the same route, pass the Santee safely; to deliver his prisoners and return twenty miles below Eutaw Springs to watch the communication between that place and Fair Lawn; then at the call of Greene to make a circuit and pass the enemy so as to reach a position on the south side of the Santee in the track of Greene's advance,—was all the work of six days. These movements of Marion and of his gallant officers merited and received the particular thanks of Congress.²

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 126-128.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 218.




BATTLE of the EUTAWS.

1st View

2nd View

- References
- 1. American Reserve
 - 2. Maryland Line
 - 3. N. Carolina
 - 4. N. Carolina
 - 5. N. Carolina
 - 6. N. Carolina
 - 7. Lee's Legion
 - 8. Henderson's Command
 - 9. Maysville
 - 10. Maysville
 - 11. The British Reserve
 - 12. British Reserve
 - 13. Kirkwood
 - 14. N. Carolina
 - 15. Hagerston
 - 16. Capt. Ogden
 - 17. Cemetery of the Legion after the Eutaw defeat
 - 18. British Encampment



Showing the Armies drawn up in the Wood

Showing their situation after the British were driven into the old field.

To Nelson's Ferry 1 Mile

SCALE OF YARDS
10 50 100 200

CHAPTER XIX

1781

JOHNSON observes that it is not true, as some authors assert, that General Greene delayed his advance, awaiting Marion's arrival upon his return from Edisto. He says that, until Greene had reached Fort Motte, it had been his intention to attack Stuart without the aid of Marion; that Greene indeed believed that the British commander was desirous to avoid a combat; and that it was not until he learned that the detachment from Fair Lawn had marched to reënforce Stuart, and that the garrison from Orangeburgh was taking position to support him, that he became convinced that Colonel Stuart meant to measure swords with him. That then Greene deemed it necessary to order Marion to his support. But, however that may be, Greene in his official report states that he began his march on the 5th of September, and advanced by small marches as well to disguise his intention as to give time to General Marion, who had been detached to join him.¹ The order to Marion was dated the 4th. It found Marion already returned, and on the next day Marion was quietly awaiting Greene at Henry Laurens's plantation, seventeen miles above the enemy. Here Greene found him on hand, and ordering up General Pickens with his men from Ninety Six, and who had now also taken command of Sumter's State troops, then under Henderson, the 6th was devoted

¹ Appendix to Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 513, 514.

to rest and preparation for battle. On the 7th, the army marched to Burdell's Tavern on the Congaree road, seven miles from Eutaw. Baggage, tents, and everything that could embarrass or detain had been left under guard at Motte's.

The number of men taken into action at Eutaw, on either side, has never been definitely ascertained. Johnson gives the following as the nearest estimate of that of the Americans: the rank and file of the Continentals or regulars, 1256; the cavalry of the South Carolina State Troops in action, 72, and the infantry, 73; the militia of North Carolina, about 150; those of Sumter's and Pickens's brigades then in the field, 307. The number of Marion's troops could not have exceeded 40 cavalry and 200 infantry. Allowing 200 for the camp guard, then forty miles in the rear, Greene's whole force could not have much exceeded 2000 combatants.¹ This is the estimate also of Ramsay.² Lee places the numbers a little higher, 2300, but gives no details.³ The Continentals were composed of those brought by Greene on his return to South Carolina, with the addition of those from North Carolina who had joined him under Major Eaton, 220, and 200 levies,⁴ but both of which detachments were now greatly reduced. Johnson had previously stated that almost 500 North Carolina militia had joined Greene on the High Hills of Santee, but that many of these were destitute of arms, and all of the levies for the North Carolina regulars had to be furnished with the arms he intended for the troops he had proposed to raise in South Carolina. In giving the disposition of the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 219.

² Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 257.

³ *Memoirs of the War of 1776*, 467. Gordon says, "2600 does not seem an exaggerated estimate of Greene's total force." — Gordon's *Am. War*, vol. IV, 168.

⁴ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 208.

troops in line of battle the same author describes the second line as composed of Continental troops, to wit: the North Carolina line 350, the Virginians 250, the Marylanders 250. This would leave Kirkwood's Delawares, Washington's Cavalry, and Lee's Legion together to count but 406, in order to make up 1256, the number at which he puts the American regulars. Classified by States, Greene's army was thus composed:—

South Carolina Volunteers or Militia, Sumter and Pickens, 307, Marion, 240	547	
South Carolina State Troops, Cavalry 72, Infantry 73 . .	<u>145</u>	692
North Carolina Continentals (Sumner)	<u>350</u>	
North Carolina Militia (Malmedy)	<u>150</u>	500
Virginia Continentals, Infantry (Campbell)	<u>250</u>	
Virginia Continentals, Cavalry (Washington)	<u>80</u>	330
Maryland Continentals (Howard)		250
Delaware Continentals (Kirkwood), Lee's Legion	<u>320</u>	
		<u>2092¹</u>

The exact number of the British force under Colonel Stuart is not known. In his report of the action to Lord Cornwallis he states that he knew the enemy were much superior to him in numbers,² but as he had just stated that

¹ General de Peyster in his account of the battle of Eutaw Springs, in *The United Service Magazine*, September, 1881, p. 321 n., observes: "It is just as much a perversion of language to style the Southern levies or drafts which served under Greene in the Carolinas militia in the sense that the term is applied to the phantasm organizations recognized as such at the North within the memory of the present generation as to make any difference between the Loyal organizations in the service of the Crown and the British Regulars which were sent out from the mother country. The fact is, the fire, individually and collectively, of the Loyal Battalion was much more fatal than that of the Regulars, as man for man the rank and file were physically and intellectually superior." There is much truth in these remarks; but it must be borne in mind that there were no levies or drafts of militia in South Carolina, for the reason that there was no civil government in the State. There was, in fact, no militia.

² Appendix to Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 510.

the rebel army consisted of near four thousand men, it is clear that no value can be placed upon his estimate of their relative strength. The British regular force at the time in South Carolina was estimated at 4000, besides 1000 Loyalists under arms and 400 cavalry. The garrison of Charlestown was composed of Loyalists and 500 regulars, and Johnson estimates that, after allowing for the garrisons at Orangeburgh and Dorchester, and for the sick and detached, it is not probable that the force under Colonel Stuart could have been less than 2300, which agrees also with Lee's estimate.¹ His force appears to have consisted of his own regiment, the 3d or Buffs; the Flank Battalion, as it was called, that is, the six flank companies of the three regiments lately arrived, which marched with Lord Rawdon in June for the relief of Ninety Six under the command of Major Majoribanks of the Nineteenth Regiment, which officer commanded them in this action; the remains of the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth regiments which had served the whole of the war; the troops who had formed the garrison of Ninety Six, that is, Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger's Battalion of De Lancey's Brigade of New York, and Lieutenant-Colonel Allen's Battalion of New Jersey Loyalists; and the New York Volunteers under Major Sheridan. In addition to these he had the cavalry raised by the Loyalists in Charlestown, under Major Coffin, a body which, though commanded by an able officer, was numerically and individually greatly inferior to the American cavalry. In artillery the armies were about equal. The troops on both sides, with probably only the exception of the North Carolina new levies and militia, had all seen service, and most of them were well-disciplined troops. It is a curious circumstance, however, that the

¹ See also General de Peyster, "Battle of Eutaw Springs," *The United Service Magazine*, September, 1881, 325.

military experiences of the troops in this action had not all been upon the side on which they fought. A large portion of the old provincial regiments of the British in these days consisted of American deserters from the Continental line, and it was said they added to the British discipline the precision of American marksmen; and so also many of the Continental troops on the American side had been recruited from the discharged soldiers and deserters from the British lines. To such an extent was this the case that it is reported General Greene was often heard to say, as we have quoted in a former volume, "that at the close of the war we fought the enemy with British soldiers; and they fought us with those of America."¹ It is to be observed also, that while the Continental troops are properly credited to the different States as classified in the foregoing table, it does not follow that they were recruited in the respective States to which they are so credited. The officers of the Continental regiments were generally of the State to which the regiment belonged, though this even was not, without exception, true; but the men were simply hired soldiers, as regulars usually are, taken wherever they could be found. During the year the Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia troops had been in South Carolina, the composition of their ranks had been greatly changed by casualties, discharges and desertions, on the one hand, and recruiting from discharged British soldiers and deserters on the other. It is claimed that the newly raised State troops of South Carolina, whose pay was in negroes, salt, and supplies, salvage as it was called, was largely recruited in the counties of Mecklenburg and Rowan, North Carolina.² Such a claim may readily be admitted on the part of South

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 220; *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 302.

² *No. Ca., 1780-81* (Schenck), 441.

Carolina, for men who would fight only for a share of plunder were not particularly an honor to either the States in which they were recruited or to that under whose name they served. North Carolina has honor enough in the patriots who voluntarily served under Davie, Davidson, McDowell, Graham, and Rutherford, without reference to these State regulars who enlisted for pay in plunder.

At four o'clock in the morning of the 8th of September, the American army moved in four columns from its bivouac in the following order. The State troops of South Carolina and Lee's Legion formed the advance under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, whose commission in the Continental service was senior to that of Lieutenant-Colonel Lee. The militia of North Carolina under Colonel Malmedy, who held a commission under that State, and the militia of South Carolina under Marion and Pickens, the whole under the command of Marion, moved next. Then followed the Continentals or regulars under General Sumner of North Carolina. The rear was closed by Washington's Cavalry and Kirkwood's Delawares under Colonel Washington. The artillery moved between the columns. The troops were thus arranged in reference to the order of battle in which they were to be formed in the field.

Colonel Stuart's movement to Eutaw, upon receiving intelligence that Greene was on his march to attack him, had been for the purpose of meeting a convoy of provisions then on the road from Charlestown, rather than weaken the army before this expected attack by sending off so strong an escort as would have been necessary for securing its safe arrival. Arrived at Eutaw, Stuart rested there quietly, believing that Greene would be delayed in his attack awaiting Marion's coming. He had no idea that that officer had already returned, and was himself but seventeen miles away, waiting Greene's coming up to him.

So it was that when, at six o'clock in the morning of the 8th, two deserters from the North Carolina levies came in with the intelligence that Greene was approaching, he neither credited their tale nor made inquiries of them, but sent them to prison. Indeed, so little attention did he give to the warning, that he sent out a party without arms with a small guard up the river for the purpose of collecting sweet potatoes. This party, commonly called "a rooting party," consisting of about 100, after proceeding about three miles, had pursued a road to their right which led to a plantation on the Santee.¹ In the meanwhile Stuart received information by Major Coffin, whom he had previously detached with 140 infantry and 50 cavalry, to gain intelligence of the enemy, that they had appeared in force in his front, then about four miles from his camp.² The American advance had already passed the road pursued by the rooting party when they were encountered by Coffin, who immediately charged with a confidence which betrayed his ignorance of its strength and of the near approach of the main army. It required little effort to meet and repulse the British cavalry, but the probability that their main army was near at hand to support the detachment, forbade a protracted pursuit. The firing at this point drew the rooting party out of the woods, and the whole fell into the hands of the Americans. A few straggling horsemen of Coffin's that escaped apprised the British commander of the enemy's approach, and infused a panic into all with whom they communicated.³

In the meantime Colonel Stuart had pushed forward a

¹ Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 378, says 400; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 222, says 100; Otho H. Williams's account of the battle, Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 144, says 100.

² Stuart's Report, Appendix to Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 509.

³ Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 378.

detachment of infantry to a mile's distance from the Eutaws, with orders to engage and detain the American troops while he formed his men and prepared for battle. But Greene, persuaded by the audacity of Coffin that the enemy was at hand, and wishing to have time to form his lines with coolness, halted his columns, and then, after distributing the contents of his rum casks, proceeded with the formation of his order of battle.

The first line was formed of the State volunteers, usually spoken of as militia, the South Carolinians in equal divisions on the right and left, and the North Carolinians in the centre. General Marion commanded the right, General Pickens the left, and Colonel Malmedy the centre. Colonel Henderson with the State troops covered the left of this line, and Colonel Lee with his Legion the right.

The Continentals composed the second line. The North Carolinians under General Sumner occupied the right, and were divided into three battalions, commanded by Colonel Ashe and Majors Armstrong and Blount. The Marylanders under Colonel Williams were on the left, divided into two battalions, commanded by Colonel Howard and Major Hardman. The Virginians were in the centre, under Colonel Campbell, divided into two battalions, commanded by Major Sneed and Captain Edmunds. Two three-pounders under Captain Gaines moved in the road with the first line equally distant to the right and left. Two six-pounders under Captain Browne attended the second line in the same order. Colonel Washington still moved in the rear, with orders to keep under cover of the woods and hold himself in reserve.¹

In this order the troops moved forward. The country on both sides of the road being in woods, the army could

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 223; Otho H. Williams's account of the battle, Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 146.

move but slowly while preserving their order. The woods however were not thick nor the face of the country irregular; it undulated gently, presenting no obstacle to the march more than an occasional derangement in the alignments. As the American line moved on, it encountered Stuart's advanced parties and drove them in.

Colonel Stuart had drawn up his troops in but one line, across the Congaree or River road, on ground somewhat elevated in front of his encampment, which was not far from the Eutaw Springs. On his right was Major Majoribanks with the flank battalion, a hundred paces from Eutaw Creek, which in that direction effectually covered the British position. Cruger's corps was in the centre, and the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth on the left.¹ The British left was, in the military language of the time, "in air," that is, without topographical cover. It was supported by Major Coffin with his cavalry and a detachment of infantry, which were concealed by a very thick hedge.²

The ground on which the British army was drawn up was altogether in wood; but at a small distance in the rear of the line was a cleared field extending west, south, and east from the dwelling-house, and bounded north by the creek formed by the Eutaw Springs, which was bold and had a high bank thickly bordered with brush and low wood. From the house to this bank extended a garden enclosed with palisades. The windows of the house, which was two stories high with garret rooms, commanded the whole circumjacent fields. The house was of brick and abundantly strong to resist small arms, and with various offices or outhouses of wood; one particularly, a barn of some size, lay to the southeast, a small distance from the principal building. In the open ground to the south and west of

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 134.

² Stedman's *Am. War*, vol. II, 378.

the house was the British encampment, the tents of which were left standing.¹

The American approach was from the west; and a short distance from the house in that direction the road forks, the right hand leading to Charlestown by the way of Monck's Corner, the left running along the front of the house by the plantation then of Mr. Patrick Roche, and therefore called by the British officers Roche's woods, being that which leads down the river and through the parishes of St. John's and St. Stephen's.

As soon as the skirmishing parties were cleared away from between the two armies, a steady and desperate conflict ensued. The Americans attacked with impetuosity. The conflict between the artillery of the opposing armies was bloody and obstinate in the extreme. Both of the American pieces in the first line were dismounted and disabled. One of the enemy's, a four-pounder, shared the same fate. The militia of North and South Carolina attacked with alacrity the British regulars in their front. It was with equal astonishment, we are told, that both the second lines, *i.e.* the Continental and the British, contemplated these men, steadily and without faltering, advance with shouts into the hottest of the enemy's fire, unaffected by the continual fall of their comrades around them. It appears that General Greene even expressed his admiration of the firmness exhibited on this occasion by these men, writing to Steuben, "such conduct would have graced the veterans of the great King of Prussia."² Why there should have been astonishment because Marion's men, who had just returned from a series of signal successes won by themselves without the aid of Continentals, or Sumter's

¹ Otho H. Williams's account of the battle, Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 147; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 221.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 225.

men, now led by Pickens, who had never yet been in defeat, behaved like veterans, it is difficult to understand. There was no room for distrust of such leaders, nor was there occasion for such leaders to distrust men who were fighting now, as they had been for more than a year, without pay or reward, and who had followed them on more battle-fields than fortune had permitted their Continental brethren-in-arms to enter. For the South Carolina militia, as they were called, there could have been no apprehension because of inexperience; but this was not the case with the North Carolinians. These had been just raised, and were not now commanded by one of their own leaders, but by a foreign officer whose conduct during the siege of Charlestown had not been so fortunate as to win approbation, but who, on the contrary, had been allowed to leave the garrison because of the ill feeling he had aroused by abandoning a post.¹ It is not surprising, therefore, that when the veterans of the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth regiments of the British line rushed with their bayonets upon them, this part of the militia in the centre should at last have yielded and been pushed back,² and thus compelled the retreat of those of Marion and Pickens on the flanks.

From the commencement of the action, the American covering parties on the right and left had been steadily engaged. The cavalry of the Legion had not been exposed to the enemy's fire, but the State troops under Henderson had been in the most exposed situation in the field. The American right with the additions of the Legion infantry had extended beyond the British left, while the American left fell far short of the British right; the consequence of which was that the State troops were exposed

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution* (McCrary), 489.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 468; *Stedman's Am. War*, vol. II, 379.

to the oblique fire of a large portion of the British right, and particularly of the battalion commanded by Major Majoribanks. Their endurance was most severely tried. Henderson solicited permission to charge his opponents, and extricate himself from their galling fire; but Greene would not run the risk of exposure of the artillery and the militia, whose flanks would have been uncovered, had the charge been made and defeated. While thus impatiently waiting opportunity for action, Henderson was severely wounded and his troops momentarily demoralized. Confidence and order was soon, however, successfully restored by Colonel Wade Hampton, who succeeded to the command, aided by Colonel Polk and Colonel Mydelton.

Upon the retirement of the militia, after having exhausted their ammunition, the brunt of the battle fell upon the Continentals of the second line, and Sumner's North Carolina brigade on the right, after sustaining a fire superior to their own, at length yielded and fell back. The British left, elated at the prospect, sprang forward as to certain conquest, but their lines soon became deranged. Availing himself of this, General Greene sent word to Colonel Williams, who upon the retirement of General Sumner was in command of what remained of the second line, to advance and sweep the field with the bayonet. Never, it is said, was order obeyed with more alacrity. Emulous to wipe away the recollection of Hobkirk's Hill, the Virginia and Maryland Continentals advanced with a spirit expressive of the impatience with which they had hitherto been passive spectators of the action. When within forty yards of the enemy the Virginians delivered a destructive fire, and the whole second line of Continentals advanced to the charge.

Upon the approach of the second line, the left of the British army fell back in some disorder. Colonel Lee

immediately took advantage of this, and wheeled his infantry upon the exposed and broken flank, the disorder of which was thereby greatly increased. But the British centre, the Third, or Buffs, the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth regiments, and De Lancey's corps, all apparently under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, and the Flank Battalion on the right, under the command of Major Majoribanks, stood firmly awaiting the onset of the Continentals, whom they considerably outnumbered. The Continentals rushed on with great gallantry, and were met with equal bravery by the British regulars. Bayonets are said to have clashed and officers to have had occasion to use their swords. The disorder of the British left began now to affect the centre; and as they gave way, left the flank of their comrades exposed, who, thus disconcerted, were pressed back by the fugitives. At that moment the Marylanders delivered a most destructive fire, and the British line, all but the right under Majoribanks, yielded. Shouts now resounded along the American line, and victory was deemed certain; but the carnage among the Americans had but commenced.

Upon the breaking of his line Stuart withdrew from the wood to the open field in front of the house, under cover of a well-directed fire from a detachment of the New York volunteers under Major Sheridan, whom he had previously stationed in the building to check the Americans should they attempt to pass it. The cavalry of Lee's legion had now an opportunity of striking an effective blow upon the disordered ranks of the British line as it retreated, but it did not move. This was accounted for by the absence of Lee, who was with his infantry, and not with the cavalry, as expected by Greene; and also by the presence of Major Coffin, who stood ready to interfere should a move be made. But from whatever cause occasioned, an excellent

opportunity of dealing a telling blow was missed, and Lee did not escape animadversion because of its loss.

Major Majoribanks was still standing firmly in the thicket on the right, and the original British line extending considerably beyond the American left, as the opposite wing of the British gave way the two armies were swung round as it were upon the British extreme right as a pivot. General Greene saw that Majoribanks must be dislodged at every hazard, and orders were despatched to Washington, who, it will be remembered, was in reserve, to push into the interval between the British and the creek and turn Majoribanks's right. Washington at once made the effort. Without waiting for Hampton, who was ordered to coöperate with him, he galloped through the woods and was soon in action. Colonel Hampton on receiving his orders also hastened to the scene of action, and making for the creek, endeavored to come in on Washington's left; before he got up Washington attempted a charge on Majoribanks's front, but it was impossible for his cavalry to penetrate the thicket. Failing in this, Washington turned to the left, endeavoring with Hampton to get into the interval between Majoribanks and the creek; but in doing so he exposed his flank to the enemy, who by a well-directed and deadly fire brought to the ground Washington himself, many of the men and horses, and all of his officers except two. The survivors of Washington's command rallied under Lieutenant Gordon and Cornet Simons, and united themselves to Hampton, who again led them to the charge upon Majoribanks, but without success. Kirkwood had, however, come up with his veteran Delawares and rushed furiously to avenge their comrades of the cavalry, with whom they had so often served. They were more successful and pushed Majoribanks somewhat back, but he still clung to the thickets, while conforming his

line to that of the left, which was still swinging back upon the settlement. Having at last to let go the thickets, he formed a new line with his rear to the creek, and his left on the palisaded garden.

The retreat of the British army lay directly through their encampment, where the tents were all standing, and unfortunately presented many objects of temptation to the thirsty, naked, and fatigued. Nor was the concealment afforded by the tents at this time a trivial consideration, for the fire of Sheridan's New Yorkers from the windows was galling and destructive, and no cover from it was anywhere to be found except among the tents or behind a building to the left of the front of the house. The old story was repeated. The American line was soon in irretrievable confusion. When their officers proceeded beyond the encampment, they found themselves nearly abandoned by their soldiers, and the sole marks for the party who now poured their fire from the windows of the house. The infantry of the Legion appears to have been the only body which was not thus disorganized. Being far on the American right, it had directed its movements with a view to secure the advantage of being covered by the barn. The narrow escape of the British army is sufficiently attested by the fact that the corps was very near entering the house pellmell with the fugitives. It was only by closing the door in the face of some of their own officers and men that it was prevented; and in retiring from the fire of the house, the prisoners taken at the door were interposed as a shield to the lives of their captors.¹

The demoralization of the American army was now complete. The fire from the house showered down destruction upon the American officers; and the men, unconscious or

¹Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 230.

unmindful of consequences, perhaps thinking the victory secure, and bent on the immediate fruition of its advantages, dispersed among the tents, feasted upon liquors and refreshments they afforded, and became utterly unmanageable. Majoribanks and Coffin, watchful of every advantage, now made simultaneous movements, the former from his left, and the latter from the wood on the right of the American line. General Greene, says Johnson, soon perceived the evil that threatened him, and not doubting but his infantry, of whose disorderly conduct he was not yet aware, would immediately dispose of Majoribanks, despatched Captain Pendleton with orders for the Legion cavalry to fall upon Coffin and repulse him. What took place is thus reported by that officer: "When Coffin's cavalry came out General Greene sent me to Colonel Lee with orders to attack him. When I went to the corps Lee was not there, and the order was delivered to Major Egleston, the next in command, who made the attack without success.

"The truth is," he adds, "Colonel Lee was very little, if at all, with his own corps after the enemy fled. He took some dragoons with him as I was informed and rode about the field, giving orders and directions in a manner the General did not approve of. General Greene was apparently disappointed when I informed him Colonel Lee was not with his cavalry and that I had delivered the order to Major Egleston."¹

General Greene now realized the extent of his misfortune, and ordered a retreat. But Coffin, who had repulsed the Legion cavalry, was not disposed to allow the Americans to retire without inflicting upon them a final blow. He hastened on to charge their rear, now dispersed among their tents. Hampton fortunately was on hand. He

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 230.

had been ordered up the road to cover the retreat, and now, coming up, charged upon Coffin with vigor. Coffin met him with firmness, and a sharp conflict, hand-to-hand, was for a while maintained. But Coffin was obliged to retire, and in the ardor of pursuit the American cavalry approached so near Majoribanks and the picketed garden as to receive from them a fatally destructive fire. Colonel Hampton, nevertheless, rallied his men, and resumed his station in the border of the wood. But before this could be effected, Majoribanks had taken advantage of the opening made by his fire, to perform another gallant action, which was decisive of the fortune of the day.

The artillery of the second line had followed on as rapidly as it could upon the pursuit, and, together with two six-pounders abandoned by the enemy in their flight, had been brought up to batter the house. Unfortunately, in the ardor to do this, the pieces had been run into the open field so near as to be commanded by the fire from the house, and consequently drew all the fire from the windows upon the artillerists; it killed or disabled nearly all of them. Majoribanks, as soon as disembarassed of Hampton's cavalry, sallied into the field, seized the pieces, and hurried them under cover of the house. Then, being reënforced by parties from the garden and the house, he charged among the Americans, now dispersed among the tents, and drove them before him. The American army, however, soon rallied after reaching the cover of the wood, and their enemy was too much crippled to venture beyond the cover of the house.

General Greene halted on the ground only long enough to collect his wounded, all of whom except those who had fallen under cover of the fire from the house he brought off; and having made arrangements for burying the dead, and leaving a strong picket under Colonel Hampton in the

field, he withdrew his army to Burdell's, seven miles distant. At no nearer point could water be found adequate to the comforts of the army.¹

Both parties claimed on this occasion complete victory. But it is noticeable that the British commander begins his despatch with the announcement of victory, while the American reserves his claim to the conclusion of his report, rather as a deduction from the facts stated than as positive assertion of his own.

Colonel Stuart hastens, on the 9th, the day after the battle, to report to the Earl Cornwallis:—

“With particular satisfaction I have the honor to inform your lordship that on the 8th instant I was attacked by the rebel General Greene with all the force he could collect in this province and North Carolina, and after an obstinate engagement I totally defeated him and took two six-pounders.”²

General Greene was in no such haste to communicate the result of the action. He deferred his report to the President of Congress, to the 11th, when, after a detail of his movements and of the incidents of the battle, he closes with the remark:—

“I think I owe *the victory which I have gained* to the brisk use the Virginians and Marylanders and one party of the infantry made of the bayonet. I cannot forbear praising the conduct and courage of all my troops.”³

The first and immediate results of the battle were clearly with the British, and Stuart's report doubtless expressed the opinion at the time, of all concerned, whether on the one side or the other. General Greene had broken up his camp, into which he had gone for the summer, for a sud-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 231.

² Appendix to Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 508.

³ *Ibid.*, 513.

den and specific purpose, and that was to strike so crushing a blow upon the British power in South Carolina as would leave him free to meet and cut off Lord Cornwallis should he attempt to escape from Washington and the French troops in Virginia. For this purpose he had at last succeeded in gathering up all his forces, Continentals, State troops, militia, and volunteers, into one grand army, and for once arraying them all in line of battle. It was an imposing array for the times. Sumter was absent, suffering from his wound; and Huger, who had fought in every pitched battle in which the Continentals were engaged in the three Southern States from Fort Moultrie up to this time, was also away. But with these two exceptions, Greene had here collected around him all the great leaders of the war in the South. Huger's place was ably filled by that excellent officer, Colonel Otho H. Williams, of Maryland, than whom no better soldier or braver man served in the war. There was Washington, the sturdy and dashing cavalryman, and Lee, brilliant and ambitious. Then there was Marion, fresh from one of his most effective partisan strikes, and Pickens, the hero of Cowpens, and Wade Hampton, already rivalling those who had been earlier in the field, and who, on this occasion, was to perform the most signal service. With these he marched, as he persuaded himself, to certain victory. Against him was an untried officer who had yet to fight his first battle. But the battle was fought, and at night Greene found himself collecting his shattered forces seven miles from the battle-field, with Hampton only standing picket between him and the enemy, who remained upon the ground the night after the action and the following day, with leisure to despatch from the battle-field itself a report of the victory he had won.

Nevertheless, though General Greene had failed appar-

ently of his purpose, the ultimate advantages were with the Americans, for while the losses were great on both sides, the waning power of the British could less afford the great loss of this bloody and hard-fought action.

Colonel Stuart's return of killed and wounded was 3 commissioned officers, 6 sergeants, 1 drummer, 75 rank and file, killed; total, 85 killed; 16 commissioned officers, 20 sergeants, 2 drummers, 313 rank and file, wounded; total, 351 wounded; 15 sergeants, 8 drummers, 224 rank and file, missing; total, 247 missing. In all 683.¹

General Greene reported his loss: *Continental Troops*: killed, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 6 captains, 5 subalterns, 4 sergeants, 98 rank and file; total, 114 killed. Wounded, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 7 captains, 20 lieutenants, 24 sergeants, 209 rank and file, total, 262 wounded. Total, 376. *State Troops and Militia*: killed, 1 major, 4 subalterns, 4 sergeants, 16 soldiers; total, 25 killed. Wounded, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 6 captains, 5 subalterns, 3 sergeants, 91 soldiers; total, 108 wounded and 8 missing; total, 141. The whole loss of Greene's army was thus 517.²

¹ Appendix to Tarleton's *Campaigns*, 513.

² *Ibid.*, 517, 518. Appended to the above tabular statement is another by Charles Thomson, secretary of the Continental Congress, giving the total of the killed and wounded and missing at 554.

Names of the Continental and militia commissioned officers killed and wounded in the action of Eutaw, the 8th of September, 1781, as given in Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 157, 158: —

“*Maryland Brigade*, Captains Dobson and Edgerly, Lieutenants Dewall and Gould killed; Lieut. Col. Howard, Captain Gibson, Capt. Lieut. Hugon, Lieutenants Ewing, Woolford, and Lynn, Ensign Moore wounded.

“*Virginia Brigade*, Lieut. Col. Campbell, Capt. Oldham, Lieut. Wilson killed; Captains Edmonds and Morgan, Lieutenants Miller and Jowitz wounded.

“*North Carolina Brigade*, Captains Goodman, Goodwin, and Potterfield, Lieut. Dillon, killed; Capt. Hadley, Lieutenants Dixon, Andrews, and Dudley, Ensigns Lamb and Moore wounded.

“*South Carolina Line*, Lieut. Col. Henderson wounded. *Cavalry*,

Colonel Stuart admits a loss of 683, including only 247 missing. But to these, however, it is fair to add 70 of his wounded who fell into the Americans' hands when he fell back on the 10th. It is also fair to add, on the other hand, that while the official report above returns the missing of the Americans at 8 militia, the British claimed to have taken 60, and the Americans admitted a loss of 40.¹

The loss in officers on both sides was very severe. Colonel Stuart was himself wounded, so that he was soon compelled to retire from his field, and Major Majoribanks fatally. He died on the march to Charlestown, and his tomb is still seen on the roadside where he expired and was buried:²

Lieut. Col. Washington wounded and prisoner of war; Capt. Watts, Lieutenants Gordon, Simons, King, and Steward, Mr. Carlisle, volunteer, killed. *Artillery*, Capt. Lieut. Finn wounded, Lieut. Carson wounded mortally, Lieut. Drew wounded, Lieut. McGurrie wounded and prisoner of war. *Legion Infantry*, Lieut. Manning wounded. Mr. Carrington, volunteer, wounded. O. H. Williams, D. A. G.

“*South Carolina State Officers*, Major Rutherford, Lieut. Polk, Adjutant Lush killed, Lieut. Col. Henderson commanding Brigade, Lieut. Col. Middleton, Captains Moore, Giles, N. Martin, and Cowan, Lieutenants Erskine, Culpeper, Hammond, and Spragins wounded.

“*South Carolina Militia*, Brig. Gen. Pickins, Lieut. Col. Horry, Captains Gee, Pegee, Lieutenant Boon wounded. Lieutenants Holmes and Simons killed.”

In the above list Washington's cavalry and Lee's Legion infantry are incorrectly credited to South Carolina. Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, wounded, is twice mentioned, and so is Lieutenant Simons killed. The name of Lieutenant-Colonel Middleton should be spelled Mydelton.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, Vol. II, 232.

² Major Majoribanks (pronounced Marshbanks), by whom, in conjunction with Sheridan, the British army was saved, lies buried on the Santee Canal Road, about half a mile below the chapel (Biggin Chapel?); he was a brave and generous enemy, and on an old headboard the following inscription is still (1821) to be seen: “John Majoribanks Esq., late Major to the 19 regt. inf'y and commanding a flank bat'n of his Majesty's army, obiit. 22 October, 1781.” — James's *Life of Marion*, 137.

On the American side Colonel Campbell of Virginia fell as he was leading his men to the charge; and it is related of him that, drawing fast to his end, he inquired how the battle went, and being informed that the enemy were routed and flying, he exclaimed, "I die contented." Lieutenant John Simons was also among the slain. General Pickens, Colonels Washington, Howard, Henderson, Hugh Horry, and many others were also wounded. Sixty-one officers were killed or wounded, twenty-one of whom died on the field of battle.

General Greene had gone into this battle, as he had done into that of Hobkirk's Hill, confident not only of victory, but also of the surrender of the British army in the field.¹ Upon what such an expectation could have been based it is difficult to conceive. The armies were, as at Hobkirk's Hill, very nearly equal, and the British all regulars or veterans. So, too, as usual, he was equally confident that, had not something unforeseen happened, he would have been entirely successful. To Washington he wrote, "We obtained a complete victory, and had it not been *for one of those incidents to which military operations are subject* we should have taken the whole British army."² The general was happily constituted. He was one of those who could always find plausible reasons why he did not succeed, and was thereby entirely consoled. At Guilford Court-house it was the North Carolina militia. At Hobkirk's Hill it was Gunby's fault, and Sumter's failing to join him. At Ninety Six it was Jefferson's fault in withholding the Virginia reënforcements. And now it was "*one of those incidents to which military operations are subject.*" The incident in this case happened to be the want of discipline in his Continentals, who broke their ranks to secure the spoils of the enemy's camp.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 233.

² *Ibid.*, 240.

The heroes of this battle undoubtedly were Majoribanks, Sheridan, and Coffin on the one side, and Wade Hampton on the other. Majoribanks cut to pieces Washington as he was assailing the last point of resistance in the British line. Then, turning upon the disordered Americans among the tents, he routed them. Coffin it was who repulsed the Legion cavalry, and delivered the final blow upon the retreating Americans. It was Wade Hampton that finally pushed Majoribanks from his position in the thicket on the left; and it was he who alone interposed between Coffin and the retreating Americans as Majoribanks drove them from the field.

It admits of no doubt, said the *Annual Register*, in its account of the battle, that the conflict was exceedingly severe, and abounded with instances of the highest gallantry on both sides. The Americans were now inured to arms and danger; and the provincial militia, who alone led on the attack in the first line, not only fought with all spirit, but with all the perseverance of old, well-tried soldiers.¹

¹ *Annual Register*, 1782, vol. XXV, 191.

CHAPTER XX

1781

IT was Greene's intention to have renewed the action the next day; but Stuart, calling up McArthur from Fair Lawn, and leaving seventy of his wounded to the enemy, many of his dead unburied, breaking the stocks of one thousand stand of arms and casting them into the spring, and destroying his stores, retreated towards Fair Lawn. Upon this Greene turned back from Burdell's plantation, and followed him for some distance; but as Stuart continued his retreat, Greene halted and detached Marion and Lee by a circuitous route to interpose between the two British forces. This, however, failed. So hurried was Stuart's retreat for fifteen miles that he brought his first division within a few miles of McArthur, coming to his aid before Marion and Lee reached Ferguson's Swamp, their point of destination. The British officers effected a junction, and Stuart halted at Wantoot, Mr. Daniel Ravenel's plantation, twenty miles from Eutaw.¹ On the day of the battle Greene had received intelligence by express from Governor Burke of North Carolina, which forbade him continuing longer south of the Santee than was necessary to ascertain whether his adversary would wait another attack; then, recrossing the Santee at Nelson's Ferry on the 12th, on the 15th he resumed his former

¹O. H. Williams's account, Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 156; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 232; James's *Life of Marion*, 136.

position on the benign Hills of Santee, as Lee called them, from which he indulged his literary propensity in communicating with his friends at the North upon the battle, for which, with some reason, he now claimed the honor of victory.¹ But, as usual, something had happened to mar his fortune. Writing to Lafayette amongst numerous others, he says, "We obtained a complete victory, and had it not been for *one of those incidents to which military operations are subject* we should have taken the whole British army." We are left, says Johnson, his biographer, to conjecture what this "*incident*" was to which he so often alludes, as the cause of his failure to capture the whole army.² The intelligence which hastened his return to the north of the Santee was the renewal of the report that Lord Cornwallis was meditating a return to South Carolina. This intelligence was apparently confirmed by the movement of Colonel Stuart, who, collecting all the reënforcements he could gather from below, strengthening his cavalry to the number of two hundred, had once more advanced to the Eutaws, and was pushing the American detachments both up and down the Santee. Hampton above, and Marion below, were both obliged to return across the river.³

Governor Burke of North Carolina was exerting himself to the utmost to meet the anticipated movement of Lord Cornwallis, when a most extraordinary event occurred. A band of Loyalists, not exceeding three hundred, headed by the celebrated partisan Hector McNeill, issuing from Wilmington, penetrated the country as high up as Hillsboro, and, seizing the Governor and some of his council and every Continental and militia officer in the place, made good their retreat to Wilmington, and from thence the Governor was immediately shipped to Charles-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 239. ² *Ibid.*, 240, 241. ³ *Ibid.*, 243.

town as a State prisoner. Lord Rawdon on his voyage to England had just fallen into the hands of the allies at sea about a fortnight before, and as his lordship had been mentioned as a fit subject for retaliation for the execution of Hayne, and as the St. Augustine prisoners had been released, it became necessary, it was said, to procure others.¹ The capture of Governor Burke put into the hands of the British a hostage of sufficient importance to insure the life of Lord Rawdon.

The success of this adventure had the effect, not only of producing a great excitement among the Loyalists of the State generally, but especially in arousing into activity those on the Pee Dee, with whom, through Major Gainey, Marion and Horry had entered into treaty. These began to assemble again and to renew their ravages, and to harass the Whigs in every quarter. To quell this uprising, General Greene despatched General Sumner as soon as he received the intelligence of the Governor's capture, with instructions to promote and carry on the measures undertaken by that active governor, and to counteract the evil consequences of his capture.

In the meanwhile the condition of Colonel Stuart's wound caused him to leave the field and to turn over his command of the army to Major Doyle. Under this officer the British army returned to the Santee, and took post at Fludd's plantation, three miles from Nelson's Ferry. According to all the intelligence of the day, after all the reductions which it had sustained from battle and disease, the British army under Doyle consisted of two thousand men besides a detachment at hand of three hundred under Major McArthur at Fair Lawn. The Loyalists also who had retired with Lord Rawdon to Charlestown were required with little discrimination to engage in active ser-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 244.

vice. Many of the lower and poorer order of these joined the Royal regiments; the more adventurous of them furnished very efficient bands of mounted infantry, which were sent out to harry and harass the Whigs. It was from this class that Major William Cuninghame, Colonel Hezekiah Williams, and other partisan leaders in the Royal cause had raised their corps, with which, following the examples of Sumter and Marion, they penetrated behind the American lines; but unlike Sumter and Marion, who conducted their warfare upon the most civilized rules, and with all humanity permissible in warfare, the Tory leaders not only carried fire and sword into the back country, but, not content with their own atrocities, called in the Indians to inflict their barbarities upon their unfortunate countrymen.

The history of the notorious William Cuninghame, whose cruelties have given him a name in the annals of his state as that of "Bloody Bill Cuninghame," is interesting and instructive as illustrating the dreadful condition of affairs at this time, and their effect upon characters which otherwise might have developed peaceable citizens with no unkindly disposition.

William Cuninghame was one of the family of the Cuninghames who had removed from Virginia to the Ninety Six District in this province. In the beginning of the struggle his political opinions leaned more to the Whig side than those of the rest of his family. He is represented as being of lively, jovial disposition, open-hearted and generous, priding himself upon keeping his word, but of a quick and fiery temper. He was a remarkable horseman, with a passion for fine horses, fine weapons, and fine clothing. These qualities rendered him a favorite with the young men of his neighborhood. On this account, though but nineteen years of age in 1775, he was applied to by

John Caldwell to assist in raising a company for Colonel Thomson's regiment of rangers embodied by the Provincial Congress. Cuninghame afterwards insisted that the conditions upon which he had agreed to enlist were that he should be made first lieutenant and should have a right to retire from the company in case they should be sent to the lower country or ordered on any other service than that specified by Congress. However this may have been, in this company he went upon the expedition under Major Mayson and was present at the taking of Fort Charlotte on the 12th of July in that year. When ordered to Charlestown Cuninghame claimed that he had consented to go only on the condition that he should be permitted to resign as soon as they reached their destination. The company encamped near the town for about a week, and was then ordered to one of the islands. Cuninghame immediately tendered his resignation, which Caldwell refused to accept. Upon this Cuninghame, insisting upon the agreement, swore that if he were taken over to the Island it should only be as a corpse. One-half of the company who had joined through Cuninghame's influence exhibited a spirit of insubordination, and it is claimed that, in order to prevent a mutiny, he again consented to go on the renewed condition that his resignation should be accepted so soon as they reached the island. No sooner had they landed, however, it is said, than Caldwell, in order to restore subordination, had Cuninghame arrested, put in irons, and tried by a court-martial on a charge of mutiny. Cuninghame was, however, not only acquitted by the court, but freed from his engagement on the ground of the conditional agreement. Caldwell thus became an object of hatred to a set of men to whom the distracted state of the country afterwards afforded ample opportunity of satisfying their resentments and avenging their wrongs. Cun-

ingham himself, it is said, was satisfied with treating them with personal indignity, but others, as will soon appear, were not content with so bloodless a retaliation. Having returned to the upper country, Cuningham still adhered to the Whigs, and was with General Williamson in his campaign against the Cherokees in the autumn of 1776. But after this expedition he declared that, having seen reason to change his opinions, he was determined to continue no longer in the service of the Whigs.

From this time a bitter neighborhood strife arose, in which on the Whigs' side one Captain William Ritchie, who had been with Cuningham in Caldwell's company, was the leader, who it is said sent Cuningham word that "he intended to shoot him down the first sight he got of him, and would follow him if necessary to the very gates of hell." In 1778 Cuningham, at the instance of his brother Andrew and Cousin Patrick, went to Savannah. While there another brother, John, who was lame and an epileptic, was murdered, it was said, by Ritchie and a party under circumstances of great atrocity, if the Tory accounts are true. William Cuningham, as the story goes on, hearing of the murder of his brother, swore he would never rest until he had avenged it in Ritchie's heart-blood. Not being able to procure a horse, he set out immediately on foot, attended by a servant, and walked all the way from Savannah to Ninety Six. On arriving at home he was informed that his father had also been ill-treated by Ritchie and his party, whereupon he hastened at once to Ritchie's house and found him in the yard with some of his followers. On seeing Cuningham, Ritchie clasped his hands together and exclaimed to one of his companions, "Lord have mercy on me, Hughes, for yonder is Cuningham and I am a dead man." He tried to escape, but Cuningham shot him down as he was crossing a fence, and coming close told him he "had

come all the way from Savannah on foot to kill him, on account of the crimes he had committed against his family.”

From this period till the end of the war, Cuninghams life was passed in a series of wild adventures, so often ending in such fearful tragedies as to earn for him throughout the country the significant cognomen of “Bloody Bill”; and in the story his famous horse, “Ring-tail,” attained a celebrity hardly less distinguished than his owner.¹ As an officer in the British service he assumed vigorously to enforce Cornwallis’s order that all who had renewed their allegiance to the King and resumed arms against his Majesty, if taken, should be put to death as rebels, and remorselessly executed all such as fell into his power.²

Early in August he set out from the garrison at Charlestown with a party of 150 men for the purpose of inflicting punishment on the Whigs of Ninety Six, who it was alleged had committed injuries against the wives and children of some of those of his party. Pushing through the American lines while Greene was in his camp of repose, and reaching the upper country, he began his operations between the Enoree and the Saluda, in what is now Laurens County. In his first raid he killed eight of the noted rebels of the neighborhood and increased his corps by sixty of the Loyal inhabitants.³ With his body thus raised, he now set in relentlessly to harass the Whigs of the country, and to wreak his vengeance upon his enemies.

Soon after this another marauding party of Loyalists made an incursion into the neighborhood of Mount Willing, in what is now Edgefield County, near which Captain

¹ Curwin’s *Journal and Letters*, 1775–81; Sabine’s *American Loyalists*, 237; MS. letters, certificates, and affidavits in possession of Clarence Cuningham, Charleston, S.C.

² Curwin’s *supra*.

³ Curwin’s, 645. *The Royal Gazette*, September 12, 1781.

James Butler lived, carrying off considerable booty. This Captain Butler, the founder of the distinguished family of that name, had taken an active part in the Revolution from its commencement, had served in the Snow Campaign in 1775, and for refusing to accept the terms of Sir Henry Clinton's proclamation upon the fall of Charlestown had been arrested, confined in irons in Ninety Six jail, from which he had been transferred to Charlestown, where he had been confined in the provost, and had just now been released upon the general exchange of prisoners. Captain Butler had been at home but a few weeks, when his neighbors called upon him to take command of a party they were organizing for the pursuit of the marauders. At first he refused to go, alleging that the hardships he had already endured and his recent return home ought to exempt him from such an undertaking. But his son James, a youth of nineteen years of age, one of the party, refusing to proceed with the expedition unless his father assumed the direction, Captain Butler yielded to the appeal and consented to accompany the party as an adviser, the actual command being in Captain Turner. The Tories were overtaken and dispersed at Tarra's Spring, in what is now Lexington County, and the horses and cattle recaptured. Upon the return of the party they unfortunately stopped at Cloud's Creek, a branch of the Little Saluda River in Edgefield, and encamped there against the protest of Captain Butler; nor would they adopt ordinary military precautions, though by him urged to do so. It was not known who were the Loyalists they had been pursuing, but the next morning demonstrated the folly of their conduct in neglecting Butler's advice. The Tories proved to have been a part of Cuninghams' command, by the whole of which, numbering, it was said, three hundred men, the Whigs were attacked on the 7th of November. Taken by

surprise, the little party of Whigs, about thirty in number, took refuge in an unfinished log house without door or windows. Upon Cuninghams demand for surrender, they asked the terms which they would be allowed, and Cuninghams agreeing to receive a communication from them, a messenger was sent, to whom Cuninghams first inquiry was, Who are of the party? And on learning that young Butler, who, they said, had been engaged in an affair in which one Radcliff was killed, was among them, Cuninghams refused to give any terms which would exempt that young man from his sword. Cuninghams was personally well acquainted with Captain Butler, having served with him in the Snow Campaign, and it is said had rather a partiality for him, and would have entertained terms of capitulation with the party had it not been for the presence of the son. Captain Butler proposed to Cuninghams that if he would spare his son he would make an unconditional surrender of himself. The young man, however, learning Cuninghams animosity to him, and believing that his father and himself would be sacrificed in the event of any surrender, determined to force the hazard of a struggle, and exclaiming that he "would settle the terms of capitulation," fired his rifle, killing a Tory. This concluded the parley, and young Butler fell with a mortal wound while kneeling to pick the flint of his gun for a second shot. The gallant but expiring boy called his father, who, having gone on the expedition as an adviser, was unarmed, to his side, handed him his rifle, and told him there were yet a few balls in his pouch. The father took the gun and continued firing it until his powder and ball were exhausted. But the death of the young man produced a panic in the little party contending against hopeless odds, and an unconditional surrender was the result. The Whigs were all ordered to be put to the

sword. But two of the number escaped. The rest were slaughtered as they stood. Captain Butler caught up a pitchfork and defended himself until his right hand was severed by a sabre stroke. A detachment of the Tories was left to meet any burying party that might be sent to inter the mangled victims, and especially to secure, if they could, another son of Captain James Butler, William, who was a captain of rangers and who was expected to hasten to the spot. Fortunately William Butler was too far from the scene to reach it in time. Women only performed the rude rites of burial possible. A large pit was dug, into which the bodies were indiscriminately placed; except that a separate grave was prepared by the sister of Captain Butler, in which the remains of the father and son were deposited.¹ In the biographical notices appended to Curwin's *Journal and Letters* it is claimed that Cuninghame was not actually present at the massacre, and that when he came up he regretted that it had taken place.² But *The Royal Gazette* heralded the affair as one of his achievements, and all other authorities have united in charging this as one of his atrocities.

From Cloud's Creek, Cuninghame crossed the Saluda and proceeded to Hayes's Station, which before had been known as Edge Hill, another small American post which was in what is now Laurens County, three miles from the Newbury line. Colonel Hayes had been warned of his danger the night before by Captain Brooks, who sent an express, advising him to disband his men and leave the post instantly, as Cuninghame was in the country, and had killed Turner and his men. Hayes did not accredit the

¹ MS. *Memoirs of Genl. Wm. Butler*, prepared by Hon. A. P. Butler; Johnson's *Traditions*, 311; Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 272; *The Royal Gazette*, November 18, 1781.

² Curwin's *Journal and Letters*, 644.

information, as he had just returned from scouting that part of the country and had heard nothing of Cuninghame, and did not follow the advice, but merely sent off to another station for assistance, in case of need.

It was on a fine morning a few days after the massacre at Cloud's Creek, when at ten o'clock a party, led on by one John Hood, rode up to the station at full gallop, and reaching the piazza of the house, called out in a loud voice that none should fire from within, or they would all be put to death. Disregarding this warning, a shot was fired and one of the Tories killed. Cuninghame, arriving shortly afterwards, sent a flag with a written message demanding instant surrender, and promising if the Whig party surrendered to spare all lives, but declaring, it is claimed, that if they resisted, and so caused the spilling of his men's blood, he would give them no quarter, but put them all to death. Colonel Hayes, trusting to receive a reinforcement before the station could be carried, refused to surrender, and answered "he would hold out to the last." Hayes and his party made a vigorous resistance, which lasted for hours; but Cuninghame at last succeeded in setting fire to the house, which was of wood, by means of ramrods wrapped round with tow dipped in pitch and thrown in a blazing state on the roof. Half suffocated, Hayes and his party surrendered at discretion. Cuninghame immediately hanged Hayes and another man, Daniel Williams, on the pole of a fodder stack. Before they were dead, the pole broke, and Cuninghame, drawing his sword, slew the half-strangled men with his own hand. This he justified himself in doing, because of alleged cruelties by Hayes to women and children, and of the killing by Williams of a favorite follower of his, one Thomas Ellison. Being told of the presence of one Cook, who, it was charged, had with Ritchie and Moore whipped his brother to death, Cuninghame

ordered him out from the rest and slew him with his sword. He then gave permission to his men to do as they pleased with the rest. And all who had rendered themselves obnoxious in any way to the Tories were slain without mercy. Each of his men singled out whomsoever he would and killed him forthwith. The execution took place about sunset. Only two of the party fell in the action; fourteen were deliberately cut to pieces after their surrender. Their names and rank as given by Ramsay were as follows: Colonel Joseph Hayes, Captain Daniel Williams, Lieutenant Christopher Hardy, Lieutenant John Neil, Clement Hancock, Joseph Williams, Joseph Irby, Sr., Joseph Irby, Jr., John Milvin, James Feris, John Cook, Great Irby, Benjamin Goodman, Yancey Saxon. *The Royal Gazette* gives two names not mentioned by Ramsay. These were probably those of the killed in the action, Captains Owen and Leonard. Cuninghame had one man killed and five wounded.¹

Colonel Hayes had been in the struggle from its commencement, and had served gallantly. He had been in the battles of Brier Creek and Stono, in the campaign against the Cherokees, at Savannah, and at Hanging Rock, Musgrove's Mills, King's Mountain, Blackstock, Hammond's Store, and Cowpens.²

The movements of Cuninghame's party were rapid and lasted but a few weeks, but their bloody tracks could long after be traced. In their passage up the country, they intercepted a convoy of wagons despatched by Pickens to the army. Upon being pursued by the Whigs, under Hammond and Purvis, they separated into several parties, and two of them, under Cuninghame and Williams, made good

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 273; Curwin's *Journal and Letters*, 644, 645; *The Royal Gazette*, December 8, 1781.

² *King's Mountain and its Heroes*, 468.

their way through the woods, and passing between the posts of Orangeburgh and Round O, reached Charlestown in safety. A third party that had charge of the prisoners, being far advanced towards the mountains, and apprehensive of being cut off if attempting to retreat, pushed on and joined the Indians.¹

Another active and vigorous Tory leader who appeared at this time was Hezekiah Williams, "Colonel," as he was called. Following Cuningham, he marched from the forks of Edisto, raiding and harassing the Whigs in Ninety Six. On October 5 he was met by Major Hugh Middleton of Colonel Hammond's regiment, who came up with him on Stevens's Creek, when, after a sharp conflict, the Whigs were repulsed with a loss of eight men killed, seventeen severely and others slightly wounded. Colonel Hammond coming up, however, with a considerable reënforcement, Williams retired; but turned to attack a small post known as Vince's Fort on the Three Runs, a branch of the Savannah. Arriving there on the 28th, however, he found the fort evacuated; the garrison under Captain Vince had retired upon his approach, and but few stragglers fell into his hands.

Early in the year General Greene had concluded a treaty with the Cherokees, by which they had engaged to observe a neutrality. This was a matter of great importance, saving the frontier settlements of North and South Carolina from their incursions; and happy would it have been for the people had it been observed, but whenever the coöperation of the Indians could be of the least service to the British forces, they were induced to break their engagement of neutrality. About the same time that Cuningham's party started out on their expedition, and it was believed in connection with it, emissaries of the British induced the

¹Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 301-302.

Cherokee Indians to commence hostilities.¹ *The Royal Gazette* of the 13th of October mentions casually, as an item of news, that about three weeks before the Cherokees had commenced hostilities against the rebel settlements of Nolachucky, Watauga, and Holston.

The first attack was made on Gowen's Fort, in the upper part of what is now Greenville County.² The fort stood on the waters of the Pacolet, and had long been a place of rendezvous and safety for the Whig families of that section, of both North and South Carolina. Many attempts had been made by the Indians and disguised white men to capture this station. They had often resorted to art and stratagem, to force and violence, but as often failed. *The Royal Gazette* of the 24th of November, 1781, announces that about three weeks since a party of loyal militia and Cherokee Indians under the command of Mr. Tuft attacked and carried a rebel fort on Pacolet River, Gowen's Ferry. Thus the official organ of the British authorities assumed the full responsibility for a most horrible massacre which now took place at this remote post. Who was the Mr. Tuft mentioned in the *Gazette* is not known, but the party was not led by any such person; though it is thus admitted that it was composed of *loyal militia*. This, however, the party at the time attempted to conceal. There came a formidable band of Cherokees and white men painted like Indians, led down the Saluda Mountain by a bandit well known as "Bloody Bates," who had repeatedly filled the country of the Pacolet, Enoree, and Fair Forest with plundering and midnight assassinations. This man

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 273.

² This was the scene, it may be remembered, of a skirmish in July of the year before (1780), in which a party of Georgians had surprised and taken a body of Tories. (*Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 613.)

possessed all the vices of his Indian associates without a single one of their virtues. After a short but vigorous defence, the fort was surrendered, on the condition that the unfortunate captives were to receive protection from their savage assailants. But no sooner was Bates in possession of the fort than, recreant to his word and insensible to the ordinary feelings of humanity, he ordered a general and indiscriminate massacre of the prisoners. A shocking butchery ensued of men, women, and children. Neither age, sex, nor his own kindred were spared. A few made their escape and some of them in a horribly mangled condition. Mrs. Thompson, the wife of Abner Thompson, afterwards of Greenville District, was saved after having been scalped by the Indians. She lived, near the scene, to a good old age, notwithstanding the terrible disfigurement.

Among those who were killed were the Motley family, all, it is believed, but one son, who lived to avenge in a signal manner the murder of his relations. Many years after the close of the Revolution, the country being restored to peace and county courts established for the administration of justice in the upper part of the State, Bates returned from the Cherokee Nation, where he had taken refuge, and having stolen some horses, he was pursued, arrested, and securely lodged in Greenville jail. He was immediately recognized as "*the Bloody Bates,*" and all were rejoicing that he would meet his doom on the gallows. But there lived in the district a son of the murdered Motley. No sooner did he hear of Bates's arrest than he determined to revenge with his own hands the murder of his father, mother, brothers, and sisters. Procuring a pair of pistols, he sought the prison wherein Bates was confined. From the jailer he demanded the keys at the pistol's mouth. They were surrendered to him and the prison door opened. Bates at once recognized his voice, and knew that not only his

days, but his minutes, were numbered. Motley seized him by the collar and ordered him to say his prayers. In a few moments he sent a ball through his head ; then, taking up the body, he carried it a few yards from the jail and buried it. No one thought of interfering, or of prosecuting Motley for the killing of Bates. On the contrary, we are told, he continued to live in the district for years afterwards, and was always respected and esteemed by his neighbors.¹



What State in the then confederacy suffered so dreadfully as did South Carolina in this terrible struggle? Not only did she endure the ordinary sufferings, fearful as they always are, of a people living in a country the seat of war, but in her case with the knowledge and concurrence of the British government — the government of the mother country. The lowest classes were formed into banditti, the leaders of which, being the commissioners of his Majesty, were turned loose to indulge their private animosities, their thirst for blood and rapine, without reference to the interest of King or country. Nor only so ; but the savage Indians were supplied with arms and ammunition and called on to add the horrors of their barbarities to the fratricidal strife. And even on the side of the cause of freedom it had been found necessary to enlist men for pay by plunder, as Congress could afford no money or means for their support.

A curious process had been going on. There can be no doubt that until the fall of Charlestown a majority of the people of the State had been opposed to the severance of the relation of this province to the mother country, and that among those so opposed were many, very many, of the best and noblest in the land ; but from the fall of the city and the advance of the British army a sifting process had

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.* ; Article *Southern Quarterly Review*, April, 1847, Charleston, S.C.

begun and continued, by which the better classes and the highest characters, with a few notable exceptions, were drawn or driven to the American cause, while on the other side the lowest elements of society gravitated to the Royal standard. Hence the term "Tory," which had first come into use in 1775 as the designation of an honorable party, became a byword of reproach and infamy which it has scarcely lost to this day.

Part of
SOUTH CAROLINA.
 Showing the Seat of War
 After the
 Battle of Eutaw



CHAPTER XXI

1781

GENERAL GREENE'S apprehension that Lord Cornwallis might attempt a retreat to South Carolina was finally dispelled by the news of his lordship's investment at Yorktown in September by the combined American and French forces under Washington. As soon as the arrival of the French fleet under De Grasse had assured the destruction of Cornwallis's army, suggestions simultaneously came from Philadelphia and South Carolina to Washington for the further employment of the allies in the reduction of the British forces in South Carolina. As early as September 12, Mr. Edward Rutledge, who had just been released from St. Augustine, wrote to General Washington urging a coöperation between the French fleet and the land forces to recover Charlestown from the enemy. He said that he had consulted the Chevalier de la Luzerne on the subject, and laid before him a plan which that minister approved, and promised that he would use his influence with Count de Grasse to obtain naval aid from him to effect its object.¹ General Greene also applied to Washington to the same effect, and sent on Colonel Lee, hoping that his pressing entreaties, engaging address, and military reputation would do something towards promoting the favorite project.² General Washington approved the plan, and the day after the surrender of Cornwallis wrote to the Count suggesting it

¹ Washington's *Writings*, vol. VIII, 174.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 256.

to him. Charlestown, he said, the principal maritime port of the British in the southern part of this continent, the grand deposit and point of support of the present theatre of the war, was open to a combined attack, and might be carried with as much certainty as the place just surrendered. This capture would destroy the last hope which induced the enemy to continue the war.

“It will depend upon your excellency, therefore,” he wrote, “to terminate the war and enable the allies to dictate the law in a treaty. A campaign so generous and so fruitful in consequences could be reserved only for the Count de Grasse. It rarely happens that such a combination of means as are in our hands at present can be seasonably obtained by the most strenuous human exertions; a decisively superior fleet, the fortune and talents of whose commander overawe all the naval force that the most strenuous efforts of the enemy have been able to collect; an army flushed with success demanding only to be conducted to new attacks; and the very season which is proper for operating against the point in question.”¹

The day after he so wrote, General Washington himself went on board the admiral's ship both to pay his respects and offer his thanks for the services that had been rendered by the fleet, and to endeavor to impress upon Count de Grasse the importance of the plan he had suggested. He returned the same evening, but having promised Lafayette the command of a detachment against Wilmington in case the Count could be persuaded to undertake the convoy and debarkation of the troops, he left that officer for the purpose of further consultation with the admiral.

Two days after, Lafayette came back with the report that the Count de Grasse would be happy to be able to make the expedition to Charlestown, all the advantages of which he felt, but the orders of his court, ulterior projects, and his engagements with the Spaniards rendered it impossible to remain the necessary time for the operations against

¹ Washington's *Writings*, vol. VIII, 185-186.

Charlestown; but conditionally promising to assist the Marquis against Wilmington, that requiring less time.¹

This was but a repetition of D'Estaing's conduct before Savannah in 1779. A second time the French fleet abandoned the Americans just at the point at which the most important success might have been obtained. General Washington did not overstate the position, — Charlestown could at this juncture easily have been taken and the war ended. But the interests of the States were not always the interests of the French allies.

The fall of Cornwallis, however, enabled Washington to send at last some reënforcements to South Carolina. The Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia Continentals were ordered to General Greene. Colonels Shelby and Sevier also joined him about the end of October with five hundred men, and a detachment of one hundred and sixty North Carolina recruits were added to his infantry. The approach of these corps was the signal for preparing for active movements, the weather had become cold, the frosts had delivered his army from the remains of their agues, the survivors of his wounded had rejoined their regiments, and the corps under Sumter, Marion, and their officers were recruiting and concentrating.

The intelligence of the surrender of Yorktown reached the American camp the last of October, but the official communication was not received until the 9th of November. The day was observed in camp as a day of jubilee.²

Relying upon his increased strength by the arrival of Shelby and Sevier, and the reënforcements on the march to join him, General Greene determined again to cross the Congaree for the long-wished-for purpose of driving the enemy into Charlestown. Every consideration induced

¹ Washington's *Writings*, vol. VIII, 187.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 252.

this move. Governor Rutledge, who was now with his army, was busy reorganizing a State government. He had, in pursuance of the powers conferred upon him, issued a proclamation for the election of members of a General Assembly under the constitution of 1778, and it was of the highest importance to recover as much ground as possible that elections might generally be held for members of the Legislature. Military motives also concurred in rendering the movement in the highest degree advisable. The surrender of Lord Cornwallis put an end to the purpose of Greene's remaining north of the Santee, while, on the other hand, Marion had received intelligence from Charlestown of an intention on the part of the enemy to evacuate that place and concentrate his force at Savannah. This movement, it is supposed, was contemplated by the British on the supposition that some such plan as that which had been urged upon De Grasse would be undertaken. Greene, it is true, did not credit the information except as dependent on an event which he knew, and the enemy did not know, would not take place — the coöperation of the French fleet. Still, as the apprehension of such a combined operation did exist on the part of the enemy, it was important for the American general to be in a position to meet any such movement should it, upon some false alarm, be attempted; and all his arrangements were accordingly made. Shelby, Sevier, Horry, and Maham were ordered to place themselves under Marion, to act in the country between the Santee and Charlestown. Together they formed a very efficient corps of mounted infantry and riflemen. General Sumter was ordered, at the head of his brigade of State troops and a detachment of his militia brigade, to take post at Orangeburgh and cover the country from the inroads of the Loyalists from Charlestown; while Pickens, with Colonel Robert Anderson's

regiment and a part of Colonel Samuel Hammond's, was despatched to put down an uprising of the Indians.¹

In the early part of November Sumter and Marion crossed the rivers and advanced upon the enemy. Sumter crossed the Congaree on Monday, the 12th, and early the following morning Major Blewford, with seventy mounted men, was despatched after a Tory Captain Giessendanner, who, Sumter was informed, had just arrived in the neighborhood of Orangeburgh with some wagons escorted by sixty men. Two men only were found at Giessendanner's, who fired at the party and escaped. Major Moore of the State troops, who was to have joined Major Blewford at Giessendanner's, passed on to Orangeburgh and thence set out for Rowe's plantation, two miles distant. Unfortunately he fell in with General Cuninghame and a large party lately from Charlestown. The enemy at first gave way, but their superior numbers soon prevailed, and pressing Moore's men back, the latter gave way in turn and were thrown into disorder by a heavy fire from a party concealed in a swamp; a rout ensued. Some of the scattered troops reached Major Blewford and with him joined Sumter eight miles above Orangeburgh. Cuninghame's force was upwards of 500 men. Sumter had with him 418.² This reverse caused Sumter to fall back; but his advance had been fortunately timed to check the further progress of General Cuninghame who had issued from Charlestown upon a more formidable expedition to the upper country, than those of which an account was given in the last chapter. General Marion was also checked in his advance by encountering at Wantoot Colonel Stuart, who had returned to the field, at the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 258; Johnson's *Traditions*, 515.

² Sumter's letter to Greene, November 14, 1781, Nightingale Collection, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 55.

head of nearly two thousand men. The enemy, it seems, were at this time seriously engaged in preparing to sustain a siege in Charlestown, anticipating the coöperation of the French, and were laying in provisions and collecting the slaves in the country, first for fortifying Charlestown, and then to be appropriated as plunder.¹

On the 18th of November the camp at the High Hills was a second time broken up; and as the route to be pursued led the army away from the support of Marion, who was charged with guarding the left of the army on its march, Captain Eggleston, with the Legion strengthened by a detachment from the Virginia line, was ordered to join him. The main army then took up the line of march on the route by Simons's and McCord's ferries through Orangeburgh to Riddlesperger's, thence by the Indian Fields road to Ferguson's Mill, where that road crosses the Edisto, intending to take post at Mr. Sanders's plantation on the Round O. Greene's intention appears to have been to take a position on the Four Hole Swamp in the parish of St. George, Dorchester, east of the Edisto, about thirty miles from Charlestown, for the double purpose of covering the country beyond him and controlling the movements of the enemy on his right towards Savannah; but an event had now occurred which rendered it indispensable that he should have the Edisto between himself and the enemy.

It was on the sufficiency of the force assembled under Marion to keep in check that of the enemy under Stuart that Greene had ventured to advance to the Four Holes, or meditated taking a position so much exposed to an attack from Charlestown. The mountaineers under Shelby and Sevier constituted the reënforcement upon which he had ventured into the field. And this force, to his astonishment, now deserted him. He had been given to under-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 258.

stand that they were to remain in service "until the spring of the year or until Charlestown was reduced." To his disappointment and surprise they all abandoned Marion by the 25th of November. Johnson supposes that this was caused by Shelby's obtaining leave of absence, or perhaps because the service at the time was not sufficiently active for their habits. Greene had warned Marion that he must give them something to do, or they would become dissatisfied.¹ But in all his efforts to effect this Marion had been unsuccessful. He had approached the enemy, but could not tempt him from his encampment. With numbers known to be decidedly superior to the Americans, it was with chagrin that Marion found it impossible to induce him to take the field. And it was not until Stuart decamped from Wantoot and retired near to the Goose Creek bridge that Marion discovered the cause. The orderly of Colonel, now General, Stuart — he having lately been promoted — fell into the hands of Marion, and on him was found a return from which it appeared that out of 2272 men the enemy had 928 on the sick list. To keep hold on public opinion, to command the country, or to collect provisions and plunder slaves, the enemy had kept the field in the Low-Country amidst the swamps and rice fields during the whole fall, the sickliest season of the year. To the recently arrived Europeans this was most deadly; and very many of them fell a prey to disease.

The only services in which the mountaineers were employed while with Marion were in attacks upon the post at Fair Lawn and on the redoubts at Wappetaw in St. Thomas's Parish. Detachments of about 200 of them, supported by Maham's cavalry of about 180, were in both instances employed under the command of Colonel Shelby. The latter place, on being approached, was abandoned, for

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 260.

General Stuart was then drawing in his forces under the protection of Charlestown.

The attack on Fair Lawn was made while the enemy lay at Wantoot. A garrison of considerable strength had been usually kept at that post to cover the landing-place on Cooper River; but when the main army of the British lay in advance of it, the garrison had been weakened, no doubt upon the supposition that its services were rendered unnecessary. Marion knew that the garrison was reduced, and determined to strike a blow turning the enemy's left, and moving rapidly into their rear. The landing-place was covered by a fort of too much strength to be carried by assault with such troops as Shelby's and Maham's; but at the distance of half a mile was Colleton's house, a strong brick building built at a very early period, and known to have been constructed for defence as well as comfort. This had been enclosed by a strong abatis, and being on the route from Charlestown to Monck's Corner, had been used as a station for their troops and convoys in passing from post to post. It was sufficiently capacious to cover a party of considerable strength, and was unassailable by cavalry, the only force from which sudden incursions could be apprehended. It was also a convenient depot in the transportation of negroes, stock, etc., taken above the British posts and moving to Charlestown, and had been used also as a hospital.

In passing the post at Wantoot, Maham was ordered to show himself and to endeavor to draw the British cavalry into the field. The manœuvre did not succeed, but it brought out a strong detachment to tread on his heels and preclude the possibility of his effecting anything further unless with great despatch.

On approaching Fair Lawn on the morning of the 27th of November, everything within the abatis indicated resist-

ance; and the loss of time, with the fort in view and the enemy in his rear, must have resulted in disappointment. A party of riflemen were at once ordered to dismount and to move as infantry, while the remainder of the corps, headed by the cavalry, advanced boldly into the field and demanded a surrender. No resistance was made and the place surrendered at discretion. In it were found three hundred stands of arms, many stores of value, some sick, and eighty convalescents. The medical men were paroled, and the convalescents carried off on horseback behind Maham's men. But the house with its contents and the abatis were committed to flames.¹

General Stuart, insolently addressing General Marion through the adjutant general instead of writing himself, complained of the taking and burning of this place as an outrage upon a parcel of sick and helpless soldiers in a hospital. "The burning an Hospital," he wrote, "and dragging away a number of dying people to expire in swamps is a species of barbarity hitherto unknown in civilized nations — especially when that hospital has been left without a guard for its defence — that could justify an attack upon the defenceless inhabitants."² This complaint was communicated by Marion to General Greene, who at once called upon Colonel Maham for a report of the facts. He wrote to Marion: "I shall be obliged to Colonel Maham to give me a particular report of the condition of the prisoners he made as well as the manner of making them, also the special reasons which induced him to burn the Hospital. I have not the least doubt that the burning the Hospital was to destroy the stores, which could not be effected in any other way; but I wish to have materials to contradict their charges with."³ We have no record of the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 260-262.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 213.

³ *Ibid.*, 215.

report then called for; but the practical answer to the charge was the delivering at the High Hills, the American depot, of eighty prisoners all able to bear arms.¹ An enemy has no right to protect a depot of stores, arms, and plunder by hoisting over it a hospital flag.

Major William Cuninghame now again made his appearance, dashing into Orangeburgh, and surprising Colonel Richard Hampton, killing eleven of his men, and dispersing the rest without the loss of a man to his own party.²

General Greene received with astonishment the intelligence of the intended return of the mountaineers. Upon this reënforcement he had ventured across the Santee, and was now too far advanced to recede. Marion, also relying on this support, had passed the Santee and penetrated down the country on the enemy's right. The most pressing entreaties were despatched to prevail on the mountaineers to remain, but before the message reached Marion's camp, there was not one of them left. Fortunately, however, Greene's movement across the Congaree had induced Stuart to draw toward Charlestown and leave Marion in safety; and that movement of the enemy, evincing his ignorance of the actual state of the American army, or a consciousness of his own weakness, induced Greene to undertake an enterprise calculated both to confirm the enemy in his opinion of the American strength, and, by forcing him into Charlestown without risking an action, to secure the entire command of the State. This was an important object just at this time, as it would assist Governor Rutledge in his plans for the election of the General Assembly he was about to convene.³

With these views, General Greene, leaving the army on

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 263.

² *The Royal Gazette*, November 21, 1781.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 264.

its march under the command of Colonel Williams, moved briskly forward towards Dorchester at the head of about two hundred cavalry of Lee's and Washington's commands, and one hundred drawn from Sumter's. The infantry consisted of those of the Legion and detachments from the Maryland and Virginia lines. In the absence of Washington, who was a prisoner, and Lee, who was an invalid, the command of the cavalry was given to Colonel Wade Hampton,¹ who, in his short career, had already risen high in the confidence of the general in command and of his troops.

Colonel Williams was directed to advance by easy marches to the Four Hole, a branch of the Edisto, while the general hastened by a circuitous route in the hope that he would surprise the post at Dorchester, garrisoned at the time by 400 infantry, all the British cavalry, not, however, exceeding 150, and some militia. But notwithstanding the celerity of his movements, the pursuit of the least-frequented paths, and every precaution for preventing intelligence, he was so watched and surrounded by Loyalists in the woods and swamps that notice of his approach preceded him half a day, and the enemy lay on their arms all the night of the 30th, expecting an attack. As Greene did not appear, at a late hour on the 1st of December a reconnoitring party of fifty Loyalists was despatched for intelligence. Hampton's advance guard fell in with this party, and suffered but few of them to escape. Twenty or thirty, chiefly Loyalists, were killed, wounded, or taken, and such an alarm excited by the presence of the general and the belief that his whole American force was upon them, that during the night the garrison destroyed everything, threw their cannon into the Ashley River, and retreated to Charlestown.² The fort at Dorchester was so situated that a

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 264.

² *Ibid.*; Greene's letter to Sumter, Sumter's MSS.

retreat from it was practicable either by land or water, and either on the east or west side of the river, whichever was most secure from annoyance. A bridge on the east side of the river being taken up, the advance of the Americans on that side was stopped; but Greene could not have pursued, as the enemy was too strong for the force he had with him. Their infantry exceeded five hundred.

The enemy halted and was reënforced at the Quarter House, about five miles from the city, where the neck is very narrow; and General Stuart making a simultaneous movement from Goose Creek bridge to the same point, all the force that could be summoned from Charlestown joined them, and the whole were actively engaged in preparing to resist an immediate attack.¹

The Royal Gazette of November 7th announced the arrival of General Leslie and a corps of artillery for the garrison. To this had also been added the garrison of Wilmington under Colonel Craig, which, upon the approach of Lafayette, had evacuated that town. General Leslie, who relieved General Stuart of command, had now a force in the town and its immediate neighborhood of 3300 men besides 1000 Loyalists. But so alarmed was he at the approach of Greene and the anticipated siege, that he resolved to embody into regiments the young and active of the slaves that had recently been crowded into the town, — a measure which proved most unpopular, and was abandoned when the alarm subsided.

Count Kosciuszko, who was serving as an engineer on Greene's staff, had preceded the army and had selected Sanders's plantation on the Round O as a proper position for an encampment. This place is situated between the swamp or river of that name, and the Ashepoo, about forty

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 264, 265; *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 523-524.

or fifty miles to the southwest of Charlestown, and ten northeast of the present Walterboro, thus commanding the communication between Charlestown and Savannah.

The whole British force was thus crowded into the town and the narrow isthmus, or neck, as it is called, between the Cooper and the Ashley rivers. To relieve this Colonel Craig, the commandant of the garrison of Wilmington, with some additional infantry and cavalry, was detached to John's Island to the south of the town, where most of the cattle collected for the British army were at pasture, where long forage was procurable for the cavalry, where coöperation with the garrison of Charlestown was convenient, and whence infantry might be readily transported along the interior navigation to Savannah.¹

General Greene took up his headquarters at Round O on the 7th of December. Marion was advanced nearer to Charlestown to keep the right of the enemy in check. He took post at Wadboo on the eastern side of the Cooper.² Sumter occupied Orangeburgh and the Four Holes. Colonel Wade Hampton with fifty of the State cavalry kept open the communication between Sumter and Marion. Colonels Harden and Wilkinson watched the enemy's movements on the south, while Colonel Lee, who had rejoined the army, in command of the light detachment posted in advance, kept the enemy from prying into the real weakness of the American army. This was indeed necessary, for the investing force did not at this time number eight hundred men, nor had the army four rounds of ammunition to a man.³

Prior to General Greene's leaving the High Hills the last time, he had been straitened for ammunition. For ten days

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 265; *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 524.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 148.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 266.

after he was ready to march he had been detained there for no other cause. A small supply had arrived before the march of the main army, and he had despatched officers in the hope of obtaining some addition to his stock from the stores captured at Yorktown. But no ammunition had arrived, whilst all were clamoring, from Georgia to Santee, for cartridges.¹

The quartermaster's department was also in such a condition that, had the army depended upon it for subsistence, General Greene could not have ventured to advance. Indeed, to relieve this department of this heavy part of its duties was one of the principal motives for taking the position at Round O.² Colonel Lee thus grandiloquently describes the section, into which he now for the first time entered.³ The first day's march, he says, brought the detachments to the country settled by the original emigrants into Carolina. The scene was both new and delightful. Vestiges, though clouded by war, everywhere appeared of the wealth and taste of the inhabitants. Spacious edifices, rich and elegant gardens, with luxuriant and extensive rice plantations, were to be seen on every side. This change in the aspect of inanimate nature could not fail to excite emotions of pleasure the more vivid because so rare. During our continued marches and countermarches never before had we been solaced with the prospect of so much comfort. Here we were not confined to one solitary mansion where a few, and a few only, might enjoy the charms of taste and the luxury of opulence. The rich repast was widespread, and when to the exterior was added the fashion, politeness, and hospitality of the interior, we became enraptured with our changed condition, and the resolve of never yielding up this charming region but with life became universal. To crown our

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 268.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Memoirs of the War of 1776*, 525.

bliss, the fair sex shone in its brightest lustre. With the ripest and most symmetrical beauty, our fair compatriots blended sentimental dignity and delicate refinement, the sympathetic shade of melancholy, and the dawning smile of hope, the arrival of their new guests opening to them the prospect of happier times. In more prosaic language, Greene had now been able to move the army into a rich and plentiful country, which had been comparatively little devastated by the war. Prévost had made a rapid incursion through it in 1779, nearly three years before, and had done some mischief, and during the siege of Charlestown, two years before, the British foraging parties had made free with stock and provisions; but for more than eighteen months this part of the country had suffered little, Marion and Harden in their raids doing as little damage as possible to the property of the people, who they knew at heart were in sympathy with their cause. True it was that many of the estates of the Whigs had been sequestered by the British authorities and maintained for the supply of their army. But this measure had the good effect, in the case of those owners who had fled to the American camp, or been imprisoned, of preserving these plantations in at least some degree of order, though Governor Mathews had occasion to observe to General Leslie that in many cases they had been stripped of negroes and of horses and cattle. In assuming the position at Round O, therefore, Greene had greatly improved the opportunity of subsisting his army, while he added to its strength by releasing so many more of those who had yet regarded themselves bound by their paroles.

There was another consideration of great importance in the move to this position. It had at first been determined by Governor Rutledge and his Council to convene the General Assembly at Camden, but General Greene, after

his excursion to Dorchester, had, with an escort of cavalry, reconnoitred the country between the Edisto and Ashepoo and found it possessed in his opinion of sufficient military advantages to admit his securing Jacksonborough from danger. He had therefore warmly pressed the Governor and Council to convene the Legislature at this place, for the double purpose of presenting on the one hand the evidence of a complete recovery of the State, while at the same time it held them secure from any sudden attempt from the Loyalists of the Saluda or Deep River, such as had been successfully made on Governor Burke in North Carolina, and was afterward repeated in the Georgia Legislature. Boldness and caution alike therefore sanctioned the holding of the Legislature at Jacksonborough, which the position of the army now fully covered.¹

Colonel John Laurens, who had been included in the capitulation of Charlestown, had been soon released, his exchange having been expedited by Congress for the purpose of sending him on a special embassy to Paris, that he might urge the necessity of a vigorous coöperation on the part of France. He had sailed in February, 1781, and there, in conjunction with Dr. Franklin and Count De Vergennes, arranged the plan of the campaign of the year which eventuated in the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, and finally in a termination of the war. Within six months from the day Colonel Laurens left America he returned and brought with him the concerted plan of combined operations. Ardent to rejoin the army, he remained only long enough at Philadelphia to make a report of his negotiations to Congress, before setting out to resume his place as one of the aids of General Washington. He was then at his post in the field again when the operations he had arranged for in the cabinet at Paris began. In the course

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 278.

of the siege he, with Colonel Hamilton, led the storming parties at Yorktown which hastened the surrender of the British. He had thus had the honor of negotiating the articles of Cornwallis's capitulation on behalf of Washington. This concluded, he hastened at once to rejoin his comrades in his native State in their struggle for its recovery, now so far advanced to a successful completion.¹ General Greene at once formed and placed under his command a detachment charged with coöperating in the measures previously adopted for confining the enemy to the limits to which he was now restricted.

Laurens was so great a favorite, and so well known in the Low-Country of South Carolina, that he soon found the means of opening a communication with Charlestown, and through one of the channels of information he had opened he learned, on the 25th of December, the rumor that a fleet from Ireland with three thousand troops on board was within two days' sail of the bar; that some of the officers had actually arrived, and that a reënforcement of two thousand more was hourly expected from New York. Lee, who was at the same time with his detachment low down Ashley River, received the same intelligence; and reeking couriers from both these officers arrived at the same moment in the American camp. General Greene received these reports as confirmation of an event he had repeatedly foretold, that the British army to the South would be reënforced as well to maintain the *uti possidetis* principle for which England was negotiating,² as because the war must languish altogether

¹ Ramsay's *So. Ca.*, vol. II, 499, 500; Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 465.

² The opposition in Parliament in England claimed that no treaty of peace should have been entered into with the American Colonies, which required the evacuation of New York and Charlestown and the abandon-

unless pressed in this quarter. Recent movements among the Indians which have been mentioned, the never failing presage of movements in the British army, had also taken place; her own diminished and ill-provided condition invited attack, and the source of this information appeared of unquestionable authority. General Greene was much alarmed, and the night was consumed in preparing despatches to Count Rochambeau, the governors of Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, earnestly soliciting immediate support. To insure despatch and effect to these applications and hasten the advance of St. Clair¹ and Wayne² with the Continental troops on their way to join him, officers of known zeal and fidelity were made the bearers of these messages.

Had the intelligence which had produced such excitement in the American camp been really true, there can be little doubt, says Johnson, that Greene must once more have yielded up all his hard-earned conquests. Count Rochambeau pleaded the want of instruction from his court, and could promise no support until Greene should be pushed back into Virginia. North Carolina, since the capture of Governor Burke, was in such a state of confusion that she could not get her Legislature together. And Virginia, convulsed by a quarrel with her own governor and with Morris, the financier of the United States, without a farthing in her treasury or a

ment of the Loyalists. The cities, being still in the actual occupation of the British forces, should have been retained. (Wraxall's *Memoirs*, vol. III, 805.)

¹ Major-General Arthur St. Clair of Pennsylvania, in command of the detachment of Washington's army consisting of the Pennsylvania and Virginia lines, now on the march to join Greene.

² Brigadier-General Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania, "Mad Anthony" as he was called for his reckless courage, commanding the Pennsylvania line under St. Clair.

prospect of any kind, so impoverished that her thousand recruits in depot were kept from perishing only by the private advances of the gentlemen at the head of the War Department, could only promise that those recruits should be immediately marched to headquarters. Militia, she could send none.¹

Under the pressure of this alarm, General Greene addressed to Governor Rutledge a letter which was the subject of much animadversion at the time. It was, however, but a renewal of the scheme proposed by Colonel John Laurens in 1780 for embodying negro troops. At great length General Greene laid before Governor Rutledge the desperate condition of affairs, notwithstanding the present reoccupation of so much of the State. He pointed out the preparation the British were making in Charlestown for its defence, the measures taken to incorporate the Tories, embodying the negroes on their side, and the incitement of the savages on the frontier. He represented that, should the enemy have in contemplation offensive operations in this quarter, they would undoubtedly reënforce their army here and oblige him to fall back, and once more give the enemy command of the most fertile part of the State. That then a change of sentiment might also take place among the inhabitants — new difficulties arise, and the issue of the war be protracted, if not rendered doubtful. Good policy, therefore, dictated that they should strengthen themselves by every means the natural resources of the country would admit. He represented the futility of depending upon the North for assistance. Then, discussing the military situation, he proceeded:—

“The natural strength of the country in point of numbers appears to me to consist much more in the blacks than in the whites. Could they be incorporated and employed for its defence it would afford you

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 271, 272.

double security. That they would make good soldiers I have not the least doubt; and I am persuaded the State has it not in its power to give sufficient reinforcement without incorporating them either to secure the country, if the enemy mean to act vigorously upon offensive plan, or furnish a force sufficient to dispossess them of Charleston should it be defensive.

“The number of whites in this State is too small, and the state of your finances too low, to raise a force in any other way. Should the measure be adopted it may prove a good means of preventing the enemy from further attempts upon this country, when they find they have not only the whites, but the blacks also to contend with; and I believe it is generally agreed that if the natural strength of the country could have been employed in its defence, the enemy would have found it little less than impracticable to have got footing here, much more to have overrun the country; by which the inhabitants have suffered infinitely greater loss than would have been sufficient to have given you perfect security. And I am persuaded the incorporation of a part of the negroes would rather tend to secure the fidelity of others than excite discontent mutiny and desertion among them. The force I would ask for this purpose in addition to what we have and what may probably join us from the northward or from the militia of this State would be four regiments, two upon the Continental and two upon the State establishment: a corps of pioneer and a corps of artificers each to consist of about eighty men. The two last may be either on a temporary or permanent establishment as may be most agreeable to the State. The others should have their freedom, and be clothed and treated in all respects as other soldiers without which they will be unfit for the duties expected from them.”

Such a suggestion could not fail to arouse great opposition. And this not only because of the practical confiscation of property which it implied; though on the ground of the negro's pecuniary value as property the British government had failed in every attempt to utilize the negro population as a military power. When Governor Rutledge reached Philadelphia upon his escape from the State in 1780, he reported, it is related, that the negroes offered up prayers in favor of England in the hope that she would give them a chance to escape from slavery. But

the British officers, regarding negroes as valuable spoil, defeated every plan for employing them as soldiers on the side of England.¹ The planters, of course, were opposed to a measure which might take from them the ablest and most intelligent of their slaves. But, far beyond this, there was an instinctive repugnance and aversion to the idea of calling upon slaves to rescue the liberties of free-men. And still further and deeper was their resentment at the proposition that, having given these negroes their freedom, they were to be clothed and treated in all respects as other soldiers. This suggestion was an offence to the rank and file of the army, militia, volunteer, and regular alike. Indeed, the indignation at the proposition, we are told, increased with the descent in the grade of the army. The attempt to carry out the scheme would, doubtless, have ended in mutiny.

The proposition was not, however, rejected absolutely by Governor Rutledge and the Council now assembled with him. It had been broached in the Legislature before, and as that body was now soon to assemble, it was resolved to submit it to their decision.²

It having been arranged between Governor Rutledge and General Greene that the Legislature should be assembled at Jacksonborough, a small village on the southwestern bank of the Edisto, the army moved from the Round O, and crossed the Edisto on the 16th of December, taking position at the plantation of Colonel Skirving, six miles in advance of Jacksonborough, on the road leading to Charlestown. In order to secure the safety of the Legislature at this place, it became necessary to guard against the detachment on John's Island under Colonel Craig. From the end of John's Island, that is, from Wadmalaw Sound, Jacksonborough was not beyond striking distance, as upon

¹ Bancroft, vol. V, 413.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 275.

a full tide by the aid of their galleys, that place might be approached by the enemy, while the communication with Charlestown by James Island rendered it easy to throw reënforcements upon John's Island unperceived. It was important, therefore, to drive the enemy from this post. As Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens was personally intimately acquainted with this part of the country, not only from his general familiarity with this section, but from his having been here engaged under Moultrie in resisting Prévost's invasion, General Greene committed to Lieutenant-Colonel Lee and himself the subject for their consideration. It was soon ascertained, not only that the island was accessible, but that the British commander, relying on his galleys, was quite unapprehensive of an attack.

There was a point between the Stono and Edisto at which the island, or peninsula, more properly speaking, was formerly connected to the high land by a piece of marsh. To complete the inland communication between Charlestown and the Edisto by way of the Stono, this marsh had been cut through, and the canal was known as the New Cut. At low water this place was fordable, and to guard the pass two galleys had been moored at convenient distances, but necessarily somewhat remotely separated in order to prevent their grounding. Laurens and Lee had made all the necessary inquiries before the army moved from the Round O. And these two enterprising young commanders now solicited permission of the general to attempt the passage by night between the galleys and the surprise of the British detachment under Colonel Craig. The attempt was readily sanctioned, and the night of the 13th of December fixed for its execution.

The main army moved by concert on the 12th on the route to Wallace's bridge, over the Caw Caw Swamp, or river on the road to Rantowles, to draw the attention of the

enemy from the real point of attack, while the two light detachments under the command of Colonel Laurens, crossing the country from the Ashley River, headed the north branch of the Stono on the night of the 13th, and advanced to New Cut, which is at the head of the south branch. The main army, intended to cover and support the light detachments, had halted as if to go into camp for the night, but was put again in motion soon after dark; and the general in person reached the Cut before the hour of low water, at which alone the ford was passable. Here he found the attacking party in a strange state of embarrassment. The detachments of Lee and Laurens formed each a separate column on the march, the former led by Colonel Lee in person, the latter by Major Hamilton.¹ Colonel Laurens, in command of the whole as the senior officer,² rode with Lee, whose column was in the advance. Hamilton's had not moved from the ground precisely at the time that the first column was put in motion; but no mistake was apprehended, as he was furnished with a guide. Before reaching the point, however, where the path which led to the ford turned off from the road they were upon, Hamilton's guide deserted him; the silence necessary to be observed prevented the detachments from communicating by signals, and Hamilton saw now no resource but hastening on in the hope to overtake the first column. In

¹ Major James Hamilton of Pennsylvania, captain First Continental Infantry, March 10 to December 31, 1776; captain First Pennsylvania, January 1, 1777, taken prisoner at Fort Montgomery October 6, 1777; major Second Pennsylvania, December 10, 1778 (Historian), had just arrived with Pennsylvania Line. After Revolution, settled in South Carolina, and took conspicuous part in her affairs; was the father of the famous nullification governor, James Hamilton, Jr.

² Colonel Laurens, it will be recollected, had been made lieutenant-colonel by special act of Congress March 29, 1779. Colonel Lee's commission was not issued until October, 1780.

his haste he passed the road to the ford, and pushing on with redoubled speed as the hour of low water approached, he so increased the distance from the first column that messengers despatched to find him returned in despair. In his anxiety to reach the ford Hamilton, without a guide, had attempted a short route across the fields, which failed him, and the second column was thus entirely lost.

The time for executing the enterprise passed by. Colonel Lee, who had crossed over to the island, was necessarily recalled before the height of the tide should cut off his retreat.

But the object could not be relinquished without some effort to accomplish it, and General Greene resolved upon forcing his passage into the island. A boat was procured, and while the artillery drove their galleys from a station where they could annoy the Americans, Colonel Laurens passed over the Cut and penetrated to Craig's encampment. But the alarm occasioned by the narrow escape of the morning had demonstrated to the enemy the insecurity of his situation, and Colonel Laurens found the island abandoned by all but a few stragglers, who were made prisoners. The cattle also had been driven across the river or dispersed in the woods. The main object had, however, been effected without loss, and the enemy had retreated so precipitately that the schooner which contained their baggage and one hundred invalids was very near falling into Laurens's hands. General Greene in his official communication indulged in his usual consolation: *if* matters had all gone right he *would* have achieved a great victory. "Had our party crossed the first night," he wrote, "the enterprise would have been completely successful. The enemy had between four to five hundred men on the island," etc. But the attacking force under Laurens and Lee could scarcely have exceeded this

number; and reënforcements could easily have been sent to Craig from James Island. The most that can be said is that had there been no miscarriage in the execution of the bold enterprise, itself replete with difficulties, there was great hope of a successful issue. But in war victory is never assured until achieved. Had the whole party crossed the Cut without misadventure, some later accident might have alike resulted in defeat.

Johnson has been followed in this account¹ in preference to Lee. The latter wrote evidently from recollection, without official documents, for he is mistaken in his chronology as well as in other matters in regard to the expedition. He writes as if he was in equal, if not in actual, command with Laurens. Whatever questions there may have been as between officers in the Continental establishment and those of the State, there could be none between those in the same line. Precedence and command were absolutely settled by seniority; and Laurens was Lee's senior as a lieutenant-colonel in the Continental line by more than a year. He was, as Johnson points out, present with Lee in the advance because he was in the command of the whole. Lee states that the execution of the enterprise was appointed for the 28th of December, and represents it as taking place probably on that night, while Johnson asserts that it took place on the 13th. There is certainly considerable difficulty in fixing the exact date of this adventure, but that Lee is mistaken is evident from the fact that by his own account Captain Armstrong commanded in the expedition a squadron of the cavalry of the Legion.² Whereas the semi-weekly *Royal Gazette* of Saturday, December 29, 1781, to Wednesday, January 2, 1782, announces the capture by Major Coffin of Captain Arm-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 273-281.

² *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 532.

strong at Garden's plantation near Dorchester on Sunday last, to wit, the 30th, which affair, again by Lee's account, occurred certainly several days after the expedition to John's Island. It is true that Mr. Henry Lee, in maintaining the correctness of his father's statement, publishes letters of General Greene to Lee upon the subject, apparently dated December 21st and 28th;¹ but the latter date is probably a misprint or mistake for the 23d. Upon Lee's theory there would scarcely be time for the movements described by him to have taken place before the established date of the capture of Captain Armstrong by the contemporaneous publication of *The Royal Gazette*.

Johnson observes that the expedition to John's Island concluded the campaign of 1781; but it did not do so entirely, for the affair in which Armstrong was captured took place, as we have just seen, before the end of the year. After the expedition to John's Island was over, Lee returned to his position of observation on the Ashley. The country between Dorchester and the Quarter House was occasionally visited by his light parties, which infringed upon the domain claimed by the sometime British army of South Carolina, now garrison of Charlestown. A well-concerted enterprise was projected by the commandant to repress the liberties taken by Lee's parties. Major Coffin, with a detachment of cavalry composed of different corps, was detached in the night to occupy specified points for their surprise. It so happened that Captain Armstrong of the Legion cavalry had been sent to Dorchester by General Greene the night before, for the purpose of conferring with a spy from Charlestown. On the approach of morning Armstrong advanced to Dorchester, and meet-

¹ *Campaign in the Carolinas* (H. Lee), 503-505. We may also observe that the letters fail to establish, as Mr. Lee supposes, that Lieutenant-Colonel Lee, the junior, commanded his senior, Colonel Laurens, in this expedition.

ing a party of dragoons sent forward for the purpose of decoying any of the American detachments traversing this quarter, he rushed upon it. Armstrong, it was said, was one of the most gallant of the brave, too apt in the confidence he reposed in his sword to lose sight of those considerations which prudence suggested. Eager to close with his flying foe, he pursued vehemently, and fell into the snare spread for his destruction. The moment he discovered his condition he turned upon his enemy and drove at him in full gallop. The bold effort succeeded so far as to open a partial avenue of retreat, which was seized by his subalterns and some of his dragoons, but Armstrong was taken — the first and only mounted officer of the Legion, it was said, captured during this war. Lee states that four privates were also taken. *The Royal Gazette* says that seven rebels were killed and eight taken prisoners, among whom were Captain Armstrong and Richard Ellis, who formerly kept the Quarter House.¹ The contemporaneous evidence of the *Gazette* is again preferable to the recollection of Lee after many years. Thus closed the military operations of the year 1781.

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 538 ; *The Royal Gazette*, December 29, 1781, to January 2, 1782.

CHAPTER XXII

1781

IT will be recollected that upon the approach of Sir Henry Clinton in February, 1780, the General Assembly then sitting in Charlestown had broken up, delegating "till ten days after their next session to the Governor John Rutledge, Esquire, and such of his Council as he could conveniently consult, a power to do everything necessary for the public good, except the taking away the life of a citizen without a legal trial." Before the investment of the town had been completed, the governor with three of his Council, Colonel Charles Pinckney, Daniel Huger, and John L. Gervais, had gone out of the lines so as to avoid the capture of the whole government upon the fall of the town then impending. Governor Rutledge proceeded to Camden, where he remained for some days; then, moving on to Colonel Rugeley's, he just escaped Tarleton when that officer rushed to Buford's slaughter.

The capitulation of Charlestown, involving, as it did, the capture of the lieutenant governor and of almost every other person connected with the civil government, rendered it of vital importance that Governor Rutledge and the three of the Council who had gone out with him should avoid any possible danger of falling into the enemy's hands. Unhappily Colonel Charles Pinckney and Daniel Huger gave up in despair and accepted royal protection. John L. Gervais, like the governor, made his escape into North

Carolina. The governor, upon whose freedom now so much depended, made his way to Philadelphia, where he exerted himself to the utmost to procure men and supplies for the recovery of his State. He appears to have been so engaged there, with, however, but little success, during the months of June, July, and August, 1780. In September he returned to the South, stopping at Hillsboro in North Carolina, where with the governor of that State he was concerting measures for the prosecution of the war, and giving what aid he could to General Gates, who was then endeavoring to reorganize his shattered army. Here it was, as has been seen, that he issued his first commission of brigadier-general to Colonel Williams, which he recalled at the instance of the delegation from Sumter's men, who went to him for the purpose of protesting against the appointment of that officer, and of urging the promotion of Sumter. From Hillsboro he issued the commissions of brigadier-general to Sumter and Marion, putting Sumter in command of all the militia of the State, and placing himself in communication with these officers, supporting and sanctioning their efforts, which had before this been made entirely upon their own individual responsibility without any governmental authorization. He had joined Greene when that general reached Hillsboro and assumed the command of the Southern Department, with him had moved first to Charlotte and thence to Cheraw, when Greene established his headquarters near that place. From Cheraw, in January, 1781, Governor Rutledge found means of opening communication with the friends of the American cause in Charlestown.

Upon the advance of Lord Cornwallis in January, 1781, into North Carolina, the governor was again compelled to fall back with the army and for the time again to abandon the State. He continued, however, with General

Greene until the 8th of March, when he wrote from the camp on Haw River, sending his letter by General Pickens to Sumter, whom he had put in command of all the militia forces, that the present situation of affairs rendering it impracticable for him to return immediately into South Carolina, and impossible to reëstablish civil government there for some time, and there being no use of his remaining with the army there, he had determined to proceed again to Philadelphia to attempt to procure supplies of clothing for the militia, and to obtain, if possible, such effectual aid as to restore both Charlestown and the country to their possession. His utmost endeavors for these purposes should be exerted, and he flattered himself that he might succeed by personal applications. By General Pickens and Major Bowie, returning to the State, the governor sent three hundred militia commissions, which he authorized General Sumter to issue, empowering him to remove officers and to appoint others in the place of the removed. In North Carolina he procured twenty-five hundred yards of woollens, which he sent on to Sumter for the use of the militia.¹ Thence proceeding by the way of Richmond, Governor Rutledge appears to have reached Philadelphia in May. There he was engaged in pressing upon Congress the necessities of the South till the latter end of the month, when he went to Washington's headquarters to lay before the Commander-in-chief the condition of affairs in South Carolina. To Washington he represented the unhappy situation of the suffering soldiery, the prisoners of war at Charlestown, and urged that measures should be taken for their relief. It was owing to his importunities probably that General Wayne with his detachment marched from Yorktown, Pennsylvania, on the 26th of May; but they were detained in Virginia and did not reach South Carolina

¹ Sumter MSS.

until the war was practically over, signaling themselves there only by their second mutiny. Governor Rutledge, on his return, brought with him a small supply of medicines and some other articles which he had procured in Philadelphia; but beyond this his personal applications — of the result of which he was so hopeful — had accomplished nothing.¹

Learning of Lord Rawdon's retreat from Camden, his Excellency returned to South Carolina and on the 1st of August arrived at General Greene's headquarters on the High Hills of Santee. After conferring with the general he retired to Camden, and there set himself at work reorganizing the militia and the State troops which Sumter had partly embodied, and instituting civil government over the territory recovered from the enemy.²

Since the fall of Charlestown there had been really no militia in the State, though the partisan bands were usually so called; for a militia, as we have had occasion to observe before, implies the existence of a government under which the citizens are enrolled and required to do duty. But since his Excellency's departure from the State there had been no government except that of the British

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, Vol. II, 247.

² By the terms of the act conferring upon Governor Rutledge dictatorial powers they were to be exercised in concurrence with such of his Council as he could conveniently consult. The members of the Council, it may be remembered, were Colonel Charles Pinckney, Daniel Huger, John Lewis Gervais, Thomas Ferguson, David Ramsay, Richard Hutson, Roger Smith, and Benjamin Cattell. Major James, in his *Memoirs*, states that at this time Governor Rutledge had but two of his Council with him, Daniel Huger and John Lewis Gervais (*Life of Marion*, 143, note). He must certainly have been mistaken, however, in regard to Daniel Huger, for he had taken protection and had avowed himself a subject of his Majesty. All the other members of the council, with the exception of Smith and Cattell, had been exiles, and were then in Philadelphia, where they had been sent on their release from St. Augustine. Governor Rutledge writes to Marion, October 24, 1781, "All the gentlemen of our council arrived yesterday." (*Gibbes's Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 196.)

authorities under the protection of the Royal army. During the four months of June, July, August, and September, 1780, in which so much had been done by the partisan bands under Sumter, Marion, Clarke, and Shelby, there had not been even a militia commission in the hands of these leaders. Davie, who was so brilliantly acting with them, had, it was true, a commission as major from North Carolina, and Marion, as an officer in the Continental line, had also one in that service; but these commissions as such were ignored, and their authority in those operations was derived only from their followers. These bands were thus purely volunteers fighting from patriotism only, without pay or reward. From North Carolina Governor Rutledge, as we have said, had commissioned first Sumter, and then Marion, and later Pickens, as brigadier-generals of militia, and authorized them to organize their followers and commission their officers as militia. The individual spirit of such men was generally of the highest character, as their services were of the most disinterested patriotism. But the want of discipline and the shifting and fluctuating character of such bodies rendered them unreliable for the persistent and continued operations of a systematic campaign. Greene's pedantry could allow him to see nothing beyond the manifest evils of the system. He had no appreciation for what it had in fact accomplished, notwithstanding its admitted defects. To meet his reiterated complaints upon the subject, Sumter, with his approval, had inaugurated the plan of raising a body of State troops — neither militia nor Continental — to serve for a certain definite period for pay to be derived from the spoils taken from the enemy.

But, as might have been expected, the system did not work well; and now that the greater portion of the State had been recovered from the enemy, his Excellency the governor devoted himself to the task of organizing a

more regular militia and of improving the organization of State troops.

The nucleus of each of the militia regiments was the regimental district of 1779, and so they were called regiments, and their officers lieutenant-colonels. They seldom, however, numbered more in action than from one hundred to two hundred men each, and were changing and fluctuating bodies, the men of the district or neighborhood coming and going as the occasion demanded and their necessities allowed or their caprice suggested, and generally expecting to be relieved at the end of two months, the limit of service required by the old militia law. The commandant when commissioned was a lieutenant-colonel. There were no colonels in the Continental line after the expiration of the first organizations, for this reason. In the British army, then as now, the colonel of a regiment was an honorary officer only — the lieutenant-colonel being the actual commandant. Thus, as the Prince of Wales, now King Edward VII., was the honorary colonel of the Life Guards, Sir William Howe, the commander-in-chief in America (1776–1778), was the colonel of the Twenty-third Regiment, of which Nisbet Balfour, the commandant of Charlestown, was lieutenant-colonel, and Earl Cornwallis was the colonel of the Thirty-third, of which James Webster, killed at Guilford, was lieutenant-colonel. As, therefore, the commanding officer of a British regiment in the field was only a lieutenant-colonel, it became important, in order to facilitate and equalize the exchange of prisoners taken, that the American regimental officer should have only the same rank. The rule adopted in the Continental line was followed in the State service.¹

¹ From letters of Governor Rutledge to Generals Sumter and Marion, dated 17th of September, 1781, an account of clothing issued to Sumter's brigade from 20th of April to 8th of October, 1781 (Sumter MSS.), and

By the "act for the more effectual defence of the State" of 1779, the whole militia had been divided into three classes, one of which was required to hold themselves in readiness to march to such place as they should be ordered, to do duty for two months from the time of their joining headquarters or arriving at the place of their destination, at the expiration of which time they should punctually be relieved by another class, which should do duty for two months, and at the expiration of their time they should also be relieved by the third class, who should serve for the like term, and they again should be relieved by the first, and thus every class should do equal duty in rotation.¹

Governor Rutledge now proceeded to reorganize the militia under this law. On the 17th of September he issued instructions to the brigadier-generals, to have the regiments fully and properly officered, mustered, and classed or drafted, as soon as possible, and to march one-third of them with the utmost expedition to headquarters, or such other place as General Greene should direct, to do duty under his orders for two months from the time of their arrival. He enclosed extracts from the several laws as were necessary to be made known to the militia, a copy of which he directed to be furnished to each colonel, and

from other sources the following table of the regiments of State troops and militia has been compiled:—

Sumter's Brigade, State Troops: (1) Henry Hampton's, (2) Wade Hampton's, (3) Mydelton's. *Militia:* (1) Bratton's, (2) Lacey's, (3) Winn's, (4) Taylor's, (5) Postell's, afterwards Kimball's, (6) Hill's.

Marion's Brigade, State Troops: (1) Peter Horry's, (2) Maham's. *Militia:* (1) Hugh Horry's, (2) Baxter's, (3) McDonald's, (4) Richardson's, (5) Irwin's, (6) Benton's, formerly Kolb's, (7) Vanderhorst's, formerly Maybank's.

Pickens's Brigade, Militia: (1) Harden's, formerly of Marion's, (2) Roebuck's, (3) Brandon's, (4) Thomas's, (5) Anderson's, (6) Hayes's, (7) Wilkinson's, (8) Samuel Hammond's, (9) Le Roy Hammond's.

¹ *Statutes of So. Ca.*, vol. IV, 503.

ordered to be read at the head of his regiment; a copy to be taken by each of his field officers and captains. He directed the brigadiers to appoint the most proper men in their brigades for officers, and to have the laws carried strictly and steadily into execution. The men drafted were directed to come on foot, as they were to serve as infantry, and their horses could not be kept in camp, nor could any drafted men be spared to carry them back.

But how were the provisions of the act of 1779 to be enforced? That statute provided this curious and impracticable scheme, viz., that every person who should refuse or neglect to turn out properly armed and accoutred when drafted should forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding £500, and treble his last tax, to be sued for and recovered in a summary way and manner by a court composed of three commissioned officers and four privates of the company to which the offender belonged, or if it should be impracticable to draw the privates from the company, they should be chosen from the regiment. The privates forming part of these courts were not to be selected by officers, but drawn nearly in the manner as jurors then were; the names of each private in the company or regiment to which the offender belonged was to be written on a piece of paper and put into a hat, and publicly and fairly drawn out by a commissioned officer. On the non-payment of the fine imposed by such a court the defaulter was obliged to serve as a common soldier in one of the Continental regiments raised in the State, for not less than four nor more than twelve months.¹

With the singular composition of these courts his Excellency does not appear to have interfered, though it is scarcely to be supposed that, thus constituted, they would have been very effective in enforcing the drafts. He

¹ *Statutes of So. Ca.*, vol. IV, 465.

did, however, in the exercise of his plenary powers, dictate an amendment to the act in regard to the currency in which the penalties, if imposed, should be paid. Concurrently with his instruction to the brigadiers he issued a proclamation suspending the resolves and acts of the Legislature which made the paper currency a tender in law, in payment of debts, and enclosing a copy to them, he wrote:—

“My proclamation of this date” (September 17, 1781) “suspends until ten days after the next meeting and sitting of the General Assembly, the acts which make Continental and State money a tender in law; all fines must therefore be paid in specie, it is necessary to ascertain to what amount in specie the court may fine. In 1776 the militia were entitled to ten shillings current money a day. There was at that time no difference in the value of specie and paper money. In March, 1778, the pay of the militia continued the same, it is therefore to be presumed that no difference had taken place between paper money and specie, at least there is no legislative acknowledgment of any depreciation. But in February, 1779, the pay of militia was raised from 10s. to 32s. 6d. per day, the paper money having and being admitted by the Legislature to be depreciated in that proportion. From these observations we may fix the following rule as the most just and equitable for determining how far the court may fine in specie. For fines imposed by the act of 1778 to the amounts of the sums mentioned in the law. Thus £100 in specie (according to the current rate of gold or silver) for £100 currency. But for fines under the act of 1779 they must not exceed in specie the sums therein mentioned as £150 specie (according to the old currency rate of rate of gold and silver) £500 currency.”

It will be recollected that, in order to complete the quota of troops to be raised by the State for the Continental line, the degrading condition was imposed on that service that vagrants and other offenders were by sentence of court impressed in the regiment of that line; his Excellency the governor after thus scaling the fines to be imposed for failure to perform militia duty, ordered also

that all offenders who might be condemned to the Continental service should be sent under guard to headquarters.¹ To the idle, lewd, and vagrant hitherto forced into the Continental service, were now added cowards and deserters from the militia.

A few days later he wrote to Marion, forbidding the practice of allowing substitutes for militia duty. "The law," he wrote, "does not allow any man the privilege of sending substitutes, nor does it exempt him from militia duty by paying such a sum as an officer may think proper to receive either in lieu of personal service, to find a Continental or State soldier, or for any other purpose."² In subsequent letters he directed, however, that no such arrangements as had actually been made should be disturbed, but none allowed in the future. His intention was, he declared, that no man outside of Charlestown should be excused from militia duty under a pretence that he was on parole or a British subject, unless he had been fairly taken in arms and paroled as an officer. To any others claiming exemption on this account he directed that they should take their choice, either of doing duty or going into the enemy's lines. If any such refused both alternatives, he was to be court-martialed and fined.

The governor also writes: "I find there are many gentlemen riding about the country under the description of volunteers who render no kind of service to it. This practice being very injurious should be immediately suppressed; and no man is to be excused from doing militia duty in the district of the regiment to which he belongs unless he is actually enrolled and obliged for some certain time to serve in some regular corps of cavalry,

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 164-165; Sumter MSS.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 174.

not merely as a volunteer, but to do the same duty and be subject to the articles as the rest of the corps are obliged to do or are subject to.”¹

But while the governor was engaged thus endeavoring to restore order and to enforce the militia law of the State, the absolute necessity of finding means to support the army, Continentals as well as militia, was forced upon him. Congress neither would nor could do anything further than to permit the experiment of a bank to be tried. Mr. Robert Morris, on undertaking the management of the American finances, had laid before Congress the plan of a national bank, the capital of which was to consist of \$400,000, to be made up by individual subscription. It was to be incorporated by government, and subject to the inspection of the superintendent of the finances, who was at all times to have access to the books. Their notes were to be receivable as specie from the respective States into the treasury of the United States. The plan was adopted by Congress,² and was for a time at least a partial success. Colonel Laurens's mission to France had resulted in hastening, if not actually securing, a gift from Louis XVI. of 6,000,000 livres, and loans amounting to 14,000,000 more.³ From these sources specie made its appearance in circulation at Philadelphia; members of Congress and all the retinue of attendants at the seat of government were paid in hard money; a general exhilaration was produced; the financier was the channel through which all flowed; and all who drank at the fount bestowed on it a benediction. But the stream sank in the sands, as it was said, long before it reached the State of South Carolina, and never reached it until after the fall of Lord Cornwallis; nor for

¹Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 179-180; Sumter MSS.

²Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 458.

³Bancroft's *Hist. of the U. S.*, vol. V, 469.

long after, except indirectly through the supplies acquired by conquest. On the contrary, the only fund in the military chest was ordered to be withdrawn from it. There was a balance on hand of certain bills drawn upon Dr. Franklin, about \$300,000 in amount, and which by the resolves of Congress were among the funds placed at the disposal of the financier. Marshall, indeed, relates that, in order to compel the Southern army to the utmost exertion to support itself without drawing supplies from the general government, Mr. Morris employed an agent to attend the army as a volunteer, whose powers were unknown to General Greene. This agent was instructed to watch the situation, and only to furnish assistance when it appeared impossible for the general to extricate himself from his embarrassments; and then, upon his pledging the faith of the government for repayment, to furnish him with a draft on the financier, for such a sum as would relieve the urgency of the moment.¹ The sale of drafts on the government thus niggardly doled out, and of shares on Mr. Morris's bank, were the only means allowed for the support of the army in South Carolina.²

Governor Rutledge had attempted during his journey from Philadelphia to interest the people in the country in the support of Mr. Morris's bank, and by the sale of shares to raise some money for the support of the army; but his route was through a tract of country where the inhabitants were little acquainted with commerce, and therefore not likely to become adventurers in a measure of that sort. But whether it was owing to objections to this particular scheme or to all projects of the kind, it is certain that not a single subscriber could be found nor a shilling of money raised. Upon his arrival at Greene's headquarters he

¹ Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 557-558.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 202.

found the imperative necessity of adopting some other scheme of raising money; and it was at this time that he resolved to impress for State service a quantity of indigo, which article at that time the middle country chiefly cultivated for market. Occupying but small space when raised, it had been hid away, and conveyed to market occasionally as opportunities offered. As these were neither frequent nor safe, there was a good deal of the article then in the country. Governor Rutledge caused the indigo impressed by him to be conveyed in wagons to Philadelphia, where it was sold. This was the first substantial supply, not of cash, but the means of raising its equivalent, the army had had since General Greene had been in command. By borrowing a portion of it for the use of his officers, he was enabled to restore them to comparative decency and comfort.¹

Colonel Lee was never content with a share only of spoils or supplies. It will be remembered the offence he had given to Marion on the subject of captured horses, and to Sumter at the capture of Granby, by appropriating to his Legion the best clothing found in the fort. This had been his course throughout his service in South Carolina, nor could he now refrain from helping himself from this source of revenue which Governor Rutledge's action had developed. Without waiting on the slow process of an equitable division of supplies from this quarter, Colonel Lee directed his legionary quartermaster to secure a portion of the indigo for the exclusive benefit of his corps. He, however, took the precaution of apprising General Greene of the measure, with a hope, doubtless, of securing in advance his sanction or of averting his interdict. But the general, perceiving at once the danger at this time of such action, and receiving an intimation from Governor

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 205.

Rutledge of his disapproval of it, thereupon at once wrote to Colonel Lee:—

“Your order to Mr. Lewis to procure a quantity of indigo for the purpose of procuring clothing for your Legion I have found necessary to countermand, having got a hint that it would be thought derogatory to the government for individuals to take a measure of that sort without the order of the Governor, who, I believe, is perfectly disposed to give every aid and support to the army in his power.”¹

A subject which gave Governor Rutledge great concern at this time was that in regard to the wisest and best course to be pursued in regard to the Tories. He writes to General Marion: “I have been very much puzzled about a proclamation to offer pardon to the Tories. I have however determined, upon the whole, to issue one with certain exceptions. It is enclosed; be pleased to have it properly circulated.”² As this proclamation, which bore date 27th of September, 1781, formed the basis of the action of the General Assembly which met soon after, in regard to the treatment of the Royalists,³ it is well here to give an analysis of it.

The proclamation recited the advantages gained by the forces of the United States, which had compelled the troops of his Britannic Majesty to surrender or evacuate the strong posts which they held in the Up-Country, and to retreat to the vicinity of Charlestown; the inability of the enemy to give the protection and support they had promised to their adherents who had taken up arms with them, compelling many to conceal themselves in secret places to

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (H. Lee), 452, and Appendix, XV.

² Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 175.

³ “I must first observe that G——r R——’s proclamation of the 27th of September, 1781, was the fountain from whence sprung some of those bitter laws, and the forfeitures and disabilities above mentioned.” — An address, *To the Freemen of the State of South Carolina*, “Cassius,” January 14, 1783, *Pamphlets*, Charleston Library, 5th series, vol. II.

avoid the effects of just resentment; Balfour's order, by which the wives and families of the friends of America were sent beyond the sea, and the governor's retaliatory order sending the wives and families of those who had adhered to the British within their lines; the representations to him that many who had been induced by vain expectations and delusive hopes were now anxious to return to their allegiance and to use their utmost exertions to support American independence, — on duly weighing and considering which his Excellency had thought fit, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to issue this proclamation, offering to all persons who had borne arms with the enemy, who had till then adhered to them, or who were concealing themselves, a full and free pardon and oblivion upon the condition that such persons should, within thirty days from the date of the proclamation, surrender themselves to a brigadier of the militia of the State and engage to perform constant duty as privates for six months next ensuing the time of such surrender; and that they actually perform such duty. To the wives and children of such persons he offered, upon their husbands or parents complying with this condition, permission to return to their homes and to hold and enjoy their property in the State without molestation or interruption. He provided, however, that if such persons should desert from the militia service within the time limited, their families should be immediately sent into the enemy's lines, and neither they nor their husbands or parents suffered to return to or reside in the State. This liberal offer was, however, qualified by the following exceptions, in which cases the persons were excluded from its benefit.

1. All persons who, having gone over to or joined the enemy, had failed to avail themselves of the provisions of the two several proclamations of his Excellency the gov-

ernor, to surrender themselves to a magistrate within forty days after the respective date of those proclamations issued in pursuance of an ordinance of February 20, 1779, entitled "An ordinance to prevent persons withdrawing from the defence of the State to join the enemies thereof."¹

2. All persons who had been sent off or obliged to quit the State for refusing to take the oath required of them by law, who have returned to the country.²

3. All those who subscribed a congratulatory address bearing date on or about the 5th day of June, 1780, to General Sir Henry Clinton and Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, or another address bearing date on or about the 19th day of September, 1780, to Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis.

4. All such as at the time held any commission, civil or military, under the British government, and were then with the enemy.

5. All those whose conduct had been so infamous as that they could not (consistently with justice or policy) be admitted to partake of the privileges of America; notwithstanding which last-mentioned exception, such persons as should be deemed inadmissible to the rights and privileges of citizens should not be detained as prisoners, but should have full and free liberty and a pass or permit to return.

The proclamation of his Excellency concluded with this appeal : —

"At a juncture when the force of the enemy in this State, though lately considerable, is nearly reduced by the many defeats which they have suffered, and particularly in the late important action at Eutaw, when they are dispossessed of every post except Charles Town garrison; When this formidable fleet of his most Christian Majesty

¹ *Statutes of So. Ca.*, vol. IV, 479.

² *Ibid.*, vol. I, 147; vol. IV, 450.

in Chesapeake Bay and the combined armies of the King of France and of the United States under the command of his Excellency Gen. Washington in Virginia afford a well grounded hope that by the joint effort of these armies this campaign will be happily terminated and the British power in every part of the Confederate States soon totally annihilated: It is conceived that the true and real motive of the offer here made will be acknowledged; it must be allowed to proceed not from timidity (to which they affect to attribute every act of clemency and mercy on our part) but from a wish to impress with a sense of their error and reclaim misguided subjects, and give them once more an opportunity of becoming valuable members of the community instead of banishing them, or forever cutting them off from it; for even the most disaffected cannot suppose that the brave and determined freemen of the State have any dread of their arms. With the persons to whom pardon is thus offered the choice still remains either to return to their allegiance and with their families to be restored to the favor of their country and to their possessions or to abandon their properties in this State forever and go with their wives and children whither and for what purpose or whom to depend or how to submit they know not, most probably to experience in some strange and distant land all the miseries and horrors of beggary sickness and despair. This alternative is now for the last time submitted to their judgment. It will never be renewed!"

The terms of this proclamation were not only regarded as harsh and ungenerous by those to whom they were offered, but were severely criticised by the staunchest of Whigs. In the address, *To the Freemen of the State of South Carolina*, over the signature of "Cassius," published the 14th of January, 1783, to which we have referred, the writer says:—

"The proclamation of September 27 as observed before went on the Governor's idea that the great body of the people who had taken protection had thereby forfeited their lives liberty and property. He takes upon him to offer pardon to every one who should join our standard in 30 days and serve 6 months in the militia as common soldiers excepting from the benefit those who were banished the State in the beginning of the troubles; the congratulators, and such as held commissions civil or military on the 27 September or were then with

the enemy. I shall say nothing of the good or bad policy of excluding such a number of citizens as this exception comprehended, admitting he had the power he pretended. However on the 17th of November he issued a second proclamation extending the benefits held out by the former under like terms.

“As the capture of Cornwallis and his army was known to the Governor when this proclamation came out; as the British troops had absolutely lost their courage with the loss at Eutaw and the Pennsylvania Line was on the march from York Town to our assistance; when this and the state the country was in at that juncture is considered I leave the reader to judge whether the proclamation was not calculated rather for creating mischief than for raising a force. For it laid all who neglected or refused not only under a stigma and reproach, but under such disabilities as degraded them below the rank of freemen.

“Obliging the whole country that had taken protection to turn out and serve six months in the militia was the greatest oppression imaginable; and the contriver of it well knew those who now drive down the measure, that it was commanding what was absolutely impossible. Men are generally so embarrassed with inconveniences of one sort or another that there is no society on earth the aggregate body whereof could all quit their families or homes for six months. In our case not to mention how much agriculture would suffer by such emigration the heads of those families who resided within the enemy's range were peculiarly circumstanced. They were no doubt called on by the feelings of fathers, husbands, or protectors to stay and afford the feeble protection they could to their families or avert the distress or ruin that would ensue if they joined our army which at that time had not the power of protecting them.

“Ordering them out therefore without regard to local situation, sickness or other distress was an extravagant act of power. Whether they resided within or out of the enemy's garrison or guards, whether a man's wife or little ones or the property the British had left him un plundered were in or out of the enemy's reach; all this was nothing; they must abandon the whole to the rage of an unprincipled, revengeful enemy, and sally forth like Don Quixote setting British guards and parties at defiance in quest of adventures on the report of a proclamation; and what perhaps was more mortifying they must humble themselves and supplicate for money as criminals at the feet of a man who a little before was a fellow citizen no more than on a footing with themselves.

“I conjure any sensible honest man to tell me if this was acting the part of a magistrate framing regulations for the ease and convenience of a people over whose happiness he was appointed to preside,” etc.¹

In many instances, the case was indeed a hard one. There were those who upon the fall of Charlestown and the abandonment of the State by Congress and its forces had no choice but to remain subject to the conqueror's power. Domestic affairs forbade their leaving their homes and families. “The State,” Cassius reminded his Excellency, “soon after the reduction of Charlestown may be strictly said to have been conquered. Not only the capital, but every post throughout the country was in the hands of the enemy. The governor, who represented the sovereignty of the State, had provided for his safety by flight, and all the Continental troops in South Carolina were either killed, taken, or routed.” But there were those who could not, like his Excellency, avoid the power of the enemy by flight, and was he now, upon his return after more than a year's absence, from behind an army which might yet vanish, as twice already had happened, and with it himself, to require them to risk the vengeance, upon themselves and their families, of the enemy in whose power they actually were? In this very proclamation his Excellency was directing that the families of all who would not join him and who were within his own lines should be compelled to go into the enemy's. If they came out, would not the enemy follow his example and send their families out of their lines; and if so, how were they to be supported while they were serving for six months in the militia? True, by another order the governor had called out all the militia of the State to serve in three terms of duty of two months each. But besides the inequality of the service required in

¹ *Pamphlets*, Charleston Library, 5th Series, vol. II.

the two cases, the militiaman could avoid serving by the payment of his fine, which his Excellency had scaled down to the lowest point. The option to him, therefore, was not an arduous one; but in the case of the man within the enemy's lines the alternative was the abandonment of his family under the most distressing circumstances, or the forfeiture of his citizenship. On the other hand, the consideration that some great difference should be made between those who had stood faithfully by the State in the hour of adversity, and those who, from whatever motive or under whatever influences, honorable or otherwise, had sat quietly down under the protection of the enemy's power during its continuance, could not be ignored. The question was a difficult one, and it was rendered still more so by the notorious fact that many — very many — had wavered, from time to time, from side to side.

General Sumter appears to have been particularly charged with the duty of receiving the submissions of the Loyalists under this proclamation and of incorporating them with his command.¹ Several hundreds came out of the British lines under the terms of the proclamation and joined the American militia. Many made their excuses for remaining with the British on account of the situation of their families; others, who had taken British militia commissions, explained their conduct that they had done so at the request of their neighbors to save them from having officers put over them who would have abused and ill-treated them. General Moultrie asserts that it was within his knowledge that several gentlemen took British militia commissions to protect their friends and neighbors from insult.²

His Excellency the governor next turned his attention

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 302; Sumter MSS.

² Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 303-304.

to the reestablishment of civil government; and his first step in this direction was the appointment of ordinaries throughout the State to administer estates, a measure of pressing necessity, from the number of citizens who had fallen in the last two years.¹

By the constitution adopted 19th of March, 1778, elections for members of the Senate were to have been held on the last Monday in November of that year and the day following, and on the same days of every second year thereafter, and for Representatives in the House on those days in that year, and on the same days in every second year thereafter.² Three years had now passed without an election, and Governor Rutledge determined now to provide for one, and as he was authorized by the constitution, should the casualties of war or contagious disorders render it unsafe for the General Assembly to meet at the seat of government, to appoint a more secure and convenient place of meeting. For the reason already mentioned he decided to call this Assembly at Jacksonborough.

As a matter of detail, he was at a loss for the want of forms for writs of election, as well as of other forms of procedure and to procure these he despatched a letter by a trusted negro named Antigua, belonging to the estate of Mr. John Harleston, deceased, who rendered him the most important services of this character, to one of the friends of the cause in Charlestown, to obtain them. The negro was captured with the letter of the governor and another to a different person, and the letters were published in full conspicuously, for several issues in *The Royal Gazette*.³ Antigua, however, soon escaped, for by the time the British were publishing the letter, taken from him some weeks

¹ Sumter MSS.

² *Statutes of So. Ca.*, vol. I, 139-140.

³ *The Royal Gazette*, October 31, 1781.

before, we find the governor sending by him to Mr. Ravenel a slave which had been improperly taken from him.¹ The form of writs having been obtained, his Excellency on the 23d of November addressed letters to the brigadier-generals, enclosing writs of election, which they were instructed to have properly filled up and issued. The character of these instructions and the governor's conduct in regard thereto will be considered in the next chapter. In this it will only be observed that one of the packets of writs was sent to General Barnwell.

It was the misfortune of the State at this time to lose the services of both General Sumter and Colonel Harden. The orders in regard to the election were issued to General Sumter, and his last service was in extending them; but Colonel Harden had already been superseded and had resigned. Governor Rutledge, considering that the part of Marion's command which extended from Charlestown to the Savannah too remote from Marion's scenes of operation, had determined to constitute a new brigade in that quarter. Hitherto Marion had confided that region to Colonel Harden, and never had service been more ably performed. But Governor Rutledge thought Major John Barnwell, though lower in grade as a militia officer, a more proper person for the position of brigadier than Harden, and appointed him to command. Major Barnwell had been one of the officers of the three first regiments raised by the Provincial Congress in 1775. He had served for a while with his regiment in the Continental line, but had resigned, and subsequently had become major in Colonel Garden's militia regiment, and as such had been captured at the fall of Charlestown and was one of those confined on the prison ships in the harbor; he had thus seen but little active service in the field, while Colonel Harden had

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), p. 197.

greatly distinguished himself as a partisan leader, and had been practically in command of the territory now made into a new brigade district since the May previous. On the other hand, it may have been urged with some force that Major Barnwell ranked Harden at the time of the fall of Charlestown, Harden being then but a captain, and that he should not be made to lose his relative rank because of his having been included in the surrender of the city — that while Harden had been enjoying the opportunity of distinguishing himself, he had for the sake of the State been enduring the horrors of the prison ship. Colonel Harden immediately resigned his commission on being superseded, and the public lost his services; not only so, but the appointment gave such offence to the officers and men who had served under him that they refused to serve under General Barnwell, so that he could do nothing and finally resigned.

General Sumter's resignation could have excited no surprise. It is hardly to be doubted that it was acceptable to General Greene, though his letters to Sumter himself are of a very different tenor. Indeed, the contemporary correspondence discloses a great want of candor, at least upon Greene's part. The immediate cause of Sumter's determination was the action of Governor Rutledge in regard to the State troops and militia which formed his command, but which action was at General Greene's own suggestion.

The letters of his Excellency of the 17th of September upon the reorganization of the militia, addressed to Generals Sumter and Marion, were almost identical in terms. They each contained a clause directing that the drafted men should come on foot, as they were to do duty as infantry, and their horses could not be kept in camp nor could any men be spared to carry them home. But a

difference was made in carrying out this order. At General Greene's suggestion it was relaxed in favor of Marion's men. Then Sumter was ordered to detach Wade Hampton's regiment for service in Georgia, and his command was further diminished by the reductions of his regiments of State troops. Colonel Lee, whether by flattery or otherwise, had doubtless obtained and exercised a great ascendancy upon the mind of the General-in-chief; or, as expressed by the author of the *Campaigns in the Carolinas*, "the mind of that hero was often indebted to him for original suggestions or acceptable advice." Unfortunately General Sumter had somehow, but the reason for which nowhere appears, incurred the enmity of Lee soon after General Greene's return to South Carolina, and from that time Lee's influence was constantly exerted to Sumter's prejudice.¹ There can be no doubt, too, that General Greene encouraged, if he did not invite, Colonel Lee's criticisms. Thus he writes to Lee, immediately after the defeat at Hobkirk's Hill: "General Sumter has got but few men. He has taken the field and is pushing after little parties of Tories towards Ninety Six. Major Hyrne is gone to him if possible to get him to join us. *But this I know he will avoid if he can with decency.*"² And Lee consoles him for his defeat at Hobkirk's Hill with the remark that "*nobody was to blame but General Sumter.*" Again, on the 9th of May, writing to Lee in cipher, evidently in reply to some criticisms in regard to Sumter, he says: "I perceive that 312 [Marion] is not satisfied and I think you are not mistaken respecting 311 [Sumter]. However be careful, be prudent, and above all attentive: this with men as well as with ladies goes a great way."³ On the 29th of July Greene writes to Lee: "I have already recommended to

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 290.

² *Ibid.*, 294.

³ *Ibid.*, 357.

General Sumter to form all the State troops into two Regiments. I wish it was practicable to get the State troops to join the army; *but be assured it would prove so fully my opinion of a certain person to give such an order as not to prevent further exertion but even opposition and it is uncertain how far disappointed ambition may carry a man.*"¹ On the 20th of August Colonel Lee, writing to General Greene, recommending that the State troops be taken from Sumter and put under Henderson, uses the language we have before quoted: "*General Sumpter is become almost universally odious as far as I can discover. I lament that a man of his turn was ever useful or being once deservedly great should want the wisdom necessary to continue so and preserve his reputation.*"²

Indulging in such an injudicious, if not absolutely improper, correspondence with one of his officers in regard to another, it cannot be doubted that at length his views in regard to Sumter should be impressed upon his Excellency the governor, and that he should at last procure in this way the reduction of Sumter's command, and the dismounting of his men, while Marion's were to retain their horses. But how different is the tenor of the following letter from what should be expected under the circumstances? On the 15th of December General Greene writes in this strain to Sumter:³—

"I was persuaded you would meet with difficulty in reducing your battalions and in dismounting them, but the good of the service requires you should persevere in both. It is true the public have neglected them but what have they had it in their power to do? Poverty and want stare us in the face on every side. But never mind little difficulties, we have gone through greater and I persuade myself we shall be happy at the last. *and your country if they have any justice and*

¹ *Campaigns in the Carolinas* (Lee), 436.

² *Ibid.*, 450.

³ Sumter letters, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 132.

gratitude will not fail to bless and reward you for your exertions made in the darkest hours they ever felt. I shall always bear testimony to your firmness, and don't fail to tell the people how much you did when others hid their heads."

How could General Greene reconcile this letter to Sumter with that to Lee of the 29th of July, in which he referred to his opinion of the former as well known to his correspondent to be of a derogatory character?

Sumter appears to have written with indignation to Governor Rutledge upon the subject of the treatment of his command, for in a letter of the 25th of December, 1781, his Excellency replies: "I do not understand the passage of your letter which says 'the State brigade is too little the object of public attention & in various cases ludicrously treated.' I am not conscious of having treated any man or body of men ludicrously nor do I know what attention government could or should have paid which it has not to that brigade. My orders to all the Brigadiers of militia with respect to the tours of duty are in the same terms; nor do I know of any other difference in the mode of your brigade & any other doing duty except that my instructions which at General Greene's particular recommendation directed the several draughts to come on foot instead of coming on horseback to camp was altered by General Greene's recommendation as to General Marion's brigade."¹

Sumter's State brigade was reduced to two regiments, one of cavalry under Colonel Wade Hampton, the other of infantry under Colonel Mydelton; and that under Hampton was detached from his command. Colonel Henry Hampton, who had been with Sumter from the commencement of his command and had so distinguished himself, was put out of commission; thereupon, on the 4th

¹ Sumter MSS.

of January, 1782, Sumter wrote to General Greene from Orangeburgh: "In my last I took the liberty to request permission to withdraw from this place upon private business, or rather to prepare to attend the Assembly. I hope to be indulged, and beg not to be honored again with your commands until a proper inquiry can be made whether I am worthy of them."¹

Soon after the Jacksonborough Assembly met, General Sumter resigned his commission and Colonel Henderson was appointed brigadier-general to succeed him. Colonel Lacey appears to have remained in command of his militia regiments.²

The cabal of Greene and Lee had at last succeeded in driving from the field the man who had been the first to stem the tide of conquest in South Carolina, and whose exertions had rendered their subsequent careers in the State possible.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 303; Sumter letters, *Year Book* City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 70.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 303; Sumter MSS.

CHAPTER XXIII

1781

GLOOMY, indeed, had been the prospect of the American cause when the year 1781 began. The resolution of Congress had called for an army of thirty-seven thousand men to be in camp by the 1st of January. At no time during the campaign of this year in the Southern Department, that is from Pennsylvania to Georgia inclusive, until the coming of the French fleet and Washington's movement to the South, did the regular force amount to three thousand effective men. In the Northern Department, from New Jersey to New Hampshire inclusive, as late as the month of April it did not reach six thousand.¹ In both departments the Continental troops were in a state of destitution. In the Northern destitution resulted in mutiny. On the night of the 1st of January the discontent of the Pennsylvania line broke out in open and almost universal revolt. On a signal given, the great body of non-commissioned officers and privates paraded under arms, and marched for Philadelphia to obtain redress from Congress. The mutineers kept the field for two weeks, when they were met at Trenton by a committee of Congress and President Reed of Pennsylvania, with a part of his executive council, and a compromise was come to on the 15th, a result which, as we shall see, emboldened them to repeat the experiment when sent to South Carolina the next year. The success

¹ Marshall's *Life of Washington* vol. IV, 445, 446.

of the Pennsylvania line inspired a part of that of Jersey, many of whom were foreigners, with the hope of obtaining similar advantages, and stimulated them to a like attempt. On the night of the 20th a part of the Jersey brigade rose in arms, making precisely the same claims which had been yielded to the Pennsylvanians. But this second mutiny was speedily crushed.¹

In the meanwhile Virginia had been invaded by a British force under the traitor Arnold. Landing at Westover on the James on the 4th of January, Arnold had marched upon Richmond, at which place and in its neighborhood he had destroyed a large quantity of stores, public and private, had burnt founderies, mills, magazines, and other buildings.

So it was that the battle of Cowpens was fought and won in South Carolina while the Northern army was in mutiny and Virginia overrun and pillaged by Arnold. Then had followed the renewed advance of Lord Cornwallis into North Carolina, which caused the abandonment of this State by Greene. For three months South Carolina was again left to struggle with her fate, unaided and alone, against a British force of more than four thousand men remaining within her borders after Cornwallis had left it with his army. Colonel Lee, with his Legion, which, after a leisurely march, had arrived in January, had at once been despatched to operate with Marion, whom he joined on the 23d, and with him had taken part in the attempt on Georgetown. He had been recalled and had followed the rest of Greene's army into North Carolina. But the war had not ceased in South Carolina, though the State was abandoned by the Continental army. Sumter and Marion had at once renewed the system of warfare upon the British posts by which they had accomplished so much

¹ Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 393-405.

the year before. Parties of Marion's men under the Postells had made their successful raids upon Wadboo and Monck's Corner. Marion himself had fallen upon and driven McLeroth through the Halfway Swamp; had met and fought Watson at Wiboo, Mount Hope, and Black River, and finally had driven him into Georgetown. Then turning upon Doyle, who had, during his absence, destroyed his stores at Snow Island, Marion had attacked him at Witherspoon's Ferry, defeated, and pursued him. Sumter, though really unfit for service by reason of his wound, had again taken the field, and, gathering his men at their old camping ground on the Waxhaws, by a rapid and circuitous march to the western side of the Congaree, had appeared before Granby and laid siege to that post in the rear both of Rawdon at Camden, and of Cruger at Ninety Six, and after destroying a quantity of stores and supplies, had only raised the siege upon the approach of Lord Rawdon with his whole force. Then hastening to the British post at Thomson's plantation in Orangeburgh, he had fallen upon and captured a large convoy, taking prisoners all the party who were not killed, and had carried off the stores, which he unfortunately soon after lost by the treachery of a guide. Still more brilliant and successful was Harden, whom Marion had despatched across the country to carry the war back to the neighborhood of Charlestown itself — to its south and west. In a week he had four times attacked the British successfully at Four Holes, Barton's Post, Pocotaligo, in Colleton, and Fort Balfour, in Beaufort, and a few days after had fought Browne at Wiggins's Hill in what is now Barnwell County. Pickens, too, who had returned from Greene, with whom he had served in North Carolina, had fallen upon Dunlap and his party at Beattie's Mill in Ninety Six and destroyed them; Hammond, one of his officers, a few days after capturing

a company at Horner's Corner in Edgefield. During Greene's absence, the South Carolina volunteer partisan bands had fought the British forces in the following affairs: —

		IN WHAT IS NOW		AMERICAN COMMANDERS	BRITISH COMMANDERS
1	Wadboo (or Watboo)	Berkeley Co.	Jan. 24	Postell, James	
2	Monck's Corner	Berkeley Co.	Jan. 24	Postell, John	
3	Halfway Swamp	Clarendon Co.	Feb.	Marion	McLeroth
4	Fort Granby	Lexington Co.	Feb. 19	Sumter	Maxwell
5	Thomson's Plantation	Orangeburgh Co.	Feb. 23	Sumter	British officer
6	Wright's Bluff (Fort Watson)	Clarendon Co.	Feb. 27	Sumter	Watson
7	Mud Lick	Newberry Co.	March 2	Roebuck	
8	Lynch's Creek	Kershaw Co.	March 6	Sumter	Fraser
9	Wiboo Swamp	Clarendon Co.	March	Marion	Watson
10	Mount Hope	Williamsburg Co.	March	Marion	Watson
11	Black River	Williamsburg Co.	March	Marion	Watson
12	Sampit	Georgetown Co.	March	Marion	Watson
13	Snow Island	Marion Co.	March	Marion	Doyle
14	Witherspoon's Ferry	Georgetown Co.	March	Marion	Doyle
15	Dutchman's Creek	Fairfield Co.	March		Grey
16	Beattie's Mill	Abbeville Co.	March 24	Pickens	Dunlap
17	Four Holes	Colleton Co.	April 7	Harden	A captain
18	Barton's Post	Colleton Co.	April 8	Harden	Barton
19	Pocotaligo Road	Colleton Co.	April 8	Harden	Fenwick
20	Fort Balfour	Beaufort Co.	April 13	Harden	Fenwick
21	Wiggins's Hill	Barnwell Co.	April	Harden	Browne
22	Horner's Corner	Edgefield Co.	April	Hammond	A captain
23	Hammond's Mill	Edgefield Co.	April	Hammond	

It was indeed a glorious struggle which had thus been maintained by her own people in South Carolina while the Continental army was absent from the State. Sumter's investment of Granby had required the movement of Lord Rawdon's force from Camden to dislodge him; and when dislodged it had only been to enable him to attack the still more interior posts at Orangeburgh and Wright's Bluff, while Marion had kept McLeroth, Watson, and Doyle all busy in his lordship's rear. This was the condition of

affairs in South Carolina which Wade Hampton, sent by Sumter, reported to Greene the day after the battle of Guilford Court-house. When therefore Cornwallis, though victorious in that battle, had been compelled to fall back before Greene to Cross Creek, and thence had turned aside and moved towards Wilmington, Greene, upon reaching Ramsay's Mill on Deep River, had had to decide whether to follow Cornwallis, or to return to South Carolina. Wade Hampton was with him to tell how the Whigs in that State, without assistance from any source, had kept up the war and broken up Lord Rawdon's communications, and was there to support Colonel Lee in urging the march upon Lord Rawdon at Camden rather than upon Lord Cornwallis at Wilmington.

General Greene, as it has appeared, never giving himself heartily to the move, but always hankering after the rejected alternative, returned to South Carolina and fought, again unsuccessfully, the battle of Hobkirk's Hill. His defeat he, as usual, attributed to the failure of others. This time it was upon Colonel Gunby of Maryland that the blame of the immediate disaster was thrown; but Sumter was held equally responsible because he did not have one thousand men in the field by the 18th of April, as Greene alleged he had engaged to do. In this, as it has been shown, Greene was mistaken, nor could anything have been more unreasonable on his part than to suppose that Sumter, without the vestige of a government in his support, could have undertaken to bring into the field one thousand volunteers under his immediate command, besides five hundred under Marion, and another party under Pickens, when the great States of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Delaware, with established governments also in full operation, could not altogether furnish three thousand men; nor could the Northern States furnish Wash-

ington himself with six thousand. Dissatisfied with the first result of his move into South Carolina, General Greene was on the point of again abandoning the State, and taking off with him the remains of the Continental army when Lord Rawdon, notwithstanding his victory at Hobkirk's Hill, evacuated Camden and fell back beyond the Congaree, a retrogression from which the British forces never recovered. To whom then is the credit of the great result due?

It will readily be conceded that, however heroic and efficient the efforts of the partisan bands, the contest with the four thousand British troops in the State could not long have been maintained had not Greene returned with his Continental army; but it must as readily be granted that Lord Rawdon had not abandoned Camden because of his fear of Greene, whom he had so easily and so thoroughly beaten. His lordship declares that he had always reprobated the post as being on the wrong side of the river. But unless now moved by some new consideration, why had he not at once abandoned it as soon as left in command, upon the advance of Lord Cornwallis in January? It was, doubtless, owing first to the fact that Sumter and Marion had demonstrated the correctness of his theory as to the position at Camden because of the length and vulnerableness of its line of communication, and their full understanding of the situation, and determination to avail themselves of it, that had compelled Rawdon seriously to contemplate the necessity of its abandonment. As long as there was no organized force in his front, he was enabled by the activity of such good officers as Watson, McLeroth, and Doyle to protect in a measure the convoy of his supplies. The presence of Greene with his Continental force, however small, as a menace to his front, required that these officers should join him, and in doing so to expose his communications. It was, therefore, primarily, the action of Sumter and Marion,

and secondarily, the return of Greene, which caused Lord Rawdon to abandon Camden and with it a large part of the State.

General Greene, in his letter to Washington of the 29th of March, giving his reasons for the move into South Carolina, had observed that by doing so the enemy would be obliged to follow him or give up his posts in South Carolina. That if the enemy followed him, it would draw the war out of North Carolina and give that State an opportunity to raise its proportion of men. That if they left their posts in South Carolina to fall, they must lose more than they would gain in North Carolina. That if he continued in North Carolina, the enemy would hold their possessions in both.¹ Those were certainly weighty considerations in the last days of March; but had they not been as urgent in the January before? In describing the advantages of the position he had taken at Cheraw in December, Greene had pointed out in his correspondence that Lord Cornwallis could not move towards Virginia and leave Morgan behind him on one side, and himself upon the other. That if he did so he would have the whole country open to him, with nothing to obstruct his march to Charlestown. Such a march, however, he did not contemplate, because it would be putting it in the power of the enemy to compel him to fight without choosing his ground. Cornwallis had, nevertheless, advanced into North Carolina, regardless of Greene's position at Cheraw, and abandoning entirely the supposed advantages of that position, Greene had with great difficulty been able to unite with Morgan, even though Morgan had defeated Tarleton at Cowpens. In contemplating such an advance by Cornwallis, he had declared that the only objection to his own move upon Charlestown would be that the enemy might force him to

¹Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 37.

battle. But this Cornwallis had done in North Carolina, at Guilford Court-house, and now upon his return one of the conditions of the problem was the necessity of attacking Lord Rawdon on his own chosen field. Would not, therefore, every condition have been better fulfilled had General Greene, instead of following Lord Cornwallis in the first instance, pursued the plan then contemplated by him, but rejected, of advancing upon Charlestown, anticipating the battle of Eutaw by eight months. Surely if he felt himself strong enough to attack Rawdon after his heavy losses at Guilford, he should have considered himself strong enough to meet him before his own army was so weakened. And if ultimately successful at Eutaw, notwithstanding his losses, not only at Guilford, but at Hobkirk's Hill and Ninety Six, and that against the enemy reënforced by three fresh regiments, is it not reasonable to suppose that if the move was wise in March, it would have been wiser in January? And that if the movement had taken place then, with Sumter and Marion's assistance, he might have recovered the State months before, or have compelled Cornwallis to return to South Carolina and leave Washington with Rochambeau to deal with Sir Henry Clinton.

The evacuation of Camden on the 10th of May had been followed by a series of brilliant successes. Sumter took the post at Orangeburgh with its garrison on the 11th. Fort Motte surrendered to Marion and Lee on the 12th, and Fort Granby to Lee on the 15th. Lord Rawdon, crossing the Santee at Nelson's Ferry, had been met by Colonel Balfour with the report that the whole country was in revolt, and Charlestown in no condition to stand a siege, as the old works had been levelled for new ones which had not yet been constructed; within the lines of the town the Royal militia had mutinied and had been disarmed, but were ready to seize the gates of the town if Greene should ap-

pear. Without a full knowledge of all these details Sumter had perceived that the time had come for the combined movement for which Greene had before been so anxious. The British morale had been completely broken, and the country was ready to rise against them. But Greene, instead of summoning to him Marion and Lee, and acting upon Sumter's advice, turned back to besiege Augusta and Ninety Six, and let the opportunity slip from his grasp. Orders had been issued for the evacuation of both of these places by the British garrisons; and then evacuation had only been prevented by the capture of the messengers. While sitting down before Ninety Six Greene had learned of the arrival of reënforcements in Charlestown, and these were soon on the way to raise his siege. The ebb of the tide of British power had been stayed; and the tide now turned again upon him. Lord Rawdon reappeared with fresh troops. The siege of Ninety Six, after great loss to the Americans, was abandoned, and Greene was soon in full retreat before the returning foe.

All the country below the great rivers which had been recovered had been again lost, and Greene was making his way for the settlement known as the Catawba Nation, in what is now York County, just across from Lancaster, — that is, the neighborhood in which Sumter had first rallied and formed his bands for recovering the State the year before, — when it was learned that Rawdon had abandoned Ninety Six and was endeavoring to form a junction with Stuart at Orangeburgh. Upon this Greene had returned, and again resumed the offensive, hoping to cross the Congaree before this junction could be made, and to strike one or the other of the parties which should first come up. But in this he had failed. Rawdon, Stuart, and Cruger united at Orangeburgh, and Greene, with his Continental army, retired to the High Hills of Santee for repose.

Then it was that Sumter had been permitted to carry out his plan of again assailing the enemy's post in his rear. While Pickens watched the Tories at Ninety Six, and Harden with Hayne approached from the lower part of the State, with Marion, and with Lee, who was assigned to his command for the occasion, Sumter had made the splendid raid by which the British posts from the Santee to Charlestown itself had all been assailed and carried, Hayne, Hampton, and Lee each successively striking within five miles of the town itself, carrying the war back to its very gates, and exciting terror within its lines. The incursions of Sumter and Marion in the winter, during the absence of Greene, again renewed with increased vigor upon the return of the Continental army, had caused the evacuation of Camden and the abandonment of the country north and east of the Congaree; this vigorous movement of the South Carolina troops, with the assistance only of Lee and his Legion, had shaken the British power to its very centre. Rawdon and Stuart and Cruger, it is true, were at Orangeburgh, but the whole country around was now in arms against them. The battle of Quinby Bridge, in which this movement culminated, had not, it is true, resulted as successfully as had reasonably been hoped, but a severe battle had been fought with advantage, the enemy losing all their baggage and many prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, within twenty miles of the town.

The British never recovered from the effects of this movement. The battle of Eutaw, which took place six weeks later, has generally been considered as the culmination of the war in South Carolina, and in many respects it was so. But that battle was for the Americans at best but a drawn one. It was not an American victory. Greene, who had attacked, collected his shattered forces seven miles from the battle-field at night; while Stuart

remained upon the field and leisurely retreated the next day. The battle had not altered the situations of the two parties. The movement was made and the battle fought for purposes not immediately affecting the war in South Carolina. Greene moved to put himself in a position to intercept Cornwallis should that general, retreating before Washington and Rochambeau, attempt to reach Charlestown. It failed in that object, for Greene was obliged again to retire to his former position on the High Hills of Santee, where he remained for two months. The anticipated movement of Cornwallis which induced Greene's advance had not taken place. His lordship had not retreated, but remained to be captured at Yorktown. The battle of Eutaw therefore left matters in the State unaltered. It was the incessant and vigorous partisan warfare of Sumter, Marion, Harden, Lee, and latterly, of Washington, breaking up the enemy's communication, destroying his posts, and carrying the war into his rear, which had compelled the abandonment of the country by the British. It was the "little strokes," the "partisan strokes," which Greene had in January written to Sumter were like the garnish of a table, but not to be depended upon for the great business of the army, which had really accomplished so much. Greene had been beaten in every great affair he had attempted; and yet the country had been recovered. To whose policy was this great success due? Was it to Greene's; or to that of Sumter, Marion, and Lee?

The Continental troops while at the High Hills of Santee had been in great distress, without money or stores, and, worse than all, without medicines or hospital supplies. Sickness had increased since the battle of Eutaw, probably from the operations in the swamps of the Congaree, and the wounded were in a most deplorable condition. Tarleton

and Simcoe in Virginia had destroyed the hospital stores on the way to South Carolina. It was at this time, says Johnson, when pressed to the earth by the distresses that surrounded him, and listening to the daily representations made of the forlorn state of his men and officers, not unfrequently accompanied with the indignant exclamation, "We are abandoned, let us retire," that the general uttered that celebrated declaration which South Carolina will never forget, "*I will deliver the country or perish.*"¹ The State certainly showed itself not ungrateful for such services as the commander of the Southern Department did render within her borders. The warmest acknowledgments for what he had done were cordially made, and substantial emoluments bestowed upon him; while the deeds of her own generals were accepted but as services due of right. The State to-day does not look back grudgingly upon what she then gave heartily. But the historian, in view of all that is now known, and of Greene's correspondence, which is now public, cannot but observe that this determination to stand by South Carolina or perish was not announced until General Washington himself had assumed command of the Southern Department. Until Washington appeared in Virginia, Greene's mind was set upon the command in that State. It was Lee's importunity and Rawdon's evacuation of Camden only that had prevented his abandonment of the State immediately after his defeat at Hobkirk's Hill. It was his intention to have returned to Virginia with a part if not all of his forces, had Ninety Six fallen, leaving the volunteer bands of South Carolina alone to oppose Lord Rawdon's army, which, though then below the Santee, was no weaker than when it had beaten him at Hobkirk's Hill. He had failed before Ninety Six and was in full retreat northward when Rawdon's evacuation of Ninety

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 249.

Six caused him again to pause, as the evacuation of Camden had in April stopped his desertion of the State at that time.

Besides other great advantages which had been derived from the brilliant successes of Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and Lee during the first months of the year, two very marked effects resulted to the American cause. The first of these was that the number of prisoners taken from the British, in the forts captured, forced an exchange of prisoners, including not only those taken in the field, but as well the St. Augustine exiles. The second was that, by reason of the recovery of territory in which they resided, and the incapacity of the British to afford protection, many of those who had given paroles considered themselves released from their obligations.

The first of these returned Henderson and many other valuable officers and stalwart men to the American ranks; and the second returned to the service of the State the original movers in the Revolution — men of great personal influence and character. The effort to check these movements induced by the second of these causes led to the long imprisonment of Postell and the execution of Hayne. But, however tragic the latter event, it was as nothing to the terrors and distress of the people caused by the internecine war which arose as the armies swept to and fro from one end of the State to the other.

In consequence of these civil wars between the Whigs and Tories, says Ramsay, the incursions of the savages, and the other calamities resulting from the operations of the British and American armies, South Carolina exhibited scenes of distress which were shocking to humanity. The single district of Ninety Six, which was only one of seven into which the State was then divided, was computed by well-informed persons residing therein to contain within its

limits fourteen hundred widows and orphans made so by the war. Nor was it wonderful that the country was involved in such accumulated distress. The State government was suspended and the British conquerors were careless of the civil rights of the inhabitants. Order and police were scarcely objects of their attention. The will of the strongest was the law. Such was the general character of those who called themselves Royalists that nothing could be expected from them, unrestrained as they were by civil government, but outrages against the peace and order of society. Though among the Tories in the lower parts of South Carolina there were gentlemen of honor, principle, and humanity, yet in the interior and frontier a great proportion of them constituted an ignorant, unprincipled banditti, to whom idleness, licentiousness, and deeds of violence were familiar. Horse thieves and others whose crimes had exiled them from society, the same class who had given rise to the Regulators a few years before, attached themselves to parties of the British. Encouraged by their example and instigated by the love of plunder, they committed the most extensive depredations. Under cloak of attachment to the old government they covered the basest and most selfish purposes. They could scarcely ever be brought to the field of battle. They sometimes furnished the British army with intelligence and provisions, but on all other accounts their services were of very little importance.¹

This characterization of Tories by Doctor Ramsay, especially of those of the Up-Country, is doubtless generally correct; but there were some in the upper part of the State who were as honorable and high-minded men as any who stood out in the Low-Country — indeed if not as true men as any of those who espoused the other side. Nothing has

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 275-276.

ever been alleged as dishonorable of Robert or Patrick Cunningham or of Fletchall, Robinson, or Pearis. It is to be feared indeed that the first of these had stronger cause of complaint against the conduct of the Whigs to himself than he had ever afforded to them. Nor can we be blind to the fact that the British officers charged great atrocities upon the part of men calling themselves Whigs, charges which are, at least in some measure, sustained by the correspondence of our own officers, Colonel Wade Hampton writing, as we have seen, that after the army left the neighborhood of Friday's Ferry for the High Hills of Santee almost every person who remained in the settlement after the army marched seems to have been combined in committing robberies the most base and inhuman that ever disgraced mankind; and another officer declaring that the practice of plunder continued to such a degree that the poor inhabitants trembled the moment a party of men appeared in sight.¹ The truth no doubt is that while generally, as the war went on, the better classes of the people sided more and more with the Revolutionists, and the lower and worst with the British, mutual injuries led to revenge, and plunder was indulged in, if not recognized as a mode of legitimate warfare. It has already been pointed out in these pages how much the system of maintaining the State troops, adopted from necessity by Sumter and afterwards approved and carried out by General Greene, Governor Rutledge, and the General Assembly, encouraged this ruinous practice.

As, however, the military forces recovered possession of the State, Governor Rutledge, with such of his council as he could gather around him, proceeded to reëstablish civil government, and to put a stop to lawlessness; but this, in the condition of affairs, was but slow and gradual work.

¹Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 186-187.

The better to accomplish it, as General Greene moved down to the Low-Country at the end of the year, Governor Rutledge called a new Assembly, to meet at Jacksonborough in January.

When the year 1781 began, the British had possession of almost the entire State. General Greene, with his small Continental army, was but just across the North Carolina line at Cheraw. Morgan, it is true, was at Grindall's Shoals on the Pacolet, threatening Ninety Six, and Marion from Snow Island was pushing his scouting parties towards Charlestown and Georgetown; but the British authority, supported by British arms, was everywhere paramount. When the year ended British rule was practically confined to Charlestown and its immediate vicinity.

During the year sixty-two battles, great and small, had been fought in the State. If we include the days spent in the sieges of Fort Watson, Fort Motte, and Ninety Six, there had been fighting by organized and commissioned forces 100 days in the 365. In the disturbed and disorganized condition of affairs the reports of the strength of the forces, of the killed, wounded, and prisoners lost on either side, are very defective, and in many cases, especially in the affairs under Sumter and Marion which took place during the absence of Greene, are entirely wanting. The following table has been compiled from such accounts as still exist. The engagements marked in roman letters were those in which Continental troops took part. Those in italics were fought by South Carolina partisan bands without any assistance.

	ENGAGEMENTS	DATE	AMERICAN			BRITISH		
			KILLED AND WOUNDED	PRISONERS LOST	TOTAL	KILLED AND WOUNDED	PRISONERS LOST	TOTAL
1	Cowpens	1781	72		72	184	600	784
2	<i>De Feyster's Capture</i>	January 16					29	29
3	<i>Sampit Road</i>	January 19						
4	Georgetown	January 24	3		3			
5	<i>Wadboo</i>	January 24						
6	<i>Monck's Corner</i>	January						
7	<i>Halfway Swamp</i>	February						
8	<i>Fort Granby</i>	February 19				13	66	79
9	<i>Thomson's Plantation</i>	February 23						
10	<i>Wright's Bluff</i>	February 27	18		18			
11	<i>Mud Lick</i>	March 2						
12	<i>Lynch's Creek</i>	March 6			18			20
13	<i>Wiboo Swamp</i>	March						
14	<i>Mount Hope</i>	March						
15	<i>Black River</i>	March						
16	<i>Sampit Bridge</i>	March			22			2
17	<i>Snow Island</i>	March						
18	<i>Witherspoon's Ferry</i>	March			18			
19	<i>Dutchman's Creek</i>	March 24				34	42	76
20	<i>Beattie's Mill</i>	March 24					26	26
21	<i>Four Holes</i>	April 7						
22	<i>Wachaws Church</i>	April 9						
23	<i>Barton's Post</i>	April 8				3	4	7
24	<i>Pocotaligo Road</i>	April 8	2	1	3	8	2	10
25	<i>Fort Bufour</i>	April 13					91	91
26	<i>Fort Watson</i>	April 15-23	8		8		120	120

{ Many British and Tories killed and wounded.
 { Many British and Tories killed and wounded.
 { No account of losses on either side.
 { No account of losses on either side.

	18	1	19	800	2596	28	{ British company cap- tured. { Post taken with pris- oners.
27 <i>Wiggins's Hill</i>							
28 <i>Horne's Corner</i>							
29 <i>Hannond's Mill</i>							
30 <i>Hobkirk's Hill</i>	132	136	268	38	220	258	
31 <i>Friday's Ferry</i>							
32 <i>Bush River</i>							
33 <i>Caunden Evacuation</i>							
34 <i>Orangeburgh</i>					90	90	
35 <i>Fort Motte</i>					150	150	
36 <i>Granby</i>					340	340	
37 <i>Beach Island</i>	6	10	6				
38 <i>Fort Galphin</i>	1		11				
39 <i>Georgetown</i>				4	126	130	
40 <i>Mydleton's Ambuscade</i>							
41 <i>Ninety Six</i>			40				
42 <i>Eggleston's Capture</i>			185	27	38	65	
43 <i>Horse Shoe</i>			15		45	45	
44 <i>Quarter House</i>	1	14	1	1	50	51	
45 <i>Wadboo</i>							
46 <i>Quincy Bridge</i>			60	45	100	145	
47 <i>Washington's Raid</i>					50	50	
48 <i>Cunningham's Raid</i>			8				
49 <i>Forks of Edisto</i>			18				
50 <i>Parker's Ferry</i>				20	80	100	
51 <i>Charlestown Road</i>							
52 <i>Stevens's Creek</i>	8	17	25				
53 <i>Eutaw</i>	509	8	517	417	247	664	
54 <i>Vince's Fort</i>							
55 <i>Cloud's Creek</i>	28		28	6		6	
56 <i>Hays's Station</i>	16		16				
57 <i>Gowen's Fort</i>							
58 <i>Moore's Surprise</i>							
59 <i>Fair Lawn</i>					80	80	
60 <i>R. Hampton's Surprise</i>	11		11				
61 <i>Dorchester</i>							
62 <i>Dorchester</i>	7	8	15			80	
Total	840	195	1405	800	2596	3526	

From this table it appears that of the sixty-two engagements during the year the State forces, volunteer and enlisted, fought forty-five without any assistance whatever, Continental or other. One, the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, was fought by the Continental army without the assistance of any South Carolina troops. The other sixteen were fought by the combined Continentals and State troops. There was one very marked difference between the engagements by the partisan bands in this year from those of the preceding. In 1780 the South Carolina volunteers had had the constant and vigorous assistance of similar bodies from North Carolina, sometimes from Georgia, and in one instance, that of King's Mountain, from Virginia. But Davie had unfortunately been taken from the field by General Greene for staff duty, and his splendid little corps disbanded. Davidson had been killed at Cowan's Ford early in the year, and the other leaders of that State, McDowell, Shelby, and Sevier, had remained inactive now that the war was transferred again to South Carolina. The two latter, it is true, had, at General Greene's earnest appeal, come for a while; but refused to remain, and had abandoned him at a most critical moment without having fired a gun. Colonel Clarke with his band of Georgians had taken an active part with General Pickens in the affair at Beattie's Mill and at the siege of Augusta, but his operations for the rest of the year had been confined to his own State.

The returns of killed, wounded, and missing in several of these engagements are entirely wanting, and in other instances are to be found only for one side or the other. From those that have been preserved it appears that, during the absence of General Greene in North Carolina, in the engagements by Sumter and Marion, the Whigs inflicted a loss upon the British and Tories in killed, wounded, and

prisoners taken, of 249, at a loss to themselves of 101. But these figures do not include the loss to the enemy at Sampit on the 19th of January, in which many British and Tories were wounded, nor at Wadboo and Monck's Corner, in which the Postells attacked the posts and carried off all the stores, presumably not without considerable loss to the enemy in men, nor at Fort Granby when first besieged by Sumter, nor at Wright's Bluff which he assaulted; nor in Marion's affairs, of Mount Hope, Black River, Sampit, and Witherspoon's Ferry, though in these Marion so worsted the British that he drove them from the Santee into Georgetown. The statistics of these affairs would add considerably to the list of casualties on both sides, but would not probably alter the proportion of nearly three to one in favor of the Americans. During the year the South Carolina partisan bands in their warfare had forty-five affairs, great and small, and had put *hors de combat* 825 of the enemy at a loss to themselves of 263. At Hobkirk's Hill, in the evacuation of Camden, Eggleston's capture, Washington's Raid, and in the affairs at Dorchester, in which none but Continentals were engaged, the losses were not so unequal, the British losing 388 and the Americans 283. In the eleven battles in which both Continentals and State troops took part the British lost 2268; and the Americans, 859. The aggregate loss of the British in South Carolina during the year was 3526, and of the Americans, 1405.

The surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown in October had practically decided the war; but the fighting was not yet over in South Carolina. In 1782 much more blood was to be uselessly shed.

CHAPTER XXIV

1781-1782

ON the 23d of November, 1781, Governor Rutledge wrote letters to the brigadier-generals, sending them writs for the election of members of the Senate and House of Representatives. He requested these officers to insert in each writ sent them respectively the names of three such persons as were deemed proper to manage the elections. The writs so prepared, he directed, should be forwarded by careful hands to the persons therein named. His instructions were that where an election could not be held in the parish or district for which members were to be chosen, it should be held at a point nearest to it, where the greatest number of persons entitled to vote could meet with safety and convenience. The brigadiers were to advise the managers whom they appointed as to the selection of polling places.¹ "Cassius," in the pamphlet before alluded to, asserts that these writs of election were accompanied with *printed instructions* to the returning officers not to admit any person to vote but such as obeyed the governor's proclamation; and that the returning officers had also further orders to choose particular men whom he named, and according to such nomination they were chosen. There is no allusion to any such instructions in the letters to Sumter and Marion which are preserved. But all accounts agree that it was ordered by the governor and council

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 214; Sumter MSS.

that at the election only such votes should be received as were offered by persons who had not taken protection, or, who having done so, had, notwithstanding, rejoined their countrymen under Governor Rutledge's proclamation of the 27th of September, 1781. Other persons, though residents, were not considered as freemen of the State, or entitled to the full privilege of citizenship.¹

As the governor's proclamation, says Johnson, precluded all persons from voting who had taken protection, it will readily be conjectured of what material the body elected would be composed. It was not strictly, he observes, an assembly of armed barons, but there were few, if any, whose swords had not been girt to their thighs in the common cause.² The exchange of prisoners had liberated the exiles, and those confined on the prison ships, the influence of whose character had too long been lost to the State. These were now returning, ready to assist with their counsel in repairing the desolation of war. From all quarters, says Lee, were flocking home our unfortunate, maltreated prisoners. The old and the young, the rich and the poor, were hastening to their native soil, burying their particular griefs in the joy universally felt in consequence of the liberation of their country. They found their houses burnt, their plantations laid waste, and the rich rewards of a life of industry and economy dissipated. Without money, without credit, with debilitated constitutions, with scars and aches, this brave, patriotic group gloried in the adversity they had experienced because the price of their personal liberty and of national independence. They had lost their wealth, they had lost their health, and had lost the props of their declining years in

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 334; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 304.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 282.

the field of battle; but they had established the independence of their country.¹

The Assembly about to convene was composed almost entirely of two classes: Prisoners,—the exiles to St. Augustine and those confined on the prison ships,—and officers of the Continental army, State troops, and militia. Among those who were returned from the parishes of St. Philip and St. Michael's, Charlestown, the senators were Arthur Middleton, the signer of the Declaration of Independence, an exile to St. Augustine, and Colonel Isaac Motte, who had been second in command at Fort Moultrie on the 28th of June, 1776. As representatives there were Thomas Heyward, Jr., and Edward Rutledge, the other two living signers of the Declaration; Henry Laurens, just released from the Tower in London, and Colonel John Laurens, his son; Hugh Rutledge; John Neufville, the chairman, it will be recollected, of the general committee of the non-importers in 1769; Major Thomas Grimball, who commanded the Charlestown Battalion of Artillery during the siege of the city; Dr. David Ramsay, the future historian, and other exiles, with Major Thomas Pinckney and Colonel James Postell. The senator from Christ Church was Colonel Arnoldus Vanderhorst, and Major John Vanderhorst a representative, two of Marion's officers. Marion himself was senator from St. John's, Berkeley. From St. Andrew's, John Rutledge, the governor; Richard Hutson, Benjamin Cattell, exiles, and Major Peter Bocquet were among the representatives. From St. George's, Dorchester, Dr. David Oliphant, the surgeon-general, was elected as senator; General Isaac Huger, General William Moultrie, Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Mathews, the member of Congress, and Edward Blake, an exile, representatives. St. James's,

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776*, 450.

Goose Creek, chose as representatives Ralph Izard, who had been one of the American envoys abroad, and who was now serving as a volunteer in the army, and William Johnson and George Flagg, two exiles. From St. Thomas and St. Denis's, Major Isaac Harleston was senator. From St. Paul's, Joseph Bee, an exile, was senator, and Thomas Bee, formerly lieutenant-governor; Thomas Ferguson and Morton Wilkinson, exiles, were representatives. From St. Bartholomew's, Major Edmund Hyrne, aide-de-camp to General Greene, who had so admirably managed the exchange of prisoners on the American side, was elected a representative. From St. Helena, Major Pierce Butler¹ and Thomas Heyward, Sr., were elected. Prince George's, Winyaw, elected a strong delegation, including Colonel Hugh Horry as senator, General Christopher Gadsden, Colonel Peter Horry, Major William Benison, and Captain Thomas Mitchell. Captain William Alston, and Nathaniel Dwight, whose house Watson had burned, were the representatives from All Saints. From Prince Frederick's there were Colonel John Baxter, who had been so severely wounded at Quinby; Major John James, Captain William McCottry, Captain John McCauley, and Colonel James Postell, all Marion's men. Among the representatives from St. Peter's was Colonel William Stafford. The senator from Prince William's was Colonel William

¹ This gentleman had been major in the Twenty-ninth Regiment, British army, and was engaged as such in the Boston Riots, the 5th of March, 1770. He had been with his regiment in South Carolina previously. He subsequently returned and married Miss Mary Middleton, daughter of Colonel Thomas Middleton (who had commanded the South Carolina Regiment in the Cherokee expedition in 1761), espoused the American cause, resigned his commission in the British army, and served in the American. He and Ralph Izard were the two first United States senators from South Carolina. (See *So. Ca. Gazette*, April 20, 1769; *So. Ca. and Am. Gen. Gazette*, Jan. 14, 1771; *Johnson's Traditions*, 470.)

Harden. From the district to the eastward of the Wateree — that is, the Camden district — General Sumter was chosen senator, and among the ten representatives were James Bradley, with the marks of iron still on his wrists, where they had remained since Tarleton's brutal treatment; Joseph Kershaw, just released and returned from Bermuda, where he had been exiled with his brother Ely, who had died on the voyage of typhus dysentery taken in the prison ships; Colonel Richard Richardson; and Major John James, who had been returned also from Prince Frederick's. From Ninety Six the senator was John Lewis Gervais, the member of the council who had gone out with Governor Rutledge from Charlestown before its capitulation, and had succeeded in keeping out of the reach of the enemy, remaining steadfast to the cause while the two other councillors who had gone with them had returned to their plantations and taken protection. General Pickens, Colonel Robert Anderson, Colonel Le Roy Hammond, Major Hugh Middleton, Patrick Calhoun, John Ewing Colhoun, and Arthur Simkins, whose house the Tories had burned, were representatives. Colonels Wade Hampton and Richard Hampton were representatives from Saxe Gotha. From the upper district between the Broad and Saluda, that is, what is now Spartanburg County, the representatives were General William Henderson, Colonel Thomas Brandon, one of the heroes of King's Mountain, Samuel McJunkin, father of the famous Whig partisan, Joseph McJunkin, and Colonel John Thomas, Jr., the hero of Cedar Springs. Colonel Thomas Taylor was senator from the district between the Broad and the Catawba, and among the representatives were Colonel James Lyles, Colonel Edward Lacey, and Colonel Richard Winn. Colonel William Hill, whose iron works were destroyed by Huck, and who had served so gallantly

under Sumter and at King's Mountain, was a representative from the New Acquisition (York). Colonel William Thomson, who had repulsed the British under Sir Henry Clinton when attempting to cross from Long Island to Sullivan's Island on the memorable 28th of June, 1776, was senator from St. Matthew's and Orange. Major Thomas, who had captured the party on the Pee Dee in September, 1780, was a representative from St. David's Parish.¹

As already stated, Governor Rutledge had first intended to have called this Assembly to meet at Camden, but the capture of Governor Burke and his council in North Carolina had warned him of the danger of assembling the body at a place beyond the immediate protection of the army. General Greene, upon his excursion to Dorchester, finding the country between the Edisto and Ashley possessed of sufficient military advantages to admit of his covering Jacksonborough, warmly pressed the governor and council to convene the legislature at that place—a strong consideration, doubtless, also was that so many of the Assembly were officers of the army it would have been impracticable to have formed a quorum except in its immediate vicinity. Jacksonborough was a small village on the west bank of the Edisto, where the river is known by the name of Pon Pon. It consisted of the courthouse, jail, and two or three small houses, and was distant about thirty-five miles from Charlestown. An incidental advantage contemplated by the establishment of the seat of government at this place was the assertion of the complete recovery of the State.

The legislature convened, as called, on the 18th of January, 1782. By the constitution of 1778 its full membership consisted of 28 senators and 174 representatives.

¹ For full list of members of the Jacksonborough legislature, see MS. journal of Josiah Smith, Jr., and Appendix A to this volume.

A quorum was constituted of 13 senators and 69 representatives. On the day appointed, 13 senators, just enough to organize the Senate, and 74 representatives, but a few more than was necessary to organize the House, appeared.¹ It was indeed a notable assembly. True, some of its most distinguished members were absent, as, for instance, Henry Laurens, who, just released from the Tower, was still in London. So, too, several of the exiles were yet detained in Philadelphia, finding no means of returning, and some on the journey home had not yet arrived. Not all of the military officers could leave their posts at the same time; nor could all elected provide for the sustenance and defence of their families in the distracted state of the country so as to allow them to attend. It was remarkable that, in the condition of affairs in the State, so large a number as that which appeared could be found to assemble. Those who did were all true and tried Whigs; the qualifications of electors as prescribed in the proclamation precluded any other. Indeed, as already observed, it was charged that Governor Rutledge had himself selected and dictated who should be chosen. There appears to be, however, no evidence to support the assertion, nor could an election at this time and under the circumstances be expected to return men of any other character than those who now appeared. A more distinguished body of men had never before, and never after, met in the State of South Carolina, nor perhaps in any State in the Union. All the original leaders in the Revolution who had remained true to their principles, most of whom had endured imprisonment and exile in support of them, were there; and to these were added the new set of heroes who had taken up the cause when the first were overwhelmed in defeat and carried into captivity, and who had now recovered the

¹ Marion's letter to Maham, Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1782-82), 232.

State, and restored the former leaders to position. The Assembly was composed, not only of patriots who had proved their fidelity by suffering, but of statesmen, jurists, scholars, and soldiers, many of whom had but commenced careers of distinguished services, and whose names are still handed down with pride and reverence, and preserved in the names of counties, towns, and fortresses, and by every means by which a grateful posterity might enshrine their memories.

The assemblage was remarkable, too, because it was the first in which there had been real representatives in the legislature from all parts of the State. In this body Sumter and Pickens and Taylor and Lacey and Winn and the Hamptons and Hammonds appeared, and brought with them from the Up-Country, which their swords had redeemed, as much weight in council as that which had hitherto been carried by the Rutledges, Pinckneys, Middletons, and others of the Low-Country.

But with all the ability and high character of the members, the circumstances under which they met were such as to preclude moderation and fairness in their dealings with their fellow-countrymen who had espoused the cause of their enemies.

Upon the assembling of the body, John Lewis Gervais was chosen President of the Senate, and Philip Prioleau, Clerk; Hugh Rutledge, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and John Berwick, Clerk.¹ No journal of either House is now to be found. The court-house and jail probably were used as Senate chamber and hall of the House; paper was scarce; and beyond the address of the Governor, the replies of the two Houses, and the statutes actually passed, we have but little account of the proceedings of this famous

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 346, 349; MS. diary of Josiah Smith, Jr.

Assembly. As there were but two or three houses in the village, the members probably found such accommodations as they could upon the neighboring plantations, or in the cantonments of the army under the protection of which the legislature was held.

The Houses having organized on Friday, the 18th day of January, 1782, his Excellency, John Rutledge, the governor, delivered an address, or "speech," as it was termed, the importance of which, marking out as it did the lines followed by the Assembly, it is well to give somewhat at length. It was as follows:¹—

"Since the last meeting of the General Assembly, the good people of this State have not only felt the common calamities of war, but, from the wanton and savage manner in which it has been prosecuted, they have experienced such severities as are unpractised, and will scarcely be credited by civilized nations.

"The enemy, unable to make any impression on the Northern States, the number of whose inhabitants, and the strength of whose country, had baffled their repeated efforts, turned their views towards the Southern, which, a difference of circumstances, afforded some expectation of conquering, or at least of greatly distressing. After a long resistance, the reduction of Charlestown was effected, by the vast superiority of force with which it had been besieged. The loss of that garrison, as it consisted of the continental troops of Virginia and the Carolinas, and of a number of militia, facilitated the enemy's march into the country, and their establishment of strong posts in the upper and interior parts of it; and the unfavourable issue of the action near Camden induced them vainly to imagine, that no other army could be collected which they might not easily defeat. The militia, commanded by the Brigadiers Sumpter and Marion, whose enterprising spirit and unremitting perseverance under many difficulties are deserving of great applause, harassed and often defeated large parties; but the numbers of those militia were too few to contend effectually with the collected strength of the enemy. Regardless, therefore, of the sacred ties of honour, destitute of the feelings of humanity, and determined to extinguish, if possible, every spark of freedom in this country, they, with the insolent pride of conquerors,

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 234.

gave unbounded scope to the exercise of their tyrannical disposition, infringed their publick engagements, and violated their most solemn capitulations. Many of our worthiest citizens were, without cause, long and closely confined, — some on board of prison-ships, and others in the town and castle of St. Augustine, — their properties disposed of at the will and caprice of the enemy, and their families sent to different and distant parts of the continent without the means of support. Many who had surrendered as prisoners of war were killed in cold blood — several suffered death in the most ignominious manner, and others were delivered up to savages, and put to tortures under which they expired. Thus the lives, liberties and properties of the people were dependent solely on the pleasure of British officers, who deprived them of either or all on the most frivolous pretences. Indians, slaves, and a desperate banditti of the most profligate characters, were caressed and employed by the enemy to execute their infamous purposes. Devastation and ruin marked their progress and that of their adherents — nor were their violences restrained by the charms or influence of beauty and innocence — even the fair sex, whom it is the duty of all, and the pleasure and pride of the brave, to protect — they, and their tender offspring, were victims to the inveterate malice of an unrelenting foe. Neither the tears of mothers, nor the cries of infants, could excite in their breasts pity or compassion. Not only the peaceful habitations of the widow, the aged and infirm, but the holy temples of the Most High were consumed in flames kindled by their sacrilegious hands. They have tarnished the glory of the British arms, disgraced the profession of a British soldier, and fixed indelible stigmas of rapine, cruelty, perfidy and profaneness, on the British name. But I can now congratulate you, and I do so most cordially, on the pleasing change of affairs which, under the blessing of God, the wisdom, prudence, address, and bravery of the great and gallant General Greene, and the intrepidity of the officers and men under his command, has been happily effected — a general who is justly entitled, from his many signal services, to honourable and singular marks of your approbation and gratitude. His successes have been more rapid and complete than the most sanguine could have expected. The enemy, compelled to surrender or evacuate every post which they held in the country, frequently defeated and driven from place to place, are obliged to seek refuge under the walls of Charlestown, and on islands in its vicinity. We have now the full and absolute possession of every other part of the State; and the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are in the free exercise of their respective authorities.

His Excellency then went on to congratulate the Assembly on the glorious victory obtained at Yorktown by the combined forces of America and France over their common enemy, on the perfect harmony which subsisted between the two countries, on the stability which the independence of America had acquired, and on the certainty that it was too deeply rooted ever to be shaken. Then discussing what might be the immediate effects on the British nation of the events he had mentioned, and of their well-founded apprehensions from the powers of France, Spain, and Holland, he continued:—

“If, however, we judge as we ought of their future by their past conduct, we may presume that they will not only endeavour to keep possession of our capital, but make another attempt, howsoever improbable the success of it may appear, to subjugate this country. It is therefore highly incumbent on us to use our most strenuous efforts to frustrate so fatal a design. And I earnestly conjure you by the duty which you owe, and the sacred love which you bear, to your country; by the constant remembrance of her bitter sufferings; and by the just detestation of British government, which you and your posterity must forever possess, to exert your utmost faculties for that purpose, by raising and equipping, with all possible expedition, a respectable, permanent force, and by making ample provision for their comfortable subsistence. I am sensible the expense will be great, but a measure so indispensable to the preservation of our freedom, is above every pecuniary consideration.

“The organization of our militia is likewise a subject of infinite importance. A clear and concise law, by which the burdens will be equally sustained, and a competent number of men brought forth and kept in the field when their assistance may be required, is essential to our security, and therefore justly claims your immediate and serious attention. Certain it is, that some of our militia have, upon several occasions, exhibited instances of valour, which would have reflected honour on veteran troops. The courage and conduct of the generals whom I have mentioned, the cool and determined bravery repeatedly displayed by Brigadier Pickens, and, indeed, the behaviour of many officers and men in every brigade, are unquestionable testimonies of the truth of

this assertion ; but such behaviour cannot be expected from militia in general, without good order and strict discipline—nor can that order and discipline be established but by salutary law steadily executed.”

His Excellency then proceeded to address the Assembly upon a subject of most vital interest to the State, and one in dealing with which the greatest statesmanship was demanded. He said :—

“ Another important matter for your deliberation, is the conduct of such of our citizens as voluntarily avowing their allegiance, and even glorying in their profession of loyalty and attachment to his Britannick Majesty, have offered their congratulations on the success of his arms, prayed to be embodied as Royal militia, accepted commissions in his service, and endeavoured to subvert our constitution and establish his power in its stead — of those who have returned to this State in defiance of a law by which such return was declared to be a capital offence, and have abetted the British interest — and of such whose behaviour has been so reprehensible, that justice and policy forbid their free re-admission to the rights and privileges of citizens.”

Continuing the subject, his Excellency added :—

“ The extraordinary lenity of this State has been remarkably conspicuous ; other States have thought it just and expedient to appropriate the property of British subjects to the public use, but we have forbore to take even the profits of the estates of our most implacable enemies. It is with you to determine whether the forfeiture and appropriation of their property should now take place. If such shall be your determination, though many of our firmest friends have been reduced, for their inflexible attachment to the cause of their country, from opulence to inconceivable distress, and, if the enemy’s will and power had prevailed, would have been doomed to indigence and beggary, yet it will redound to the reputation of this State to provide a becoming support for the families of those whom you may deprive of their property.”

Then turning to the financial condition of the State, he proceeded :—

“ The value of the paper currency became of late so much depreciated that it was requisite, under the powers vested in the executive

during the recess of the General Assembly, to suspend the laws by which it was made a tender. You will now consider whether it may not be proper to repeal those laws, and fix some equitable mode for the discharge of debts contracted whilst paper money was in circulation.

“In the present scarcity of specie it would be difficult, if not impracticable, to levy a tax to any considerable amount towards sinking the public debt ; nor will creditors of the State expect that such a tax should, at this time, be imposed ; but it is just and reasonable, that all unsettled demands should be liquidated, and satisfactory assurances of payment given to the publick creditors.”

In conclusion the governor added : —

“The interest and honour, the safety and happiness of our country, depend so much on the result of your deliberations, that I flatter myself you will proceed, in the weighty business before you, with firmness and temper, with vigour, unanimity and despatch.”¹

How far General Greene was entitled to the principal, if not sole, credit of the redemption of the State, which, under the blessing of God, the governor attributed to him, has already in a measure been considered, and the subject may again be alluded to when we come to narrate the action of the Assembly at the suggestion of his Excellency in the rewards heaped upon him. It is sufficient now to observe that, while the enterprising spirit and unremitting perseverance of Sumter and Marion are commended, little importance was attached by the governor to their conduct as forerunning the action of Greene, and preparing the way for his successes, if not accomplishing results of which his successes were only the natural and inevitable consequences.

In stating that the Whigs had now the full and absolute possession of every part of the State but Charlestown and the neighboring islands, and that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers were in the free exercise of their respective authorities, the governor rather overstated the result

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 331-342.

that had been so far accomplished. The legislature at the time was sitting only under the protection of the army, and judicial powers could scarcely be said to be in existence. No sheriff could have served a writ without military assistance, nor could a court have been convened or have held a session except, as in the case of the legislature, under the protecting wing of the army. As a matter of fact the courts were not opened for nearly a year after. His Excellency had indeed but begun the reëstablishment of civil government, and this only by the aid of military power.

To this address answers were returned by the two Houses of Assembly. The answers did but little more than echo his Excellency's address, save in regard to General Greene, of whom they spoke in still more exalted terms. The Senate, without an allusion to Sumter, Marion, or Pickens, answered:—

“It is with inexpressible pleasure, that we receive your Excellency's congratulation upon the great and glorious events of the campaign, on the happy change of affairs, and on the pleasing prospect before us; and we assure your Excellency, that we concur most sincerely with you, in acknowledging and applauding the meritorious zeal, and the very important services which have been rendered to this State by the great and gallant General Greene, and the brave and intrepid officers and men under his command, and to whom we shall be happy to give the most honourable and singular testimonies of our approbation and applause.”

The House, in still more extravagant language, replied:—

“We should betray a great degree of insensibility, and be wanting in justice to his merit, should we omit this occasion of acknowledging, with the warmest gratitude, our obligations to the great and gallant General Greene. His achievements in this State, while they rank him with the greatest commanders of ancient or modern date, will engrave his name in indelible characters on the heart of every friend to this country. Our acknowledgments are also due to all the brave officers and men under his command who have so often fought, bled, and conquered for us.”

This branch of the Assembly, however, added this much merit of praise to the partisan leaders of the State:—

“The Generals Sumpter, Marion, and Pickens, with the brave militia under their commands, those virtuous citizens who did not despair of the commonwealth in her greatest extremity, are deserving of the highest commendation.”

Pickens was at this time away conducting his most successful campaign against the Indians, but both Sumter and Marion were present in the Senate; probably it was their modesty and delicacy which excluded from the proceedings of the Senate any recognition of the great services they had rendered, not only before and during Greene's campaign in the State, but while he had abandoned it to meet Lord Cornwallis in North Carolina.

CHAPTER XXV

1782

THE suggestions of his Excellency in his address were all carried out by the legislature. Indeed, it may be said that he moulded its action in his proclamation of the 27th of September and in his address.

Under the constitution of 1778 the term of office of the governor and lieutenant-governor was to continue for two years, and no one serving in either of these offices was reëligible for a period of four years after.¹ Governor Rutledge had been elected in January, 1779, and Christopher Gadsden had, during the siege of Charlestown, in May, 1780, been appointed lieutenant-governor in the place of Thomas Bee, who was in Philadelphia attending the Continental Congress. Their terms of office, under the Constitution, consequently expired in January, 1781, but at that time the British had possession of the whole State, and no election could be held. The first duty of the present Assembly which now met was, therefore, to elect a governor and lieutenant-governor. The Tories, no doubt learning of Sumter's resignation, built up great hopes of discord and jealousies among the Whigs at this time. *The Royal Gazette* of the 26th of December, 1781, announcing that the Assembly was soon to meet and that a new governor was to be chosen, added as information from the rebel country that "the aristocratick party as they are styled

¹ *Statutes at Large*, vol. I, 138.

are strenuous for Mr. Ralph Izard, Senior — to whom Mr. Sumter is opposed by a considerable body of the Back-Country people.” Whether there was any real foundation for such a rumor is not further known; but certain it is that, though aggrieved by the action of Governor Rutledge at the instigation of General Greene, Sumter lent himself to no such intrigue. So far was he from seeking to be elected governor that on the 22d of December he writes to General Greene, acknowledging the receipt of two letters, of the 12th and 15th. “In the former of these letters you asked if I did not intend to get into the General Assembly. It is probable I may serve if elected, but as I never have solicited any public appointment, I can’t think of doing it now.” And when elected to the Senate, he gave the new governor his most active support, notwithstanding the ill treatment he conceived himself to have received, volunteering even to recruit men for the Continental battalions, though himself out of the service.¹

The Assembly went into an election for a governor, and Christopher Gadsden, the lieutenant-governor, was chosen, but he declined the office in a speech which Ramsay reports as to this effect : —

“I have served you in a variety of stations for thirty years, and I would now cheerfully make one of a forlorn hope in an assault on the lines of Charlestown, if it was probable that, with the certain loss of my life, you would be re-instated in the possession of your capital.

¹ Letter of Governor Mathews accepting his offer, March 11, 1782, Sumter MSS. Governor Mathews writes to Sumter: “The establishing an armory is certainly a very desirable object. I will consider your proposal and acquaint you with the result as soon as I can. Your undertaking to recruit men for our Continental battalions would be rendering your country a most substantial service. I therefore request you would proceed on that business with every possible attention, and inform General Huger of my desire that you would engage in this important business.”

What I can do for my country I am willing to do. My sentiments of the American cause, from the Stamp Act downwards, have never changed. I am still of opinion that it is the cause of liberty and of human nature. If my acceptance of the office of governor would serve my country, though my administration would be attended with the loss of personal credit and reputation, I would cheerfully undertake it. The present times require the vigour and activity of the prime of life; but I feel the increasing infirmities of old age to such a degree, that I am conscious I cannot serve you to advantage. I therefore beg, for your sakes, and for the sake of the publick, that you would indulge me with the liberty of declining the arduous trust." ¹

Christopher Gadsden having declined, John Mathews, the member of Congress whose prompt and vigorous action had thwarted the intrigue of the French ambassador, by which the Carolinas and Georgia came near being sacrificed for the independency of the other ten States, and who had since been rendering Washington signal service as a member of the committee of Congress at his headquarters, was next elected governor and accepted the office. Richard Hutson, one of the exiles, was elected lieutenant-governor. The privy councillors chosen were Christopher Gadsden, Edward Rutledge, Peter Bocquet, Morton Wilkinson, Richard Beresford, Samuel Smith, Benjamin Guerard, and John Lloyd. Delegates to Congress, John Rutledge, Arthur Middleton, John Lewis Gervais, Ralph Izard, and David Ramsay. Commissioners of the Treasury, William Parker and Edward Blake.²

The first act passed by the legislature was one repealing the laws which had made paper currency or bills of credit a legal tender in payment of debts.³ Accompanying this was one suspending the operation of the statute of limitations of actions until the 1st of February, 1783; ⁴ and another pro-

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 349.

² MS. diary of Josiah Smith, Jr.; *The Royal Gazette*.

³ *Statutes at Large*, vol. IV, 508.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 509.

hibiting the commencement of suit for any debt until ten days after the meeting of the next General Assembly.¹ "An act for settling the qualifications of the electors and elected in the next General Assembly" followed, by which Governor Rutledge's proclamation of the 7th of September and 17th of November was recited and adopted, and their provisions extended to the next election.² An act of considerable importance, the repeal of which, the next year, was the subject of an unfortunate interference by General Green, was one vesting in the Congress of the United States power to levy duties of five per cent ad valorem, on certain goods and merchandise imported into the State, and on prizes and prize goods condemned in court of admiralty.³ And an act was passed for furnishing supplies to the army to the value of 373,598 Mexican dollars, being the quota assigned to this State of the Continental estimates for the year 1782.⁴ "An act to procure recruits and prevent desertion" provided that every able-bodied recruit of the proper age, who should enlist in the Continental service for three years, or during the war, should receive for each and every year's service the bounty of one sound negro between the age of ten and forty years, to be delivered one at the time of his enlistment, another at the time of the second year's service, and the third at the expiration of the third year's service. It was provided that, if any such recruit should die, be killed, or maimed after the commencement of the third year, he or his heirs should, nevertheless, be entitled to receive the same bounty as if he had served out the third year. If he deserted, the bounty was to be forfeited to the use of the State. A bounty of a negro between the ages above mentioned was also offered to any person who should procure twenty-five recruits within two months after the passing of the

¹ *Statutes at Large*, vol. IV, 513.

² *Ibid.*, 510.

³ *Ibid.*, 512.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 525.

act; a like gratuity was offered to any person who should procure thirty-five recruits to enlist within three months.¹

Following Governor Rutledge's recommendation, Thomas Ferguson, Morton Wilkinson, and John Ward were appointed commissioners for purchasing an estate to the value of 10,000 guineas in trust for the Honorable Major-General Nathanael Greene, and the faith of the State was pledged for the fulfilling of any contract which should be made by the commissioners for the payment of the purchase money.² It may well be doubted if the legislature would have been so prompt in awarding this gratuity had it been known at the time that the return of General Greene to South Carolina had not been of his own suggestion, and that he had unwillingly remained in the State after coming; that, on the contrary, he had been about to abandon it again after the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, and had only been prevented from doing so by Lee's remonstrance, and Lord Rawdon's abandonment of Camden in consequence of the breaking up of his communications by Sumter, Marion, and Lee, movements which he had scarcely sanctioned. Lee's story had not then been told. Nor were Sumter and his heroic followers, the Hamptons, Taylors, Lacey, Hill, and Winn, nor Marion with the Horrys, Postells, McCottry, James, and the Vanderhorsts, all with seats in that body, aware that he had sneered at and belittled their services, declaring to Governor Reed of Pennsylvania that they and their gallant and patriotic bands had been serving more from a desire of plunder than from any inclination to promote the independence of the United States. Had all this been known at the time, it is not probable that an acre of land or a dollar of money would have been voted him. At the time of Rutledge's recommendation for his remuneration, the governor believed that it was Greene's mili-

¹ *Statutes at Large*, vol. IV, 513, 515.

² *Ibid.*, 515.

tary genius which had conceived the bold policy of leaving Cornwallis in North Carolina and moving upon Lord Rawdon in this State. It was to his patient constancy to this plan that was attributed the redemption of the State. He was held up by his friends and admirers in extravagant language as second only to Washington; in almost blasphemous language he was styled "deputy Saviour."¹ And all this, Sumter and Marion, sitting as senators, were too high-minded to challenge, when by doing so they would bring in their own services in competition with his. Georgia and North Carolina, not to be outdone in expressions of gratitude, voted to Greene, also, the former 5000 guineas, and the latter 2400 acres of land. But the general's enjoyment of these extraordinary marks of favor was not without alloy. The effusions of congratulations were closely followed by bitter complaints at the neglect and injustice that others than the generals had sustained. Nor was it long after these grants were made before reports were in circulation as injurious as those which had once before assailed his moral character whilst in the quartermaster-general's department. It was said that he had intrigued with the legislature to obtain these grants, and that he had combined with a mercantile house, under the firm name of Hunter, Banks & Co., to participate in a contract for the supply of the troops and even to practise upon the necessities of his companions in arms.² It is very probable that his advice that the legislature should assemble at some place under the immediate protection of the army gave color, if not rise, to the suspicion of intrigue with the body as to the grant; but, as it has been well observed, the character of the Assembly was in itself a sufficient answer to such a charge. The shadow of the

¹ "The Battle of Eutaw" (General J. Watts de Peyster), *The United Service Magazine*, September, 1881.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 285, 286.

latter accusation hung over him for the remainder of his life, though it is not probable that he was guilty of more than indiscretion in regard to that transaction.

The legislature next proceeded to the most serious part of its business: the confiscation of the property of avowed Tories, and the amercement of those who had withdrawn themselves from the contest and accepted protection from his Majesty's forces. The justification of these measures was set out in a carefully prepared statement, by way of recital, to the first of these acts. It is here given in full as the presentation of the views of those who enacted the law — a law which was received with only less indignation by many of the truest Whigs than by the Tories who suffered under it:—

“Whereas, the thirteen British colonies (now the United States of America) were by an act of the Parliament of Great Britain, passed in or about the month of December, in the year of our Lord 1775, declared to be in rebellion, and out of the protection of the British Crown; and by the said act not only the property of the colonists was declared subject to seizure and condemnation, but divers seizures and destruction of their property having been made after the 19th day of April 1775, and before the passing of the said act, such seizure and destruction were, by the said act, declared to be lawful; and whereas, the good people of these States, having not only suffered great losses and damages by captures of their property on the sea, by the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, but by their seizing and carrying off much property taken on the land; in consequence of such proceedings of the British Crown, and those acting under its authority, the honorable Congress of the United States, after due and mature consideration, authorized the seizing and condemnation of all property found on the sea, and belonging to the subjects of Great Britain, and recommended to the several States in which such subjects had property, to confiscate the same for public use; all political connexion between Great Britain and the United States having been dissolved by the separation of these States from that kingdom and then declaring themselves free and independent of her; in pursuance of which recommendation most (if not all) have disposed of such property for the public use; and whereas, notwithstanding the State has forborne even to sequester the profits arising

from the estates of British subjects, the enemy, in violation of the most solemn capitulations and public engagements, by which the property of individuals was secured to them, seized upon, sequestered, and applied to their own use, not only in several instances the profits of the estates, but in other instances the estates themselves, of the good citizens of the State, and have committed the most wanton and wilful waste of property, both real and personal, to a very considerable amount; and whereas, from a proclamation of Sir Henry Clinton, declaring that if any person should appear in arms in order to permit the establishment of his Britannic Majesty's government in this country, such person should be treated with the utmost severity, and their estates be immediately seized in order to be confiscated; and whereas from a letter of Lord Rawdon to Lieutenant-Colonel Rugely declaring that every militiaman who did not use his utmost endeavors to apprehend deserters should be punished in such manner as his lordship should think adequate to such offence, by whipping, imprisonment, or being sent to serve his Britannic Majesty in the West Indies; from the Earl Cornwallis's letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger, bearing date the 18th of August, 1780, declaring that he had given orders that all the inhabitants who had submitted, and who had taken part with their countrymen in the first action near Camden (although such submission was an act of force or necessity) should be punished with the greatest rigor, that they should be imprisoned, and their whole property taken from them or destroyed; and that he had ordered in the most positive manner, that every militiaman who had borne arms on the part of his Britannic Majesty, and who had afterward joined their fellow citizens (although he had been compelled to take up arms against them), should be immediately hanged; and ordering Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger to obey these directions in the district which he commanded, in the strictest manner; and from the general tenor of the enemy's conduct, in their wilful and wanton waste and destruction of property as aforesaid, committing to a cruel imprisonment, and even hanging, and otherwise putting to death in cold blood, and an ignominious manner, many good citizens who had surrendered as prisoners of war; it is evident that it was the fixed determination of the enemy, notwithstanding their profession to the contrary, to treat this State as a conquered country; and that the inhabitants were to expect the utmost severities, and to hold their lives, liberties, and properties, solely at the will of his Britannic Majesty's officers; and it is therefore inconsistent with public justice and policy, to afford protection any longer

to the property of British subjects, and just and reasonable to apply the same toward alleviating and lessening the burdens and expenses of the war, which must otherwise fall very heavy on the distressed inhabitants of the State."

Having thus stated the causes and justification of the act, the persons to be affected by its provisions were divided into six classes, upon lists as follows:—

List No. 1 contained the names (1) of those known to be subjects of his Britannic Majesty, and (2) of those who went over to and took up arms with the enemy, and failed to come in and surrender themselves as required by proclamation of the governor in pursuance of an ordinance of the General Assembly of the 20th of February, 1779.

List No. 2 was of those who, upon the surrender of Charlestown, had congratulated Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot on its reduction.

List No. 3 was of those who had voluntarily embodied and served in the Royal militia.

List No. 4 was of those who had congratulated the Earl Cornwallis on his victory at Camden.

List No. 5 was of those who then held, or had held, commissions under his Britannic Majesty, and were then with the enemy.

List No. 6 was of those who had not only voluntarily avowed their allegiance to his Britannic Majesty, but by the general tenor of their conduct had manifested their attachment to the British government, and proved themselves inveterate enemies of the State.

The property, real and personal, of the persons mentioned in the six lists was vested in commissioners appointed under the act, who were directed to sell and dispose of the same at auction on five years' credit. The act went on also to provide that, although the lives as well as the fortunes of the persons mentioned in the lists numbered 2, 3,

4, and 5 were by law forfeited, yet, in order to avoid, if possible, sanguinary measures, and to extend to such persons such mercy as might be consistent with justice to the public, instead of inflicting capital punishment, they were declared to be forever banished from the State upon the penalty of death without benefit of clergy should they return. The commissioners were, however, allowed on the credit of the estates directed to be sold, to make such provision for the temporary support of such of the families of the persons mentioned on the lists numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 as should appear to the commissioners necessary. A provision in the act directed that, before the commissioners sold any of the slaves belonging to these persons, a sufficient number should be set aside for the payment of the bounties promised to the recruits for the Continental troops, and 440 male slaves belonging to such persons, which should be fit and proper for the use of the Continental army as pioneers, wagon drivers, artificers, and officers' servants were to be employed in those several occupations so long as they were wanted for the public service. They were likewise to set aside such horses, cattle, wagons, and provisions as should be needed for the use of the army. In order, however, to raise a sum of money in specie necessary for the service of the State, the governor was authorized to sell for ready money not exceeding 150 slaves, the slaves to be sold in families.¹

Such was the famous act. It was followed by another entitled, "An act for amercing certain persons named therein."² This act thus declared in preamble its purpose:—

"Whereas, many persons, inhabitants of, and owing allegiance to the State (some bearing high and important trusts and commissions), have withdrawn themselves from the defence thereof, accepted protection from the officers commanding his Britannic Majesty's forces,

¹ *Statutes at Large*, vol. IV, 516, 522.

² *Ibid.*, 523.

now carrying on a cruel and destructive war within this State, and are either within the lines of the enemy, or have omitted to surrender and enroll themselves and perform the duties to their country pointed out and required by the proclamation of his Excellency, the Governor, dated the twenty-seventh day of September last past, in utter neglect and contempt of the executive authority of the said State, and to the evil example of society. And whereas, there are others, who, forgetting all the social ties of kindred, the feeling of humanity, and regardless of the duty and allegiance they had most solemnly sworn to their country, did actually subscribe and pay by themselves or agents, considerable sums of money towards mounting and equipping a troop or troops of cavalry, or other military force for the service of his Britannic Majesty, to act against their fellow citizens, and the independence and freedom of this State; and whereas, it is but just and reasonable that the estates of such persons, both real and personal, should be amerced, and that a due discrimination should be made."

The commissioners appointed for carrying into execution the Confiscation Act were required within four months to make an inventory of the real and personal estates of the persons named in the list annexed to the act, and to amerce them twelve per cent on the actual value for the use of the State.

The preambles of these acts are given in full, as they declare the reasons for their passage, assigned by those who enacted them. These reasons amounted to nothing more than the right and justice of retaliation, which, as against willing and avowed British subjects and adherents, was certainly justified as a measure of war. But herein lay the difficulty of the matter, *i.e.*, to determine definitely and justly who were really willing subjects and adherents of the Royal cause. Still more so in regard to those who had merely taken protection. Both measures were earnestly opposed by a minority led by the heroic Christopher Gadsden, who, notwithstanding his long imprisonment in the castle of St. Augustine, and the immense loss of his property, opposed the confiscation of the estates even of the

adherents of the British government, and zealously contended that sound policy required to forget and forgive.¹ The Confiscation Bill, he said, "was like an *auto da fé*, a sort of proceeding used in Portugal against heretics, where they are dressed in frocks painted over with figures of fiends and devils, to excite a horror against them in the multitude."²

It was urged that the act was one of condemnation without hearing or trial. No crime was alleged, no article of charge given in against any of the persons named, no accusation entered on the journals of either House. At the time the Assembly was taking his property from the citizen, the unhappy man was in Charlestown, struggling under the pressure of necessity in getting the common necessaries of life, and suffering under British tyranny from which the State had not been able to shield him. A report or idle story, an old grudge, revenge, or malice, supplied the place of legal accusation, of evidence, of judge and jury. History had branded with infamy the instances in which the Parliament of Great Britain had condemned subjects without trial or examination. But condemnation without a hearing was not the only objection; the bill proposed an *ex post facto* law. Taking protection from a conqueror who was in possession of the country, or signing a congratulation was no offence against any law of the State. Allegiance and protection were reciprocal. When the governor had sought his safety in flight, and all other civil officers were either fugitives or prisoners, when there was no other organized armed force in the State but that of the enemy, the citizen was under necessity of accepting protection from the conqueror, nor could all be blamed who, under the pressure of their situation, signed papers of congratulation or even contributed money to the enemy —

¹ Ramsay's *Hist. of So. Ca.*, vol. II, 464.

² "Cassius," p. 18.

such addresses and contributions were not always as voluntary as they appeared to be.

Still stronger was the objection to the Amercement Act. It was charged that a great majority of the Assembly itself were men who had at some time taken protection, but who, from circumstances, had been enabled to accept of the terms of Governor Rutledge's proclamation. Were others, who had not been so fortunately circumstanced, now to be punished by amercement? In all countries overrun by an invading and victorious army, it was said, nothing was more common than to raise what is called *contributions* for the support of it, and in cities and civilized places, to make the matter easy to the people, or from an affectation of politeness which soldiers of fortune sometimes put on, with the bayonet at your breast, the thing is generally done by *subscription*; and we afford the first example of such contribution being charged as a crime. Those in Charlestown who subscribed for the British cavalry were some of them volunteers for raising a force against us; but this was not the case with all of them, it was believed. The citizen was under the yoke of a tyrant who had a thousand ways of doing him mischief. To such people the *subscribing to British* cavalry was another name for *contribution*. It was done, perhaps, under the highest necessity and compulsion. To make that a crime, therefore, by a *retrospective law* which was none before, and condemn to forfeiture of their property, was *ex post facto* arbitrary and unconstitutional.¹

Such considerations might possibly have prevailed had the reasons put forth in the preambles to the acts been the real motives for their enactment. But there can be little doubt that revenue and not retaliation was the real inducement of the measures. General Marion writes to Colonel

¹ "Cassius," p. 44.

Peter Horry on the 10th of February: "Two regiments are to be raised as our Continental quota, giving each man a negro per year, which is to be taken from the confiscated estates. A number of large estates are down on the list and others are amerced, which will give in at least a million sterling as a fund."¹ Marion himself was known to have been opposed during the whole war to all acts of cruelty to and vengeance upon the Tories, and constantly to have borne in mind and urged upon his followers that, however the war might end, Whigs and Tories must be fellow-countrymen, and that it was policy as well as duty to forbear from all unnecessary acts of severity which might in the future impede a reconciliation of fellow-citizens and brethren. Indeed, he is said, but on doubtful authority, to have given as a toast at a large party at Governor Mathews's table just after its passage, "*Here is damnation to the confiscation act.*"² Johnson states that the most efficacious reason for adopting the measure was that the State was wholly destitute of funds, and the Whig population so stripped and impoverished as to put it out of the power of government to raise any immediate resources, either by loan or taxation; and that the estates of the Loyalists were therefore seized upon as a means of establishing a capital to build a present credit upon.³

It is very doubtful, however, whether the result as a financial measure justified an act otherwise so impolitic. It was charged, as must have been expected, that great injustice and partiality were indulged in the details of the act. That the members of this popular Assembly, acting in different characters of legislators and judges, in proceeding to confiscation and banishment, put in enemies and kept out friends,

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 174.

² Weems's *Life of Marion*, 291.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 283.

and gave loose rein to malice, avarice, and revenge. Indeed, it was alleged that in many instances this was carried to extraordinary lengths. An instance was cited of a well-known gentleman, member of the Assembly itself, who would have been banished and his estate forfeited had not some friend secreted the slip of paper on which his name was inserted.¹

In the lists appended to these acts as published in the *Statutes*² there appear the names of 239 persons whose estates were confiscated and of 47 whose estates were amerced. But upon an examination of these lists, and comparing them with the lists of the 210 who did sign the address of congratulation to the British commanders, "the addressors," as they were called, all of whose estates were confiscated by the act, it is manifest the published lists as appended to the statute are not correct. List No. 2, purporting to contain the names of "the addressors," contains but 43 names out of the 210. This discrepancy may, it is true, be accounted for, in a measure, by the fact that not all of the addressors were possessed of estates to be confiscated. But that this consideration does not entirely account for the difference appears from the fact that in the list appended to the act of 1784 for restoring to the persons therein mentioned their estates,³ the names of several "addressors" appear whose names are not appended to the Confiscation Act itself. So, too, the same observation applies to other lists; names appear upon the restoration lists which do not appear upon the original confiscation lists.

The lists appended to the acts are remarkable for the names that do not appear upon them. This is particularly the case with List No. 1 to the Confiscation Act,

¹ "Cassius," p. 39.

² *Statutes at Large*, vol. VI, 629-635.

³ *Statutes at Large*, vol. IV, 624; vol. VI, 634.

which purports to contain the names of the known subjects of his Britannic Majesty. Conspicuous from its absence is that of William Bull, whose unshaken fidelity to his king was so open and avowed. Still honored and loved, however, by all, it was perhaps impolitic, if not impossible, to have placed his name upon the list, especially after his generous and spirited appeal for the life of Hayne. But there were others, the absence of which is not easily explained. We do not find the name of Thomas Skottowe,¹ the member of Council who had refused to appear before the General Committee in 1775, and had been consequently banished, but had returned during the British rule; nor of James Simpson, the attorney-general, who had been banished with Skottowe and likewise returned, and had occupied the position of intendant of police under the British military government; nor of Colonel Innis, who had raised a regiment which he had conspicuously commanded against the Americans; nor of Colonel Probart Howarth, governor of Fort Johnson, nor of George Roupell, the postmaster, — the last three of whom had, like Skottowe and Simpson, been banished in 1775.

But even still more remarkable is the fact that, though the legislature was composed largely of Low-Country men, out of the 239 persons whose estates were confiscated, but 10 were of the Up-Country. These were Andrew and John Cuninghame and Colonel Clary of Ninety Six, Captain Anderson of Thicketty Creek, William Guest of Tyger River, William Stevens of Saluda, George Grierson of Waxhaws, Julin George of New Acquisition (York), and William Valentine of Cam-

¹ That Samuel Skottowe had adhered to the American cause and had endured confinement on prison ship may possibly have saved the estate of his relative.

den. In the district of Ninety Six and in that between the Saluda and Broad, the Tories far outnumbered the Whigs, and many had borne militia commissions in the British service. How was it that the fine estate of Colonel Fletchall at Fair Forest, with its famous mill, was not confiscated, while both those of Elias Ball (of Wambaw) and Elias Ball (of Comingtee) were taken? Why is it that with Colonel Clary we do not find the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Philips, Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Turner, and Majors Daniel Plummer, Zachariah Gibbs, and John Hamilton, who with him bore British militia commissions. Surely some of these must have possessed estates equal in value to those of William Cameron the cooper, James Duncan the blacksmith, John Fisher the cabinet-maker, and John Ward the tailor, whose estates in Charlestown were confiscated.¹

The list appended to the Amercement Act strongly corroborates the charge of partiality in its application. On September 19, 1780, the British authorities published a list of 168 persons who had petitioned for protection, and who were notified to appear before the intendant of police to subscribe the declaration of allegiance, and to receive their certificates.² A similar notice appears in *The Royal Gazette* of the 11th of July, 1781, to which is appended the names of 213 more. There were thus 381 persons publicly announced as having accepted protection. The Amercement Act, which by its terms was to apply not only to those who had ac-

¹ It is a remarkable fact that as the triumphant Whigs, upon the recovery of the government of the State in 1782, confiscating the estates of the Loyalists, restricted their doing so to those of the Loyalists on the coast, so upon their overthrow of the Confederacy in 1865 the Federal government likewise restricted its practical confiscation to those of Confederates in the same region.

² *So. Ca. and Am. Gen. Gazette.*

cepted protection, but to those also who had subscribed to the equipping of a troop of cavalry for the British service, punished only 47 of the 381. The same observation as that just made in regard to the Confiscation Act doubtless would account in some measure at least for this discrepancy, namely, that those who had no estates were not amerced. But this does not fully explain the great difference. The preamble of the act recites as an aggravation in some instances of the accepting of protection, that the person who did so had borne high and important trusts or commissions under the State, but in the list under the act the only persons named who could come under this description were Colonel Daniel Horry, who had commanded the regiment of dragoons raised in 1779, Colonel Maurice Simons, who had commanded the militia in Charlestown during the siege, Colonels John Harleston and Joseph Jenkins, also of the militia, and Colonel Charles Pinckney, member of the Council who had gone out with Governor Rutledge from the town before its fall. On the other hand, we do not find in the list of those amerced the names of Henry Middleton and Rawlins Lowndes, who gave up the contest and took protection when Charlestown fell, nor of Daniel Huger, who, like Charles Pinckney, having gone out with Governor Rutledge as a member of the Council, returned and submitted to the enemy. The case of Colonel Charles Pinckney was a hard one, for he had all along, from the beginning in 1775, been hurried on faster and farther than he had been disposed to go in the rebellion, as was particularly shown in his correspondence with General Moultrie in 1779. He did not, however, long survive the mortification. He died in the September following.¹

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, September 28, 1782.

The protest of "Cassius" produced good fruit. In 1783 — the year after — the provisions of the Confiscation Act were so modified that seventy-seven persons who had been banished by it were allowed to return upon certain conditions, and the sale of their estates was suspended.¹ The next year another act was passed by which the estates of sixty-two were taken off the confiscation list and amerced; thirty more were entirely released, and the persons whose estates had been sold were indemnified. The names of thirty-three others were also taken off the confiscation list and amerced, but were disqualified from holding any office or trust for a term of seven years.² From this time forth almost every legislature restored some part of the confiscated property to the different former owners or their descendants, and their return to the country was welcomed.³ As measures of revenue for which these acts were passed they accomplished nothing to compensate for the ill feeling they aroused.

The legislature, having adopted these measures, adjourned on the 26th of February, 1782.

¹ *Statutes at Large*, vol. IV, 553.

² *Ibid.*, 624.

³ *Ibid.*, 639-666, 687, 699-721; *Curwin's Journal and Letters*, 670.

CHAPTER XXVI

1782

THE beginning of the year 1781 found the British forces upon the northern confines of the State preparing to advance into North Carolina and Virginia, regarding this State as already subjugated. The beginning of the year 1782 found the conquerors driven back, and confined to Charlestown Neck and James Island.

Soon after General Greene had taken post at Round O, General Leslie, who was now in command in Charlestown, began to feel seriously the effects of the restriction of his foraging ground. The driving in of his detachments and the crowding of refugees within his restricted lines caused an accumulation of horses for which he was unable to procure forage. His necessities on this account compelled him to put two hundred of these useful animals to death. To relieve this distress, strong parties were kept on the alert, watching for opportunities of collecting provisions from the surrounding country. As starting points for these raiders, posts were established on the extreme tongues of land at Haddrell's Point and Hobcaw in Christ Church Parish and Daniel's Island in St. Thomas's opposite the city, from which retreat was difficult to an attacking enemy, and to which reënforcements could easily be conveyed by water. These points, now the last held by the British, it will be observed, were just those the last held by the Americans during the siege of the city in 1780 —

the positions of the parties being exactly reversed. To cover the communication with these posts, galleys lay in the rivers at convenient distances. During the winter several brilliant and successful sallies were made from these positions. The first of these was by Major Coffin, the hero of Eutaw, and the captor of Armstrong.

On the American side a post was established at Cainhoy, at the head of navigation of Wando River, about twelve miles from Charlestown, which was now under the command of Colonel Richard Richardson. A British galley lay in the Wando, which was an object of observation to Colonel Richardson, who patrolled the road from Cainhoy on the St. Thomas side of the river to Daniel's Island, the northern point formed by the junction of the Wando and Cooper rivers. On the 2d of January Major Coffin with a detachment of about 350 men, cavalry and infantry, were transported from Charlestown by water to Daniel's Island.¹ Colonel Richardson, learning of this movement from his patrols, immediately pushed his scouts to the causeway over Beresford Creek, which, with the Wando and Cooper, forms Daniel's Island, and wrote to Marion for reënforcements. Marion's force scarcely equalled that of the enemy, but he resolved to advance for the purpose of attacking them. To detain them while he should come up with his main body, he ordered Colonel Richardson and a part of Maham's newly raised horse to throw themselves in front of the enemy and engage them until he reached them. Maham did not himself come with his cavalry; they were under the command of Major Giles.

The British advanced, taking the Strawberry road, and, crossing Beresford Creek, about noon reached Brabant, a plantation belonging to the Rev. Robert Smith, about fourteen miles distant. To the north of this plantation was a swamp

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 303; James's *Life of Marion*, 158, 159.

of considerable width with a causeway and a bridge known as Videau's. Beyond the causeway, on the east, was a fence on a bank with a ditch behind it. Richardson passed the swamp, and, going down to the bank to reconnoitre, came back with a British troop and Captain Campbell at his heels. Upon reaching his command, Richardson at once ordered a charge. From the outset it was easy to see that Maham's new corps had not yet been trained.

They charged in disorder, but at first drove the British cavalry before them. At the bridge they met the British infantry, who gave them a volley. All was at once in confusion, horses and men wedged together upon a narrow causeway, the front striving to retreat and the rear pushing them on. The British cavalry now came in aid of the infantry, and a total rout of the Americans and scene of carnage ensued. Captain Samuel Cooper, one of Maham's officers, rallied his men, and, returning to the road, saved several lives and drove back a part of the British cavalry. Maham's men suffered particularly; being on the road when the rout commenced, they were trampled down by both parties. Among the creditable feats of the day was that of Captain Bennett, who with twelve men having been pursued by a party of the enemy double their number, and stopped by an impassable creek, turned upon his pursuers and drove them back. Another was that of G. Sinclair Capers, who took three swords from the British in single encounters, for which General Marion promoted him to a lieutenantcy. Had Richardson posted his militia behind the fence, his defeat might have been prevented. The Americans admitted that twenty-two of their men were buried on the causeway; how many were killed in the pursuit was not known. *The Royal Gazette* of the 5th of January estimated the loss of the Americans at fifty-seven killed and twenty taken prisoners. That of the 9th of January rep-

resented the loss of the rebels in killed, disabled, and prisoners as upwards of ninety, a large proportion of whom, it stated, were those who had reverted to the American cause contrary to their most solemn engagements as British subjects. The British loss was but one officer killed and a dragoon wounded. The officer killed was Captain Campbell, known as "Mad Archy," he who had captured Colonel Hayne in the July before.¹ The defeat

¹ Dr. Johnson, in his *Traditions of the Revolution*, p. 67, mentions this officer among the numerous British officers in America of the name of Campbell, and relates the following story of him : —

"Of Mad Archy, or Mad Campbell, we know nothing, except while the British occupied Charleston; we believe that this appellation was given him by his brother officers. An instance of Campbell's violence of temper was told to a lady still living (1851) by the Rev. Edward Ellington, rector of St. James's, Goose Creek. Captain Campbell once drove up to his house accompanied by a young lady, who appeared agitated or alarmed; he called for the reverend gentleman to come out to him and asked to be married to this lady. 'Yes,' was the answer, 'with her consent and that of her friends.' Campbell then drew his pistols and swore that he should marry them or be put to death immediately. Such was the character and deportment of Campbell that the minister did not dare to refuse; he married them, and it proved to be a case of abduction. The lady was Paulina Phelp, of one of the most respectable families in the State. She told her friends that when Campbell was particular in his attentions, and flattered her, she had considered it nothing more than what all the British officers were in the habit of saying and doing, and supposed that Captain Campbell meant no more to her. That she had never promised to marry him or intended to do so, and never consented except when terrified."

Mrs. Campbell survived her husband but a few days. *The Royal Gazette* of January 5, 1782, announces the death of Captain Campbell; that of the 12th contains this notice : —

"*Death.* — Mrs. Margaret Campbell, widow of Cap. Archibald Campbell and daughter of Robert Philp. She died greatly regretted by all who had the happiness of her acquaintance."

From the notice it appears that the lady's name was *Margaret Philp*, not Paulina Phelp. Robert Philp, her father, was one of the addressors of Sir Henry Clinton.

The novelist, W. Gilmore Simms, incorporates this story in his historical novel, *Katherine Walton*.

of Richardson left Marion too weak to hazard an attack, and the enemy were content with what they had accomplished without attempting to force him to it. Marion retired to Wambaw. The British marched up to Quinby Bridge, and, having gathered some stock, retired across Wappetaw to Haddrell's Point.¹

A stronger vindication of the correctness of the opinion that it was necessary for the State to provide means of defending itself, observes Johnson, could not have been desired than was furnished when it was thought necessary to appeal to other quarters for protection and defence, a strong practical illustration of which were the circumstances attending the advance of the reënforcements under General St. Clair. Ever since the month of March, 1781, this officer, with the mutinous Pennsylvania line, had been under orders to reënforce the Southern army. He had first been halted on his march to aid in the defence of Virginia; and when again set in motion for his place of destination, he consumed more than two months in marching from Yorktown to Greene's headquarters in South Carolina. Nor was he chargeable with any unnecessary delay; on the contrary, he was said to have proceeded too rapidly, and so much was his strength impaired when he reached the Round O, that his force but little exceeded one-half of the number that crossed the Potomac. It was not until the 4th of January, the day after this affair at Videau's Bridge, that St. Clair formed a junction with Greene. The general had four days before dismissed the Virginia line with his warmest acknowledgments for their active and patient services. Only about sixty from that State now remained, and they had but one month longer to serve.

Five days after the arrival of General St. Clair, General

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 159; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 303.

Wayne was detached with the Third Regiment of Dragoons under Colonel White, who had rejoined the army,¹ and a detachment of artillery, to place himself at the head of the forces then in arms in Georgia. Orders, it will be remembered, had been some time before issued to General Sumter to detach Colonel Hampton's cavalry to the support of General Twiggs in that State, and that corps was also placed at the disposal of General Wayne. In addition to the forces under Wayne's immediate command, General Barnwell, who at this time commanded in that part of South Carolina which lay along the lower part of Savannah River, received instructions to coöperate with General Wayne and render him all the aid in his power.²

The General Assembly, as has been seen, met on the 18th of January and sat until the 26th of February. During its sitting the demon of discord again seems to have possessed the American forces. Soon after it met, Sumter, resenting his treatment, resigned; and Lee, who had done so much to create an enmity between Greene and Sumter, himself taking offence at Laurens's command, by reason of his superior rank, early in February, retired in disgust from the field.³ It was at this time that the opposition to General Barnwell's command, and discontent at his appointment to the prejudice of the superior rank, and, as it was alleged, the superior claims of Colonel Harden, ran so high that he also resigned his commission.⁴ But still more

¹ Colonel Anthony Walton White, the officer who, it will be remembered, had been routed by Tarleton on the Santee in May, 1780. *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 493-494.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 276, 277.

³ *Ibid.*, 328. In his *Memoirs of the War of 1776* Colonel Lee declares that he retired because of ill health, but his own account of the matter leaves little doubt that the reason assigned by Judge Johnson was the controlling one.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 294.

serious at this time were the dissensions in Marion's brigade, which brought it nearly to ruin, and laid open the country to the enemy's ravages.

With the consent of Governor Rutledge and General Greene, Colonel Maham was engaged in the attempt to raise a legion for the Continental service upon the same basis as that of Colonel Lee, and had at least partially succeeded and was in command of the troops he had raised. General Marion, Colonel Peter Horry, and Colonel Maham were all members of the General Assembly. The importance attached to the meeting of this body rendered Marion's attendance at Jacksonborough necessary. His command then lay at Strawberry; but, fearing that some disaster might happen during his absence, he had moved them back near the banks of the Santee, to be out of the reach of any sudden movement of the enemy. When leaving he turned over the command of his brigade to Colonel Peter Horry, as the senior officer, giving him directions to be pursued during his absence. In pursuance of these orders Colonel Horry retired to the north side of the Wambaw, a large creek emptying into the Santee. Colonel Maham's corps was ordered by Marion to be posted at Mepkin plantation, on the western branch of the Cooper River. As the enemy got most of their intelligence from persons, more especially women, going to and from town, Marion particularly ordered that guards should be kept to prevent any boats from passing without a written permission from himself or Horry.

It appears from the correspondence that Maham had already raised the question of Horry's right to command him, claiming that as the commander of a legionary corps, as that of Colonel Lee, he was under the immediate command of the general-in-chief, and that Marion, upon his arrival at Jacksonborough, had at once submitted his claim

to General Greene, for on the 16th of January Greene wrote to Marion: —

“I cannot imagine upon what principles Lt. Col. Maham presumes to dispute rank with Lt. Col. Horry; the latter has been a Lieut. Colonel in the Continental service and still claims his rank in that line, but supposing his claim not to be well founded, he is out of service not of choice but of necessity and is a supernumerary officer on half pay and therefore his claim to rank must be good whenever called into service. . . . On this ground I think Col. Horry has clearly the right of outranking Col. Maham. Much is due to the merits and exertion of Col. Maham, but no less is due to the rights and claims of Lieut. Col. Horry. It was never my intention that Lieut. Col. Maham’s corps should be subject to no order but my own, [but] in the first instance this would be totally incompatible with the nature of the service. My intention with respect to that corps was that it should stand upon the same footing as Lieut. Col. Lee’s Legion which is called an independent corps; nobody has a right to command them but the commander in chief unless by him placed under some other command. Lee’s Legion is frequently put under a particular officer’s command according to the nature of the service¹ and to be otherwise would be burdening the public with a useless expense, for many things which are practicable with a combined force could not be attempted without it. I am persuaded when Col. Maham thinks more fully upon the subject he must be convinced his idea of the constitution and nature of his corps is totally inadmissible,” etc.²

Upon receipt of this letter of General Greene, Marion at once wrote to Colonel Horry on the 18th: “I send you General Greene’s letter in answer to mine sent him as soon as I arrived here, and it is determined as I expected. You will keep the letter, and if the enemy should approach your quarters and you find it necessary, you must call on Colonel Maham’s troops and horse as a reënforce-

¹This statement of General Greene is a conclusive answer to Lee’s claim of independent command when serving under Sumter, Marion, or Pickens. See *ante*, 176–177, 323–324.

²Gibbes’s *Documentary Hist.* (1781–82), 229–230.

ment.”¹ He cautioned Horry not to call on Maham for any other purpose.

Unfortunately Greene and Marion appear not to have been explicit to him upon this subject, though both wrote to Maham at this time. On the 19th Horry wrote to him: “I received letters of Generals Greene and Marion yesterday. The former terminates our rank in my opinion (*sic*) and the latter writes me to take command of your Legion if I find it necessary; the generals also wrote you, and I suppose to the same purpose. Please make a return of the strength of your Legion that I may know what support I can have in case of need. I have an officer and six men at Wadboo; as 'tis beyond your post, I wish you to relieve him from your cavalry.”²

To this Maham replied that he also had received letters from Greene and Marion, that neither of them had written to him to give up his rank, and added, “As I cannot think of being commanded by an officer of the same rank, I think it proper not to make you a return of my regiment, and shall not obey any orders that you may be pleased to send.”³ Horry informed Marion of Maham's conduct, and Marion wrote on the 23d, promising to see General Greene and endeavor to settle the dispute.⁴ Maham also requested and obtained a hearing from General Greene, refusing to submit until he received a personal answer. This General Greene gave in substantially the same terms as in his letter to Marion of the 16th, concluding with an appeal to Maham for the public service: “You have exerted yourself with an enthusiasm in raising your corps; and I have only to recommend that you let the public good and your private wishes walk hand in hand, and when I am persuaded you will not wish a single indulgence

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 231.

³ *Ibid.*, 238.

² *Ibid.*, 238.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 240.

incompatible with the principle I have laid down." Maham appears also to have complained of the hard service to which his corps had been subjected; and upon this Greene observes:—

"With regard to General Marion's having made too free use of your cavalry, you are to consider how extensive the country is he has to guard and how much he depends upon your corps. This will account for the hard service you have been put to. The general is a good man, and when you consider his difficulties and make just allowances perhaps you will have little to complain of but the hard necessity of the service. Our force is small and our duty extensive. Let me entreat you to think properly on these matters and to endeavor to accommodate yourself to the circumstances of our affairs, and I will again endeavor to impress the general with the necessity of giving you as much repose as possible. General Marion has been very useful and is very necessary; and your corps can nowhere be as usefully employed as where you are."¹

Notwithstanding this appeal, Maham remained obdurate, and on the 28th Greene writes to Marion:—

"I will also write to Col. Maham decidedly upon the dispute respecting his rank. I am sorry the colonel carries the matter to so disagreeable a length. Rank is not what constitutes the good officer, but good conduct. Substantial services give reputation, not captious disputes. A captain may be more respectable than a general. Rank is nothing unless accompanied with worthy actions."²

Contenting himself with such sententious platitudes to Marion, instead of peremptory orders to Maham, General Greene allowed the most important and vulnerable section of the country to be exposed with no other protection than that afforded by Horry, whose commands Maham refused to obey. Maham's value as a cavalry officer was doubtless too well established not to excite regret at the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 305, 306.

² Gibbs's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 244.

probable loss of his services, which he intimated would be the result of his forced submission.¹ But this fear should not have prevailed over the necessity of providing for concerted action in case of a movement of the enemy to the northward of Charlestown. Unfortunately Governor Rutledge joined in the discussion, and wrote, it is said, a philippic against Horry.²

So matters continued. Marion had especially charged Horry to prohibit and prevent communication with the town except by his own order or that of Horry himself. This Maham openly and flagrantly violated. "Colonel Maham interferes with my command," writes Horry to Marion on the 31st of January. "So much that I can scarcely act; he gave passes to several ladies to go to town without my leave, and they accordingly went in a boat, which has since returned, and the ladies have since come up."³ Upon this General Greene writes on the 1st of February, to Horry:—

"I have written decidedly to Lieut. Col. Maham upon the dispute subsisting between you and him upon the subject of rank and told him you had an unquestionable right to outrank him. I have only to observe upon this subject that great delicacy on your part should be exercised on this occasion, nothing like triumph as that will wound his feelings; blinded by matters of interest and love of rank he will yield to conviction unwillingly and finding himself in this situation will feel with double force every unnecessary exercise of authority."⁴

In this embarrassing position, with an officer in command of a considerable part of his force refusing to obey his orders, and his superiors evidently afraid to bring matters to an issue with his refractory subordinate,

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 305.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 158.

³ *Ibid.*; Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 245.

⁴ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 247.

Horry, himself sick, appealed to Marion to return and relieve him of the responsibility. Marion replies on the 3d of February that he had written positive orders to Maham not to interfere with him, and had been in hopes that General Greene would have prevented such evils before that, but that his presence was absolutely necessary in the legislature for a few days, until the militia act and that raising the Continental quota of troops was passed. There was also the confiscation and sequestration bill on hand, and until these were passed he could not get leave to return.¹ Horry continued to urge Marion's return, and on the 10th (Sunday) Marion writes:—

“Yours of the 7th came to hand. I asked leave of the House to return but they would not grant it; there are three laws now on the carpet which they insist I should stay until finished. If I leave the House the business will be over as many will go with me and they will not be able to make a House. Our material business is the three laws above hinted at. These reasons oblige me to stay until Wednesday next when I hope I shall set out. If your health is such as to require your absence from camp you will leave the command of the brigade to Col. Maham,”² etc.

General Greene had decided against Maham's pretensions, but in doing so he had given offence to Horry; so on the 14th he writes a long letter of explanation replete with moral reflections, urging Horry to take the initiative in making friends with Maham, as he was in a superior position to do so with dignity.³ On the same day Marion writes that he cannot yet return, as his going away will break the House and put a stop to business, “but hope we shall get through by the beginning of next week,”⁴ that is, by the 18th or 19th. The Assembly did not, however, finish its business until the 26th, and in the meantime the

¹ Gibbes's *Documentary Hist.* (1781-82), 248.

² *Ibid.*, 249.

³ *Ibid.*, 251, 252.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 253.

enemy, doubtless through the women who were allowed to go to town against Marion's orders, were fully apprised of the disorganized condition of the forces on the Cooper River, and prepared to take advantage of them.

On the British side a new character appeared on the field at this late day. The celebrated Count Rumford, then Colonel Thompson, a Massachusetts Tory who had been in England since the evacuation of Boston by the British army, and had, under Lord George Germain, reached the high post of Under Secretary of State, and in the prosecution of his scientific pursuits had been elected Fellow of the Royal Society, had now returned to America, and come to South Carolina as a cavalry officer burning for an opportunity of distinction. Arriving at the opportune moment, a detachment of two hundred horse, five hundred infantry, and two pieces of artillery was formed, and under his command moved up the Cooper River. Early information of this movement had been communicated by the numerous and vigilant confidants in Charlestown; and Greene, it is said, had repeatedly hinted to Marion the necessity of his return to his command.¹ But the State officials were all so bent at the time upon the enactment of the unfortunate Confiscation Act, they seemed to have been unable to consider other matters, however important. Marion did not leave Jacksonborough until the British detachment was actually in motion. Then, accompanied by Colonel Maham, who had also left his command for his legislative duties, by a circuitous route and a very rapid ride, on the 24th of February, he reached the ground on which Maham's regiment was encamped at Mepkin. Here they were informed that the enemy was retiring, and while Maham paid a visit to his own plantation, Marion remained to rest and refresh him-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 306.

self before they resumed their journey for the encampment of the brigade. In five hours after Maham's departure an express arrived with the alarming intelligence that the brigade had been surprised and dispersed.¹

Colonel Horry had by Marion's orders taken a position on the north side of Wambaw Creek. His position there was in an angle formed by two roads which passed from Lenud's Ferry to Elias Horry's plantation, about a quarter of a mile from the bridge over the creek. In his rear was a wood. His newly raised Continental regiment, scarcely yet half completed, lay at Durant's plantation, about a mile above, under the immediate command of Major Benison. On the 23d of February Horry had out patrols upon the Christ Church road, and scouts in St. Thomas's Parish. Thinking himself secure, and being sick, on the 24th he went over the river to his own plantation, leaving the brigade under the command of Colonel McDonald, contrary, says James in his *Life of Marion*, to General Marion's order, which was to leave it in such case under Maham.² But this criticism is unjust, for not only had Maham separated his command from Horry, but Maham himself at the time was with Marion at Jacksonborough.³

Colonel Thompson's detachment, consisting of the cavalry, Cuninghams and Young's troops of mounted militia, the Yagers, Volunteers of Ireland, a detachment of the Thirtieth Regiment, and one three-pounder, on Sunday, the 24th of February, crossed Cooper River to Daniel's Island in St. Thomas's, and rapidly advanced to attack Horry's position. By the very spirited exertions of the troops and by mounting the infantry occasionally

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 307.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 160-161.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 307.

on the dragoons' horses, Colonel Thompson was enabled to carry on the whole corps thirty-six miles without halting, when, falling in with a party of Horry's, an officer and six men, none of whom escaped to give intelligence, he pressed on with the cavalry and mounted militia, leaving the infantry posted at Drake's plantation.¹

Major Benison was at dinner when Captain Bennett, who commanded the scouts in St. Thomas's, came in with the intelligence that the British were approaching. Finding Benison, it is said, incredulous of the report, and unwilling to be disturbed at his meal, Bennett proceeded to headquarters, where he found McDonald also at dinner. He likewise refused to believe the intelligence because, he said, he had been down into Christ Church the day before; but he desired Major James, who had just arrived in camp and came for orders, to take command of his regiment. In less than half an hour after firing commenced at Durant's.

McDonald's regiment was on the right towards Echaw Creek, and two regiments of six-months men were on the left towards Wambaw. Major James immediately formed McDonald's regiment in the wood in the rear, and rode to the left for orders from the ranking officer present, Colonel Screven; but Screven's men had already broken and he was trying to rally them, but in vain.²

Benison, who commanded Horry's regiment of dragoons, when the pickets were driven in, crossed Wambaw bridge and formed the corps in very good order on rising ground one hundred yards beyond. He had scarcely done so before the best of the Royal mounted militia, under Colonel Doyle, arrived, and formed at once opposite Benison's party to give time for the rest to come up.

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, March 2, 1782.

² *James's Life of Marion*, 160, 161.

Colonel Doyle,¹ however, judging from the movements of the American officers that Benison was about to attack, determined to anticipate the action, and made the signal with his whistle for a charge, which was instantly obeyed by the men with the greatest gallantry. Benison's men, newly raised Continental recruits, fired their pistols, then broke in confusion and were pursued with great slaughter, Benison himself being killed. The British asserted that nothing but the breaking down of Wambaw bridge, when the first of their dragoons were crossing, prevented a total extinction of Horry's corps.²

Benison's fugitives fell back upon Screven's men, who likewise gave way. Major James, perceiving the day to be lost, returned to his own regiment and ordered a retreat. The Americans did not claim to know their loss. The British asserted that, including patrols met in the morning, forty were killed and four prisoners taken. The Americans admitted a loss of thirty-five horses.³

It was of this disaster that Marion heard while resting at Mepkin. Placing himself at once at the head of Maham's regiment, he hurried on across the country towards Wambaw, thirty or forty miles away. Arrived within five miles of the enemy, he halted at the house of Mrs. Tydiman to refresh his men and horses; and the latter were unbitted and feeding when the whole of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance.⁴ To deceive his opponents, Colonel Thompson, after his success on Sunday the 24th, had made a parade of driving off the cattle he

¹ Colonel Doyle, it will be remembered, had sailed for England with Lord Rawdon on the 21st of August, 1781. The vessel in which they sailed was captured by the French. How Colonel Doyle was released and returned to South Carolina we do not know.

² *The Royal Gazette*, March 2, 1782.

³ *Ibid.*; James's *Life of Marion*, 162.

⁴ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II., 307; James's *Life of Marion*, 162.

had collected and sending his infantry in the direction of Wappetaw, in Christ Church Parish. Then, at eight o'clock on the morning of the 25th, with his cavalry and mounted militia, he pushed on to the Santee. Approaching Tydiman's plantation, he discovered two pickets with bayonets, who were, he assumed, Continental soldiers. Learning from this the presence of infantry, Colonel Thompson formed his line with rapidity, but with great care.¹ Alarmed by the fire of the advanced pickets, Captain John Carraway Smith, commanding Maham's corps, having had time to bit the horses and mount his men, drew them up promptly in column, and General Marion, posting a small body of infantry along the fence of the lane, ordered Smith to charge. In order to avoid a pond in doing this, Smith was obliged to incline to the left to reach the enemy, and in performing the evolution, the regiment, being also newly raised and not yet well drilled, fell into disorder. Thompson at once seized the opportunity and charged with a shout. All was now rout and dismay. Many of the Americans, attempting to escape by swimming the Santee, were shot in the river by the enemy's riflemen, and others were drowned, among them Lieutenant Smyser of Horry's cavalry. A considerable party under the command of Captain Jones took the river road, and by lifting the Wambaw bridge arrested the progress of the enemy, and rallied at a short distance from their recent encampment. The number of slain was by no means as great as might have been supposed, for the pickets saved the infantry. The British claimed to have killed about twenty and captured twelve. James, however, asserts that but three men were killed. The enemy's estimate is more probably correct.²

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, March 2, 1782.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 308; James's *Life of Marion*, 163; *The Royal Gazette*, March 2, 1782.

The detention of Marion at Jacksonborough in order to pass a confiscation bill, an unwise and unfortunate measure in itself, and the quarrel between Maham and Horry, now acting under Continental commissions which Greene had weakly allowed to continue without practical and definite decision, thus resulted in the annihilation of Marion's force for the time, with scarcely the loss of a man to the enemy. Few of his men had been killed or taken, but the loss of horses and arms was great ; above all was the blow to the confidence Marion had hitherto so successfully cherished in his men. But no sooner was Marion's actual presence known than they again gathered around him. McDonald collected about two hundred beyond the river. Maham, sadly vexed and mortified and not a little offended with his commander for marching without him, also gathered up his dispersed corps, and the greatest efforts were made once more to regain the tract of country now in the undivided possession of the enemy. The enemy's triumph was, however, of short duration ; fearing the result of Thompson's expedition, General Greene, immediately on hearing of its actual movements, ordered Colonel Laurens to march to Marion's support. On his approach Colonel Thompson, after gathering some stock and provisions, retired to Cainhoy, where he was securely posted and could retreat or be reënforced in perfect safety. Laurens then returned beyond the Ashley.¹

After this brilliant exploit, Colonel Thompson formed a bold plan of surprising General Greene himself, whose headquarters were at Ashley Hall, and capturing the commander of the Southern department. To effect this he must cross Ashley River either over Bacon's bridge at Dorchester, which was too well secured for a sudden attack of cavalry, or at Ashley, now Bee's Ferry, ten miles

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 308.

from town. He chose the latter. But when he arrived there it was ebb tide, the water running out as from a mill sluice, the banks on each side were miry, the river at least one hundred yards wide, and there was not a boat. Thompson, unacquainted with the nature of the marshy banks, ordered Major Fraser to lead the first troop into the river and swim across. Fraser, who was an excellent and gallant officer, declared that he was not in the habit of disputing or hesitating to perform any order given by his commander, but protested that the thing was impossible. Thompson still persisted, but consenting that the attempt should be made by a sergeant, the best trooper and best swimmer in the corps mounted on a valuable charger belonging to Major Fraser—the horse was lost, and the sergeant himself barely saved; the further attempt to cross the river was abandoned and the scheme to capture Greene given up.¹ With this attempt Colonel Thompson disappears from the scene in South Carolina to become minister of war, minister of police, and grand chamberlain to the Elector of Bavaria.

After the late unfortunate occurrence, Marion found Horry's regiment so crippled and disorganized that it was ordered to fall back to the Pee Dee to recruit. Only sixty of Maham's horse could be brought into the field, and he could only muster forty militiamen. Thus reduced, Marion was compelled to retire beyond the Santee until he could return in force to repossess the country. The interval of his absence was but too successfully improved by the enemy in predatory excursions. The cattle had been previously driven across the Santee, but provision and slaves to a considerable amount were carried off.²

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 164.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 309.

It was now determined to consolidate the remnants of the two Continental regiments of Horry and Maham into one, and the question as to which of the two should be retained as the commander of this consolidated regiment was one of great delicacy and embarrassment. Governor Mathews at last, however, extorted from Marion his decision. Horry and himself had begun their careers together as captains in the regular regiments raised in 1775, had been together at Fort Moultrie, and in the Continental service until the fall of Charlestown; Horry had been with him from his first return from North Carolina under Gates, and had joined him in raising again the standard of American freedom when the State was declared subjugated; and during all this time he had been conspicuous for his gallantry and patriotism. His property had been wasted and his life exposed recklessly in the cause of his country. Nevertheless, the fact appears to have been that Horry, though a good infantry officer, failed in the most essential requisite of a commander of cavalry, and the most common accomplishment of a gentleman of the time, that of horsemanship. Strange to say, though ambitious of the fame of a good cavalry officer, he was a poor rider. In several charges he made, it is said that he was indebted to some one or other of his men for saving his life. This Marion with great reluctance was forced to admit, and Maham was appointed to the command of the new regiment. Horry resigned, but as some consolation Marion made him commandant of Georgetown, with full power not only to defend it from the enemy, but to regulate its trade. The latter was a duty for which, however, he was scarcely better fitted than for the command of cavalry.¹

Maham had but a short enjoyment of the preference shown him and of the command for which he was so am-

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, 165.

bitious. He was soon after taken sick, and retired to his plantation, at which a militia guard was posted to watch the enemy and to apprise him of any danger that should threaten. The news of his absence from his corps could not be long concealed from the enemy — so much in the habit of attaching importance to the presence of particular leaders; an adventurous young lieutenant of Cuninghams's Loyalists undertook and executed the bold enterprise of penetrating sixty miles into the country and of making Maham prisoner. Among the negroes taken from Maham's neighborhood he found guides to conduct him through the woods and into the house of the colonel, whilst he sat at supper with his physician and one of his lieutenants. The surprise was too complete to admit of resistance. From the conduct of Cuninghams's parties in recent instances and the known hostility of the Loyalists to Maham, nothing but death appeared to await the prisoners, when Robins, for that was the name of the young man, demanded their surrender to an officer of General Cuninghams. Robins could neither read nor write, and his conduct was said to have proved his ignorance of the forms of service, but with true bravery and humanity the apprehensions of his prisoners were soon allayed by his telling them, "We shall do you no injury; treat my men with humanity when you meet them in the field." "How much blood," observed Johnson, from whom this account is taken, "would have been saved had a similar spirit animated all who had borne a part in this dreadful drama!" Maham was paroled to his own house, but the original parole was left in his possession; and Robins, though requested, had exhibited no commission.¹

Maham's career was ended. Horry retired to an uncon-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 334; *The Royal Gazette*, May 22, 1782.

genial local command to which he was not suited, and Marion's brigade generally was disorganized. This was the result of Marion's detention at Jacksonborough, and the dispute between the two officers as to their rank — a dispute which the commander of the department, usually so arbitrary, had not the firmness peremptorily to decide.

About the same time that Thompson started upon his raid, a Tory son of South Carolina undertook a like incursion below. Young Andrew De Veaux, who earlier in the war, in order to commit his followers irrevocably, had ravaged General Stephen Bull's plantation and burnt Sheldon Church, in what is now Beaufort County, after several brilliant and perilous personal adventures had risen to the rank of major in the Royal militia, and as such had been in command when Harden took Fort Balfour, was again in the field. He sailed from the Stono with a party of soldiers in three small vessels, and foraged all along the inland watercourses, extending his incursions all the way to Ossabaw in Georgia.

General Wayne, who it will be remembered had been despatched by General Greene into Georgia, and was now operating against Savannah, was endeavoring to circumscribe the country from which the garrison of that town was drawing its supplies, as Greene had curtailed that which supplied Charlestown. A considerable quantity of rice which had not been thrashed remained on Hutchinson's Island, opposite Savannah, and so near the town as to be under the cover of the enemy's guns. There was also a large amount of stacked rice on Governor Wright's plantation, about half a mile northeast of the town. Unable to get possession of this rice himself, Wayne determined to attempt its destruction. His plan was to make simultaneous attempts to burn the forage and grain collected both at Wright's and on Hutchinson's Island.

The time appointed was between twelve and two in the night of the 24th of February, and it was arranged that the party under Wayne should advance and occupy the attention of the enemy, whilst General Barnwell, crossing from the Carolina side of the river in canoes, should perform his part of the undertaking.

Unfortunately for this enterprise, De Veaux with his flotilla appeared at Beaufort at this time, and, though deceived and foiled by a party of gentlemen representing themselves in the dusk of the evening as an advanced guard of a large force, upon his first landing at Beaufort Island he succeeded in destroying the boats which General Barnwell was collecting for Wayne's expedition. Colonel Robert Barnwell was, however, ordered with fifty men in boats to pass the river and burn the rice upon the island. By some misfortune he was betrayed or discovered, and being fired upon as he advanced, retreated, losing five or six of his men killed and as many taken prisoners. Wayne, hearing the firing, advanced, in order to draw the attention of the enemy to himself, and completely succeeded in effecting his part of the undertaking.¹ It was at this time that the opposition to General Barnwell's command and discontent at his appointment ran highest; and he very soon after resigned.²

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 293, 294; McCall's *Hist. of Georgia*, vol. II, 402; Johnson's *Traditions*, 178; *The Royal Gazette*, March 13, 1782.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 293-294.

CHAPTER XXVII

1782

WHEN the Jacksonborough Assembly adjourned, General Greene moved the army from Skirving's plantation on the Pon Pon to Bacon's bridge at the head of the Ashley. From this point a communication by boat was opened with Charlestown, and a contraband trade carried on with the concurrence of the governor and council, and with the connivance of the general himself. Means were brought to his consideration by which certain offers of goods in return for rice were suffered to enter Charlestown. Some supplies for the most distressing wants of the army were received in this way under the eyes of Colonels Laurens and Lee.

From the time of the failure of the expedition to John's Island, General Greene had in contemplation a bold movement into the peninsula or neck of land on which stands the city of Charlestown. His plan was to float a detachment down the Ashley, in the night, to enter the town in that quarter, in connection with an assault by him upon the enemy's lines in front. Sumter, being consulted upon the plan, just before his resignation, wrote that there was no difficulty of carrying the post at the Quarter House, and thus entering the neck; the question was as to the materials which Greene had for the assault upon the lines of the town, and the danger of being flanked from the rivers.¹

¹ General Sumter to General Greene, December 22, 1781; Sumter's letters, *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1899, Appendix, 68.

As the scheme presented great difficulties, it was not to be attempted without the careful preliminary examinations of the river. Unfortunately a British galley, for some unknown purpose, had been pushed high up the Ashley and stationed there. Greene was anxious to have the obstruction removed, and intimated his wish, provided the galley could be destroyed without too great a sacrifice. Captain Rudolph of Lee's Legion was advised by Lee of the general's wish, and charged with the device of some plan for the execution. Rudolph at once undertook the project, but its attempt was for the time postponed by a movement of the enemy to beat up Lee's quarters at McQueen's plantation, forcing Lee to fall back nearer the army. Rudolph did not, however, give up the scheme. Soon after the defeat of Marion's brigade, that is, early in March, he presented a plan to Colonel Lee, who laid it before General Greene. He had observed the facility with which boats going to market passed the galley; and he proposed to put in one of these boats an adequate force, disguising himself in a countryman's dress, and three or four soldiers in the garb and color of negroes. The boat was to be stored with the usual articles for the Charlestown market, under cover of which he concealed his armed men, while the boat was apparently manned only by himself as a countryman, and four negroes. Lieutenant Smith of the Virginia line, who had with him arranged the plan, joined the captain in its execution. Everything having been prepared with profound secrecy, Rudolph and Smith embarked with their parties at a concealed landing-place high up the Ashley on the night of the 18th of March. Between three and four in the morning, Rudolph got near to the galley, when the sentinel hailed the boat. He was answered in the negro dialect that it was a market boat, going to town, and asked permission to proceed. In reply the boat was ordered to

come alongside, as the captain wished to purchase some provisions. Rudolph obeyed, and, as he got alongside, threw some of his poultry on deck, his disguised men at the same time taking fast hold of the galley. On signal from Rudolph, Smith and the soldiers rose and boarded the galley. Three or four of the men of the galley, including the sentinel, were killed. Some escaped in the darkness of the night by throwing themselves into the river, and the captain with twenty-eight sailors were captured. The galley mounted twelve guns besides swivels, and was manned with forty-three seamen. Rudolph did not lose a man, and after taking out such stores as he found on board the galley he burnt her, and returned to his place of embarkation.

The enterprise was productive of excellent effect upon the British garrison in the town. It counteracted the successes of Coffin and Thompson, and alarmed the enemy lest the town might be assailed, as Greene contemplated, and to open the way for which this adventure had, in fact, been first designed. Every alarm in the night excited dire apprehensions: sometimes Greene was moving to force their lines; at others he was floating down the Ashley; and in one way or other he was ever present to their disturbed imaginations. But such fears were illusory. After a critical examination of the enemy's situation, no point was found vulnerable, and the general was obliged to relinquish any attempt on the city.¹

There was distress and great discontent in the army at this time. No supplies could be obtained from Congress, and none from Virginia or North Carolina. For two years two armies had ravaged the State of South Carolina, drawing their supplies entirely from its fields. The arrival of

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 537, 545-546; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, 297.

reënforcements from Pennsylvania now, after the fighting was nearly over, but added so many more mouths to be filled. On the 9th of March General Greene addressed the President of Congress as follows: —

“Your officers are in distress, having drained every private resource for support. Your soldiers are complaining for want of pay and clothing; and though both have shown as much merit and virtue, as much patience and forbearance, as can be found in history, yet you cannot but be sensible that this is a dangerous foundation to build upon—though it may last for a time it will have an end. I shall use all the address and influence I am master of to gain time; but some fundamental alteration must take place or opposition will fail; and whenever a discontent begins to discover itself a dissolution will follow—a temper I dread the approach of, and a consequence I fear much more than the force of the enemy.

“Great part of my troops are in deplorable situation for want of clothing, and it would have been much worse had it not been for some small supplies from the people at large and from the merchants of Charlestown by the advice and approbation of the Governor and council of the State, who have, upon every occasion, done everything in their power for our relief and support.

“Not a rag of clothing has come from the northward, except a small quantity of linen for the officers. A considerable quantity has been in Virginia all winter, and a number of arms which we have been, and still are in great want of. *We have three hundred men without arms, and more than a thousand men are so naked for want of clothing, that they can only be put on duty in cases of desperate necessity.* Men in this situation, without pay or spirits, it is difficult to tell what charm keeps them together. I believe that nothing but the pride of the army, and the severity of discipline support them under their sufferings.”¹

When General Greene first entered South Carolina there was no civil government, and he had exercised the right of impressment from military necessity. And when Governor Rutledge joined him on the Pee Dee the governor was at hand to support him to the extent of his dictatorial

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 316, 317.

powers. But this power of impressment had been greatly abused in Virginia, and, as has been seen, offensively exercised by Colonel Lee in this State. It is not surprising, therefore, that among the acts of the Jacksonborough Assembly was one prohibiting impressments. The State did not, however, stop to bargain for the support of the army now left entirely upon her, for Georgia could do nothing; but without contract or reference to the inquiry whether it would amount to more or less than her quota, took upon herself its maintenance. The fact was, as afterwards appeared, South Carolina was already creditor to the largest amount of any State in the Union except Massachusetts, notwithstanding the greater devastation which had been committed within her borders. But this she did not stop to compute. Congress had assigned as her quota of \$1,000,000, the Continental estimate for the year 1782, the sum of \$73,598. In consideration of the scarcity of specie, Mr. Morris, the Superintendent of Finance of the United States, proposed that supplies for the army should be furnished by the State in kind, instead of in money to that amount. The Assembly accepted this proposition, and passed an act reciting the facts and pledging the faith of the State for procuring and furnishing supplies to the army to the amount asked for. For this purpose commissioners were appointed who were charged with obtaining these supplies in a manner most equal and least burdensome to the people. But in doing this the Assembly also provided that no other persons than those who should be appointed by the governor should be allowed or permitted to procure supplies for the army.¹ Impressments were thus emphatically prohibited. It was objected that this prohibition was calculated to make the

¹ *Statutes at Large*, vol. IV, 325, 326.

army altogether dependent upon the State for subsistence ;¹ but surely, if Congress could not or would not support it, the alternative, however disagreeable to General Greene, was the necessary consequence of the neglect of Congress, not the fault of the State. The condition in which the community would be placed, if the army could take whatever they wanted or claimed that they wanted, would scarcely be preferable to the demands of the Royal authority. Though he made no complaint at the time, it is evident that Greene was not pleased with the arrangement. The sincerity and earnestness of the governor and council, as well as of the Assembly, however, were too conspicuous to admit of doubt of their intentions, and the general communicated to the governor the quantity of provisions in bread and meat necessary for the daily allowance of the army. This Governor Mathews undertook without hesitation to furnish.

Mr. William Hort was appointed commissary and forage master general in behalf of the State, and the new system went into operation under the most favorable auspices ; but in less than six weeks murmurs began and General Greene was complaining. On the 1st of April he writes to the governor :—

“I am much afraid that Mr. Hort has not the activity or industry requisite for the duties of his appointment. We are from day to day kept uneasy for want of regular supplies of provision. One day we are without beef, the next without rice, and some days without either. Supplies coming to the army in this way keep the men continually murmuring and complaining. Men will bear disappointments for two or three days at a time, but when the supplies are continually irregular and frequently deficient, the soldiers will get impatient and that will soon grow up into disagreeable discontent. To produce these frequent disappointments there must be a defect in the arrangements or a want of industry in the execution. I am not acquainted with Mr. Hort but

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 315.

I am afraid he has more method than despatch. To fill the place he is in activity is no less requisite than method and integrity. Your Excellency knows of how much importance it is to have the army constantly and well supplied; and in our situation how dangerous a failure. I beg you will therefore explain to Mr. Hort the necessity of being punctual. The service must suffer if the troops are without provisions and God only knows what may be the consequences should the enemy avail himself of one of these unfortunate moments to attack. We are very near the enemy, even within surprising distance. It is dangerous hazarding the least discontent in a matter which never fails to produce ill humor in an army. Our troops have never been without provisions so much during all last campaign as they have since Mr. Hort has undertaken the business, and the provisions not more than twenty or thirty miles off.”¹

Besides General Greene's usual querulousness, there is a tone of uneasiness and anxiety in this letter unwarranted by the irregularities in the supplies of which it complains. That Mr. Hort was able to supply the army at all under the circumstances should have caused congratulations rather than complaints. The country from which the supplies were to be drawn had been harried and ravaged now for two years. The dispersion of Marion's brigade had cut off the country from the Cooper to the Santee; that from the Santee to the Edisto had, during the whole of the preceding season, been traversed and pillaged to an extent which had prevented farming and interfered with the produce. Upon the evacuation of Camden, Sumter had cleared it as far as he could of cattle and horses, and Lord Rawdon on his retreat had swept away all that Sumter had left. In the section to the south of the Edisto the planters had been in a turmoil since Harden had entered it the year before. Without means of transportation, the wonder is that the State commissary was able to accomplish as much as he did. Doubtless the army felt the check upon the arbitrary

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 315.

impressments in which they had been indulged during the last year, and that in this way it was true that they had not been as restricted during the last campaign. Governor Mathews, who had experience as chairman of the committee of Congress, at Washington's headquarters, was quite as competent to judge of Mr. Hort's efficiency as General Greene; and while he made the most zealous efforts to keep the troops supplied, General Greene's complaints did not shake his confidence in Mr. Hort's industry and capacity. Probably, too, Governor Mathews was aware of the general's habit of finding some one responsible for all his own misadventures, and that not even Colonel Davie, who had sacrificed opportunities of fame in the field, to act as his commissary and had served him so faithfully, and apparently possessed so large a portion of his esteem, could escape expressions of the general's impatience.¹

The truth is that Greene had deeper causes of anxiety at this time than could have been given by the absence of rum and tobacco, and the irregularities of the commissariat. The whole Continental line was doubtless in a deplorable state for the want of clothing and other necessaries; but beyond physical suffering, which many other armies have endured without rebellion, there was at this time a spirit of unrest and insubordination throughout his army. Colonel Lee, who had been so petted and spoiled by General Greene, could not brook being outranked by Colonel Laurens, and conceiving that Greene had not done him justice in his official reports, on the 26th of January, 1782, requested leave of absence in a letter in which he does not attempt to conceal his discontent and dissatisfaction. A wordy and platitudinous correspondence ensued between the former friends, in which they declared their love for each other; but Lee refused to withdraw his letter, and left the army

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 248.

in which he had so greatly distinguished himself, and the operations of which he had so greatly influenced.¹ Upon his retirement General Greene reorganized his light troops into a brigade, which he placed under the command of General Gist of Maryland. By this arrangement the cavalry of the Legion and that of the Third and Fourth Virginia Regiments were united under Colonel Baylor; the infantry of the Legion, the dismounted dragoons of the Third Regiment, the Delaware Regiment, and one hundred men detached from the line and commanded by Major Beale, were formed into a body of infantry under the command of Colonel Laurens. This arrangement gave new cause for offence, as it prevented the promotion of Major Rudolph, who had so long and so efficiently served, but who, in Greene's opinion, did not possess the requisites for such a command. Connected with this objection was also an indisposition to serve under Colonel Laurens. The result was the resignation in a body of Major Rudolph and all the officers of the Legion. Then the captains and subalterns of the Pennsylvania line were offended because Captain Wilmot of the Maryland line had been put in charge of a critical service, and undertook to remonstrate against it and discuss with the general the propriety of the detail.² It was not surprising, as General Wayne declared, that such a spirit of discontent and insubordination should be communicated to the men. Nor was it to be expected that the state of the army or the sentiment of the soldiers could be concealed from an enemy but twenty miles distant; and unfortunately the army at this time had in it a mass of material too easy

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 321-322. Colonel Lee concludes by declaring his wish that he could bind his mind to another decision. He writes, "I have tried much, but the sores of my wounds are only irritated by such efforts."

² Captain William Wilmot, Second Maryland Continental Regiment, who was to fall just before the end of the war, his blood the last spilled in the Revolution.

to be worked upon. This was in the Pennsylvania line, whose officers were now disputing with the general the propriety of his orders, and whose men were the very mutineers who had triumphed over the government in the insurrection in New Jersey the year before, and who, as Lafayette observed, "had been well paid and well clothed in consequence of it." There was even in it one of the sergeants who had been put in command of the regiments in the mutiny, and a number of others of the same description who had deserted from the enemy whilst they lay in Philadelphia. It was believed that this man, Sergeant Gornell, and several others, including the general's steward, had been bought over by secret emissaries; and had the zeal of these agents not prompted them to make an attempt on the fidelity of the Maryland line, the most fatal consequences might have ensued.¹

The first indication of the trouble was a placard near the quarters of General St. Clair, who commanded the Pennsylvanians, to this effect, "*Can soldiers be expected to do their duty clothed in rags and fed on rice.*" The Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia Continentals were doubtless in rags at this time; but the Pennsylvania line, as Lafayette observed, were from their mutiny the best-clothed troops in the army. These men were no doubt unaccustomed to rice, but it was a substantial and nutritious food. Pampered, indeed, must have been the soldiers who would mutiny rather than eat it. Suspicion attaching to certain of the line, they went over at once to the enemy, and the trouble apparently ended. But it had not; a conspiracy was formed by Gornell and the general's steward, and a correspondence opened with the enemy to deliver up on a given day the commander and every officer of distinction. The quick ear of a camp-woman, who had noticed the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 319.

murmuring of the disaffected and unguarded expressions of the ringleader, occasioned the discovery of the plot.

Steps were at once taken to meet and crush the revolt. The light troops, who had been relieved of outpost duty and were being indulged with more comfortable quarters in the rear to recover from the fatigues of the severe service they had undergone, were quietly brought forward. To these not a shade of suspicion attached. Washington's and the Legion cavalry took their station in advance. The Delawares, Smith's company of Virginia regulars, and the Legion infantry were drawn nearer to headquarters. A troop of horse was pushed forward to watch the motions of the enemy. These arrangements having been quietly but promptly made, Sergeant Gornell was arrested. That night every soldier who apprehended he had committed himself broke away and joined the enemy, then advanced to receive them; for this it appears was the very day the plot was to have been executed. For many days before symptoms of mutiny had appeared, and movements of the enemy had taken place which had put the American commander on his guard.

Sergeant Gornell was tried and convicted and executed on the 22d of April. He walked to his execution with a firm step and composed countenance, distributing, as he passed along, to such of his companions as approached him, several articles of his clothing, at that period valuable legacies. His hat he gave to one, his coat to another, his sleeve-buttons to a third. Every countenance, we are told, expressed sorrow, but not a murmur was heard. Arrived at the fatal spot, the doomed man, in a few words, but in the most impressive manner, called upon his comrades "not to sully their glory nor forego the advantages they would specially realize from a termination of the war; and if a thought of desertion had been harbored in their bosoms

at once to discard it." "I have no cause," he added, "to complain of the court. I certainly spoke imprudently, and from the evidence given of my guilt they could not have acted otherwise." He then gave the signal to the platoon selected from his own corps, was fired on, and expired.¹

Some others, believed to be associates with the sergeant, among whom were Peters and Owens, domestic servants at headquarters, were also tried; but the testimony was not deemed conclusive by the court. Four other sergeants of the Pennsylvania line were sent into the interior under guard. The decisive conduct of General Greene crushed effectually the mutiny, and the result proved that, although the temper of complaint and of discontent pervaded the army, but few of the soldiers were in reality guilty of the criminal intentions which were believed at first to have spread far through the ranks.

On the morning of the execution Captain O'Neal of the Legion, accompanied by Lieutenant John Middleton and Captain Rudolph, who had volunteered, was sent to watch the movements of the enemy. Passing Bacon's bridge, they patrolled the road for several miles below Dorchester, and seeing no appearance of the enemy without their lines, O'Neal turned his troop to retire. Rudolph and two dragoons were in the advance. On a sudden three well-mounted black troopers appeared in their front. These were immediately charged. The chief of the negro party fell by the arm of Pope, a soldier of distinguished gallantry. Rudolph dismounted the second, and made him a prisoner. The third escaped. From the captive they learned that a troop under the command of Captain Dawkins had gone by the way of Goose Creek bridge and were to return by way of Dorchester. Upon this informa-

¹ Garden's *Anecdotes of the Revolution*, 365-367.

tion O'Neal pushed forward in full expectation of a complete triumph. Dawkins was soon discovered passing through the village of Dorchester and bearing down upon O'Neal. The charge was sounded on both sides and a fierce conflict began; but before any material advantage could be gained, the bugle was heard from another quarter, and British infantry arose in every direction. A road leading to Goose Creek afforded the only chance of retreat; this was immediately taken, and, though exposed to a heavy fire, the officers and most of the privates escaped without injury — nine men and fifteen horses of the troop fell into the hands of the enemy. This was the only advantage resulting to the enemy in a conjuncture from which he expected to derive signal benefit.¹

General Pickens, it will be remembered, had, about the 1st of November, been despatched to guard the frontiers against the Indians, who had again been incited to rise, a part of Cuninghams band having escaped in that direction after the massacre at Hayes's Station and joined the Cherokees there.² Some time before General Pickens embarked upon the expedition he communicated his intentions to Generals Rutherford and Sevier of North Carolina, requesting their coöperation. These officers responded, and a plan of campaign, assailing the Indian country at different points, was arranged; but for some reasons unknown, Rutherford and Sevier did not comply with their undertaking. General Pickens, relying upon this promised assistance, about the 1st of January, with a party of Georgians under Major John Cunningham and a portion of his own brigade, made a rapid but cautious march into the eastern part of the Cherokee Nation, in what is now Oconee

¹ *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 547, 549; *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, 319, 320; *Garden's Anecdotes of the Revolution*, 367, 368.

² See *ante*, 484.

County, and laid every town, village, and settlement in ashes on the east of the mountains. Receiving no intelligence, however, of the coöperation of Rutherford and Sevier, he fell back. This retrograde motion was construed by the Indians into fear of a general engagement, and dissipated the effect of the destruction of their towns and property. In this expedition Pickens killed forty Cherokees, with a great number of prisoners, burned thirteen towns, with the loss only of two men wounded.¹

Colonel Robert Anderson of Pickens's brigade, obtaining intelligence that an attack was to be made by a body of Loyalists, Cherokees, and Creeks, communicated the information to Colonel Clarke of Georgia, and appointed Freeman Fort as the place of rendezvous on the 1st of April. Clarke repaired there with one hundred Georgians and was joined by Anderson with three hundred Carolinians. They marched early the next morning to Oconee River, passed over it a short distance, where they halted to obtain further intelligence of the enemy. Scouts were sent out in different directions, with orders to avoid if possible being discovered by the Indians. Captain Black, who commanded one of these parties, had not proceeded more than a mile before he fell in with the main body of the enemy. The discovery of each other was made at the same time by both parties. Black retreated towards camp, and was pursued and fired upon by the Indians, who appeared to have had no information of a formidable force being so near them. Colonel Clarke immediately advanced to the scene of action and met Black on the retreat. When the enemy discovered the American force, they fled in the utmost confusion, and scattered in various directions so as to avoid a general engagement. Several of the Indians were killed, and two of the Loyalists were taken prisoners and

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 698; *Memoirs of the War of 1776* (Lee), 527.

hanged — for former offences, as it was said. Their very presence with the Indians, however, under these circumstances, would have justified their execution. Captain Holloway of Anderson's regiment was killed in the pursuit by a wounded Indian. This defeat had a temporary effect, and left the inhabitants for a few months in the enjoyment of comparative quietness and peace.¹

Lee justly observes that it is extraordinary that the Cherokees, who had complied with their engagements and kept the peace during the past campaign, when the success of Lord Cornwallis and the many difficulties Greene had to encounter gave such encouragement to their rising, should have delayed doing so until the British army in Virginia had been forced to surrender, and that acting in South Carolina had been compelled to take shelter under the guns of the forts and ships in Charlestown harbor; and that at this late hour they were so rash as to listen to exhortations often before applied in vain.

The inhabitants in the interior, between the Indians on the frontier and the armies now restricted to the coast, were yet in a fearful condition. Open war had ceased, and the armies had passed away, but the internecine struggle in many parts of the State still continued with fearful results. In some, however, truces were agreed upon between the Whigs and Loyalists. One instance of this was a truce made between the Loyalists on the Salkehatchie and the neighboring State militia in order to allow the cultivation of the crops for the ensuing summer. To effect this, proposals were made for a cessation of hostilities for a limited time. Commissioners authorized for the purpose met at the house of a Mr. Gray on the southern side of the Edisto, about ten miles above Saw Mills. Captains Oldfield, Jones, and Cheshire of the

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 398, 399.

Royal militia represented the Tory side, and Colonel Davies, Captains Youngblood of Edisto and Heape of Horse Shoe, empowered by Governor Mathews, represented that of the Whigs. A truce was agreed upon for two months, from the 1st of April and ending on the 1st of June, during which a strict neutrality was to be observed, and those who had lost property on either side were to be allowed to recover it upon proper proof. The territory included in the truce was described as extending from the Upper Three runs to Mathews's Bluff on the Savannah River, and from thence across the country in the same breadth in a direction nearly perpendicular to South Edisto, comprising an extent of country nearly sixty miles square, part of which reached within thirty miles of the rear of General Greene's position.¹

This truce lasted until near the 25th of May, when *The Royal Gazette* charged that it was broken by the Whigs; Major Goodwyn of the Congaree militia with eighteen men from the post at Four Holes at midnight seizing Captain Cheshire and three of his men at a friend's house on the Edisto. But this action was probably brought on by the collection of a body of hostile Tories on Dean Swamp, a branch of the South Edisto, near the present town of Salley. Captains Michael Watson and William Butler of Pickens's brigade, learning of the assembling of the party of Tories, determined to break them up. The expedition was formed at the Ridge, in what is now Edgefield, with Captain Watson in command. Watson's men were mounted militia armed with rifles and muskets, Butler's were cavalry armed with pistols and cutlasses. The party moved forward at sunset to surprise the Tories. They moved with great rapidity and captured a disaffected man named Hutto, whom they hurried along with them under guard.

¹ *The Royal Gazette*, June 8, 1782.

As they approached the Tory encampment Hutto made his escape and gave notice to the Tories of Watson's approach; upon which an ambush was arranged for the approaching Whigs. When Hutto's escape was reported, Watson declared his opinion that the expedition should be abandoned; but Butler thought otherwise, and they continued to advance. As the Whigs approached the edge of the swamp two men were observed as if endeavoring to hide themselves. Butler, Watson, and Sergeant Vardell—a very brave man—rode rapidly forward to capture them. Watson first discovered that these men were only a decoy, and when too late warned the others that the whole of the Tories were there concealed. The Tories arose on being discovered, and poured on their assailants a well-directed fire, which brought down Watson, Vardell, and several others of the foremost Whigs. Upon the fall of Watson, Butler assumed command, and, though sorely pressed, brought off the wounded men; but now found to his mortification that the infantry had little or no ammunition left, and that the enemy were advancing upon him. In this emergency John Corley, his lieutenant, made a desperate charge on the enemy, and that so unexpectedly as to throw them into confusion; following up his advantage, his men, mingling in the disordered ranks of the enemy, prevented them rallying. Butler continued his impetuous onslaught until the Tories took refuge in the swamp. As the Whigs returned in triumph, the gallant Vardell made an effort to rise and wave his hand in exultation, but fell back and expired. He was buried in the field. Watson survived until the Whigs reached Orangeburgh, but died immediately afterwards.¹

It was just after this that "Bloody Bill" Cuninghame made a second incursion into Ninety Six District. Per-

¹ Johnson's *Traditions*, 548, 549; MS. Memoir of General William Butler.

fectly familiar with the country from his youth, possessed of great sagacity and fertility in military expedients, and endowed with all the physical qualities so essential to the partisan, he was no mean adversary. But, fortunately for the Whigs, a leader was found in Captain William Butler, fully able to cope with the brilliant, if bloody, Tory partisan. Cuningham's favorite manœuvre was to divide his command upon the march into small detachments, to be concentrated by different routes near the point at which the blow was aimed. In this manner he had concentrated his force at a point known as Corradine's Ford on the Saluda. Butler, with a portion of his company, marched to meet him, and to ascertain his position resorted to a ruse. Approaching the residence of Joseph Cuningham, near the junction of the Little and the Big Saluda, he sent forward his brother, Thomas Butler, with Abner Corley, to the house in the night. Thomas Butler was an excellent mimic, and, imitating the voice of one of William Cuningham's men, named Niblets, called aloud and inquired "where our friend Cuningham was." The wife of Joseph Cuningham replied that he had crossed Corradine's Ford. With that Captain Butler himself rode up to the house, and, mounting Joseph Cuningham upon a horse, compelled him to guide the party across the ford. They crossed this ford at twelve o'clock at night, and next morning halted in a peach orchard near Bauknight's Ferry. The horses were feeding, when a gray mare which Cuningham was known to have taken from the neighborhood was observed passing back, having escaped from his camp. This incident disclosed in some measure the state of affairs, and Butler's rangers received the order to march. The rangers numbered about thirty, Cuningham's men about twenty. The bloody scenes of Cloud's Creek, it was observed, animated every encounter between Butler and

Cunningham with more the spirit of the duel than of the battle-field.

Approaching the Tory position unobserved, John Corley was detailed with eight men to gain their rear, and upon a preconcerted signal to attack while the main body advanced under cover of a hedge. The Tories were drying their blankets by their camp-fires, and Cunningham himself was at a little distance off from his band. As it afterwards appeared, Butler's person being at one time exposed in advancing before the signal was given, he was observed by the Tories, but taken for their own leader, for there was a strong personal resemblance between the two men. Corley's furious assault, himself foremost in the charge, was the first intimation to the Tories that their exasperated foes were at hand. Cunningham was promptly at his post; but, taken by surprise and attacked by superior numbers, thought only of safety. Having no time to saddle his horse, but seizing his holsters, with a partisan's quickness he sprang to his seat, while Butler, singling him out, dashed in pursuit. Both men were remarkably good riders, and tradition has preserved even the names of the horses they rode. Cunningham was mounted on a mare which had become celebrated in his service as "Silver Heels," while Butler rode a horse called "Ranter." As Butler carried only a sabre and Cunningham had only his pistols, which had been rendered useless by the rain of the previous night, life or death hung upon the speed of the horses. As long as the chase was in the woods, Ranter maintained his own; but when they struck an open trail in which the superior stride of Cunningham's thoroughbred could tell, turning in his seat and patting with triumphant confidence the noble animal that bore him, he tauntingly exclaimed, "I am safe." Dashing rapidly away from his adversary, he escaped by himself swimming the Saluda near Lorick's Ferry.

When Butler returned from the pursuit of Cuninghame, he found a portion of his command assembled at the Tory camp under circumstances which gave him great concern. Turner, one of the prisoners, had been deliberately shot through the head after he had surrendered. When Butler had rebuked the act, Scysia, who had committed the deed, justified himself by telling of an outrage the unfortunate Tory had inflicted upon his mother. The Tory, he alleged, had stripped Mrs. Scysia to the waist, had tied and severely whipped her, to force her to disclose where were a party of Whigs among whom was her son. The corps justified Scysia, and no action was taken against him. A pursuit of Cuninghame's men was ordered for the purpose of capturing or dispersing them, and some were overtaken while crossing the river, others were shot. The result of this action was the dispersion of Cuninghame's famous band.¹

¹ MS. Memoir of General William Butler; Curwin's *Journal and Letters*, Appendix, 646.

CHAPTER XXVIII

1782

ON the 4th of April, General Leslie addressed a communication to General Greene, in which he stated that it was with deep concern he viewed, in the proceedings of the late Assembly, acts for amercing the property of some persons and confiscating that of others whose principles had attached them to the cause of their sovereign. He had hoped that humanity would have arrested their execution, and that he would not have been compelled to take measures to counteract their effect. But when these hopes were disappointed and he found the property of the loyal removed from their estates, he could no longer remain the quiet spectator of their distresses; and in order to induce a juster line of conduct he had employed a part of the force intrusted to his charge for their protection in seizing the negroes of General Greene's friends, that restitution might be made to such of his as might suffer under these oppressive and ruinous measures. This, he stated, was the object of the late expedition towards the Santee, and intimated that others would follow unless the confiscation and amercement acts were abandoned.

General Leslie felt, however, the necessity, in making this communication, of explaining or justifying in some way the action of his predecessors in their conduct towards the estates of the rebels, as they termed the Whigs; so he proceeded:—

“To point out to you, or the world, the distinction between temporary sequestration and actual confiscation would be impertinent; but it will by no means be so to observe on the opposite conduct pursued by each party in carrying into execution these very different measures; for whilst you have endeavored to involve, in perpetual ruin, the persons and estates of those who have differed from you in political sentiments, I can safely appeal even to those whose violent opposition to the King’s government compelled the withholding from them for a time their possessions in this province, for the great attention which has been invariably paid to their property—the connected state in which it has been preserved—and the liberal allowances that were made to their families, in so much that, while other estates were running to waste by the destruction of the country, these have greatly thriven at the expense of the government.”

On the other hand, General Leslie went on to suggest that, should the enforcement of the confiscation acts be suspended, and General Greene should think a meeting of commissioners on each side might tend to lessen the devastations of the war and secure inviolate the property of individuals, he would have a peculiar happiness in embracing proposals that might accomplish such benevolent purposes.

To this letter General Greene returned an immediate answer “that he had the honor to command the forces of the United States in the Southern Department, but had nothing to do with the internal police of any State.” On this General Leslie addressed himself to Governor Mathews, enclosing the letter he had addressed to General Greene.

Governor Mathews on the 12th returned General Leslie an elaborate reply, in the course of which he wrote:—

“I would not, Sir, give an hasty answer to your observations on this subject, and thought myself well justified in deviating from the rule of politeness in delaying an answer, that I might have an opportunity of investigating truth. I have taken much pains in my inquiries, the result of which has been the most indubitable proofs,

that so far from these sequestered estates having had the greatest attention paid to them—being preserved in a connected state—and ‘greatly thriven,’ most of them, while under the management of your sequestrator, have been very greatly injured; many have been nearly ruined, and others altogether so. What expense the British government has incurred on their account I know not, but, I can with confidence assert the sequestered estates have been very little benefited thereby.

“I will now appeal to a fact within your own knowledge. You know that great numbers of the negroes, belonging to these estates are now within your lines, and lost to their owners. And on few plantations is a four-footed animal to be found. How then do you prove that the estates have been preserved in a connected state, when one-half of some, two-thirds of others, and the whole of a few have been deprived of the negroes and stock that were upon them when put under sequestration? How do you prove that these estates have greatly thriven; and that the greatest attention has been paid to them?

“As to the liberal allowance made to the families of those persons whose estates were sequestered: this, Sir, I must beg leave to say you have been as greatly deceived in, as the other parts of your information. So far from the wives and children having been allowed the stipulated sums out of their husbands’ and fathers’ estates, the truth is, that after much entreaty, and in many instances very unbecoming treatment, some have obtained trifling sums compared with what they were entitled to, while others have been altogether denied.

“On this ground of investigation I am ready to meet you, Sir, whenever you think proper, when I will undertake to produce to you the proofs for everything I have here advanced.

“Your observations on the opposite conduct of each party on carrying into execution the measures of sequestration and confiscation, so far from being founded in fact, evidently show the uniform deception into which you have been led.

“In the common acceptation of the word, it is true, sequestration means no more than a temporary privation of property; but your sequestrator general, and most of his officers, have construed this word into a very different meaning; and, regardless of the articles of capitulation of Charlestown, as well as the most sacred contracts contained in marriage settlements, every species of property, negroes, plate, household furniture, horses, carriages, cattle, etc., have been indiscrimi-

nately torn from their owners by persons now under your immediate command, and have been either sent beyond seas, for the benefit of those who had taken — I had almost said plundered — them, or now remains within your lines, and in either case lost to their owners.

Now, Sir, let us for a moment view the conduct of the legislature of this State in their late session. The most sacred regard has been paid by them to private contracts; neither marriage settlements nor the faith of individuals have been violated, but left to their full operation. A provision was also made for the families of those whose estates have been confiscated. And although the property of British subjects within this State has been confiscated, yet the debts due to them from the citizens of this State have been left untouched. And be assured, Sir, whilst I have the honor of holding the rank I now do, it shall be my particular business to see that this, as well as every other law of the State, is executed with lenity, fidelity, and integrity.”¹

The result of this correspondence left General Greene to expect a renewal of the incursions of the enemy, as well from the necessity of procuring supplies as from his threat of retaliation on account of the Confiscation Act. Steps, indeed, were taken to carry out this purpose. The commissioner of sequestration prepared galleys and other vessels, which were manned by the dismantled troops, whose horses the enemy had been compelled to kill for want of forage with which to feed them, and stationed in the rivers and creeks contiguous to the valuable estates, to cover the shipment of produce in small craft and conveying these supplies to town. Some of the strongest of these vessels were sent thirty miles up the Cooper River.²

But while these measures were in preparation, news from England came which induced General Leslie to withhold the attempt to carry out his threat.

On the 22d of February a resolution had been introduced in the House of Commons in England, that an address

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 355-364.

² Narrative of John Cruden, Commissioner, *Winnowings in Am. Hist.*, Revolutionary Narrative, No. 1.

should be presented to his Majesty that he would be pleased to give directions to his ministers not to pursue any longer the impracticable object of reducing his Majesty's revolted colonies to their allegiance by a war on the continent of America; and to assure his Majesty that his faithful commons would most cheerfully concur with him in such measures as might be found necessary to accelerate the blessings of returning peace. The resolution, after a very warm debate, had been lost—but by only *one* vote. The majority of only one on the side of the ministry proved that their influence was at an end; and when, five days after, it was renewed, the resolution was carried without a division.¹ A few days after a commission passed the great seal appointing Sir Guy Carleton commander-in-chief in America,² thus superseding Sir Henry Clinton. Sir Guy arrived in New York on the 5th of May,³ and on the 7th communicated to General Washington the disposition that prevailed in the government and people relative to the making of a peace with the Americans.⁴

In the meanwhile Congress had, on the 23d of February, authorized the commander-in-chief to agree to the exchange of Earl Cornwallis, provided that the Honorable Henry Laurens should be liberated, and proper assurances given for the exchange of all other prisoners.⁵ Mr. Laurens had been released from close confinement in the Tower on the 31st of December before, but was under a verbal recognizance to appear at the court of King's Bench the next Easter term, and not to depart thence without leave of the court. Though still a nominal prisoner on parole,

¹ *Annual Register*, 1782, vol. XXV, 167-168; Wraxall's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 511, 522; Gordon's *Am. War*, vol. IV, 229-230; Bancroft's *Hist. of the U.S.*, vol. V, 530.

² Gordon's *Am. War*, vol. IV, 231.

³ *Ibid.*, 249.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 291.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 245.

Mr. Laurens was busy negotiating the treaty of peace which he was to sign as one of the commissioners on the part of America.¹ His actual exchange for Lord Cornwallis was not communicated to General Washington until the 2d of August.²

When the vote of the British Parliament was communicated to General Leslie, he proposed to General Greene a cessation of hostilities, and that he should be permitted to purchase and receive from the planters such subsistence as he needed. The subject of a cessation of hostilities General Greene referred to Congress; the other subject he referred to the governor and council. But their views had already been communicated to General Greene in a request "that he would by all means in his power prevent supplies from going into Charlestown, except so far as his contracts respecting clothing made it necessary." This was necessary, as the State had undertaken to supply the army in kind. To have opened a market with Charlestown would have been to drain the country immediately, and perhaps have protracted the stay of the enemy by lessening his inconveniences. General Leslie's offer was therefore, of course, rejected, and he thereupon intimated that, however anxious he was to discontinue the horrors of war, he would take provisions by force wherever they could be obtained, and immediately commenced preparation for that purpose. To meet this renewal of strife General Greene determined to reorganize his forces. General Marion, who had rallied his men sufficiently to recross the Santee, was requested to strengthen himself so as to meet the enemy in that quarter, whilst a strong detachment was formed under General Gist of Maryland to cover the country lying south and west of the army's position. The cavalry of the Legion and that

¹ Mr. Laurens's Narrative, *Coll. So. Ca. Hist. Soc.*, vol. I, 64 *et seq.*

² Gordon's *Am. War*, vol. IV, 294.

of the Third and Fourth Virginian regiments united under Colonel Baylor; the infantry of the Legion, the dismounted dragoons of the Third Regiment, the Delaware Regiment, and one hundred men detached from the line commanded by Major Beale, the whole infantry under the command of Colonel Laurens formed the brigade under the command of General Gist.¹ Colonel Henderson, who had been appointed brigadier-general in the place of Sumter, was with Pickens, who had returned from his Indian campaign, and the militia under these, with Marion, were drawn together near the headquarters.

Scarcely had Marion reached Dorchester, when the Loyalists beyond the Pee Dee, with the celebrated Major Gainey at their head, once more appeared in arms. On the 28th of April a party of them, commanded by Captain Jones, surrounded and set fire to the house of Colonel Kolb of the militia. He, after receiving assurance of being treated as a prisoner of war, surrendered; upon which he was immediately put to death in the presence of his wife and children.² From this time the Tories in this section, disregarding the treaty they had made with Marion on the 17th of June, 1781, had become more troublesome, not only to the people of this State, but of North Carolina. They now appeared in such large force, both cavalry and infantry, that it became necessary to detach Marion against them. At the head of Maham's cavalry — Maham himself being a prisoner as already related — Marion proceeded upon his mission. General Greene's instructions to him on this occasion, which were in consonance with his own sentiments and the tenor of his whole conduct, were to spare

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 329.

² Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 371. Ramsay gives the name of the officer in command of this party as "Jones," but James gives it as Gibson (*James's Life of Marion*, 166).

the unnecessary effusion of blood.¹ And happily these he was able to comply with. But little defence was made by the Tories; only one skirmish took place, in which, however, Robert James, a friend of the general's, was wounded. At Burch's Mill on the Pee Dee, in what is now Marion County, about ten miles west of the present town of Marion, another treaty was signed on the 8th of June, by which Gainey's party agreed to lay down their arms, to demean themselves thereafter as peaceable citizens, to deliver up all stolen property, to apprehend all who did not accede to the treaty now made, to take all deserters from the American army, to return them to their allegiance, and to abjure that of his Britannic Majesty. From this treaty the officer in command of the party who killed Colonel Kolb, and a notorious Tory leader in North Carolina named Fanning and his party, were excluded, but they escaped. Under this treaty at least five hundred men laid down their arms to Marion.²

As usual, Marion's absence was the signal for the renewal of depredations between the Cooper and the Santee. Colonel Ashby had been left in command of the infantry, but he had been pressed upon and compelled to retire, so that the general was recalled the moment he had quelled the insurrection of the Loyalists, to spread his shield once more over the country which had so long been the object of his protecting care. But had he not been joined by a new corps under Major Conyers, he must have come alone. His movements had been so rapid that Maham's corps, broken down with fatigue, were necessarily left in his rear to recruit; the militia of the country he had thought advisable to leave under Colonel Baxter to hold the Loyalists in check, as he doubted their sincerity and feared they would rise in force, plunder the country, and

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 335.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 167.

move down with their spoil to a fleet the enemy had been preparing in Charlestown for some enterprise. At Murray's Ferry he halted to collect his militia, and awaited the arrival of Maham; then, having under an order of the governor consolidated the two commands of Maham and Conyers into one regiment, about the middle of July he was enabled once more to cross the Santee at the head of a respectable cavalry and about three hundred infantry. With these he took post on the Wassamasaw road, in St. James's, Goose Creek, in a position secure from sudden attack, and calculated for easy coöperation with the detachment of the main army, in covering the country.

General Leslie now prepared to carry into effect his threat of seizing provisions wherever he could find them, and late in July a numerous fleet of small boats, carrying eight hundred men and convoyed by galleys and armed brigs, issued from Charlestown, destined, as it was thought, against Georgetown. Marion was immediately ordered to that place.¹ After a forced march of about four days he arrived at White's bridge, but found no enemy in that neighborhood. In this march of about 160 miles Marion's men had but one ration of rice; the rest was lean beef.²

Georgetown was not the destination of the expedition. It was directed to another point. The collection of rice was its object, which could best be secured upon the Santee, and the enemy succeeded in carrying off from that river about six hundred barrels without interruption. Marion's force was now thrown over Sampit River so as to overtake their march to Georgetown, but it was impossible to prevent their plunder of the plantations under the guns of the galleys. In taking the rice, however, the enemy left receipts for the amount taken except in two instances, —

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 334, 336.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 166.

one, of the rice taken from the plantation of the estate of Thomas Lynch, Jr., who had signed the Declaration of Independence; and the other of Mr. Neyle, who had fallen in the siege of Charlestown.¹

The enemy having left the Santee, Marion was ordered to take post at Wadboo, as the return of the fleet into port suggested the probability of some enterprise up the rivers communicating with the town. But their next movement was against Combahee, and after depositing the spoil collected they set sail, and arrived a few days after in the port of Beaufort.

The light brigade, under General Gist, soon after it was formed, took a position in advance of the army near the Stono. Colonel Laurens, still charged with conducting the intercourse of intelligence with his secret agents in Charlestown, had a guard assigned him at his own request, by order of General Greene, and took a position beyond the line of pickets of the brigade, near to Wappoo Creek. Here they remained comparatively inactive until intelligence was received of the sailing of the foraging fleet to the southward.

As General Greene had other channels of communication with Charlestown besides those kept open by Laurens, he received intelligence of that event a day before it reached Colonel Laurens. Orders were immediately despatched to General Gist, dated the 23d of August, to march to the protection of the country on the Combahee, where a quantity of provisions, both public and private, was then lying. Not thinking it advisable to withdraw Colonel Laurens from a post so highly confidential and important as that which he then occupied at Wappoo, under the immediate orders of General Greene, Gist moved on to the southward without issuing orders to Colonel

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 336.

Laurens to join him. But the ardor of the latter, says Johnson, was not to be restrained when the longed-for opportunity for enterprise presented itself. In a hurried scrawl to Greene of the 24th, probably the last words Colonel Laurens ever wrote, conveying the intelligence of the Combahee expedition, he says, "I forward you the enclosed which I have just received — vague intelligence reached me of the march of the light troops — will you be so good as to inform me whether anything is likely to be done?"

It was enough that General Gist was ordered to strike at the enemy. Laurens, though laboring under an ague, and actually in bed with it when he heard of Gist's march, arose, hurried away, and overtook the brigade on the north bank of the Combahee River near the ferry. The enemy had landed on the opposite side of the river, and the cavalry had been ordered round by the Salkehatchie bridge to join the militia, who had collected in that quarter, seeking an opportunity for striking at the enemy.

Twelve miles below the ferry, on the north side of the Combahee, the extreme end of Chehaw Neck approaches the bed of the river, which generally between these points is bordered by extensive swamps and rice fields. At this point General Gist had ordered a work to be thrown up for the purpose of annoying the enemy in their retreat, and Colonel Laurens solicited the command of the enterprise at that post. Fifty infantry with some matrosses and a howitzer were ordered out under his command; and on the evening of the 26th he moved down the river, halting at a plantation near enough to take post at Chehaw by daylight the ensuing morning.

The night, it is stated, was spent in all the enjoyments of hospitality and female society, and the company did not separate until two hours before the time when the detachment must be put in motion. Ere the sun rose upon

Laurens the next morning he was a stiffened corpse, and his two companions of the evening's festivity lay wounded in the field.

The enemy were disappointed in their expectation of collecting rice on the south side of the Combahee; all that could be spared from the subsistence of the people had been drawn from that side of the river for the use of Wayne's army in Georgia, which had been supplied altogether from Carolina. The light brigade arrived in time to prevent their foraging on the north side; and upon the advance of the militia and cavalry and the commencement of the work below them, their troops were silently embarked in the night, and, by slipping their anchors and dropping down with the tide, the departure of the vessels from their moorings was not perceived until four o'clock in the morning.

General Gist immediately anticipated the danger to which Laurens was exposed, and despatching an express to him with the intelligence, and being joined by his cavalry, which had swum the river the preceding evening, he moved off with all possible expedition at their head to the support of Laurens, leaving orders for his infantry to hasten after him. But the mischief was already done. The enemy had either received information of the marching of the detachment, or had rightly concluded that the brigade, or a detachment from it, would be hastened on to Chehaw to annoy them in their retreat. Landing, therefore, on the north bank of the river, and pushing into the road that communicates with the Point, a British officer, with a detachment of 140 men, lay in ambuscade in a place covered with fennel and high grass, and were undiscovered until they rose to fire on the unsuspecting Laurens.

At three o'clock in the morning Laurens had commenced

his march, and altogether unsuspecting of danger, he was on horseback with his advanced guard when the enemy was discovered. His decision was promptly taken not to retreat or surrender; the only alternative the case admitted of was a daring charge. Laurens dashed forward, calling on his men to follow. But he fell at the first fire, as did also Captain Smith of the artillery, and the men were thrown into confusion.

The howitzer fell into the enemy's hands, and the infantry had retreated in confusion a quarter of a mile when they were met by General Gist. The enemy soon discontinued the pursuit, and drew up under cover of a wood near the border of the river. An attempt was made to dislodge them from this after the infantry came up, but it failed and was attended with some loss. The British force was covered by logs and brush, so as to be inaccessible to cavalry, and their force in infantry was much beyond that of Gist's command. Nothing was recovered on their debarkation except the horses of the artillery.

The enemy sustained no loss on this occasion that was known. That of the Americans was, for their small force, very serious. Besides Colonel Laurens, a corporal of the Legion cavalry was killed, three commissioned officers, sixteen rank and file were wounded, and three missing, probably made prisoners.

It was with extreme affliction, says Johnson, whose account of this action has been followed, that General Greene heard of the fall of Colonel Laurens. He had been chagrined (and had expressed it) at his leaving a post and an employment so critically important, at this juncture, to the safety of the army; for it was when Marion had his hands full with Fraser and the enemy was threatening an attack on their weakened army; when intelligence from town was all important and honor

required that the personal security of his secret agents should not be confided to any other man than him whom they had trusted; and when the direct route to surprise Greene or to throw troops in the rear of Gist was by Wappoo — that Colonel Laurens had left his post, simply contenting himself with announcing “that he would return with all possible expedition.” But every other feeling with the general, it is said, was absorbed in profound grief for his loss, for it was not only a gallant soldier and a tried patriot that had fallen, but an amiable companion, a fast friend, and one of whose influence and popularity in the State his army had great need, had been cut off at a most critical period.¹

General Greene’s criticism upon Laurens’s conduct, which ended so tragically, unhappily was most just. Laurens’s ambition to be foremost in any fray had led him into a gross violation of soldierly duty, the abandonment of an important post which imperilled the safety and honor of others. But the world forgives much where personal bravery induces the fault and death follows its commission. In announcing his fall in general orders to the army, General Greene says: “His fall was glorious, but his fate is much to be lamented. The army has lost a brave officer and the public a worthy citizen.” In a private letter he justly said: “Poor Laurens has fallen in a paltry little skirmish. You knew his temper and I predicted his fate. The love of military glory made him seek it upon occasions unworthy of his rank. The State will feel his loss.” This rashness in the pursuit of military glory, it will be remembered, had three years before, during Prévoſt’s invasion, within but a few miles of the scene of this disastrous affair, led him to a similar violation of orders in crossing the Tullifiny and attacking the enemy, instead

¹ Johnson’s *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 339, 341.

merely of covering the retreat of the rear guard as directed by Moultrie. Then he had escaped with only a severe wound and the expression of Moultrie's displeasure. Now he falls, and his country forgets all but that he died bravely in her defence.¹

¹The two Laurenses, father and son, — Henry and John, — were the most conspicuous figures from South Carolina in and near the congressional government during the Revolution. They were the great national figures from South Carolina, as the term would now be applied. The old delegates who had taken so prominent a part in Congress prior to the Declaration of Independence were no longer present in its hall. Gadsden had been first detained at Charlestown in the military service, and then in exile and in prison. John Rutledge, as president and then governor of the State, had had his hands full at home. Henry Middleton, an old man, had retired, and his son Arthur was with Gadsden in exile. The two Lynches, father and son, were both dead. Edward Rutledge and Thomas Heyward, Jr., were also in exile. William Henry Drayton, with his great abilities and restless energies, had been transferred with Henry Laurens from the Council of Safety of the State to Congress, but he, too, had died, leaving Laurens the only one of the old Revolutionary set in its halls. There he had taken a high and leading position, becoming President of the Congress, as the position of what was then the presidency of the United States was styled. He was President during a most eventful period. It was during his presidency, 1777-1778, that the Articles of Confederation were adopted, that the offers of the British Peace Commission were received and rejected, that the treaty with France was made. Then he was appointed minister plenipotentiary from the United States to Holland, and on his voyage was captured by the British and thrown into the Tower of London, where he was held for the rest of the war as the most important State prisoner in the power of the Royal government, and ultimately exchanged for Lord Cornwallis, the most important British personage in the hands of the Americans. He repaired to Paris where, with Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay, he signed the preliminaries of peace, on the 30th of November, 1782, by which the independence of the United States was acknowledged. And so it happened that the name of Henry Laurens is found inscribed upon some of the most striking and important State papers in the history of the country, to wit: to the adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1778, to the treaty with France in the same year, and to the treaty with Great Britain in 1782, by which the independence of the United States was secured.

The career of his son, John Laurens, was scarcely less distinguished

It is remarkable that in all the fighting that had been done in South Carolina during the last three years, that

in the history of the country at large. Born in 1755 and educated in Europe—in Geneva and London—he was a student of law at the Temple when the Revolution began, when, making his way home with difficulty, in 1777, then but twenty-two years of age,—no doubt through the influence of his father, at the time President of the Congress,—he was at once taken into the military family of General Washington. His position near Washington was doubtless owing, as we say, to his father's influence, then so great; but John Laurens was not one to owe his retention in any position to the favor of another, though that other was his own father. He soon found opportunities of distinguishing himself in the battles of Germantown and Monmouth; then allowed to attach himself, in 1778, to the army in Rhode Island, where the most active service was expected in the final operations of the French under D'Estaing, and the Americans under Sullivan, he so distinguished himself in command of some light troops with which he was intrusted that, as we have had occasion to state in a preceding volume, he was by resolution of Congress given the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Continental line at the early age of twenty-three years. Hastening to his native State when the tide of war turned upon her, we have seen his conspicuous conduct in resisting the invasion of the British under Prévost, have seen him the first to mount the British redoubt at Savannah, and taking part in defence of Charlestown in 1780. Taken a prisoner upon the capitulation of the city, he was soon released, his exchange having been expedited by Congress for the ulterior purpose of sending him as a special minister to Paris, "that he might urge the necessity of a more vigorous coöperation on the part of France." This, it will be recollected, was the crucial period when the French fleet and army, previously sent under de Ternay and Rochambeau, lay cooped up at Newport by the ascendancy of the British in American waters, and the only obstacle to the prosecution and perhaps fulfilment of the British ministerial plan of carrying the war "from the South to the North," lay in the uprising of the people of the Carolinas and Georgia, and the splendid service of the partisan bands. We have seen John Laurens, in 1778, refusing the promotion tendered him by Congress, lest it might give rise to jealousies in others, and thus disturb the harmony of officers of the line and his colleagues in the family of the commander-in-chief. So now, again, acting from the same generous and noble purpose, he recommended and urged that Alexander Hamilton should be sent in preference to himself. Congress, however, adhered to their first choice, and John Laurens was, on the 23d of December, 1780, commissioned special

Colonel Laurens was but the second Continental officer of as high a rank as that of lieutenant-colonel who had fallen,

minister at the court of Versailles, and sailed for France. Within six months from the day Colonel Laurens left America he returned, and brought with him the conceded plan of combined operations, which ended at Yorktown. Garden tells the following anecdote, upon the authority of William Jackson, the secretary of the legation, of Laurens's conduct in this mission, which, however apocryphal, illustrates, at least, the energy with which Laurens acted, if at the expense of his real diplomatic skill, to which his success was more probably really owing:—

“When sent by Congress to negotiate a loan from the French government (for that was a part of his mission), although his reception was favorable and encouragement given that his request would be granted, yet the delays perpetually contrived by the minister, the Count de Vergennes, afforded little prospect of immediate success. Convinced that procrastination would be a death-blow to Independence, he resolved, in defiance of all the etiquette of the court, to make a personal appeal to the King. Dr. Franklin, our minister at Versailles, vehemently opposed his intention, and, finding Laurens firm in his purpose, he said, ‘I most cordially wish you success, but anticipate so different a result, that I warn you — I wash my hands of the consequences.’ Accordingly, at the first levee, Colonel Laurens, walking directly up to the King, delivered a memorial to which he solicited his most serious attention, and said, ‘Should the favor asked be denied, or even delayed, there is cause to fear that the sword which I wear may no longer be drawn in the defence of the liberties of my country, but be wielded as a British subject against the Monarchy of France.’ His decision met with the reward it merited. Apologies were made for delays. The minister gave his serious attention to the subject, and the negotiations were crowned with success.”

And so it was that while Sumter and Marion and their volunteer-partisan followers in South Carolina were desperately throwing themselves across the path of the invader who was hurrying on in his triumphal march to reach the Chesapeake before the further assistance could be obtained from France, another son of the State in Paris, disregarding form and ceremony, was demanding and extorting from the king of France, the promised but long-delayed assistance. Sumter and Marion in the hills and swamps of South Carolina, and John Laurens in Paris, were all unconsciously, yet in support of each other, simultaneously playing great parts in the same great drama in which the future of the whole United States of America was at stake.

Upon his return from Paris, immediately joining the army and resuming his place as one of the aides of General Washington, Colonel Laurens

the first having been Colonel Owen Roberts of the artillery, who fell at Stono.

From the Combahee the enemy passed into Broad River, in what is now Beaufort County, and successively ascended the smaller streams communicating with it, carrying off with them all the provisions and live-stock they could collect. From thence they put into Beaufort harbor and laid the islands of Beaufort and St. Helena under contribution.

In the meantime, however, a party of infantry posted at Wadboo attracted the attention of the enemy. Marion was supposed to be in Georgetown with the cavalry. The rapidity of his movements had prevented the knowledge of his return, and the party there was supposed to be only that under Ashby. Early on the morning of the 29th of August Marion received intelligence of the advance of Major Fraser with about a hundred dragoons, with the intent, as it was reported, to surprise his pickets, above him at Biggin bridge and below him at Strawberry Ferry. It happened unfortunately that his cavalry were at the time absent patrolling down the river; but messengers were

took part in the siege of Yorktown, which he had done so much to render possible by hastening, if not procuring, the coming of the second French fleet under De Grasse; and in the final struggle of the siege, with Colonel Hamilton, he led the storming parties of the American forces, and he at the head of eighty men, turned the redoubt, taking the garrison in reverse, and intercepting their retreat. Then with the Viscount de Noailles, representing the French, he, representing the Americans, had negotiated the terms of Cornwallis's surrender. Hence, probably, the inspiration of their requiring of his lordship the same terms as had been required of Lincoln at his surrender of Charlestown. So John Laurens negotiated the terms of Cornwallis's surrender, which released his father, Henry Laurens, from the Tower in exchange, and enabled his father to take part in negotiating the treaty with Great Britain acknowledging the independence of the Thirteen States.

Then hurrying back to his own State where the war still lingered, John Laurens again took the field to perish in an insignificant affair with which he had no call or duty to take part.

immediately despatched to call in both the cavalry and the pickets, and some of the latter had joined him before the enemy appeared. It was not without some uneasiness that Marion prepared to receive the enemy, for the greatest part of his force consisted of what was then called *new-made Whigs*. These were the men who had left the enemy in consequence of Governor Rutledge's proclamation offering pardon to all, with certain exceptions, who would leave the enemy within a specified time, and join the American forces. But perhaps, as it has been observed, he could not have had a set of men to command more deeply interested in securing themselves by victory against the British vengeance. It is not probable that any one, if taken and recognized by the enemy, would have escaped military execution.

The enemy, having taken some of Marion's outposts, and approached by an unfrequented route, advanced upon him in full confidence of all the advantages of a surprise; but they found him ready, drawn up to meet them, his main body in an avenue of trees before the house of Dr. Fayssoux, and his left, by which the enemy must approach, advanced a few paces under cover of some small buildings. The latter were ordered to reserve their fire until the enemy approached within thirty yards, and the main body to reserve theirs until further orders.

The enemy came on at a full charge, but Marion's troops behaved with coolness; and when the left delivered their fire as ordered, the enemy recoiled in confusion, leaving a captain and several men and horses dead upon the field. They soon rallied, and attempted to turn his right and then his left flank; but by changing his front, and availing himself of the cover of the buildings and fences, he rendered it too hazardous for the enemy to attempt a second charge, and they retired on the route that leads by Quinby to Daniel's Island.

A single fire terminated this action, but it had seldom happened that a single fire had done equal execution on the same number of men. One officer and eight men were killed, three officers and eight men were wounded. Five horses fell dead on the field, a few were taken, and many wounded. The Americans sustained no loss in men, but a very severe loss of another kind. The driver of their ammunition wagon took fright, and made off with his charge in a direction which enabled the enemy to capture it. Marion soon discovered his loss, but was without cavalry to retrieve it. A party of five men on captured horses attempted it, but failed. Soon after the enemy moved off Major Conyers arrived with his cavalry; but before he could overtake them, Major Fraser had formed a junction with a detachment of infantry that had advanced up the Wando to support him, and Marion's loss of ammunition obliged him to retreat once more towards Santee. Here ended Marion's warfare.¹ During the remainder of the summer he frequently changed his encampments from place to place between the Cooper and the Santee rivers, with three objects in view, — to cut off supplies from the enemy, to prevent all surprises from their sudden irruptions, and to provide for his own men. His scouting parties still penetrated into St. Thomas's Parish as far as Daniel's Island and Clement's Ferry on the Cooper. At the head of one of these, Captain G. S. Capers performed a gallant action. Having the command of only twelve men, he encountered a party of twenty-six British black dragoons, and cut them to pieces. They had at the time two or three of his neighbors in handcuffs as prisoners.²

General Gist, though reënforced by a six-pounder with

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 336-338; James's *Life of Marion*, 168, 169.

² James's *Life of Marion*, 169.

some matrosses and infantry, did not venture to cross the Combahee until, by the enemy's landing troops on Beaufort and St. Helena islands, he was satisfied it was not a feint to draw him off from covering the provisions on the north of the Combahee. On the 2d of September he crossed the river and pressed down to Port Royal Ferry. There he found the *Balfour* and another galley lying, and having gained an advantageous position for his field-piece, Lieutenant Bocker, who commanded it, soon made the galleys slip their cables and attempt to escape. In this the *Balfour* galley ran aground and was abandoned by the crew. The crew did not leave without scuttling the vessel and spiking her guns, but this was done so hastily that she was easily repaired and secured under the guns of the brigade.

The enemy was recalled on the 6th by the arrival of a fleet to convoy the army, which it had now been officially announced would soon evacuate the city. As soon as the enemy passed the bar of Beaufort, General Gist hastened back to reënforce the main army, and nothing more occurred during the war in which this brigade was engaged. But this expedition in the rice fields in the months of August and September had nearly invalidated the whole of these troops. The general himself did not escape, and the number on the sick list was greatly increased on their return to camp.

When General Leslie's foraging expeditions set out, the one to Wadboo, and the other to Combahee, in the hope of recalling them, General Greene put his whole army in motion down the Ashley road, feigning a design on James Island, while Pickens, at the head of the militia, was ordered down between the Ashley and the Cooper to draw the attention of the enemy to his post at the Quarter House. The feint did not succeed in its principal object,

but their posts at the Quarter House and on the islands were abandoned, and the troops drawn in under the protection of their redoubts. General Pickens continued in command of his own brigade and General Henderson's until September, when he organized and conducted a last expedition against the Indians on the frontier, who had again become troublesome.¹

When the British general, Clarke, in Savannah, found his bounds contracted by General Wayne's movements, he sent expresses to the Creek and Cherokee nations requesting assistance of the Indian allies. This assistance was provided by some of the leading warriors of both nations, but Pickens's expedition in April had disconcerted the movement. Though the grand council did not sanction a continuance of the war in alliance with the British, whose power they saw was rapidly passing away, a few warriors determined to comply with the promises made, and three hundred Creeks, headed by Guvistersigo, who stood high in the opinion of his countrymen for bravery and military skill, set out from the nations for Savannah early in the month of June. So stealthily did these warriors approach, that but for an accidental change of his camp, General Wayne would have been captured by them. A smart action took place on the 23d of June in which Guvistersigo with seventeen of his warriors and white guides were left dead on the field, and twelve taken prisoners, who were shot a few hours after by order of General Wayne. The American loss was only four killed and eight wounded.

As the limits of the British lines became more and more contracted, a number of those who adhered to the Royal cause were unwilling to be confined within their narrowing circle, and General Clarke conceived that they could

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 346.

render him an essential service by retiring to the Cherokee Nation. At the head of these was one Colonel Thomas Waters, who had formed a settlement on Hightown River at the mouth of Longswamp Creek, in what is now Wilkes County, Georgia, where they had collected a number of negroes, horses, cattle, and other property, which they had plundered from the frontiers of Georgia and Carolina.

To break up this banditti, General Pickens now applied to Governor Mathews to be allowed to carry another expedition into the Cherokee Nation. His scheme was approved, and an express sent to Colonel Elijah Clarke of Georgia, on the 5th of September, requesting the aid of a part of his regiment, and fixed on the 16th at Long Creek, as the time and place of rendezvous with 30 days' provision. This was agreed to, and General Pickens, with 316 men, joined Colonel Clarke accordingly, who had 98, including 10 volunteers from Richmond County, making in the whole 414, including officers.

The general marched on the morning of the 19th in a westerly direction for the Chattahoochie River, which he reached and crossed on the 24th at Beaver Shoal. Pursuing their course on a small Indian trail, they met two Indians who were taken prisoners. From these they learned that there were several Indian towns within the distance of ten or twelve miles, and from thence Colonel Waters's party was about twenty miles. The general thereupon detached Colonel Robert Anderson with one hundred men, guided by one of the Indian prisoners, to destroy the villages and towns upon the river. Colonel White was ordered down the river with a detachment for a similar purpose, while General Pickens with Colonel Clarke took a more direct course for Colonel Waters's position, the destruction of which was the principal object of the expedition; but Waters had received information of Pickens's approach just in time

to escape with his party. A few Indians were killed and a number of women and children were taken prisoners. Anderson and White joined the main body in the afternoon, having killed eight Indians and destroyed a number of towns.

General Pickens sent out some of his prisoners in search of the chiefs, offering terms with assurances that no more towns would be destroyed if they would surrender the white people among them, and enter into a treaty of peace. In the meantime he marched from one town to another, procuring supplies of provisions and forage for his men. Several of the chiefs met in the mountains and sent one of their head men, called the Terrapin, with a party of warriors and six of Waters's men prisoners, promising that every exertion should be made to bring in the others. On the 8th of October Colonel Clarke marched from Selacoa with one hundred men in pursuit of Waters who had halted on the Estanala River about sixty miles west of Long Swamp; but Waters, hearing of his advance, retreated through the Creek Nation and made his way to St. Augustine. On the same day Captain Maxwell's company marched to Estanala town where he took twenty-four negroes, the principal part of whom had been plundered by Waters's party from the inhabitants of Georgia and Carolina, a number of horses, and a quantity of pelfry with which he returned on the seventh day.

Finally a number of chiefs came in and proposed to General Pickens while he was at Selacoa to hold a treaty at Long Swamp on the 17th, to which he agreed. On the day appointed twelve chiefs and two hundred warriors appeared and entered into temporary articles of treaty, which were afterwards to be confirmed by the whole nation at such time and place as the governor of Georgia should appoint.

By this treaty all the lands claimed by the Cherokees south of Savannah River and east of the Chattahoochee were to be surrendered to the State of Georgia as the price of peace. The Indian trade was opened upon terms not less advantageous to the Indians than that which had previously been carried on between them and the British government. The articles being signed by the parties, General Pickens returned to his former position of Long Creek, where the troops were discharged on the 22d of October, and returned to their homes without the loss of one man.

General Pickens carried with his command not a tent or any other description of camp equipage. After the small portion of bread which they could carry in their saddlebags was exhausted, his men lived upon parched corn, potatoes, peas, and beef, which they collected in the Indian towns; salt they had none.

Early in the succeeding year the governor of Georgia invited the Cherokee chiefs to Augusta, and finally concluded the articles of treaty which had been temporarily entered into by General Pickens.¹

All the blood to be lost in South Carolina in the struggle for American independence was not yet shed, but these were the last military operations of any consequence in the war.

¹ McCall's *Hist. of Ga.*, vol. II, 408-414.

CHAPTER XXIX

1782

THE British administration having resolved upon abandoning offensive operations in America, the scheme of evacuating the weaker posts in the United States was adopted. Savannah, which had been the first Southern post to fall, was the first to be relieved. It was evacuated on the 11th of July.¹ A heavy firing off the bar on the morning of the 6th of September announced the arrival of Sir Samuel Hood with a fleet to convoy and cover the evacuation of Charlestown. It was the arrival of this fleet which recalled Leslie's foraging expeditions from Wadboo and Beaufort. It was three months, however, before the evacuation did actually take place.

During the possession of the city by the British, a number of merchants had come from England and established themselves in business. These were now in a most unfortunate position. They had entered into extensive commercial engagements. Those of their debtors who were without the lines were not subject to British jurisdiction; those who were within were unable to pay. Surrounded with difficulties, and threatened with bankruptcy should they leave the State with the British troops, they applied to General Leslie and obtained leave to negotiate for themselves. A deputation of the body waited on Governor Mathews and obtained from him permission to reside in

¹ Gordon's *Am. War*, vol. IV, 300-301; Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 369.

South Carolina for eighteen months after the evacuation, with the right to dispose of their stock of goods on hand, and to collect the debts already due them,—an indulgence which was extended to a longer term by the legislature at their next meeting, before information was received that the preliminary articles of peace had been signed.¹

When the long-expected evacuation drew near, the citizens of the State were apprehensive that the British army, on its departure, would carry off with them the thousands of negroes who were within their lines. To prevent this Governor Mathews wrote to General Leslie, on the 17th of August, warning him “that if the property of the citizens of South Carolina was carried off by the British army, he should seize on the debts due to the British merchants and to the confiscated estates, and the claims on those estates by marriage settlements, which three articles were not included in the Confiscation Act.” This announcement operated to some extent as a check on this plunder, and induced General Leslie to propose a negotiation for securing the property of both parties. This was agreed to, and Benjamin Guerard and Edward Rutledge were appointed commissioners in behalf of the State, and Alexander Wright and James Johnson in behalf of the Royalists. On the 10th of October these commissioners agreed to the following articles:²—

“First, that all the slaves of the citizens of South Carolina, now in the power of the honourable Lieutenant General Leslie, shall be restored to their former owners, as far as is practicable, except such slaves as may have rendered themselves particularly obnoxious on account of their attachment and services to the British troops, and such as had specific promises of freedom.

¹ Gordon's *Am. War*, vol. IV, 301 ; Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 371-372.

² Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 376-378.

“That the faith of the State is hereby solemnly pledged, that none of the debts due to British merchants, or to persons who have been banished, or whose estates have been confiscated, or property secured by family settlements fairly made on contracts relative thereto, shall now, or at any time hereafter, be arrested or withheld by the executive authority of the State — that no act of the Legislature shall hereafter pass for confiscating or seizing the same in any manner whatever, if it is in the power of the executive to prevent it — and that its whole power and influence, both in its public and in private capacity, shall at all times be exerted for that purpose.

“That the same power shall be allowed for the recovery of the debts and property, hereby protected and secured by the parties or their representatives, in the courts of justice, or otherwise, as citizens of the State may at any time be entitled unto, notwithstanding any act of confiscation or banishment, or any other disability whatever, and that this same may be remitted to whatever part of the world they may think proper, under the same, and no other, regulations than the citizens of the State may be subject to.

“That no slaves restored to their former owners, by virtue of this agreement, shall be punished by authority of the State for having left their masters, and attached themselves to the British troops; and it will be particularly recommended to their respective owners to forgive them for the same.

“That no violence or insult shall be offered to the persons or houses of the families of such persons as are obliged to leave the State for their adherence to the British government, when the American army shall take possession of the town, or at any time afterwards, as far as it is in the power of those in authority to prevent it.

“That Edward Blake and Roger Parker Saunders, Esquires, be permitted to reside in Charleston, on their parole of honor to assist in the execution of the first article of this compact.”

In consequence of this agreement Governor Mathews commissioned Thomas Ferguson and Thomas Waring to reside at Accabee near the British lines to receive and forward the negroes which should be recovered by Messrs. Blake and Sanders in the city. The owners of the negroes were to attend at Accabee to receive them, and Governor Mathews earnestly entreated that the negroes so

restored should be forgiven for having deserted their masters and joined the British. Great were the expectations of the citizens that under this arrangement they would soon obtain possession of their property. But in their hopes they were disappointed.

Messrs. Blake and Sanders, having waited on General Leslie, were permitted to examine the fleet bound to St. Augustine, but were not suffered to examine any vessel that wore the king's pennant. Instead of an examination, the word of the commanding officer to restore all the slaves that were on board in violation of the compact was offered as an equivalent. In their search of the fleet bound to St. Augustine, they found and claimed 136 negroes; but when they attended to receive them no more than 73 were landed for delivery. Upon their demand for the remainder, they were informed by General Leslie that no negroes would be delivered till three soldiers that had been taken by a party of General Greene's army were restored.

General Leslie's adjutant general, on the 18th of October, addressed a communication to Messrs. Blake and Sanders, complaining that a large patrol from General Greene's army, two days before, had come down so near his advanced post on Charlestown Neck as to carry off three soldiers who were a little way in the front, while Mr. Ferguson and another person were at Accabee to receive the negroes, without any other sanction but that of the agreement; and declaring that, if a line of conduct so different from theirs was adopted, it must put an end to the pacific intention of General Leslie in regard to the Province during the short time he was to remain in it. He demanded the return of the soldiers, and announced that until this was done he was under the necessity of putting a stop to the further completion of the agreement.

This letter was forwarded to Governor Mathews, who replied the next day to General Leslie, in person, that he had not been without apprehensions of an intended evasion of the compact, but on receipt of this letter no room was left for doubt, which obliged him, without giving further trouble to those engaged in the business and introducing further altercation, to declare that he looked on the agreement as dissolved and had accordingly ordered his commissioners to quit the British lines.¹

The distinguishing fault of Governor Mathews, it was said, was a hasty temper, and it was thought that a little more temporizing in managing this affair would either have secured a number of slaves or put the enemy so much in fault as to furnish strong ground for demanding an indemnity of their government after peace. The saving clause, "*except such as had rendered themselves obnoxious by services rendered the enemy, and such as had been expressly promised their freedom,*" would itself, however, have furnished abundant ground for carrying off a large number. Scarcely an officer or his wife or mistress was without one or more of the planters' slaves, to whom no doubt they would all have promised freedom; and there were many who, if they had not been actually in arms, had been employed in various services that relieved the British soldiers. Thus five hundred were shipped to New York to be used as pioneers, and Colonel Moncrief is said to have had eight hundred employed in all the numerous duties of the engineer and ordinance departments, and to have taken them all off with him when he sailed. It is also confidently asserted of this officer that, after shipping them as king's men, he sold them in the West Indies as his own property. It is highly probable, as it has been observed, that after entering into this treaty General Leslie found it exceed-

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 379-380.

ingly difficult to carry it into execution. Opposition must have met him in every quarter, not only from avarice and party interest, but from the great number of amorous connections well known to have existed. And finally, there can be little doubt that multiplied evasions of his authority took place to effect the shipping of innumerable individuals. An instance is cited of the body of a suffocated slave, headed up in a rice barrel, drifting into the market dock the day that the fleet crossed the bar.¹

Upon Colonel Laurens's death the confidential services upon the lines were committed to Count Kosciuszko, who was scarcely less eager for enterprises than Laurens himself had been. The successful issue of one of these brought General Greene in conflict with the governor and council of the State.

After the enemy had retired under the guns of their redoubts, they were obliged daily to drive their cattle to pasture on Charlestown Neck under a strong guard. A number of their cavalry horses also, particularly those of the Loyalists, were placed on James Island, where they were secured at night near the fort and by day driven out to pasture. Kosciuszko attempted to seize and secure both of these, and though he found the cattle too well guarded for his small force, succeeded in bringing off a number of very fine horses. These horses were committed to the quartermaster-general to be sold, and after making a compensation to the soldiers, the balance of the proceeds was directed to be placed in the public coffers. But it happened that among the captured horses were a number that were claimed by citizens as horses that had been plundered from them by the enemy. The governor was instructed by the council to demand that these horses

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 384; Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 351; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 369.

should be restored to the owners on a salvage of one fourth, the rate, it will be recollected, established by General Sumter when endeavoring to reorganize the military force of the State while it was without a government. This General Greene refused to do, claiming the horses for Congress. A very warm and, it is said, learned discussion followed, turning upon the doctrine of the right of *postliminium* in which it was claimed that General Greene displayed a perfect acquaintance with the best civilians.¹ If so well acquainted with the civil law upon the subject, it is a pity that, in a matter of so much delicacy, for the sake of a few dollars, he should have insisted upon the strict letter of a technical rule, against the spirit and reason of the rule itself, and against the opinion of so eminent a lawyer and statesman as Colonel Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.

The right of *postliminium* is defined by Vattel to be that in virtue of which persons and things taken by an enemy are restored to their former state on coming again into the power of the nation to which they belonged.² It is a right recognized by the laws of nations, and contributes essentially to mitigate the calamities of war. When, therefore, property taken by the enemy is either recaptured or rescued from him by the fellow-subjects or allies of the original owner, it does not become the property of the recaptor or rescuer, as if it had been a new prize, but it is restored to the original owner by right of *postliminium* upon certain terms.³ Naturally, says Vattel, every kind of property might be recovered by the right of *postliminium*, and there is no intrinsic reason why movables should be excepted in this case, provided they

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 344.

² Vattel, B. III, ch. XIV, § 204.

³ Kent's *Commentaries*, vol. I (12th ed.), 109.

can be certainly recognized and identified. Accordingly the ancients, on recovering such things, frequently restored them to their former owners. But the difficulty of recognizing things of this nature, and the endless disputes which would arise from the prosecution of the owners' claims to them, have been deemed motives of sufficient weight for the general establishment of a contrary practice. Movables, therefore, says Chancellor Kent, are not entitled by the strict rules of the laws of nations to the full benefit of the *postliminy*, unless retaken from the enemy promptly after capture; the original owner then neither finds a difficulty in recognizing his property nor is presumed to have relinquished it.

It was upon this technical exception to a general rule, the reason of which did not apply in this case, that General Greene chose to stand, and to withhold the return of property the ownership of which was admitted. It was peculiarly unfortunate, too, that the dispute should have arisen about this particular class of property. As has appeared in the course of this history, the people of South Carolina, like those in Virginia, were devoted to their horses, and prided themselves upon their racers and riding animals. Wills are still on record in Charlestown whereby slaves were given their freedom for having saved their masters' horses from capture by the enemy.¹ And unfortunately, it had happened that several collisions had already occurred in regard to the taking of horses in each of these States. The impressment of blooded stock in Virginia for the purpose ostensibly of public use, but, as was charged, for the gratification of officers, had led to serious difficulties in that State.² Colonel Lee's desire to appropriate the best of the horses taken by Marion had led to

¹ *Hist. of So. Ca. under the Roy. Gov.* (McCrary), 524, 525.

² *Johnson's Life of Greene*, vol. II, p. 41.

the tender of the latter's resignation; and one of the reasons for which Sumter had tendered his was because, by the terms of Maxwell's surrender of Fort Granby, Lee had allowed that officer to march out with his men mounted on horses stolen from Sumter's people. The corrupt practice by which the officers of the Continental cavalry had appropriated the best horses, and were in the habit of trading in them, had recently come out in the case of Captain Gunn, in which Colonel White of the Third Regiment, justifying himself for having in some measure sanctioned the practice by exchanging one of his own for a public horse ridden by a cavalry officer, had declared in a letter, "I believe I am the only officer in the cavalry, from Colonel Moylan to the youngest cornet, that does not possess at this time from one to three public horses."¹ The taking of the horses and forcing their sale under such circumstances was regarded by the citizens with great resentment.

It was a serious question, it was claimed, how far the army of the United States, under the confederation, when operating within a State, was bound by the State laws as to the loss or acquirement of property in war. "It was," says Johnson, "obviously a struggle between State and United States powers; and probably the first party question smacking of federalism and republicanism ever agitated in South Carolina; but fortunately no collision had yet occurred on the subject of impressment. General Greene convened a numerous council of war to whom he referred the subject; and it stands recorded that an eminent character of the State, then a colonel,² and then and now not less esteemed for profound law knowledge than for every quality that can render man amiable and estimable, stood

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 326.

² Colonel C. C. Pinckney.

alone in support of State rights—no small ground of claim (we respectfully suggest) to be the acknowledged protosire of South Carolina republicanism. Habitual deference¹ would incline us to side with the minority; but we cannot help thinking that the only difficulty lay in the ill-defined tenor of most of the grants of power under the old confederation. The general power of conducting war would seem to have vested in Congress the right to legislate on captures; whether they had legislated with a view to *postliminy* cases," says Johnson, "is what we are not able to decide. It is probable they had not."² They certainly had not. General Greene made no claim to the protection of any such legislation, but rested on the civil—the international—law in which he was so well read—as we are told.

The governor's council on this occasion appear to have "assumed a very positive tone, but the representative and delegate of congressional power would make but one concession; he permitted those who claimed their horses to receive them on stipulation according to the practice of prize courts, and referred the subject to Congress."³

It is not amiss to observe that, as there were no South Carolina Continental troops in the service under Greene, except those recently raised, as we have seen, General Pinckney, the only member of this council of war to whom the commander referred this delicate question, was probably the only Carolinian, and the only lawyer, upon the board. Certain it is, that, if not the only lawyer, he was the only lawyer of reputation upon it. This was doubtless one of the occasions of the bitter feeling which already had begun to be entertained in the State,

¹ Judge Johnson, the author, who thus writes, studied law under General Pinckney.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 345.

³ *Ibid.*

not only against its commander, but against the whole Continental army within its borders.

Another enterprise of Kosciuszko's, of the same kind, was to occasion the last bloodshed of the Revolution. Just a month before the evacuation, Kosciuszko suggested to Captain Wilmot and Lieutenant Moore of the Maryland line to surprise a party of woodcutters from Fort Johnson, on James Island. So much was the accuracy of the information doubted, that many believed that the negro who gave it had been sent expressly to decoy the Americans. Certain it is the party found the enemy prepared, and received so deadly a fire that Wilmot and several others fell lifeless, while Moore with others remained on the field, covered with wounds. Kosciuszko, although his weapon was shattered in his hand and his coat pierced by four balls, escaped unhurt. A British dragoon was killed by Mr. William Fuller, a very young and gallant volunteer who had joined the expedition, while in the act of cutting Kosciuszko down. The British buried Wilmot with the honors of war, and showed the greatest attention to Moore, who was removed to Charlestown to receive the best surgical attention. He died under his wounds a few days after the evacuation.¹

It is related of Marion that about this time Kosciuszko wrote to him, calling his attention to a watering party at Lemprière's Point, so situated as to afford him an opportunity of attacking it with success. To which Marion replied that he had not overlooked the situation of the British at that spot, but he viewed the war in Carolina as over, and as the enemy were preparing to go away he had sent a party to protect them from being annoyed by his own men; that his fellow-citizens had already shed blood

¹ Ramsay's *Revolution in So. Ca.*, vol. II, 375; Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 345; Garden's *Anecdotes*, 91.

enough in the cause of freedom, and that he would not spill another drop of it now that it was unnecessary, — no, not for the highest honors that could be conferred upon him.¹

Such was the difference between the patriot and the soldier of fortune.

General Moultrie, who had been a prisoner of war since the fall of Charlestown, was, on the 19th of February, 1782, exchanged for General Burgoyne, and had arrived at Waccamaw in June, where he learned that Greene's army lay inactive at Ashley Ferry. He remained at Winyaw till late in September, when he paid a visit to General Greene. He thus describes his journey : —

“ It was the most dull, melancholy, dreary ride that any one could possibly take, of about one hundred miles through the woods of that country, which I had been accustomed to see abound with live-stock and wild fowl of every kind, was now destitute of all. It had been so completely chequered by the different parties that no one part of it had been left unexplored ; consequently, not the vestiges of horses, cattle, hogs, or deer, etc., were to be found. The squirrels and birds of every kind were totally destroyed. The dragoons told me that on their scouts no living creature was to be seen except now and then a few camp scavengers,² picking the bones of some unfortunate fellows who had been shot or cut down and left in the woods above ground. In my visit to General Greene's camp, as there was some danger from the enemy, I made a circuitous route to General Marion's camp, then on Santee River, to get an escort, which he gave me, of twenty infantry and twenty cavalry ; these, with the volunteers that attended me, made us pretty strong. On my way from General Marion's to General Greene's camp my plantation was in the direct road, where I called, and stayed all night. On my entering the place, as soon as the negroes discovered that I was of the party, there was immediately a general alarm and an outcry through the plantation that, ‘ Massa was come ! Massa was come ! ’ and they were running from every part with great joy to see me. I stood in the piazza to receive them. They

¹ James's *Life of Marion*, Appendix, 8.

² Turkey buzzards.

gazed at me with astonishment, and every one came and took me by the hand, saying, 'God bless you, Massa! I'm glad to see you, Massa!' and every now and then some one or other would come out with a 'Ky!' and the old Africans joined in a war-song in their own language of 'Welcome the war home.' It was an affecting meeting between the slaves and the master. The tears stole from my eyes and ran down my cheeks. A number of gentlemen that were with me could not help being affected at the scene. Many are still alive, and remember the circumstances. I then possessed about two hundred slaves, and not one of them left me during the war, although they had had great offers; nay, some were carried down to work on the British lines, yet they always contrived to make their escape and return home. My plantation I found to be a desolate place, — stock of every kind taken off, the furniture carried away, and my estate had been under sequestration. The next day we arrived at General Greene's camp. On our near approach, the air was so affected with the stench of the camp that we could scarcely bear the smell; which shows the necessity of moving camp often in summer in these hot climates. General Greene's expecting the evacuation to take place every week from the month of August was the reason he remained so long on the same ground."¹

The army had moved in July from the neighborhood of Bacon's bridge, down the Ashley River, to Ashley Hall, about twelve miles from Charlestown. The position afforded good spring water, and a high and dry situation, and was a comparatively healthy one, that and the adjoining plantation of Middleton Place being inhabited by the families of the wealthy owners during the whole year. Great pains were taken to preserve the health of the troops, and it was obviously better at this place than the former. But even here great care was required to preserve health during the fall, and it was impossible to enforce the precautions necessary in a discontented and inactive army. General Greene deemed it necessary, however, to remain in this position during the autumn months, and even he did not escape an attack of fever. Many of the officers

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 354, 357.

suffered in the same way. To the honor of General Leslie it is to be stated that, as the war was now practically over, as far as in his power, he relieved the unhappy situation of his opponents. Many of the American officers were permitted to retire, under safe conducts, for their health, to the salubrious ocean air, a courteous indulgence which was granted to the wife of General Greene, who had joined him upon the first appearance of approaching peace.

But the condition of the army at this time was truly deplorable, half naked, badly fed, never supplied with salt food, but uniformly only with rice, to which they were unaccustomed, and fresh beef, the latter of an inferior quality, with a very moderate quantity of salt. Other diseases attacked them than those incidental to the climate. To add to their discomforts, dysentery began to make dreadful havoc among them. To this disease many fell victims, and to the real suffering and loss which it occasioned was added that depression of spirits which generally affects an army attacked by it, an effect not a little aggravated by the state of listless inactivity to which the main army was subjected. The deaths became alarmingly frequent. Scarcely an officer, it is believed, was entirely free from sickness, and the report of the inspector, when he mustered the men a short time afterwards, presented a dreadful return of the mortality that had prevailed.¹

General Leslie had pressed his preparations for evacuating the town with energy and despatch, but so much was to be done that, although the evacuation was officially commenced on the 7th of August as a measure soon to be adopted, and the fleet to carry his army had arrived on the 6th of September, it was not until the 14th of December that it actually took place. In the meanwhile the dis-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 348, 354.

tresses resulting from his confined situation had been greatly relieved by his wise measures. By giving permission to the Loyalists to return and make their peace with their countrymen, General Leslie had relieved himself of great numbers; even General Cuninghame had availed himself of this license. Some, who carried with them a great number of plundered slaves, had been furnished with transports to take them to St. Augustine; and finally, after he had advanced far in levelling the recently reërected works of the town and Fort Johnson, he ordered all who were well affected to the American cause to quit the town in twenty-four hours, under penalty of being considered spies. This measure, whilst it disembarrassed him of a number of useless mouths and suspected friends, was ingeniously calculated to give pretexts to many for casting themselves upon the mercy of their country, who had not availed themselves of the governor's proclamation or had been excepted from its benefits.

Having nearly completed his preparations for sailing, General Leslie opened a communication with General Greene upon the subject of his peaceable departure. As there were many persons in his army whose hearts were swelling with revenge, and from whom he apprehended some attempts to fire the town, his conduct was not only prudent, but magnanimous; and as no possible advantage could be taken of him, but by an attack upon his rear guard, an injury that could be amply revenged on the town from his shipping, an agreement was entered into that the Americans should take possession as the enemy's rear guard retired, that no attempt should be made upon the latter, and no injury done the city either before or after their departure.¹

General Wayne was accordingly ordered, on the 13th of

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol II, 366.

December, to cross Ashley River at what is now known as Bee's Ferry, with a corps consisting of three hundred light infantry, under the command of Major Hamilton, eighty of Lee's cavalry, and twenty artillery, with two six-pounders, and to move down towards the British lines, which were near Colonel Shubrick's, the present Belvidere Farm,¹ north of Magnolia Cemetery, which consisted of three redoubts. There General Leslie sent him word that he would leave the advanced works at the firing of the morning gun the next day; at which time it was arranged that General Wayne should move on slowly and take possession; and from thence to follow the British into the town, keeping at a respectful distance, about two hundred yards. This plan of movement was carried out. At the appointed time the British abandoned the redoubts, and took up the line of march down what is now the King Street road, — then the only road into the city, — and after passing through the town gates filed off to Gadsden's wharf, at the foot of what is now Calhoun Street. The movements of the two armies were conducted with great order and regularity, but were necessarily very slow, as time had to be allowed for the British troops to embark as they reached the water; so that now and then the British called to General Wayne that he was too fast upon them, which occasioned him to halt. It thus occupied about four hours to make the march of three miles; and it was about eleven o'clock A.M. when the American troops, marching into the town, took post at the State-House at the corner of Meeting and Broad streets.

At three o'clock P.M. General Greene conducted Governor Mathews and the council, with some other citizens, into the town. They marched in the following order: an advance of an officer and thirty men of Lee's dragoons, then

¹ Now the property of the Country Club of Charleston.

followed the governor and General Greene, then Generals Moultrie and Gist, then the council, citizens, and officers in all about fifty, a body of about one hundred and fifty cavalry brought up the rear. The party halted in Broad Street, opposite where the Charleston Library now stands; there they alighted, and the cavalry were dismissed to their quarters.

It was, says Moultrie, whose account of the reëntry of the American troops we have followed, a grand and pleasing sight to see the enemy's fleet (upwards of three hundred sail) lying at anchor from Fort Johnson to Five-fathom Hole, in a curved line, and what made it more agreeable, they were ready to depart from the port. The great joy that was felt on this day by the citizens and soldiers was inexpressible. The widows and orphans, the aged men, and others who from their particular situations were obliged to remain in the town, many of them cooped up in one room of their own elegant houses for upwards of two years, whilst the other parts were occupied by British officers, not a few of whom were rude and uncivil, were now released from mortifying situations which must have been truly distressing. "I can never forget," writes the old hero of Fort Moultrie, "the happy day when we marched into Charlestown with the American troops; it was a proud day to me, and I felt myself much elated at seeing the balconies, the doors, and windows crowded with patriotic fair, the aged citizens, and others congratulating us on our return home, saying, 'God bless you, gentlemen! You are welcome home, gentlemen!'" Both citizens and soldiers shed mutual tears of joy. It was an ample reward for the triumphal soldier, after all the hazards and fatigues of war which he had gone through, to be the instrument of releasing his friends and fellow-citizens from captivity, and

restoring them to their liberties and possession of their city and country again.”¹

The embarkation, which was not only of the army but of many of the Loyalists and their slaves, had begun the day before. It was necessarily a slow and tedious business, for nine thousand civilians and slaves, besides the British soldiery, were crowded into the fleet. The following figures of the exodus are preserved among the manuscripts of the Massachusetts Historical Society:²—

TO WHAT PLACE	MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	BLACKS	TOTAL
Jamaica	600	300	378	2613	3891
East Florida . .	630	306	337	1653	2926
West Florida . .	166	57	119	558	900
England	137	74	63	56	330
Halifax	163	133	121	53	470
New York	100	40	50	50	240
St. Lucia	20	350	370
	1816	910	1068	5333	9127

To these are to be added the negro slaves which the British had attached to their army, eight hundred of whom were said to have been carried off by Colonel Moncrief,³

¹ Moultrie's *Memoirs*, vol. II, 358-361. "The British evacuated Charleston. The American regular army entered it in triumph; but our poor partisans were thought *too* irregular, too ragged of raiment to share this triumph! They were not too ragged to *fight*, only too ragged for *show*. It was a most ungenerous and ungrateful exclusion from the scene of the very men to whom the best part of the grand result was due! They were disbanded here and there in swamp and thicket, wherever the moment found them; disbanded without pay or praise, naked, starving, having the world before them, but losing from that moment all their customary guides but Providence!" — *Russell's Magazine*, vol. IV, 128.

² *Year Book*, City of Charleston, 1883 (Courtenay), 416.

³ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 369.

making a loss of population to the State by this exodus of probably ten thousand.

One of the most striking incidents of the evacuation was the astonishing number of deserters left behind. The author of the *Life of Greene* states that he had in his possession the names of 350 who reported themselves during the year 1782, but this was whilst it was necessary to surrender themselves to the army. After the evacuation, as such report was unnecessary, none was made. Hundreds made their appearance from cellars and chimneys as soon as it could be done with safety. Not a Hessian went back but under compulsion; and even of the other troops few appeared disposed to adhere to their colors but those who had previously deserted from the American standard or enlisted in the country.¹

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 367.

CHAPTER XXX

1782-83

THE British fleet had scarcely crossed the Charlestown Bar, and disappeared at sea, before the most serious controversies arose between General Greene, as commander of the Continental forces, and the State authorities.

Upon the evacuation of the city the greater part of the American army, now composed entirely of Continental troops, the most of whom had come only after all the fighting in South Carolina was over, and whose only achievement in the State had been a mutiny, were now marched down to James Island and stationed there for the winter. The Virginia cavalry, to the number of two hundred under Major Swan, were posted near Combahee, as well to be at hand for the protection of Georgia from the British force at St. Augustine as for the convenience of forage. The Legion was posted in the vicinity of Georgetown.

The army was now well clad; but the circumstances under which the clothing had been obtained, coming to light immediately after the evacuation, were such as to bring General Greene's conduct under suspicion of personal corruption. Unfortunately, too, it was in the full tide of the excitement caused by this affair that the general most unwisely, and, to say the least of it, indecorously undertook to address the governor and legislature of the State, not only as to their duty in supplying his troops, about

which he went so far as to threaten them with his army, but also in regard to another matter of the policy of the State, with which he had no concern.

While the Southern army was retreating from Ninety Six, Major Robert Forsyth, who, it will be recollected, General Greene, upon his coming to the South, had had appointed deputy commissary for the Southern Department, relieved Colonel Davie from the duties of commissary upon General Greene's immediate staff, duties which Davie, says Johnson, had performed with unusual applause,¹ but whose faithful service, it may here be observed, Greene's biographer is forced to admit, had not been able to shield that officer from his commander's expression of dissatisfaction.² It was through this Major Forsyth that General Greene was now involved in the unfortunate transaction with which his name must ever be associated.

Some few weeks before the evacuation of Charlestown, one John Banks, who had been in the business of contracting for the supplies of the army, happened to be in Georgetown, and hearing there of the action of the governor and council in granting leave to the British merchants to remain after the evacuation, and of the deplorable condition, not only of the army, but of the citizens, both for themselves and their negroes, for the want of clothing, saw at once the immense profit to be made if he could secure the purchase of the necessary materials in the hands of the British merchants before the evacuation, and thus monopolize, or, to use the language of the times, engross the articles of clothing of which there was such great need. In pursuance of his scheme, he obtained a flag from Colonel Lushington, who commanded the militia garrison at Georgetown, and under it proceeded to Charlestown. There he made his bargains with the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 361.

² *Ibid.*, 248.

merchants to the amount of £23,000 sterling, but to carry out such a large transaction he needed financial assistance. To obtain this he secured another flag, one from General Leslie to the American camp. Arriving there, he was introduced to General Greene through Major Forsyth, with whom he had had commercial transactions at Fredericksburg in the spring of the year, while pursuing his duties in Virginia as commissary of purchases, and who, with Major Burnet, another officer of General Greene's family, he interested in the transaction to the amount of one-fourth each.

Thus presented to General Greene, Banks represented himself as an agent from the merchants in Charlestown, and submitted to him an offer from them, to take his bills on Mr. Morris, the financial agent of the United States, at par for the value of the clothing, provided the sum of 1200 guineas could be obtained as a cash payment. General Greene accepted the offer. But how was the 1200 guineas to be raised?

It happened that Mr. George Abbott Hall was at the time in South Carolina as the receiver in behalf of the United States to receive from the State the quota of the \$8,000,000, the amount of the Continental estimate for the year 1782 apportioned to the State, to meet which the Jacksonborough General Assembly had passed the act for furnishing supplies to the amount of \$373,598; and also to receive the five per cent duty proposed to be levied on imported and prize goods. To Mr. Hall, General Greene applied for an advance of the 1200 guineas. Mr. Hall objected that the money had been confided to him by Mr. Morris to take up his notes and those of his bank. He admitted, however, "that he was authorized to let General Greene *have small sums upon the most pressing occasions.*" General Greene conceived that a pressing occa-

sion had arrived, and notwithstanding Mr. Hall declared that he should be bankrupted by the demand, insisted upon and obtained 1200 guineas, which he at once turned over to Banks, and gave him also bills to the amount of £8000 drawn on Mr. Morris. As soon as Banks received the bills, he forwarded them through the agency of Major Forsyth by the government express, to his partner, Hunter, in Fredericksburg, Virginia. It happened that Captain Shelton, of the wagon master's department, to whose care the package was committed, overlooked Major Forsyth while that officer was making up the package, and, having his suspicions aroused as to the transaction, communicated them to General Scott of Virginia, through whose hands it was to pass.¹ Upon this, General Scott broke open the package upon receiving it, and in it found a letter from Forsyth, dated the 7th of November, and another from Banks, giving a full account of the transaction and sending the bills as the first fruits of it. Major Burnet was mentioned as one of the copartners, with a particular request that his interest should be kept secret. The next day another communication to Hunter arrived by the line of expresses, the only mail conveyance then existing. This was also franked by Major Forsyth, who, as commissary of purchases, had the right to transmit despatches by this conveyance. General Scott opened this letter also. It proved to be from Banks, and from it it appeared that Banks, during his residence in Charlestown, had been dealing largely in the corrupt practices which a state of war never fails to introduce or develop in commercial communities. Unfortunately, there were

¹ General Charles Scott of Virginia, who, it may be recollected, was present at the siege of Charlestown in 1780, and was taken prisoner upon the fall of the town. *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 472, 509.

intimations in these letters, implicating not only Majors Forsyth and Burnet, but General Greene himself. General Scott, thinking that he had made an important discovery, immediately communicated the intercepted letters to Governor Harrison and the council in Virginia.¹

The purpose of the governor and council in allowing the British merchants to remain in Charlestown after the evacuation had thus been frustrated, to a great extent at least. A great mercantile firm, composed in part of officers of the commander-in-chief's family, with capital drawn from the public coffers, had thus obtained a monopoly of the clothing of which the people stood so much in need. The exact details of the transaction were not yet known, but by some means, probably through General Scott and Captain Shelton, the matter became public in Virginia, where General Greene at the time was very unpopular, and from Virginia the most injurious rumors had reached South Carolina.

Under the contract with Banks, General Wayne declared that the army was then better clothed than he had ever seen American troops;² but in the matter of subsistence they were still in as great difficulty as ever. Congress and Mr. Morris had cast their support upon the Southern States of Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia. Virginia and North Carolina would, and Georgia could, do nothing. The army was in South Carolina, and must therefore live upon her resources. The people of the State became indignant that the maintenance of the Southern army was thus thrown exclusively upon them, when it was known how much they had al-

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 358-364; *The So. Ca. Weekly Gazette*, February 15, 1783.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 360.

ready contributed, and how much more they had endured and suffered in the common cause.¹

By the Constitution of 1778, then in force, the General Assembly was to meet on the first Monday in January in each year, but it was not until the 24th of that month, 1783, that a quorum was ready this year for business. When it met, notwithstanding the state of popular excitement at the time, Governor Mathews opened its proceedings with a message, not only devoid of the slightest intimation of dissatisfaction with the army, but containing the kindest and most flattering references to its commander. And to these sentiments of his Excellency both the Senate and House responded in their addresses in the most cordial manner.² But these kindly official expressions but thinly veiled the mutual discontent between the army and the people. On the 10th of January, General Greene had been notified that impressments would no longer be allowed; and impressments had indeed failed to supply the army with beef, for no one would bring their cattle within reach of the impressing officer. In more than one instance beef had been taken by force from the public market for the use of the army. An attempt was then made to find a contractor. But it was in vain that letters and advertisements had been circulated, calling for bids, until Banks & Company again came forward; but they would not undertake the contract at the prescribed prices. Colonel Carrington, in charge of the subsistence

¹ We have seen, it will be remembered, that South Carolina had overpaid her proportion of the expenditures of the war, in the sum of \$1,205,978, exceeding every other state but Massachusetts in the amount of her contribution to the common cause, and very nearly equaling that State which had three times her white population. This she had done before she was overrun and devastated by the enemy. *Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution 1775-80* (McCrary), 303, 304.

² *The So. Ca. Weekly Gazette*, February 15, 1783.

of the army, appreciating the delicacy of the situation in dealing with the firm, now the subject of so much suspicion, took the precaution of communicating the terms they offered to Hugh Rutledge, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, with the request that he would lay the subject before the House and request their advice on any means that could be adopted to obtain another contractor and better terms. Mr. Rutledge replied that he had laid the letter before the House, that the terms of Banks & Company were thought too high, but as no others had been offered, and the pressing necessities called for immediate relief, it was thought needless to keep open the contract any longer. Upon this Colonel Carrington closed with Banks. And Banks now had not only the contract for clothing, but for feeding the army as well, and that upon his own terms.

General Scott, as we have said, upon ascertaining the character of the letters of Banks & Company, had transmitted them to the governor and council of Virginia. It was at this time, on the 1st of February, that the following official letter from Governor Harrison and his council reached General Greene:¹—

“ VIRGINIA IN COUNCIL, December 24, 1782.

“ SIR :— The inclosed copies of letters from Mr. John Banks and Major Forsyth discover a dangerous partnership entered into by those gentlemen with others to carry on an illicit trade within the Southern States entirely injurious to them, and contrary to the strongest recommendations of Congress and the good faith so solemnly pledged to our good allies the French that I look at it as a duty incumbent on me to acquaint you with the particulars in order that such steps may be taken, as well to prevent the scheme's being carried into execution, as to call to account the officers of your army who have so imprudently entered into a connexion derogatory to their characters as officers and abusive of that confidence you have

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 364.

been pleased to place in them. The letters will so fully explain the whole transaction that I need not trouble you with any comment of mine, further than to observe that Mr. Banks has endeavored to involve you in this business, by hinting a desire in you to become a partner; and that he had liberties granted him by your connivance that could not be obtained by any other person. These insinuations I assure you Sir have made no impression to your disadvantage either with me or any other member of my council. Your character stands in too exalted a point of view with us to be aspersed by any thing from so trifling an individual. Yet it may not be amiss to let him feel the weight of your resentment for his presumption lest the uninformed may differ with us in this sentiment. You will see that the letters are public here and by what means they became so."

The arrival of this communication at this time was most unfortunate for General Greene. The report spread far and wide that, employing the funds of the public, he had, through the agency of Banks, opened a lucrative commerce with Charlestown, and in a short time it was superadded that Mr. Morris, participating in the iniquity, had given him an unlimited right of drawing in order to furnish a capital for speculation.¹ It so happened also that the paper had

¹ Banks, soon after obtaining the contract to supply Greene's army with food as well as with clothing, speculating in other directions, became deeply involved, and could not comply with his contract, whereupon the merchants proposed that if General Greene would guarantee Banks's debts they would furnish the latter further credit. Greene agreed to this. Banks failed, and after the war (*i.e.* in 1784) his creditors called upon Greene to make good his guarantee. In 1785, on the advice of his friends, General Greene applied to the Continental Congress for relief; but before action was taken he died [Commanders Series, *General Greene* (Greene), 297-298]. In 1791 his widow renewed the application by petition to the Second Congress under the Constitution. There her petition was met and opposed by General Sumter, then a member of that body, not on the ground of fraud or of General Greene's connection with Banks, but on the broader ground that there had been no necessity of such action on the part of General Greene, that South Carolina herself, pressed and devastated as she was, would have yet furnished the necessary supplies had a proper application been made in time; and of this General Sumter was in a position to speak with authority, as he was

come just at the time when the General Assembly was about to go into the election for another governor, under the Constitution, which required an election every two years and rendered the incumbent ineligible. Governor Mathews, from his previous position in Congress upon the committees at General Washington's headquarters, had had much experience in regard to the wants and necessities of an army, and of the ways and means of supplying them. His position in Congress had also doubtless rendered him most friendly to the Continental army and its

on a committee charged with providing the means of doing so, when, as we shall see, General Greene most improperly interfered—an interference which caused the abandonment of the measure—and that large grants had been made by the States of Georgia, North and South Carolina, which were still in the possession of the general's heirs. He recognized, he said, the delicacy of his position owing to his relations with General Greene, and would not suffer past injuries to warp his judgment, but acted in conformity with the opinions of the people of South Carolina, and in particular of the district which he had the honor to represent. The petition, on the other hand, was supported, among others, by General Wayne and Colonel Wadsworth, Greene's partner in the firm of Barnabas Deane & Co. who was then his executor and a member of Congress. After the fullest debate the petition was defeated by a vote of 28 to 25. (*Abridgment of Debates of Congress*, vol I, 335-341.) It was, however, again renewed the next year, and on the 4th of April, 1792, a measure for the relief of Greene's estate in one case was passed by a like close vote of 29 yeas to 26 nays. (*Ibid.*, 373.) Four years after another bill was passed for the relief of the estate in another case by the large majority of 56 yeas to 26 nays. (*Ibid.*, 762.) For a summary of the case as presented in Congress pro and con see *ibid.*, but it may well be doubted if either of these measures of relief would have been passed had it been then known that General Greene had in 1779-80 been a secret partner in the firm of Barnabas, Deane & Co., and as quartermaster-general purchasing supplies from his own house, for such knowledge would have much weakened the argument so much pressed and relied upon, that it was impossible to suppose that one of his high character could have been involved in such a transaction. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that there is not a vestige of evidence that the partners in that house took undue advantage of their official positions to extend the business or increase the profits of the firm. (J. Hammond Trumbull, LL.D., *Magazine of Am. History*, vol. XII, 28.)

officers. Now another governor was to be chosen, while popular sentiment ran strongly against the army in general and its commander in particular.

On the 4th of February, 1783, the legislature proceeded to the election of State officers; whereupon Benjamin Guerard was chosen governor and Richard Beresford lieutenant-governor. The constitution rendering the privy councillors, as well as the governor, ineligible to reëlection, new members of that body had also to be elected; and Peter Bocquet, Arnoldus Vanderhorst, Benjamin Waring, Josiah Smith, Nicholas Eveleigh, William Hasell Gibbes, Jacob Read, and Daniel DeSaussure were chosen.

The names of those hitherto prominent, either in the civil or military line, are conspicuously absent in this list of the new officers of the State. This is no doubt, in part at least, accounted for by the constitutional provision forbidding reëlections. The absence of any but Low-Country men in the Privy Council is with no less doubt to be attributed to the necessity of having in the council residents of the immediate neighborhood of the city where the governor resided, so as to insure a quorum upon immediate pressing occasions. The journals of the legislature show the presence in the body of all the old leaders, as well from the Up-Country as from the Low-Country, and their active concern in all its measures, so that there could scarcely have been any local or class prejudice controlling these elections. The delegates to Congress chosen also disprove the idea that any such motives controlled. These were Henry Laurens, John Rutledge, Ralph Izard, Jacob Read, and Thomas Sumter. Governor Guerard had been one of those confined on a prison ship and exiled to Philadelphia, and his popularity doubtless arose from his noble conduct in regard to his fellow-prisoners and the exiles to St. Augustine who were transported to Philadelphia.

Many of these, as has already been stated, accustomed through life to every essential comfort, were then destitute of common necessaries, and not a few actually wanted bread. Mr. Guerard was possessed of an extensive property, and, touched by the sufferings of his fellow-citizens, he came forward and offered to pledge his whole estate as a security to raise a sum to be exclusively appropriated to their maintenance, demanding no greater share for himself than that which should be allowed to every other individual. Carolina estates, then in the hands of the enemy, were not regarded as a very good security, and his generous intentions proved altogether abortive; but they were not forgotten by his fellow-exiles. The influence of the St. Augustine company and of those who had been on the prison ships, in this election is very manifest. Governor Guerard had been on the prison ship *Pack-Horse*. Lieutenant-Governor Beresford and Privy Councillors Josiah Smith, William Hasell Gibbes, Jacob Read, and Daniel DeSaussure had all belonged to the St. Augustine party.

A measure which was at this time exciting the greatest interest in this legislature was a bill for the repeal of the act of the year before allowing Congress to levy five per cent duties on imports and prizes. Under the articles of confederation the consent of every one of the thirteen States was necessary to any amendment of them, and such an amendment was necessary to allow the imposition of this tax; and as Rhode Island refused her consent to this measure it stood in abeyance. Congress, having no resource except persuasion, was about to send a delegation to that State to urge its consent, when intelligence was received that Virginia had joined Maryland in opposition to it, and had without a negative in her Assembly passed an act to withdraw her assent. The reasons recited in the preamble to the Virginia act of repeal were thus stated: "The per-

mitting any power other than the General Assembly of this commonwealth to levy duties or taxes upon citizens of this State within the same is injurious to its sovereignty, may prove destructive of the rights and liberties of the people, and so far as Congress may exercise the same is contravening the spirit of the confederation.”¹ Following the lead of Virginia, a bill had been introduced into the legislature of South Carolina, reciting that the body at its last sitting, desirous of strengthening the hands of the United States, had passed the act vesting in Congress a power to levy duties of five per centum ad valorem on certain goods and merchandise imported into the States, and prizes and prize goods condemned in the courts of admiralty; that the State of Rhode Island had refused to vest Congress with such powers, and the commonwealth of Virginia had repealed the law by which she had empowered Congress to impose such duties; that it was repugnant to the commercial interests of the State to continue the act, and enacting its repeal.

At the same time the Assembly was busy considering measures for the support of the army without impressments. A joint committee of the Senate and House had been appointed to consider without delay some speedy and effectual measure to prevent the present method of collecting supplies of provisions and forage. The committee was a very able and representative one, one fully competent and willing to do justice to the army. Upon it were General Moultrie, General Sumter, General Barnwell, Major Bocquet, and Colonel Vanderhorst. General Moultrie was a Continental officer, and had been absent, and therefore entirely removed from any participation in the differences between General Greene and General Sumter. None of the other members are known to have been in any way

¹ Bancroft, vol. VI, 33, 34.

embroiled with General Greene or with any one connected with the Continental service.

This committee reported, on the 14th of February, that since General Greene had applied for assistance, a considerable quantity of salt beef had arrived at James Island, which they conceived might be a sufficient supply till the contractors were ready to commence their issues. Should it prove otherwise, they recommended that warrants be issued to impress till the contractors could relieve the army, at a rate not exceeding one-third of the cattle and hogs each person might be entitled to. For supplying the army with forage, they recommended that the governor might be empowered to appoint forage masters in such places as were necessary to procure and deliver forage in such quantities for such horses only, however, as were allowed by the regulations of Congress.¹

It was while the legislature was thus occupied, devising a measure for the support of the army by modified impressments, that General Greene, notwithstanding his own personal unpopularity, and the equivocal position in which he was placed by the disclosure of the Banks correspondence, undertook most officiously to address the governor and the legislature upon the measures which they were considering, to volunteer his opinions, and to threaten the governor and Assembly with the anger and power of the army if they did not comply with his views and demands — for this was the effect of his communication, however his friends and admirers have attempted to explain it away.

The letter addressed to the governor — with a request that it be laid before the House — bears date the 8th of March. Its terms, says Johnson, were perfectly respectful and decorous. It urged the great necessities of Congress, the little to be apprehended from its powers, the injustice

¹ *Journal of the House of Representatives.*

that had been done the army, its mutinous temper, the withering state of the treasury, and the imperious duty of enabling the general government to fulfil its contracts. "I confess," he wrote, "I am one of those who think our independence can only prove a blessing under congressional influence." "If we have anything to apprehend," he continued, "it is that the members of Congress will sacrifice the general interest to particular interests in the State to which they belong; that this had been the case, and from the very nature and constitution of that body, more was to be dreaded from their exercising too little, than too much power." Then, warming with his subject, he went on to observe:—

"The Financier says the affairs of his department are tottering on the brink of ruin; the army to the northward are in the highest discontent; and the same is to be expected to the southward. It must be confessed the soldiers have given noble proofs of virtue and patriotism under every species of distress and suffering. But this has been in full persuasion that justice would be done them in due time. The distresses of a suffering country have been urged with success to silence their present demands; but these arguments will have no weight in future—the present repose affords a prospect of permanent revenue. The eyes of the army are turned upon the States in full expectation of it. It is well known that Congress have no revenue; and the measures of the States will determine the conduct of the army. I need not tell your Excellency that the moment they are convinced they have nothing to hope from that quarter they will disband. Nor will they be satisfied with general promises. Nothing short of permanent and certain revenue will keep them subject to authority. I think it my duty to be explicit because I know the sentiments of the army. Men will suffer to a certain degree; beyond which it is dangerous to push them. My influence shall never be wanting to promote the tranquillity of government; but this will have little weight when opposed to the demands of an injured soldiery. My heart is warm with good wishes for this country; and I cannot contemplate future dangers that threaten it but with pain and anxiety. I am sure I shall never turn my back when troubles overtake her; but it is much easier to prevent evils than correct them. *This country is much better*

calculated for revenue than for war. It may lose by every new convulsion, but can never gain where liberty is not the object. Your wealth and weakness are a double temptation to invite an invasion, and are the strongest arguments for uniting in the closest terms your interest with others. View but for a moment the vast property you have exposed, and the little permanent force for its defence. Again, consider how unhealthy your climate, and the prejudices prevailing against it. Should you add new difficulties in matters of finance, the war continue, and the army disband, your ruin is inevitable," etc.¹

The impatience of some of the members, it is said, could scarcely be restrained to the conclusion of this letter. "Are we to be dictated to by a Cromwell?" said some. "Can we not manage our own concerns? Are we to be terrified by threats of mutiny and violence? Let us first be paid our advances and then let Congress, or its swordsmen, require this duty! If we are to pay a duty we can collect it ourselves, without having the placemen of Congress swarming among us!"²

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 387-388.

² Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 388. In a letter of General Greene to Gouverneur Morris, April 23, 1783, he writes: "The subject of your letter by Major Edwards is important to the public, and interesting to the army. The disposition of the latter here is much the same as it is to the northward, but I am afraid of both. When soldiers advance without authority who can halt them? We have many Clodiuses and Catilines in America, who may give a different direction to this business, than either you or I expect. It is a critical business and pregnant with dangerous consequences. Congress are fast declining, and their power and authority must expire, without more effectual support. What this may produce time will manifest. I have done my duty and await events.

"I wrote a letter to the Governor of the State on the subject of finance and the discontents of the army. It gave some alarm and much disgust. Continental authority and the financier are looked upon with a jealous eye here. No people were ever more blind to their true interest. Time and further experience will produce what reason and persuasion cannot. I send you a copy of my letter to the Assembly and a couple of papers with some strictures thereon. More will be said on the subject hereafter. Plain dealing will soon become necessary," etc. *Life of Gouverneur Morris* (Sparks), vol. I, 251.

The proceeding gave great alarm, not only to the members of the General Assembly, but to almost every man in the State. With less excitement, but with earnest protest, others took up the matter in the press, and seriously and gravely pointed out its dangerous tendency. A writer over the signature of "Hampden," in *The S. C. Weekly Gazette*, observing that the general in his communication in regard to impressments complains of the inattention of the Assembly to the wants and distresses of the army, and indirectly informs the governor that, as his powers of impressing were at an end, some mode must be established for furnishing supplies, declares that this was setting up an authority unknown to our government and superior to the law — an attempt affecting, in his opinion, the very vitals of the constitution. The fundamental laws of human nature, and the precepts of our forefathers, he urged, were equally repugnant to the claim. "The very idea of property excludes the right of another taking any thing from me without my consent, otherwise I cannot call it my own. No tenure can be so precarious as the will of another. What property can I have in what another can seize at pleasure? If any *part* is subject to the discretionary power of others, the whole may be so likewise. If any part of my estate is to be seized at any time without the authority of the legislature, I can have no property.

"It will, I suppose," he continued, "be objected, is South Carolina then to enjoy the protection of the confederacy and to contribute nothing to its support, or to the maintenance of that army which had afforded her citizens safety and security and placed them in a situation of peace and quietness? They, her people, have given the fullest answer to this objection, in a manner not to be controverted, through a series of years and by the most explicit declarations. Equally in words and actions, in the most unequivocal nature, they have demonstrated their love, their

ardor, their long attachment to their sister States. They have always been ready, not only to contribute to the expenses of the government, but likewise to the wants and necessities of others. In some instances they have far exceeded the cold line of prudence; with cheerful hearts they gave all they had in their power and contended with them against a common enemy of the liberties of America. The last House will bear witness to the grateful sense they had of the important services of General Greene, and their acts give the fullest proof of the warm affections of their hearts to the army, and of their readiness to bear their share of the public expense and burdens when in a situation to contribute, but the whole was the gift of freemen, who feel that they are, and know that they have a right to be, free."

Then, turning to the other subject, "Hampden" went on to say, "The vesting Congress with the power of levying an impost of five per centum, which the last House had no right to pass, would never be submitted to by the freemen of America. The spirit of it is hostile in the extreme to liberty. It is enacting a permanent revenue — it is a charter of slavery. I deny the principle of the act. We bewilder ourselves with fantastic expressions of the happiness of America under congressional influence. The gentlest natures are too often fond of power, though they do not abuse it. There are many things which the legislature cannot do, many cases in which it has no power. They cannot create themselves perpetual. They are merely a delegated power from the people, and therefore cannot surrender their share of power.

"I will never admit," he continued, "arbitrary power to be lodged in any man or body of men. Many things are so closely woven in with the constitution, like the trial by jury, that they cannot be separated unless the body of the people expressly declare otherwise, after a full considera-

tion. There are fundamental, inalienable rights, landmarks of the constitution, which cannot be removed."

It is said that nothing could exceed the astonishment of General Greene that his interference should have been received as it was. Upon the advice of friends he thought proper the next day to address another letter to the governor, exculpating himself from the charge of intending to dictate or offend; but the second letter, says Johnson, was not calculated to allay the ferment. Its stubborn vindication and cast of satire were not adapted to make its apologies acceptable.¹ Upon the receipt of the governor's message laying the letter of March 8th before the General Assembly, that body, on the 16th of March, resolved:²—

"That the Legislature of the State has strained every nerve in endeavors to contribute their share towards the continental expense. That in the beginning of last year when the country was desolated by the ravages of the enemy they passed a law for the payment of their full quota as assessed by Congress and have every reason to believe that the said law has been complied with. That the State did further furnish a considerable supply of clothing to such of our quota of troops as was raised, which expenditure has been acknowledged to have been received as part of their quota by the Financier. That during the present session of Assembly, taxes have been laid upon this country which must be burthensome and distressing to our constituents with a view to comply with the requirements of Congress. That in aid of the taxes above mentioned, a considerable portion of confiscated property has been appropriated to the supplies of the current year. That in addition to the current taxes the legislature have voted the necessary forage for the cavalry which must amount to a very considerable sum, and that the continental forms a part of the supplies.

"Resolved that no public creditors have any reasonable cause of complaint against the State for want of raising supplies towards the general expense."

¹Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 389.

²*Journal General Assembly*, March 16, 1783. The letters of General Greene are not recorded in the journal, and the text of the first only is to be found, and to be found only in Johnson's *Life of Greene* as above.

The act repealing the impost duty was promptly passed¹ and the measures looking to a conditional of the impressments abandoned. It was not long before another cause of offence was given. Captain Ker of the British army, the friend, as we have seen, of General Pickens, and who, it was said, had saved the life of Colonel Washington at the Eutaws, who had married in Charlestown, and was there well known and liked, had arrived with a flag from Governor Tonyn of East Florida to the military commander of the Southern Department.² By him it was duly received and acknowledged, and the usual forms on such occasions regularly observed. But Governor Guerard construed the reception of an embassy from the civil gov-

¹ *Statutes of So. Ca.* vol. IV, 560, March 16, 1783.

² It is unfortunate that we do not know the subject of this embassy or flag—as it was called. Our only knowledge of it is derived from Judge Johnson's work, which we have followed. It is probable, however, that Captain Ker's flag was not the beginning of the matter, for in a manuscript book in the Secretary of State's office in Columbia, entitled *Index to Loose Documents*, we find an entry, "Letter of Gov. Tonyn to Gov. Guerard demanding the person of Dr. Wells (M. 94, 1783). Other papers relating to the subject (M. 11, 28, 29, 1784)." And again, "Letter to Gov. Tonyn of East Florida, respecting the right of British subjects under the provisional treaty (M. 11, 102, 1784). . . . Letter to Captain Wyly agent for Gov. Tonyn (M. 103, 105, 1784)." This index refers to Revolutionary documents which had been arranged and classified, but upon the burning of the State-House by the Federal army in 1865, were, with other manuscripts, tumbled out, but fortunately not destroyed, and now lie in a confused mass in a room in the present State-House, and for the rearrangement and classification of which the General Assembly has just made an appropriation.

There is also this entry in the Journal of the House, August 13, 1783: "With respect to the correspondence passed between Governor Guerard and the governor of St. Augustine and the letter of Mr. Read Head to Sir Guy Carleton and the answer relating to the vesting of the property of citizens of the State carried off by the British army. The committee are of opinion that copies of that correspondence be forthwith transmitted to our delegates in Congress to be made use of as they may prefer in order to make reparation for the property so taken away."

ernor of a foreign power, by the military commandant of the United States troops accidentally within the borders of his State, without reference to him as governor and commander-in-chief, as an indignity to the State. It was not, it will be observed, a flag from a military officer in the field, but from the civil governor of Florida. The articles of confederation had certainly not clothed the United States, still less its military officer, with the power of sovereignty. Would General Washington himself have received an embassy from the governor of Canada without referring it to Congress? The articles of confederation, it is true, provided that no State without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled should send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, any king, prince, or State.¹ But did that authorize an officer of Congress, the military commandant in the field, to do so? The governor, holding that it did not, issued his mandate to arrest the whole party, even the crew of the vessel which brought the British officer. Captain Ker immediately claimed the protection of General Greene. To himself it was effectually extended; but the sheriff, supported by the governor, insisted on detaining the crew as prisoners under civil process. The case now became one of extreme delicacy, which General Greene promptly resolved to solve by force. He first, however, called a council of war, to which he submitted the question whether Captain Ker had committed any violation of his flag? This point, which does not appear to have been involved in the controversy with the governor, the council unanimously decided in the negative. Troops were thereupon ordered to take possession of Fort Johnson and Wap-poo Cut, and to permit no one to pass or repass, under flags, without permission from Greene's headquarters. Seeing that General Greene had taken his resolution, and knowing

¹ Article 6.

that he would adhere to them, the governor and council concluded to discharge the prisoners, but to order Ker to leave the city immediately and the State in three days. From this new indignity, as he conceived, Ker again appealed, and received from the general the following reply:¹—

“The order sent you by the Governor you will pay no regard to. When I am ready to discharge your flag I will inform you. The time and manner of your leaving the State shall be made as agreeable as possible. I confide in the honor of the flag and will not impose impossibilities. I shall have my letter ready for you to leave this the day following the time the Governor has set for your departure. I am exceedingly unhappy at this further instance of indelicate treatment you have met with. Instead of an apology for the injury past, you are subjected to further indignity; and instead of being dismissed with the politeness due to a flag, you are ordered out of the State like a criminal and threatened with the vengeance of government. Nothing but my wishes to preserve the tranquillity of the people and the respect and regard I have for their peace and quiet could have prevailed on me to have suffered your flag to be treated in the manner it has been. And although I do not think this a sufficient apology for the indignities to which the flag has been subjected yet I hope some allowance will be made for my truly delicate situation. I know it was my duty to afford you complete protection at every hazard, and was the same insult to be offered to one of my flags I must be silent after what has happened here. However I shall write to Governor TONYN. I hope you will relate the peculiarity of the case on your arrival with the same liberality you speak of it here,” etc.

In his communication to General Lincoln² on the subject, General Greene requested the latter to lay it immediately before Congress, as he was resolved not to submit to a second attack on the United States authority, “a precedent for such encroachments shall not be founded upon

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 390.

² The office of Secretary of War had been established in 1781, and General Benjamin Lincoln, who had formerly commanded the Southern Department, was appointed to it.

his failure to resist them." He further observed that "this is not one of those cases where the right was doubtful or public safety the object, but appears to be a matter of temper, and pursued without regard to either."¹ Thus dogmatically, with sword in hand, did the general decide a most delicate question, in which the right was nevertheless most doubtful. His detaining the flag a day longer than necessary was a mere matter of boastful insult, as to which he well knew there was no power to resent or resist.

It was not true that this was "not one of those cases where the right was doubtful." The position he assumed was, on the contrary, to say the least, most questionable. Nor had he any right to call in question the sincerity of Governor Guerard's motives as he did, when he assumed to write to General Lincoln that the public safety was not the governor's object, but that his course was a matter of temper. Such reflection upon the governor's conduct was unbecoming the conduct of public business and his intercourse with one occupying the official position of chief magistrate of a State. Whatever may or may not have been Governor Guerard's personal motives,—and there was no ground to impute improper ones,—the question raised was one which no governor could have afforded to ignore in the uncertain relations of the State to the Congress under the Confederation. The State had not waived her newly acquired sovereignty by the articles of confederation to which she was a party. She was still the mistress of her territory, and competent to say who should or who should not enter upon it; and this she had done. She had forbidden the presence of any one upon her soil who did not acknowledge her sovereign authority. By the act of 1778, to enforce allegiance, the State had ordained that every person thereafter coming into the State,

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 390.

either by land or by water, should repair immediately to the nearest justice of the peace, and take the oath of allegiance prescribed.¹ No subject of Great Britain had, therefore, any right to land upon her coast, and any such person was liable to arrest if he did so. Nor did the fact that such person claimed to come with a message from the governor of Florida to General Greene alter the case. General Greene, as military commander in the South, would undoubtedly, with propriety, have received a flag of truce from the military commandant in the field, against whom he was operating. But it will be observed that such was not the case in point. Captain Ker, though himself a British army officer, did not come from the commander of the British military forces, but came bearing a message from the civil governor of Florida. The communication, though spoken of at the time as "a flag," was not properly so termed—a flag of truce is technically a communication from an officer in the field to his opponent, upon some matter relating to the conduct of the war in which they are engaged. The communication in question was one of a civil nature from the civil governor of that province, and as such Governor Guerard may well have held that General Greene had no right to receive and entertain it upon the territory of his State—and that in violation of a fundamental statute thereof.² The peace commis-

¹ *Statutes of So. Ca.*, vol. I, 147.

² In the invasion of the State, 1779, and the investment of the city by General Prévost, it will be remembered that he followed this rule, and as a general in the field refused to receive a communication from Governor Rutledge, and declined to deal with any but the military commandant on the American side. [*Hist. of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80*, (McCrary), 375.] And curiously enough, General Greene himself had just acted upon the same principle when, in replying to General Leslie in regard to the Confiscation Act, he had written that "he had the honor to command the forces of the United States in the Southern Department, but had nothing to do with the internal police of any State."—*Ante* 683.

sioners from England had not addressed themselves to General Washington, the Commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States; nor had Washington undertaken to receive them. Sir Henry Clinton announced by flag their arrival to Washington, and requested a passport or safe-conduct for their secretary through his lines, as bearer of despatches to Congress; and this was refused. What would have been thought of Washington had he received and entertained the commissioners at his headquarters, regardless of the Congress and Henry Laurens, its president, because, forsooth, they had come under a flag? To Congress, if not to Governor Guerard, should General Greene have referred any message from the governor of Florida. Under the articles of confederation, it is true, it had been agreed that no State should, without the consent of the United States, send or receive any embassy from or to any king, prince, or foreign State. Whether Governor Tonn's communications came within this prohibition or not does not appear, but it did not follow, if they did, that the military officer of Congress in command of the United States troops in any particular State was authorized to carry on a correspondence with a British civil magistrate in British territory. But whether this reasoning be accepted as sound or not, it cannot be denied that there was much force in the view, and that Governor Guerard, acting for the State of South Carolina, did not transcend the duties of his position in making the question; nor do we think that General Greene's arbitrary manner of deciding it can be approved as wise, generous, or dignified. And so it was that, in the very throes of her birth, South Carolina had trained upon her the guns of a Federal army.

The army and its commander, says Johnson, had now become very unpopular. The people of the State regarded

them as little else than the last enemy to be got rid of. Mutual discontents were exasperated by mutual reproaches. The former considered the latter as ungrateful protégés, who, after being delivered from their enemies, would leave their protectors to starve; the latter denied their obligation to maintain their so-called deliverers, urged their liberal advances to the common cause, and referred them to the Congress.¹

Thus every day the relation between the army and the people became more strained. New difficulties were daily presenting themselves. The rumors of peace checked the sale of goods, and the plundering crews of small craft from St. Augustine, as in the days of the early settlement of the province, so infested the coast and inlets as often to intercept the provisioning vessels, there being no other means of transportation. If this supply failed, impressment must follow, and the general knew not what might be the consequences. He might have found himself cooped up in his military territory of James Island, or forced to open his way from it with the bayonet. The smothered feeling — that the State had been abandoned by Congress in the most critical periods, a feeling shared and expressed by Greene himself; that she had been saved by her own sons when there was not a Continental soldier within her borders; that when her sons had opened the way for the return of the Continental army, that body, with the concurrence of its commander, had assumed airs of superiority and arrogance galling to her own leaders; and that now, before the war was actually over, her people were left to support those who bore themselves more as conquerors than deliverers — had now broken out. Congress and its minions became most unpopular. The people believed their newly acquired State sovereignty already in danger,

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 391.

and rallied around it with ardor and enthusiasm.¹ It has been well observed that, happily for the people of the United States, Great Britain desisted from the contest exactly at that point of time when she ought most to have pressed it. She had regained the mastery of the ocean; Charlestown lay exposed without a piece of cannon to defend it; a few frigates could at any time have repossessed it; and three thousand men had only to move forward to regain the control in the three Southern States.²

On the 16th of April, the *South-Carolina Gazette and General Advertiser* announced the arrival, at General Greene's headquarters, of an express with the news of the confirmation of a general peace having been concluded. Unhappily, with the news of the approach of peace came also a confirmation of that of the mutinous condition of the Northern army, and of the famous Newburg address, calling upon the army to retain their swords until their wrongs were redressed and their services rewarded. The effect upon the temper and discipline of the Southern army was immediately felt. As none of the soldiers were enlisted for a period beyond the war, they began all to clamor for their discharges, contending that they had an immediate right to be released from duty. In the Maryland line, particularly, it required all the energy of their officers to prevent a general insurrection and their moving off in a body. Upon one occasion General Greene had actually to draw up the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 393. This hostile sentiment to the Continental army and impressments was not limited to South Carolina, says Johnson. It is not easy to conceive how it would have been possible for the Southern commander, perhaps for the United States, to have maintained another campaign. The people were utterly worn out and disgusted with the system of impressments and specific contributions, and the refusal in some States to contribute their quotas in cash or permit the collection of a duty must have produced (and finally did produce) a general resolution of the States to the same effect.

² *Ibid.*

troops in whom he could confide, charge his artillery with grape, and post the artillerists with lighted matches to awe down the mutinous spirit which had indicated itself by the most unequivocal signs. The cavalry, which had been sent to the Congaree for the convenience of forage, broke through all control; one hundred of them, placing a Sergeant Dangerfield at their head, moved off in a body, and actually seized the horses of those who would not join them, and apportioned them to their own use.

Orders were received from the Secretary of War for furloughing the troops until the signing of the definitive articles of peace, which were immediately carried into effect as to the few troops of South Carolina and Georgia; but those of North Carolina and Virginia were ordered to their respective States to be furloughed, and those of Maryland and Pennsylvania it was proposed to send home by water. A trifle of pay had been voted them by Congress, and as soon as that could be distributed the troops of North Carolina and Virginia were promptly despatched; but such were the delays that attended the collection of transports that the other troops did not get off until July, 1783. Nothing could exceed the uneasiness that this occasioned. A contract had been entered into by Mr. Morris with some merchants in Philadelphia to furnish the necessary transports, but from delays in collecting them, and their unusually long passage, the stay of the army was protracted until the diseases of the climate began to reappear among them. Their murmurs then ran high; they charged the government with having deceived them, and hundreds who had served, some for seven years, deserted in groups, and forfeited their pay. Nearly one-third of their number were on the sick list when the transports left Charlestown.¹ Upon arriving at Philadelphia, these remnants of the

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 398-400.

Southern army, as it was called, were received with the ringing of bells and every other testimony which a gratified people could render to their merits and services. St. Michael's bells would have rung for joy upon their departure from South Carolina, had those bells not been carried off by the British. Their reception in Philadelphia was soon after rewarded by outrage and renewed mutiny.¹

But whatever were the sentiments of the State in regard to the army and its commander, the legislature stood liberally to its purpose of rewarding General Greene for his services. Boone's Barony, a very valuable body of land on the south of the Edisto, with a portion of the slaves attached to the land as the property of one of the confiscated estates, were ordered by the legislature to be conveyed to General Greene; the rest of the negroes belonging to the plantation, the legislature, upon his application, set a value upon, and allowed a credit to enable General Greene to purchase them. The slaves were valued and transferred to him. And thus, as it was observed, the Rhode Island Quaker soldier became a South Carolina slaveholder and planter. He did not, however, remain in South Carolina. He removed to Georgia, where he settled upon a plantation called Mulberry Grove, confiscated property which had been bestowed upon him by the State of Georgia. There he died, on the 19th of June, 1786.

In reviewing the events of the few months which had elapsed since the evacuation of Charlestown, one would almost imagine, says Johnson, that we had proposed to trace the origin and progress of anti-federalism, to develop the causes that led to the adoption of the Federal Constitution, or the distribution of parties into Federal and Republican.

¹ Johnson's *Life of Greene*, vol. II, 398-400; Marshall's *Life of Washington*, vol. IV, 615.

CONCLUSION

WE have now accomplished the purpose announced in the introductory chapter to this history of South Carolina. We have traced the development of the State, socially and politically, from the inception of the colony to the end of the American Revolution. The thirteen colonies, after seven years' struggle, we have now seen recognized as independent of Great Britain, and *South Carolina a sovereign State*.

A brief review of the salient points of the story will be a fitting conclusion to our work.

The isolated position of the colony of South Carolina from its inception to its ultimate development as a State has been pointed out. The colony had been planted in a far-away position — an outpost — as an assertion of Britannic right to disputed territory; so planted, it had been left to struggle for its existence against Spaniards, French, and Indians, with but such little assistance as her twin sister, North Carolina, could occasionally afford. She was a British colony planted for imperial purposes of the mother country, and yet, with one exception, that of Oglethorpe's regiment, which passed through Charlestown on its way to Florida in 1738, no British troops set foot upon her soil until 1760, when Montgomery's regiment was sent to meet the Cherokees, who had been set on to the British frontier by the French, with whom England was at war. For nearly seventy years, that is, from 1670 to 1738, the colony had struggled alone, without the aid of a British soldier, against Indians, Spaniards, and French, the enemies of Great Brit-

ain, and against pirates, the enemies of mankind. Then had been planted the feeble colony of Georgia, between the Spaniards in Florida and the colony in South Carolina. To disasters of all kinds the Carolina colony had opposed a stubborn resistance, and with slow growth had gradually developed into a small but wealthy community.

There were essential differences, as we have seen, between South Carolina and the other colonies, in the source of her institution, and in the manner of their development. These had not originated, so to speak, on her own soil, but had been transferred with her first settlers, in an advanced condition of development, from the British West Indies, principally from Barbadoes, the settlers bringing with them institutions of a planters' colony, social, civil, and military, all based upon that of African slavery.

Isolated from the other colonies, left to struggle for existence as best they might, the people of South Carolina early learned the lesson of self-reliance, and with independence of the Proprietors for defence, they grew restless of their authority, and were the first colonists successfully to rebel against the government provided for them in England. The revolution "of the people," as it was termed in 1719, it is true, was connived at, if not even to some extent at least instigated, by those at home, who wished to recover for the king the authority recklessly granted to the Proprietors. But it was a dangerous appeal, that of the king to the people; and so the prediction of the time that if that "revolt is not crop't in the bud, they [the people] will set up for themselves against his Majesty," was ultimately fulfilled. The revolt of 1719 was not cropped in the bud, and the people, tasting of the power to put down one and set up another, had now overthrown the Proprietors for the king. The time was to come when they would overthrow the king for themselves.

But circumstances conspired for half a century to prevent any such desire. South Carolina became the favored colony of Great Britain, and under the first two Georges, though but few troops were sent to her assistance against the Spaniards, the French, and Indians, she was, on the other hand, left with but little interference, to prosper and accumulate wealth. Indeed, her treatment by the mother country was not only merely passively favorable; she was the recipient of beneficial measures in her development. Two great staple crops were found adapted to her soil and climate, and susceptible of profitable cultivation by negro labor, and for the accommodation of this her trade, the navigation laws of England — that upon which it was believed that the greatness of the kingdom depended — were modified, and bounties were generously given to induce the cultivation of other products for the market at home. True, she was still in a great measure restricted to commerce with the mother country; but as the mother country took all her commodities at remunerative prices, she felt no burdens in restriction of her trade. And herein lay a great difference between herself and most of the others, especially the Northern colonies. The navigation laws of Cromwell, enforced after the Restoration with even greater strictness and severity than in the days of the Commonwealth, did not materially affect her interests while they crushed and ruined the interests of others.

Her commerce was not only undisturbed by those laws so ruinous to others, but led to closer relations with the mother country. The intercourse between London and Charlestown became as close as that which had been so long maintained between Bridgetown, Barbadoes, and the great city; an intercourse so intimate that the West Indian was said to be more familiar with the streets of London than the British squire who lived within a few

miles of the city. The Carolina Coffee House was a London institution. Scarcely a week passed that some vessel did not sail for England from Charlestown, and few of these did not carry passengers. The regular packets were filled with travellers to and fro across the ocean. There were few people in Charlestown who had not crossed and recrossed the Atlantic. In this, as has appeared, the people of Carolina were different from those of the Northern States, in which we are told that a man who had been to Europe was pointed out as a curiosity. And so it was that, out of a list of 114 Americans admitted as members of the Inns of Court in London in the twenty-seven years from 1759 to 1786, 46 were South Carolinians, and of the 30 Americans in London in 1774 who petitioned Parliament against the Boston Port Bill, 15 were from South Carolina.

The sons of the opulent of South Carolina were sent to England for their education, and after passing through Oxford or Cambridge, not infrequently remained to eat commons at the Temple, and to return, not only with their academic degrees, but as English barristers as well. The taste for British politics, thus inspired, became a part of the lives of the people. It was upon this that was founded the Charlestown Library Society in 1748, when a few young men were associated, and contributed among themselves for the purpose of raising a fund to collect new pamphlets and papers published in Great Britain — thus to keep abreast of the times “at home,” and to follow the struggle between the great orators and pamphleteers as they fought for Whigs or Tories. Thus it was, that, regardless of Wilkes’s personal character, the leaders in South Carolina warmly espoused his cause as that of liberty, and associated it with the struggle over the Stamp Act. The conduct of the people in

the Wilkes case was similar to that pursued by them in regard to the Stamp Act and to the tax on tea. In neither case had they any material interest at stake. In the matter of the Stamp Act and in that of the tax on tea, they entered into the contest as a matter of principle, and a sympathy with the people of the Northern States, who were so grievously oppressed by the navigation laws. But in all this agitation, it was English politics which the young men were discussing. The people, young and old, abhorred the idea of a severance of their ties to the mother country which New England began to agitate. The revolutionists in South Carolina were Chathamites. But step by step, almost unconsciously, they were drawn into the struggle, and then from resistance to revolution, from revolution to independence.

It can hardly be doubted that the people of South Carolina as a whole had been at first by a vast majority opposed to separation. The extreme Revolutionary party was confined to the coast, and even in that region there were many, very many, who, though for resistance to the unconstitutional proceedings of Parliament, as they conceived, regarded with horror the very idea of being no longer a part of the great British Empire; while in the Up-Country the Scotch-Irish and the newly come Virginians in the middle country were too busy with their new settlements to be concerning themselves with questions which they regarded as but Low-Country politics. What concern was it to them whether stamps were required on legal papers or not, when there were no courts in their section in which to use them, and when for their protection against horse thieves and other criminals they were forced to the necessity of organizing courts of regulators, which became as dangerous almost as the evils from which they were established to protect them? Why ask them to

fight against taxation without representation in Parliament in England, when they had no representation in the General Assembly which met in Charlestown? It was most unfortunate that the Revolution found the people of the province, by and large, in an inchoate condition. The normal order of settlement of the country had been, as we have seen, suddenly changed. Prior to 1750 immigration had come by way of the sea, and from Charlestown had pushed up the rivers, carrying with it the civil and social organization of the coast; but in the eighty years since the beginning of the colony, the settlement of the province had extended but little beyond the falls of the rivers. Then, after Braddock's defeat, had come the immense tide of population from Pennsylvania and Virginia by way of the foot of the mountains, filling up that region with Scotch-Irish Presbyterians and some Germans, and the middle country with English Virginians, until it was estimated that those sections contained two-thirds of the population of the State. This immigration had come, not as individuals and families, but as communities, bringing with them their own religious and social systems. It is remarkable, too, that it had come so quietly that the old colonists on the coast, sitting in their Assembly, elected from parishes organized under the Church of England, were scarcely aware of the presence of such a people until they found themselves outnumbered in the province. Measures for the extension of the parish system and the establishment of schools for the children and courts for the people had been contemplated, and it will be recollected to some extent inaugurated, by the General Assembly; but had been effectually stifled in London by the *sine cure* holders of patent offices living in England, whose interests would thereby be affected, and who through court influence required to be bought off before such measures should be

allowed to pass. This had been done, and courts provided had actually been opened; but the parishes had not yet been extended, nor had provision yet been made for giving the people in the back country representation in the Assembly when the Revolution began. For this condition of things the newcomers held the people on the coast responsible, and ridiculed the idea of being called upon to join in rebellion against the mother country because Parliament in England taxed the American colonies without giving them representation, when they on the coast did the same in regard to themselves.

It was an unfortunate condition of affairs for which the Low-Country people were not altogether, if indeed at all, to blame; but so it happened that the Revolution found the people of South Carolina radically divided in a manner in no wise connected with the questions between Great Britain and the colonies. The Scotch-Irish Presbyterians, above the falls of the rivers, enjoying religious freedom to a greater extent than ever before, and however zealous for political freedom as well, more concerned then with settling their new homes than with the theoretical questions agitated on the coast, turned a deaf ear to the commissioners sent to appeal to them to join in the struggle against the king. With but few exceptions they refrained from taking any part in the struggle until rudely awakened by Tarleton's slaughter of Buford's men in the Waxhaws, and the burning and desecration of their churches upon the assumption that, as the dissenters in New England were the leaders in the Revolution, the dissenters in South Carolina must necessarily be rebels as well.

But it so happened that, divided as South Carolina was upon the subject of the Revolution, not only upon its general merits, but also as to the extent to which it should

be carried, the first decisive victory for the American cause was that of Fort Moultrie in Charlestown harbor.

It was, indeed, a striking incident, to which we have before called attention, that when, on the 28th of June, 1776, Jefferson at Philadelphia was laying on the table of Congress the draft of the Declaration of Independence, and the delegates from South Carolina were hesitating as to their course, his doing so was, all unconsciously, saluted in Charlestown harbor by the roar of artillery as the guns of the British fleet were pouring their broadsides into the little log fort on Sullivan's Island. We have seen the decisive consequences of that great victory, one of the most brilliant of the whole Revolution—a victory in which, on the American side, none but South Carolinian blood was shed.

The victory of Fort Moultrie secured three years of comparative quiet to the South, while the war of the Revolution was waged at the North, though in that time her Continental troops had been greatly reduced by the ill-advised expedition against the British in Florida, an expedition in which an army was wasted without a battle having been fought. Then the war was transferred to the South, and South Carolina became its theatre—its bloody ground—its bloodiest ground in all the country.

Upon the evacuation of Boston in March, 1776, the first British movement, as we have seen, had been the expedition of Sir Peter Parker and Sir Henry Clinton against the Southern States, which had culminated in the attack upon Charlestown harbor, and the disastrous defeat of the British fleet and army. Then for three years the conflict had been confined almost entirely to the Northern States, in which the first object had been, by a joint movement from Canada down the lakes under Burgoyne, and up the Hudson from New York by Sir William Howe, to cut off

and isolate the New England States, which it was assumed in England would end the war. That movement had likewise ended disastrously, the whole of Burgoyne's army having been captured. Then "Mr. Lee's plan" of carrying the war into the middle States and capturing the city of Philadelphia, the seat of government of the rebel States, had most extraordinarily been followed by the two Howes at the instance of the traitor Charles Lee, while a prisoner in their hands, to the abandonment of the plan of campaign before agreed upon by the two brothers, Lord Howe and Sir William, in conference with the War Office in London. Philadelphia had been taken, but the campaign had proved abortive. The Howes had been recalled, Sir Henry Clinton appointed commander-in-chief, and a new programme arranged by the British ministry, based upon two principal ideas: (1) the carrying the war "from South to North," and (2) "the conquering of America by Americans."

This plan, it will be observed, was but a recurrence to that of 1776, which had been based upon the belief, not without foundation, that the Revolutionary movement in the South was confined almost entirely to the coast of the two Carolinas, that the people of the interior of these provinces were hostile to the governments in the Low-Country, and ready to rise against them, that especially was this the case in North Carolina. It was believed that, if the British could but penetrate to the region in which the Scotch refugees from Culloden, who now, strange to say, were of all people in America the most loyal to the house of Hanover, to wit, the neighborhood of Cross Creek, in which the town of Fayetteville now stands, that they might establish a Royal government there, in the rear of the seats of the State governments on the coast; and that, having done so, the people would flock to the Royal standard; that a full regiment of Highlanders would be

formed to join the British when they reached that point, and that the strength of their army would be greatly increased as they marched through the country, gathering recruits at every point; that with this growing army they would march triumphantly through Virginia to the Chesapeake and thence on northwardly. These were the basic ideas of the campaign to be conducted upon the transference of the war to the South.

The movement began, it will be recollected, upon the rejection by Congress of the terms of peace brought by the peace commissioners from England in 1778. The British garrisons in Florida were strengthened, and General Prévost directed to move from that quarter, while a considerable force under Colonel Campbell was despatched from New York to form a junction with him. Savannah was promptly taken by Colonel Campbell, who followed up his success by an advance into the interior of Georgia and the defeat of the American force under General Ashe at Brier Creek. Then in 1779 had followed Moultrie's affair at Beaufort and Prévost's expedition into South Carolina, in which he had nearly succeeded in taking the city of Charlestown; then had been fought the battle of Stono, the year 1779 closing with the disastrous siege of Savannah by the combined French and American forces. These had been but the beginning of the long and terrible warfare to be waged in South Carolina.

Prévost's march had been begun, not with any expectation of reaching Charlestown, but more as a feint, or threat, to recall General Lincoln, the Continental officer who had superseded Howe in command of the American forces in the South, from a movement of his towards Augusta to counteract the effect of Ashe's defeat at Brier Creek in Georgia; failing to accomplish that object, Lincoln understanding its original purpose, and not believing that

Prévost would have the temerity to press on to the city, Prévost had nearly succeeded in taking it. He had failed to do so, but his march had not been without results of the greatest importance. He had marked the road to the city and demonstrated that its true approach was not from the sea, but through the various inlets in its rear. His raid had also shown the immense wealth of the region through which it had been made, and had given a substantial earnest of the spoils to be obtained; and more, it had shown the divisions of the people, the unreliability of the militia of the country, and the military weakness because of the negro slaves. The losses in the battle of Stono, at Beaufort, and in the siege of Savannah, Sir Henry Clinton well knew, were irreparable to the Americans. The time had arrived, therefore, for the more decisive inauguration of the grand ministerial plan of carrying the war from South to North. His scheme for the fulfilment of this plan of campaign was by calling in his forces around New York, to leave a part of them under Lieutenant-General Knyphausen to confront Washington on the Hudson during the winter, while, with the bulk of his army, he proceeded by sea to Savannah, under the convoy of Admiral Arbuthnot, who had just arrived with a reënforcement from England, and landing there and on the islands near Charlestown, to advance upon the city, which, knowing the great weakness of the Continental army, and the impossibility of any adequate reënforcements by Washington overland from New York, it was assumed would speedily be taken; this accomplished, Sir Henry, leaving a sufficient part of the army under Lord Cornwallis to make a triumphal march through the Carolinas and Virginia, he would return with the rest of the army to New York; all this was to be done in mid-winter, while the ice and snow would prevent operations at the North. As we have before shown, this plan was the

prototype of Sherman's march to the sea, and from the sea to the rear of Lee's army in 1865, even to the detail, which had been arranged, that Sir Henry Clinton, after his return to New York, should send an expedition to land at Portsmouth, Virginia, which, moving across that State, should meet Cornwallis on his arrival there, who, with the joint forces, was to proceed to Baltimore and thence northward as circumstances would allow. This part of the scheme, it will be observed, was that followed in 1865, when General Terry's expedition was landed at Wilmington and joined Sherman in North Carolina. This was the grand plan which Sir Henry Clinton had undertaken to carry out.

We have seen the result — Charlestown would not at once fall. Her walls would not come down as Jericho's did, not even in six days, though the men of war compassed her about, and the trumpets were blown! Time pressed Sir Henry, but the city would not surrender. Time, indeed, was now very precious to the British. The season for active operations at the North was approaching, and it behooved Sir Henry to get back to New York as soon as possible, lest Washington, taking advantage of his absence, might, with a recruited army, fall upon Knyphausen's depleted force. At last, on the 12th of May, the city capitulated, and Sir Henry at once addressed himself to the securing of the fruits of his victory. He had captured the great bulk of the Continental army in the Southern States, which he held as prisoners. In order to get in the militia of the State, he now offered the same terms to all who would come in and surrender as he had allowed the troops in the city. His offer was accepted, and large numbers laid down their arms, gave their paroles, and accepted certificates of protection of their property. But time was passing, and a new cause for anxiety arose. Late in April the Marquis de Lafayette had arrived at Boston on his return from

his native country, which he had obtained permission to revisit, and where he had been received with every mark of favor and distinction at the Court of Versailles, and from which he had brought information that his Most Christian Majesty had consented to send a considerable land and naval force to assist in the ensuing campaign. The British had learned of this, and it became of the greatest importance that Sir Henry Clinton should bring matters to a close in South Carolina, and be able to return to New York with part of his army before the French expedition should reach America. In this emergency he fell upon the unfortunate device of revoking the paroles he had taken, and issuing a proclamation, on the 3d of June, declaring that all inhabitants of the province who were prisoners on parole and were not in the regular military line, should, from the 20th of that month, be freed and exempted from all such paroles and be restored to all the rights and duties of citizens, and that all such persons who should neglect to return to their allegiance and due submission to his Majesty's government, should be considered as enemies and rebels to the same, and be treated accordingly; upon this point, as we have seen, the continuance of the Revolution in South Carolina turned. Having issued this proclamation, Sir Henry sailed for New York with four thousand men, and reached that place just in time to escape an encounter with the French fleet and army, which arrived at Newport on the 12th of July.

Upon the fall of Charlestown the British troops had at once been advanced into the interior of the State, and the slaughter of a Virginia regiment which had been sent to reënforce Lincoln's army in the South, had taken place in the Waxhaws under circumstances of great atrocity. British posts were established at Ninety Six, Camden, and Cheraw. And so it was that Sir Henry Clinton, just

before his departure for New York, with great assurance, could write to Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for War in England, that he could venture to assert that there were few men in South Carolina who were not either prisoners or with the British. But Lord Cornwallis, his successor, was soon to realize how fallacious were such appearances. The Continental army under Gates, sent by Washington to bar his path on his march to the northward, he had met at Camden, promptly defeated and routed, and the road, at least as far as Cross Creek, the former trysting place, where the British and Tories were to meet and set up the government in the interior, seemed clear and open. But there was a lion in his path!

Misunderstanding the condition of affairs in South Carolina, and assuming, as we have observed, that because the dissenters in New England had been the moving spirits in the Revolution, that the Scotch-Irish Presbyterians in North and South Carolina were likewise rebels, Tarleton and Huck had dashed in among them, slaughtered Buford's men, and cut and slashed among these people, who had really as yet taken but little part in the struggle. The British had, indeed, stirred up a hornet's nest. Scotch-Irish blood was never slow at taking fire! If as rebels they were to be treated, rebels they indeed would be! A man, too, was found to lead them. Sumter, without a commission from either the State or Congress, gathering a little party at Clem's Creek, in the Waxhaws, just below the line between North and South Carolina, was joined there by Hill, Neel, and Lacey, and Henry and Richard Hampton, and the Taylors and Bratton, and McLure and Winn, and Williams and Brandon, and by the Virginians recently come into the province, and refugees from the Low-Country, and these all, with Davie's little band of North Carolinians as a nucleus, formed and organized themselves as partisan

bands to stem the tide of British progress. Assisted only by a few similar small bands from North Carolina and upper Georgia, Sumter first raised the fallen standard of American independence in a country which was overrun by British troops, and claimed by the British commander to be conquered.

Marion, who had fortunately escaped capture upon the fall of Charlestown, had hastened to join the Continental army advancing through North Carolina, and, still more fortunately despised by Gates, had been sent on by that officer to gather up boats on the Pee Dee,—in truth, to get him and his ragged associates away from his regular army. Marion had done more than gather boats on the Pee Dee. There he too raised the standard of independence, and gathered not only boats, but men, and organized a partisan corps like Sumter's. With him were the two Horrys, Peter and Hugh, the Jameses, McCottry, Baxter, and Vanderhorst. These partisan bands in a month, from the 12th of July to the 12th of August, in twelve engagements, had inflicted a loss upon the enemy of five hundred men, at a loss to themselves of but half that number. The field had thus been thoroughly prepared for Gates's advance, but that vainglorious officer had been met by Lord Cornwallis at Camden, and utterly defeated.

The Continental army routed and dispersed, the cause of American independence was now abandoned to the defence of the partisan bands in South Carolina. The French fleet and army, which had arrived at Newport on the 12th of July, having gone into that harbor and disembarked, and the British recovering the command of the water by the arrival of a reënforcement to its navy, had been caught and locked up there, where they remained for a year, "bottled up," to use a later famous expression. Time was now again of the utmost consequence to the British plan

of campaign. If Cornwallis could now have pressed on, reached Cross Creek, and found there the assistance he had been told to expect, had received the expected addition to his army, and had then pushed on to Virginia, it is not improbable he might have carried out the grand plan of campaign while the French lay cooped up at Newport. It behooved him, therefore, to move, and he did so. But he could not throw off the partisans of Sumter, Marion, Davie, Clarke, Shelby, and Sevier. They hung upon his flanks, opposed his march, and broke up his communications, and finally, at King's Mountain, defeated and killed Ferguson and captured his command. Notwithstanding the brilliancy of Tarleton's movements, now after Marion, and then after Sumter, Cornwallis, who had reached Charlotte, in spite of Davie's small corps, which had held him at bay for some time, and had advanced some distance beyond, found himself obliged to abandon his march, so necessary to the accomplishment of the British campaign, and not only himself to return with his army to South Carolina and take position at Winnsboro, but to send to Leslie, whom Sir Henry Clinton had despatched to Virginia to meet him there, orders to abandon the attempt to form a junction with him in Virginia, and to come by sea to Charlestown, and thence to join him at Winnsboro. Thus had these volunteer bands, without assistance from Congress, broken up the plans of the enemy, and detained the army of invasion in the backwoods of South Carolina. In these affairs the partisan bands of North and South Carolina and Georgia had killed, wounded, and taken prisoners of the enemy three times as many men as they had themselves lost.

It is difficult to overestimate the results of the work of these volunteers in South Carolina at this juncture. It is not the language of extravagance to say that they had

rendered the most essential and vital service to the whole country in an hour of its greatest extremity. True, they did not know of the grand ministerial plan which Lord Cornwallis had been charged to carry out, and upon which he was then embarked, and with which they were so materially interfering. They probably did not know that the French fleet, from the assistance of which so much had been expected, was cooped up at Newport, nor how important it was to delay and prevent the consummation of the British plans until it could be released — in short, they did not know what great consequences would flow from their exertions to harass and retard the British on their march through the State; but they acted upon each occasion, as it presented itself, of striking a blow in behalf of liberty; content with performing small things as the opportunity allowed, they accomplished great results in the cause of the common country. Huck's defeat, Flat Rock, Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, Musgrove's Mills, Nelson's Ferry, Fishdam, and Blackstock, and even King's Mountain, were small affairs as great wars go, but they counted up to great proportions in the end. It is not, perhaps, too much to say that at a most critical moment they saved the cause of liberty and independence in America.

But now came General Nathanael Greene—the "*Deputy Saviour*," as he has been almost blasphemously styled—to reap the fruits and the honors not only of what had been already done by the partisan bands, but of what they should thereafter do. General Greene brought with him his staff, and Lee's Legion followed him. We have seen the false position he first took, and the unfortunate letter he wrote to Sumter upon assuming command of the department. It will be remembered how complacently he had regarded his position at Cheraw. It made, he thought,

the most of his inferior force. It compelled his adversary to divide his, and held him in doubt as to his own line of conduct. The enemy could not leave Morgan, whom he had sent to threaten Ninety Six, to come against him, or his post at Ninety Six would be exposed. He could not go after Morgan or prosecute his views upon Virginia while he was there with the whole country before him. He was as near Charlestown as was Cornwallis. But although, he added, there was nothing to obstruct his march to Charlestown, he was far from having such a design in contemplation, in the present relative positions and strength of the two armies. In all this the result showed that General Greene was utterly at fault. He had divided his army, sending Morgan with his best regiment, and all his cavalry except that of Lee's Legion, to the west of the Broad to threaten Ninety Six. Lee's Legion he had sent to Georgetown while he rested upon the eastern bank of the Pee Dee. Morgan defeated Tarleton at Cowpens, but, notwithstanding this, Cornwallis, who had drawn Leslie over the Catawba, and united his command with his own, without hesitation or regard for Greene's position on his flank, moved forward between the Catawba and the Broad on his march to North Carolina. The two great rivers, the Catawba and the Pee Dee, protected his flank, while Lord Rawdon was left at Camden with a force sufficient to forbid any advance by Greene upon Charlestown had the latter contemplated such a movement.

Finding himself mistaken as to the supposed advantages of his position, General Greene appears to have lost his judgment. Turning over the command of what army he had to General Huger, he adopted the most extraordinary course of going himself to hunt Morgan in the woods of North Carolina. With only a guide, one aide, and a sergeant's guard of cavalry, he struck out upon a mad ride

of 125 miles across the county, and across the line of his adversary's advance. Owing to the delay of his lordship at Ramsour's Mill for two days, Greene happily succeeded in finding Morgan, on the 30th of January, at Sherard's Ford. But what was the purpose, or where the necessity, of the exposure of the commander of the department to the betrayal of Tories who infested the country, and other great dangers of such a journey? Was not Morgan quite as able to take care of the small party he had, as was Huger to the safe conduct of the rest of the army? His object, doubtless, was to effect a junction of the two divisions of his army at some point in front of the British advance, and for this purpose to communicate with Morgan. But this would have been effected quite as well by couriers or scouts as by the commander of the department himself in person. Indeed, as soon as he found Morgan, he had to communicate again with Huger, but as he could not, like Oglethorpe in his Florida campaign, be riding back and forth, he had now to content himself with but a letter to Huger.

There was nothing in this first essay of the new commander to inspire confidence in his military judgment. He had manifestly been mistaken in the disposition of his forces, and had been out-manceuvred by his opponent, notwithstanding Morgan's brilliant victory. So evident was this, that, in the popular mind, his utter ruin at the time, says his devoted biographer, was saved only by a miraculous rise of the Yadkin, which prevented the British advance. What really did save him was the delay of Cornwallis at Ramsour's Mill to destroy his baggage. Then had followed the campaign in North Carolina, culminating in the battle of Guilford Court-house, in which Greene was defeated, but Cornwallis, crippled by his losses, unable to take advantage of his victory, and falling back to the

coast for supplies, became the pursued instead of the pursuer.

In the meanwhile, though the State had again been abandoned by the Continental army, the war had not therefore ceased in her limits. Sumter and Marion had not retired from the field, though the former was suffering badly from the wound received at Blackstock in November. In the three months of Greene's absence, in 1781, the partisan bands had now added twenty-six more engagements to the same number they had fought in 1780. Sumter with his rough riders had raided around Lord Rawdon's position at Camden, had attacked Fort Granby and the post at Thomson's plantation, and taken a large convoy and train on its way thither, and had taken Orangeburgh. He had thus penetrated between Camden and Ninety Six, had broken in upon Lord Rawdon's communications, and completing the circle, had ended his campaign in an affair at the Waxhaws from which point he had started. In the same time Marion had been particularly busy, and had done some of his most brilliant work. He successfully baffled the concerted movements of Watson, Doyle, and McLeroth directed by Lord Rawdon to crush him. He had fought with more or less success the affairs of Wiboo Swamp, Mount Hope, Black River, Sampit Bridge, Snow Island, and Witherspoon's Ferry. He had sent Harden with a part of his command across the country to the lower part of the State, where Harden with brilliant success had carried the war into the rice fields, and taken post after post where the British looked not for an enemy. The partisan bands had thus again prepared the way for the return of the Continental army.

General Greene having followed Lord Cornwallis to Ramsay's Mill, where his lordship changed the direction of his retreat, and from the road to South Carolina to that

to Wilmington, Greene now made the movement upon which his reputation as a military leader has in great measure been built. But it has clearly appeared, as we think, that not only did General Greene not originate the plan, but that he never cordially approved it. He complained to Colonel Lee that he had been misled by him in adopting it. Preparatory to his movement into South Carolina, he writes to Sumter to join him when he reached the State. He calls upon Sumter for reënforcements, as if Sumter had a regularly organized body of militia at his command, which he could bring out at any time if he chose. He misreads Sumter's plain reply, and lays up against him a lasting complaint that he had failed at this time to meet him with one thousand men independently of Marion's followers. He marches to attack Lord Rawdon, who, taking the initiative, moves out from Camden, meets, attacks, and defeats him at Hobkirk's Hill. Upon this defeat he determines again to abandon the State, and is only deterred from doing so by learning that Lord Rawdon, notwithstanding his victory, had evacuated Camden and was on his retreat towards Charlestown.

It was Sumter's, Marion's, and Harden's work during Greene's absence from the State that had compelled Rawdon to fall back. At Nelson's Ferry his lordship was met by Colonel Balfour, the commander at Charlestown, with the report that the whole country was once more in rebellion, and the provincial troops in the city in mutiny. In the meanwhile Sumter, Marion, and Lee had been busy again in Lord Rawdon's rear. Orangeburgh, Fort Motte, and Granby had been taken, and Sumter had ridden with his men to within fifty miles of Charlestown; he had scoured the country, capturing horses and securing all the means of transportation in the way. Now was the time, he urged upon Greene, to strike a decisive blow. He urged

him to call in all his forces, and, uniting them in one, to fall upon Rawdon's retreating army. True Lord Rawdon had not many days before defeated him at Hobkirk's Hill, but the prestige of that success had been entirely lost by his lordship's retreat, and by Balfour's discouraging reports of the rising of the people of the Low-Country. But Greene preferred to follow the old rule, never to leave a fortress in the rear, and turned aside to take the fort at Ninety Six, instead of pressing on after Rawdon. There he was not only detained for three whole weeks of the most precious time, but was repulsed, and obliged to raise the siege. While he lay before the post at Ninety Six, accident brought in British reënforcements, Rawdon was saved, and the country which the partisan bands had rescued from British control was again in their possession.

Pickens and Lee had, however, in the meanwhile, taken Augusta, and Rawdon, finding himself unable to hold Ninety Six, abandoned it as it would have been abandoned before had not Greene's investure prevented the receipt by Colonel Cruger, the commandant, of Rawdon's order for the purpose. Then, too late, Greene had given Sumter leave with Lee and all the partisan bands to make a dash towards Charlestown, to drive into its immediate vicinity the British outlying forces. The expedition was well planned, and its result brilliant in many of its details, but not as fully successful as it might have been had it not been for the jealousies of its leaders. Wade Hampton and Lee had indeed reached the very gates of the town, and killed, wounded, and captured the guards at the post but four miles from the city. The battle of Quinby Bridge had been fought, and fought not altogether unsuccessfully, but its complete success had not been attained because of the want of a cordial coöperation of the various bands

composing Sumter's command, especially by the want of Lee's usual zeal and activity.

In the meanwhile, a general exchange of prisoners had taken place, under which the exiles at St. Augustine, the original leaders in the Revolution, had been released, but forbidden to return to the State, and their families banished from Charlestown. Contemporaneously therewith had occurred the capture and tragic death of Colonel Isaac Hayne.

Upon the advance of Lord Cornwallis in January, and the abandonment of the State by General Greene, Governor Rutledge, it will be remembered, had gone to Philadelphia, where he remained for some months, endeavoring to obtain assistance from Congress. As most of the State had now been recovered, he had returned, bringing with him some few necessaries, medical stores, etc., but nothing more. Establishing himself at Camden, he began, under the great powers with which he was invested, to arrange for the restoration of some form of civil government and the reorganization of the militia in the recovered territory. For this purpose he had issued the proclamation for the election and convening of a General Assembly we have discussed. We have seen the work of the body thus convened — the Jacksonborough Assembly, as it was called — presenting the singular phenomenon of the most unwise and unjust legislation enacted by one of the most distinguished bodies that ever sat in this or any other State of the Union. Governor Rutledge's reorganization of the militia resulted in the loss to the service of both Sumter and Harden.

The battle which should have been fought in May, while the British were in consternation at the numerous successes of the partisan bands and the rising of the people, and before the arrival of the fleet with reënforcements from Ireland, was now to take place — the last pitched battle of

the Revolution in South Carolina, and the last except that of Yorktown in the United States. It was fought, and both sides claimed the victory; but Greene retired from the field, while Colonel Stuart, who commanded the British force, held it for the night, but was obliged to abandon it the next day and to fall back to Monck's Corner. Much blood was still to be shed in South Carolina, and many dreadful scenes between Whigs and Tories were to be enacted; but none of these in any appreciable degree affected the situation of the contending parties. It is curious that, while the British were generally successful in the affairs and engagements in 1782, the general result was to drive in and circumscribe their forces into narrow and still narrower limits.

It is difficult to understand the persistent hostility of Greene and Lee to Sumter; it is still more so to understand the unwillingness of Marion to submit to his command, or even to coöperate with him, though appealed to by Governor Rutledge upon the subject; but most of all we are at a loss to account for the manifest coolness of Governor Rutledge himself to one who, in the darkest hour of his country, had raised its fallen flag and stemmed the tide of conquest, and whom he, Rutledge himself, had put in command of all the militia. We can understand to some extent the jealousy of Greene and of Lee of the fame which had already begun to attach to Sumter's name; we can, with regret, understand that Marion may have indulged somewhat the same sentiment, though it was so unlike his character in every respect; but we cannot refrain from asking ourselves where was the occasion of any such motive on the part of John Rutledge? And yet, when at the instance of Greene he discriminated between Sumter's and Marion's men in favor of the latter, and practically broke up Sumter's command, he must have contemplated

Sumter's resentment and resignation, and determined upon the course at the risk of losing his services. There is in this strong inference that there must have been in Sumter's conduct something calling for such action, and yet, as we remember, it was but a few weeks before that the governor had assured Sumter that he had heard nothing to his disparagement, and that should he do so, in justice to his merits and services, he would most certainly suspend judgment until he could hear from him in the matter. Reading the correspondence between Greene and Sumter alone, no one would imagine that there was the least difference or unkind feeling between them. Greene makes no complaint to Sumter of his conduct, and upon occasions is most flattering to him; Sumter is most assiduous in his letters to Greene, writing not only almost daily, but at times repeatedly in the same day; nor in all these letters of his can we find a suspicion upon his part of the want of the most entire confidence in him on the part of his commander; and yet we have the contemporaneous correspondence between Greene and Lee, carried on in part in cipher, in which they join in speaking of Sumter in the most disparaging manner, and heaping upon him the responsibility and blame for all the failures of the campaign. Is it any wonder that, in after life, when he came to know the truth, Sumter should entertain the deepest resentment against Greene, who, he learned, had to others belittled and misrepresented all he had done, had intrigued for his removal, and finally driven him from the field?

The Jacksonborough Assembly, however unwise in its enactments and unjust to the Loyalists, was most generous to General Greene. With Sumter and Marion sitting in the Senate, and all the other partisan leaders in one or other House of the body, while nothing was said or done for Moultrie, Sumter, Marion, or Pickens,

honors were heaped upon Greene with material and pecuniary rewards. These he accepted as due him of right. He took the plantation—"Boone's Barony," as it was called—and the negroes and the money, and turned upon the State which bestowed them. The British fleet had scarcely crossed the bar of Charlestown harbor, relieving him of further hostilities, when he turned his guns upon the people of South Carolina, as if he was their conqueror and they his subjects. In a State with a civil government fully established, and the people ready to do what they could to support his army,—the whole burden of which was left upon them without assistance from other States,—an army few of whom had borne any part in the rescue of the State from the British, most of whom had come into South Carolina only when the fighting was over, and there to mutiny! he claimed the right to impress as if in a hostile territory. He needlessly offended the people by setting up with a parade of knowledge of international law the far-fetched doctrine of *postliminy*, that his officers might indulge their fancy as horsemen by retaining the high-bred animals recaptured from the enemy,—an exercise of mere arbitrary power certain to give great offence, and for which nothing was to be attained in comparison with the injury it would inflict upon the sentiment of his people. From the needless impressment of such horses in Virginia, Greene and the Continental army were at this time in the greatest unpopularity in that State. Then, in the controversy with Governor Guerard over the flag from Governor Tonyn of Florida, whatever may have been the merits of the question involved, General Greene's conduct was not only undignified and petulant, but unwise and most unfortunate in the impression which it left upon the minds of the people of the State.

General Greene's whole conduct in South Carolina was, indeed, most unfortunate in its influence upon the future relations of the State to the general government. To the minds of many his purpose seemed to have been scarcely less to put down State pride and State assertion, than to overthrow British rule. It was not then known, it is true, how in his private correspondence, with persons of influence near Congress, he was belittling and sneering at the conduct of her heroes, while to them he was writing most flattering letters; but his flattery could scarcely conceal his real unfriendliness to them and to their followers, whom he described as serving more for plunder than from the love of liberty. It did not escape observation that, when he made triumphal entry into the city upon its evacuation by the British, no State officer had been called upon to be present, though Marion and all his officers were within reach; nor was Wade Hampton—who the year before had cut his way to the very gates of the town,—beyond call. The only officer of South Carolina whom he allowed to accompany him was Moultrie, who was in the Continental line, and who, however brilliant had been his career in the earlier days of the war, had been a prisoner during the occupation of the city by the British, and thus had had nothing to do with the recovery of the State. The grand entry of the recovered town was made by General Wayne and his mutinous troops from Pennsylvania, who had fought no battle in South Carolina. Then, assuming a grand air of importance, superiority, and patronage, and in a manner somewhat at least as that of a dictator, he assumes to address the General Assembly upon matters under their consideration with which he had no concern. In the issue with Governor Guerard, he defies the chief magistrate of the State and contemptuously overrides her statutes.

It is true that there were those of the State who sus-

tained and upheld General Greene in these, as in all other matters, for there were already the germs of the Federal party forming in the Continental line, soon to develop into the Cincinnati Society, and thence into that political organization, and in the debates of Congress ten and twelve years later (1792-94), upon the question of the relief of Greene's estate from embarrassment, growing out of the Banks contracts, we shall find the delegates for South Carolina in the House of Representatives dividing upon that line, the Federalists, Robert Barnwell, Robert Goodloe Harper, and William Loughton Smith supporting the bills for relief, while the Republicans, Sumter, Hampton, and Winn oppose them. These votes, too, it will be observed, divide also locally. The Low-County representatives uphold Greene's course, while those of the Up-Country condemn it. It will be further observed that it is Sumter and his old leaders in the field, Hampton and Winn, that in Congress resist the claims of Greene's estates as growing out of his own wrong; and so it was that the Republican or Democratic party in South Carolina gathered around Sumter and his leaders, as did the Federalists around the Continental officers. It is most interesting again to observe, if we shall look, that in the votes in the State Convention which subsequently adopted the Constitution of the United States, the same lines are generally followed. The Federalists, the members of the old Continental Congress, the original movers in the Revolution, the St. Augustine exiles, under the Rutledges, the Pinckneys, and Gadsden, who advocated its adoption, coming almost entirely from the Low-Country; while the heroes from the Up-Country, Sumter and his old followers, Hill and Lacey, the three Hamptons (Wade, Richard, and John), Taylor, Brandon, Thomas, and Butler, were the Republicans who opposed the adoption of that instrument and carried with

them fifty-two out of the seventy-three votes in the convention against its adoption. The vote was almost solidly the upper country under Sumter against the lower under the Continentals. General Greene's conduct, especially his course in regard to Sumter, had much, very much, to do with the formation of parties in the State.

It has been said that however true it is that individuals in South Carolina took an early and a noble stand against the oppressive measures of the British ministry, that though it is equally true that South Carolina was the first of the thirteen States to form an independent constitution, and that she overpaid her proportion of expenditures of the war in the sum of \$1,205,978, that though it is also true that she sent some gallant Whigs to the field, and several wise ones to the council, that statistics show, nevertheless, that she failed far in furnishing men for the cause; and that it will not do in answer to this charge to point to the many battle-fields in the State; that the exact question is not where were the battle-grounds of the Revolution, but what was the portion of men each of the thirteen States supplied for the contest?¹ We have taken occasion in a preceding volume to show how fallacious and impossible are the figures given in Knox's Report to Congress in 1790, upon the authority of which this criticism is based, especially as the same are amplified by the author who makes it. We have pointed out that, even in the case of South Carolina itself, the population could not have furnished the number of men she is credited with, still less a greater number; and we then asked the pertinent question which we venture again to repeat, viz.: If so be that there were so many Americans in the field, where did they fight, and why did they not drive the British from the continent without waiting for the as-

¹ *The American Loyalists*, by Lorenzo Sabine, 30, 31.

sistance of the French?¹ But the question recurs: Is it true that South Carolina failed to furnish her portion of men to the cause of freedom and independence? Is it or is it not a fact that, while her territory was the battle-field of the struggle during its last three years, her sons took but little part in the war that was waged upon her soil? This charge, so grave, is not to be answered by indignant denial, however natural and true such denial might be. It must be answered, if it is to be effectively, by the record. But here her historians find themselves in difficulty. For, as we have had occasion so often before to observe, the peculiarity of the condition of affairs in the State during this time precluded contemporaneous record of those who followed her partisan leaders. As there was no government in the State outside of the military rule of the British within the lines held for a time securely by them, there was no such thing as a militia in the American service until the reorganization of the government by Governor Rutledge in the fall of 1781. Hence there were no rolls. The men who did the fighting in South Carolina under Sumter, Marion, and Pickens were purely volunteers, partisan soldiers who came and went, and fought as the occasion demanded, without the prospect or hope of pay or reward. It is true that in years afterwards rolls were made upon which a grateful State issued pensions and rewards, and these rolls may yet be found among miscellaneous records which were saved when the capital of the State was burned in 1865, but which have not yet been arranged, and remain in a confused mass in a room in the State-House. But as from the very nature of the case there were no field returns made at the time of the severest fighting, there being no government to receive them, South Carolina never can

¹ *History of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775-80* (McCrary), 289-300.

show by record the exact number of her sons who took part in the struggle, nor even approximately so. But this her historians can safely say, that, from the very nature of the warfare that existed in her borders, there were few men living who did not serve at one time or another upon one side or the other in the great contest. It was a time in which there was no such thing as neutrality, nor place in which there was a spot for safety.

But while her historians cannot find militia rolls to swell the numbers of those who rendered services important or trifling as the case may be, they can point to the list of battles, actions, and engagements which took place in South Carolina, which, if analyzed, will answer most emphatically the question which has been asked.

From a carefully prepared Table, which appears as an appendix to this volume, it will be seen that there are recorded one hundred and thirty-seven battles, actions, and engagements which took place in the State. Doubtless some of these were very small affairs, scarcely more than skirmishes, but the list contains no smaller affairs than are to be found in the list of battles which took place in other States;¹ it enumerates as but one the siege of Charlestown, which lasted fifty-three days, and included several bloody actions, and as but one each also the sieges of Forts Watson, Granby, and Ninety Six, each of which occupied several days in its operations. If we analyze this table we shall see that in the first two years of the war, 1775-76, there were nine

¹ See Chronological List of Battles, Actions, etc., appended to Heitman's *Historical Register of the Continental Army, 1775-1783*. This list analyzed gives the number of battles in the respective States as follows: New York 90, South Carolina 54, New Jersey 34, Georgia 24, North Carolina 21, Massachusetts 15, Canada 15, Connecticut 14, Virginia 14, Rhode Island 5, Pennsylvania 3, Delaware 3, Indiana 3, Vermont 2, Maine 1, Florida 1, Kentucky 1, Chesapeake 1, Lake Ontario 1, Nova Scotia 1, elsewhere 3—in all 312.

battles in South Carolina, — one, the great victory of Fort Moultrie, in which none but Carolinians, North and South, took part, nor any blood but that of South Carolina was shed. In the other eight none but South Carolinians fought for the American cause. For three years there were no military operations in South Carolina, but her Continentals were wasted in a fruitless expedition to Florida in 1778. In 1779, when the war turned southward, there were nine affairs in South Carolina, and in these none but her own Continentals and militia took part. In a preceding volume, we have shown that in 1780 there had been thirty-four engagements in the State, in eight of which Continental troops had taken part, and in the remaining twenty-six only partisan bands.¹ To the twenty-six should be added two in the early affairs of Beckham's Old Field and Mobley Meeting-house (omitted in that list because of the want of any account of casualties in either of them on either side). In four of these partisan affairs, *i.e.* Gowen's Old Fort, Flat Rock, Hanging Rock, and Wahub's Plantation, North Carolinians only were engaged; and in the battle of Camden there were no South Carolina troops present; in nine other partisan conflicts there were men from the three States of North and South Carolina and Georgia; in twenty-two there were none but South Carolinians. From the advent of Greene to the end of the war, *i.e.* during the years 1781–82, it will be seen by the table appended that there were eighty-three battles, etc., fought, and that in these the Continentals from other Southern States, under Greene alone, took part in nine; that South Carolinians took part with these Continentals in ten, and that they fought sixty-four without assistance from any one coming from beyond the borders of the State. To recapitulate, then, of the one hundred and thirty-seven battles, actions,

¹ *History of So. Ca. in the Revolution, 1775–80* (McCrary), 850–853.

and engagements, between the British and Tories and Indians on the one hand, and the American Whigs on the other, which took place in South Carolina during the Revolution, *one hundred and three* were fought by South Carolinians alone, in twenty others South Carolinians took part with troops from other States, making in all *one hundred and twenty-three* battles in which South Carolinians fought, within the borders of their State, for the liberties of America; leaving but fourteen in which troops from other States fought within the same without her assistance. Besides the battles fought in their own State, South Carolinians fought twice at Savannah and twice at Augusta. They were with Howe when he was defeated by Colonel Campbell at Savannah in December, 1778, and bore a conspicuous part in the siege of that place by Lincoln and D'Estaing in 1779. They took part with Clarke and McCall at the first siege of Augusta in 1780, and under Pickens and Lee in the second in 1781. They fought and pursued the Indians over the borders of North Carolina and Georgia. A few of them under Pickens and Lee were with Greene in his North Carolina campaign. Is not this a sufficient answer to the question as to the proportion of men which she furnished to the general cause? Can any State show better?

The condition of affairs in South Carolina was without parallel in the history of the Revolution. No other State was so completely overrun by British forces. There was no part of her territory, from the mountains to the seaboard, which was not trod by hostile forces, no ford nor ferry that was not crossed by armed men in pursuit or retreat, no swamp that was not cover to lurking foes. No other State was so divided upon the questions at issue, and in none other did the men of both sides so generally participate in the struggle. In none other were Tory organi-

zations from other States so much used in connection with Royal troops to subdue American Whigs, thus attempting to carry out the British ministerial plan of overcoming Americans by Americans. While South Carolina received but little assistance from any State but North Carolina, and none from the North, her territory was garrisoned by Americans serving in the British army enlisted from Connecticut, from New York, from New Jersey, and from Pennsylvania. The British forces at King's Mountain and at Ninety Six were composed entirely of provincials raised in Northern States. Northern States furnished also several excellent Tory officers who operated with the British army in South Carolina. Among these were Lieutenant-Colonels Turnbull and Cruger and Major Sheridan of New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Allen of New Jersey, and two brilliant cavalry leaders from Massachusetts, Major John Coffin and Colonel Benjamin Thompson, afterwards Count Rumford. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, furnished the notorious Huck whose career was, however, soon ended. Connecticut sent the infamous Dunlap, and Maryland the robber Maxwell. In no other State was the civil government set up by the Revolutionists so completely overthrown, and the country so given over to anarchy. The citizens of no other State suffered exile for the American cause as did those from South Carolina at St. Augustine. In other States the militia was occasionally engaged in operations with the Continental forces, and sometimes, though rarely alone, in enterprises against the enemy. The complete overthrow of all civil government in South Carolina, rendering the employment of militia on either side within her borders impracticable, in their place partisan bands were organized by the Whigs, upon the nucleus of the old militia organizations, and, practically self-maintained for the last three years of the

war, again and again upheld the struggle while there was not a Continental soldier in the State. The names of Sumter, Marion, and Pickens stand out in the history and romance of the United States, occupying a peculiar and unique position. And yet, neither they nor their followers could, for the brilliant services they rendered, be admitted to the Cincinnati Society. In no other State was there so much fighting and bloodshed. No State contributed so liberally of her means to the common cause of her sister States, a cause which was not originally hers; no State, we venture to assert, furnished so many men in proportion to her population in the actual warfare which ensued, nor so few upon the pension rolls of the country after it was over. More than a hundred battle-fields dot the map of South Carolina and blazon the glorious struggle of her people.

We may be permitted, in conclusion, to quote again, as we have before done in a former volume, the tribute of the great American historian to the conduct of the people of South Carolina when practically abandoned by Congress and its army.

“Left mainly to her own resources,” says Bancroft, *“it was through the depths of wretchedness, that her sons were to bring her back to her place in the republic, after suffering more and daring more and achieving more than the men of any other State.”*

APPENDIX A

LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE ELECTED IN 1781 UNDER GOVERNOR RUTLEDGE'S PROCLAMATION,¹ WHICH MET IN JACKSONBOROUGH IN JANUARY, 1782. COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE JACKSONBOROUGH ASSEMBLY.

PARISHES OF ST. PHILIP AND ST. MICHAEL, CHARLESTOWN

Senators

Arthur Middleton and Col. Isaac Motte.

Representatives

Thomas Bee, Adænus Burke, Richard Beresford, John Blake, Edward Darrell, Nicholas Eveleigh, John Edwards, Thomas Grimball, Wm. Hasell Gibbes, John F. Grinké, Thomas Heyward, Jr., Thomas Jones, Henry Laurens, John Laurens, William Lee, Alexander Moultrie, Richard Lushington, John Neufville, Jr., John Owen, Thomas Pinckney, Col. James Postell, John Ernest Poyas, Edward Rutledge, Davis Ramsay, Hugh Rutledge, Jacob Read, Thomas Savage, Daniel Stevens, Anthony Toomer, Charles Warham.

ST. ANDREW'S PARISH

Senator

Col. William Scott.

Representatives

Peter Bocquet, Benjamin Cattell, Thomas O. Elliott, Richard Hutson, Solomon Milner, John Rutledge.

PARISH OF ST. GEORGE, DORCHESTER

Senator

Dr. David Oliphant.

Representatives

Edward Blake, Gen. Isaac Huger, John Mathews, Captain William Moultrie, Jr., Charles C. Pinckney, Daniel Stuart, Dr. Thomas Tudor Tucker, Thomas Waring.

PARISH OF ST. JAMES, GOOSE CREEK

Senator

William Logan.

Representatives

John Baddeley, Alexander Broughton, Thomas Elliott (of Wappoo), George Flagg, Ralph Iazard, William Johnson.

¹ This list is taken from the diary of Josiah Smith, Jr., and so far as we know such a list is not to be obtained elsewhere, as the journals of this legislature cannot now be found.

PARISH OF ST. JOHN'S, BERKELEY

Senator

Gen. Francis Marion.

Representatives

Alexander Broughton, John Cordes, Gabriel Gignilliat, Richard Gough, Thomas Giles, John Frier-son.

PARISH OF ST. JAMES, SANTEE

Senator

Richard Withers.

Representatives

Henry Hughes, Mark Huggins, Joseph Legaré, Lewis Miles, Alexander McGregor, Anthony Simons.

CHRIST CHURCH PARISH

Senator

Arnoldus Vander Horst.

Representatives

John Berwick, Clement Brown, John Sandford Dart, William Scott, Jr., John Vander Horst, James Vander Horst.

PARISH OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. DENIS

Senator

Isaac Harleston.

Representatives

Joseph Fogartie, Hopson Pinckney, Thomas Shubrick, Benjamin Simons, Robert Quash, Edward Weyman.

ST. STEPHEN'S PARISH

Senator

Joseph Palmer.

Representatives

Col. Hezekiah Maham, Thomas Cooper, John Palmer, Peter Sinkler, James Sinkler, Benjamin Walker.

ST. PAUL'S PARISH

Senator

Joseph Bee.

Representatives

Thomas Bee, Thomas Ferguson, George Livingston, Christopher Peters, Joseph Slann, Morton Wilkin-son.

ST. BARTHOLOMEW'S PARISH

Senator

John Lloyd.

Representatives

Joseph Glover, Sr., Edmund Hyrne, James Postell, Jr., Richard Singleton, William Skirving, John Ward.

PRINCE WILLIAM'S PARISH

Senator

Col. William Harden.

Representatives

Major William Davis, Dr. Aaron Gillet, Thomas Hutson, John McPherson, Capt. Andrew Postell, James Smith.

PARISH OF ST. HELENA

Senator

Benjamin Guerard.

Representatives

Pierce Butler, Glen Drayton, Jacob Guerard, Thomas Heyward, John Kean, Charles C. Pinckney.

ST. PETER'S PARISH

Senator

Cornelius Dupont.

Representatives

Thomas Cater, Charles Dupont,
James Moore, John Moore, William
Stafford, Col. James Thompson.

PARISHES OF PRINCE GEORGE AND
ALL SAINTS*Senator*

Col. Hugh Horry.

PRINCE GEORGE

Representatives

Gen. Christopher Gadsden, Col.
Peter Horry, Major William Beni-
son, Capt. Thomas Mitchell.

ALL SAINTS

Representatives

William Alston, Nathaniel Dwight.

PRINCE FREDERICK'S PARISH

Senator

Samuel Smith.

Representatives

Major John Baxter, Major John
James, Capt. William McCottry,
Capt. John McCauley, Col. James
Postell, Thomas Potter.

ST. DAVID'S PARISH

Senator

William Thomas.

Representatives

Col. Lemuel Benton, Capt. Dewitt,
Capt. Pledger, William Pegues,
Capt. Pegues, Major Thomas.

PARISHES OF ST. MATTHEW AND
ORANGE*Senator*

Col. William Thomson.

Representatives

Henry Felder, William Mydelton,
William Reid, Richard A. Rapley,
John A. Truetlin.

SAXE GOTHA ELECTION DISTRICT

Senator

William Arthur.

Representatives

Col. Jonas Beard, Joseph Culpeper,
Uriah Goodwyn, Wade Hamp-
ton, Richard Hampton, Dr. Jacob
Richmond.

DISTRICT BETWEEN BROAD AND
CATAWBA RIVERS*Senator*

Col. Thomas Taylor.

Representatives

Major Adair, Col. Hunter, Joseph
Kirkland, William Kirkland, Major
Lyle, Col. Edward Lacey, Major
Miles, Major Pearson, William
Reeves, Col. Richard Winn.

UPPER OR SPARTAN DISTRICT BE-
TWEEN BROAD AND SALUDA RIVERS*Senator*

Simon Berwick.

Representatives

Col. William Henderson, Col.
Thomas Brandon, Samuel McJun-
kin, Col. John Thomas, Jr.

LITTLE RIVER DISTRICT BETWEEN
BROAD AND SALUDA RIVERS

Senator

Col. Levi Casey.

Representatives

Benjamin Kilgore, — Montgomery, Dr. Ross, Capt. Wild.

LOWER DISTRICT BETWEEN BROAD
AND SALUDA RIVERS

Senator

Major Gordon.

Representatives

David Glynn, Michael Leitner, George Roof, Philemon Waters.

NINETY SIX ELECTION DISTRICT

Senator

John Lewis Gervais.

Representatives

Robert Anderson, Patrick Calhoun, John Ewing Colhoun, Le Roy Hammond, James Moore, Hugh Middleton, John Murray, Gen. Andrew Pickens, Arthur Simkins.

CAMDEN ELECTION DISTRICT

Senator

General Thomas Sumter.

Representatives

James Bradley, Samuel Dunlap, Wood Furman, Capt. Gordon, John Gamble, Col. John James, Joseph Kershaw, Joseph Lee, Richard Richardson, William Welch.

NEW ACQUISITION

Senator

Col. Watson.

Representatives

John Fergus, William Hill, Joseph Howe, William Howe, David Linch, John McCaw, Joseph McKinney, John Moffat, John Patton, Frame Wood.

DISTRICT BETWEEN THE EDISTO AND
SAVANNAH RIVERS

Senator

Stephen Smith.

Representatives

John Collins, William Dunbar, Robert Lusk, John Parkinson, William Robison, George Robison.

There was no election in the parish of St. John's, Colleton, as the islands composing that parish were in the hands of the enemy.

APPENDIX B

TABLE OF BATTLES, ACTIONS, AND ENGAGEMENTS WHICH

AMERICAN										
Battle or Action, etc.	Place (What is now)	Date	Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	Amenities
1 Naval battle	Charleston Har-	11 & 12 Nov.	Simon Tufts	70						
2 Ninety Six	Abbeville Co.	1775 19 & 21 Nov.	Williamson	562	1	12	13			
3 Great Cane Brake	Anderson Co.	22 Dec. 1775	Thomson	1300		1	1			
4 Cherokee Indian Town	Anderson Co.	26 June 1776	McCall	33	4					1
5 Fort Moultrie	Charlest'n Harb'r	28 June 1776	Moultrie	6522	33	63	96			
6 Lyndley's Fort, Ray- burn's Creek	Laurens Co.	15 July 1776	Downes	150						
7 Essenecca	Anderson Co.	1 Aug. 1776	Williamson	330	3	14	17			
8 Oconore	Oconee Co.	8 Aug. 1776	Williamson	640						
9 Tomassy	Oconee Co.	11 Aug. 1776	Williamson	640	6	17	23			
10 Beaufort	Beaufort Co.	12 Feb. 1779	Moultrie	300	8	22	30			
11 Cherokee Ford, Sa- vannah River	Abbeville Co.	14 Feb. 1779	Anderson			16				16
12 Coosawhatchie	Beaufort Co.	3 May 1779	Laurens	350						
13 Charlestown (Pré- vost)	Charleston Co.	11 to 13 May 1779	Moultrie	2500						
14 Stono	Charleston Co.	20 June 1779	Lincoln	1090	50	115	165			
15 Galley fight, Stono River	Charleston Co.	June 1779	Pyne				6			
16 Mathews's Planta- tion (Stono)	Charleston Co.	June 1779	Mathews							
17 Capture of seven British vessels	Charleston Co.	June 1779	Hall & Tryon							
18 Schooner <i>Rattle- snake</i> (Stono)	Charleston Co.	June 1779	Frisby							
19 Salkehatchie	Colleton Co.	18 Mar. 1780	Ladson	50	17	4	21			29
20 Pon Pon	Colleton Co.	20 Mar. 1780	Washington	10						4
21 Rantowle's	Charleston Co.	27 Mar. 1780	Washington							
22 Monck's Corner	Berkeley Co.	12 Apr. 1780	Huger	100	15	18	33			
23 Siege of Charlestown	Charleston Co.	Mar., Apr., May 1780	Lincoln		89	169	258			568
24 Lenud's Ferry	Berkeley Co.	18 May 1780	White	300	10	25	35			
25 Beckham's Old Field	Chester Co.	May 1780	McLure	30						
26 Mobley's Meeting- house	Fairfield Co.	May 1780	Bratton							
27 Buford's Massacre	Lancaster Co.	29 May 1780	Buford	350	113	150	263			53
28 Williamson's Planta- tion	York Co.	12 July 1780	Bratton	260			1			
29 Brandon's Camp	Union Co.	July 1780	Brandon	70						
30 Stallions	York Co.	July 1780	Brandon	50	1					

APPENDIX B

BOOK PLACE IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING THE REVOLUTION

BRITISH, TORY, OR INDIAN

Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	Aggregate Loss
Wormborough							130 shots fired ; no casualties
Robinson	1890			20		20	Ninety Six besieged by Tories ; siege raised
Birmingham, P. Indian chief		5				130	Tories defeated
Clinton Indian chief	2800 190	2		200		13	First complete American victory
Indian chief		1	3	4			4
Indian chief		16					16
Indian chief							20
Hardiner	200			13		7	7
Wynd							100
							See McCall's <i>Hist. of Georgia</i> , 196, 197
Prévost	2400			45			45
							No account of British loss Prévost lays siege to Charleston
Maitland Maitland	500	26	103	129			129
							One of the hardest-fought battles of the war No account of British loss
Denwick							
	60						
							An affair in which most of Beaufort company were killed or wounded No account of casualties
							British loss, captain and greater part of men
Matterson Tarleton			2				2
Tarleton							2
Tarleton						7	7
Tarleton	150			2			2
Clinton	13000	78	139	267		20	287
							Americans surprised and routed Charleston besieged and taken
Tarleton	150			2			2
Orry	200						
							Americans dispersed { No account of casualties. First uprising of the people { Tories routed on both occasions
Tarleton	700	5	14	19			19
Huck	115	35	50	85			85
							Buford's Virginia regiment destroyed Huck defeated and slain
Orry Orry		2	4	6		28	34
							Brandon's party routed Tories defeated

AMERICAN										
Battle or Action, etc.	Place (What is now)	Date	Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	Amputations
31 Cedar Springs	Spartanburg Co.	13 July 1780	Thomas	60						
32 Gowen's Old Fort	Spartanburg Co.	13 & 14 July 1780	Jones							
33 McDowell's Camp	Spartanburg Co.	16 July 1780	Hampton, Ed.	52	8	30	38			
34 Flat Rock	Kershaw Co.	20 July 1780	Davie	80	1	3	4			
35 Thicketty Fort	Spartanburg Co.	30 July 1780	McDowell	600			6			
36 Hunt's Bluff	Darlington Co.	1 Aug. 1780	Gillespie							
37 Rocky Mount	Lancaster Co.	1 Aug. 1780	Sumter	380						
38 Hanging Rock	Lancaster Co.	1 Aug. 1780	Davie	80						
39 Hanging Rock	Lancaster Co.	6 Aug. 1780	Sumter & Davie	300			100			
40 Old Iron Works or 2d Cedar Springs	Spartanburg Co.	8 Aug. 1780	Clarke & Shelby	600	4	20	24			
41 Port's Ferry	Williamsburg Co.	15 Aug. 1780	Marion	250		2	2			
42 Wateree	Kershaw Co.	15 Aug. 1780	Sumter	700						
43 Camden	Kershaw Co.	16 Aug. 1780	Gates	3500			800		1270	20
44 Fishing Creek	Chester Co.	18 Aug. 1780	Sumter	700			150		310	4
45 Musgrove's Mills	Laurens Co.	19 Aug. 1780	Clarke & Shelby	200	4	9	18			
46 Nelson's Ferry	Clarendon Co.	20 Aug. 1780	Marion	16	1	1	2			
47 King's Tree	Williamsburg Co.	27 Aug. 1780	Marion	150						
48 Black Mingo	Williamsburg Co.	14 Sept. 1780	Marion	150			50			
49 Parcote	Williamsburg Co.	Sept. 1780	Marion	400						
50 King's Mountain	York Co.	7 Oct. 1780	Campbell	910	28	62	90			
51 Fishdam	Chester Co.	9 Nov. 1780	Sumter	550	1	1	2			
52 Blackstock	Union Co.	20 Nov. 1780	Sumter	420	1	3	4			
53 Rugeley's Mills	Kershaw Co.	4 Dec. 1780	Washington							
54 Long Cane	Abbeville Co.	11 Dec. 1780	Clarke	500	14	7	21			
55 Hammond's Store	Abbeville Co.	30 Dec. 1780	Washington	275						
56 Williams's Planta- tion	Newberry Co.	31 Dec. 1780	Washington							
57 Cowpens	Spartanburg Co.	16 Jan. 1781	Morgan	940	11	61	72			
58 De Peyster's capture	Georgetown Co.	19 Jan. 1781	Postell, John	28						
59 Sampit Road, White's Bridge	Georgetown Co.	Jan. 1781	Horry, Peter							
60 Georgetown	Georgetown Co.	24 Jan. 1781	Marion & Lee		1	2	3			
61 Wadboo	Berkeley Co.	24 Jan. 1781	Postell, Jas.							
62 Monck's Corner	Berkeley Co.	24 Jan. 1781	Postell, John							
63 Singleton's Mill, Halfway Swamp	Clarendon Co.	Feb. 1781	Marion							
64 Fort Granby	Lexington Co.	19 Feb. 1781	Sumter							
65 Thomson's Planta- tion	Orangeburg Co.	23 Feb. 1781	Sumter	100						
66 Wright's Bluff	Clarendon Co.	27 Feb. 1781	Sumter		18		18			
67 Mud Lick	Newberry Co.	2 Mar. 1781	Roebuck	150						
68 Lynch's Creek	Kershaw Co.	6 Mar. 1781	Sumter		18					
69 Wiboo Swamp	Clarendon Co.	6 Mar. 1781	Marion	250						
70 Mount Hope	Williamsburg Co.	Mar. 1781	Marion							
71 Black River	Williamsburg Co.	Mar. 1781	Marion							
72 Sampit Bridge	Georgetown Co.	Mar. 1781	Marion							
73 Snow Island	Marion Co.	Mar. 1781	Marion		7	15	22			
74 Witherspoon's Ferry	Georgetown Co.	Mar. 1781	Marion							
75 Dutchman's Creek	Fairfield Co.	Mar. 1781			18				18	
76 Beattie's Mill	Abbeville Co.	24 Mar. 1781	Pickens							
77 Four Holes	Colleton Co.	7 Apr. 1781	Harden	100						

BRITISH, TORY, OR INDIAN

Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	Aggregate Loss	
Gerguson	150	1	3	4		32	36	Several British killed; rest routed
nes	300	8					8	
arden	150						40	
boore	94					94	94	
ills	100					100	100	
arnbull	300			12			12	
arden	500			50			50	
arden	500						200	
Gerguson	2000		30	30			30	
ainey								Whole body of Tories routed; several killed
rey				7		100	107	
ornwallis	2239	68	245	325		11	336	
arleton	350			16			16	
nes	500	63	90	153		70	223	
captain						176	176	
emyss	300			15		15	30	
ill				60			60	
ynes				26			26	
Gerguson	925	119	123	242		664	906	
emyss	250			20			20	
arleton	500	92	100	192			192	
ageley						104	104	
llen	450			3			3	
ory officer	250			150		40	190	
ningham, R.								Several British and Tories killed and wounded
arleton	1000	60	124	184		600	784	
e Peyster	29					29	29	
ainey								Many British and Tories killed and wounded
campbell								Many British and Tories killed; 5 taken
								No account of losses on either side
eLeroth								No account of losses on either side
								No account of losses on either side
axwell	80			13		66	79	Sumter invests, but relieved by Rawdon
								Sumter repulsed
								Total rout British and Tories
raser							20	
atson	550							British dispersed
atson								British abandon the field
atson								Many British killed
atson								Skirmish
oyle			2				2	
oyle								Sharp fight; no account of casualties
rey								
unlap		34				42	76	
arnton						26	26	

AMERICAN											
	Battle or Action, etc.	Place (What is now)	Date	Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	Aggregate
78	Barton's Post	Colleton Co.	8 Apr. 1781	Cooper		1	2	3			
79	Pocotaligo Road	Colleton Co.	8 Apr. 1781	Cooper			2			1	
80	Waxhaws Church	Lancaster Co.	9 Apr. 1781	Sumter							
81	Fort Balfour, Pocoligo	Beaufort Co.	13 Apr. 1781	Hamden							
82	Fort Watson	Clarendon Co.	15-23 Apr. 1781	Marion & Lee	380	2	6	8			
83	Mathews's Bluff	Edgefield Co.	Apr. 1781	McKoy							
84	Wiggins's Hill	Barnwell Co.	Apr. 1781	Harden		7	11	18		1	
85	Horner's Corner	Edgefield Co.	Apr. 1781	Hammond							
86	Hammond's Mill	Edgefield Co.	Apr. 1781	Hammond							
87	Hobkirk's Hill	Kershaw Co.	25 Apr. 1781	Greene	939	19	113	132	136		2
88	Friday's Ferry	Richland Co.	1 May 1781	Hampton, W.							
89	Bush River	Newberry Co.	May 1781	Thomas							
90	Camden, Evacuation of	Kershaw Co.	10 May 1781	Greene							
91	Orangeburgh	Orangeburg Co.	11 May 1781	Sumter	500						
92	Fort Motte	Orangeburg Co.	11 May 1781	Marion & Lee	380						
93	Granby	Lexington Co.	15 May 1781	Sumter & Lee	300						
94	Beach Island	Aiken Co.	15 May 1781	Clarke		6		6			
95	Fort Galphin	Aiken Co.	21 May 1781	Rudolph							
96	Georgetown	Georgetown Co.	5 June 1781	Marion							
97	Mydelton's ambuscade	Lexington Co.	June 1781	Mydelton	150						1
98	Ninety Six	Abbeville Co.	12 May to 19 June 1781	Greene	1000			185			1
99	Eggleston's capture	Lexington Co.	8 July 1781	Eggleston	50						
100	Horse Shoe	Colleton Co.	8 July 1781	Ilayne		14	1	15			
101	Quarter House	Charleston Co.	15 July 1781	Hampton, W.		1					
102	Wadboo	Berkeley Co.	16 July 1781	Sumter							
103	Quinby Bridge	Berkeley Co.	July 1781	Sumter	700			60			
104	Washington's raid	Berkeley Co.	July 1781	Washington							
105	Cunningham's raid	Laurens Co.	1 Aug. 1781			8		8			
106	Fork of Edisto	Orangeburg Co.	Aug. 1781	Rumph		18		18			
107	Parker's Ferry	Colleton Co.	31 Aug. 1781	Marion	200						
108	Charlestown Road	Berkeley Co.	31 Aug. 1781	Cooper				10			
109	Turkey Creek	Edgefield Co.	6 Sept. 1781								
110	Eutaw	Berkeley Co.	9 Sept. 1781	Greene	2098	139	370	509		8	5
111	Stevens's Creek	Edgefield Co.	5 Oct. 1781	Hammond		8	17	25			
112	Vince's Fort	Barnwell Co.	25 Oct. 1781	Vince							
113	Cloud's Creek	Edgefield Co.	7 Nov. 1781	Turner	30	28		28			
114	Hayes's Station	Laurens Co.	Nov. 1781	Hayes		18					
115	Gowen's Fort	Greenville Co.	Nov. 1781								
116	Moore's surprise	Orangeburg Co.	Nov. 1781	Moore				12			
117	Fair Lawn	Berkeley Co.	27 Nov. 1781	Shelby & Maham	380						
118	R. Hampton's surprise	Orangeburg Co.	Nov. 1781	Hampton, R.		11					
119	Dorchester	Berkeley Co.	1 Dec. 1781	Hampton, W.							
120	Dorchester	Berkeley Co.	29 Dec. 1781	Armstrong		7				8	
121	Vidcau's Bridge	Berkeley Co.	3 Jan. 1782	Richardson		57				20	

BRITISH, TORY, OR INDIAN

Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	Aggregate Loss	
orton		1	3			3	7	
rnwick	35	1	7	3		2	10	
awick	150 91					91	91	British kill and wound several Post captured by Harden
Kay	120					120	120	Post captured by Marion and Lee
ry officer owne	670	16		16			16	Tory party dispersed Harden defeated by Browne
rke ry officer wdon	900	38 18 3	220				258 18 15	Post captured by Hammond Company of Tories captured Greene defeated by Rawdon
wdon						12		
itish officer Pherson	100 150					100 150	100 150	Fort taken by Marion and Lee
xwell owne	310					340	340	Fort taken by Lee
		4				126	130	Marion takes Georgetown without loss Mydelton's command routed
ffin nger	550	27	58	85			85	Siege of Ninety Six
itish officer aser	60					45	45	
ugh ates ates	700	1 7		45		50 100	51 145	
ningham, W. nnaway aser								Party of Royal militia attack and disperse Americans Marion ambuscades British party under Fraser Cooper raids within 10 miles of Charleston
lliams, Hez. hart lliams, Hez. lliams, Hez.	2300	82	335	417		247	664	Battle of Eutaw
ningham, W. ningham, W. tes	300	1	5	6				American post captured and burnt by To- ries Whigs massacred by Tories Whigs massacred by Tories American fort captured; garrison massa- cred
ningham, R.	500					80	80	Moore, commanding a party, routed Post taken and burnt
ningham, W. hart	500						80	Hampton surprised and dispersed British reconnoitring party defeated and dispersed
ffin ffin	350	1	1	2			2	American reconnoitring party defeated Americans routed

AMERICAN

	Battle or Action, etc.	Place (What is now)	Date	Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	A Azerments
122	Savannah River	Beaufort Co.	24 Feb. 1782	Barnwell, R.		5				5	
123	Wambaw	Berkeley Co.	24 Feb. 1782	McDonald		40				4	
124	Tidyman's Planta- tion	Berkeley Co.	25 Feb. 1782	Marion		20				12	
125	Indian Villages	Oconee Co.	Mar. 1782	Pickens	400						
126	Beanfort	Beaufort Co.	13 Mar. 1782								
127	Galley captured, Ashley River	Charleston Co.	19 Mar. 1782	Rndulph							
128	Oconee River	Oconee Co.	1 Apr. 1782	Anderson		1					
129	Dorchester	Berkeley Co.	24 Apr. 1782	O'Neal						9	
130	Dean Swamp	Orangeburg Co.	May 1782	Watson & Butler							
131	Lorick's Ferry	Edgefield Co.	May 1782	Butler							
132	Bowling Green	Marion Co.	3 June 1782	Marion			1				
133	Combahee	Colleton Co.	25 Aug. 1782	Laurens	60	2	19	21		3	
134	Wadboo	Berkeley Co.	29 Aug. 1782	Marion							
135	Capers's Scout	Berkeley Co.	Aug. 1782	Capers, G. S.	12	2					
136	Port Royal Ferry	Beaufort Co.	2 Sept. 1782	Gist							
137	John's Island	Charleston Co.	14 Nov. 1782	Wilmot							

BRITISH, TORY, OR INDIAN

Commander	Force	Killed	Wounded	Killed and Wounded	Missing	Prisoners	Aggregate Loss	
Veaux mpson mpson								A small affair Americans defeated Americans defeated
an chief Veaux		40						Several Indians killed; villages destroyed
		4		4		28	82	
an chief kins y officer			2				2	Body of Tories attacked and dispersed
ingham, W. ey reton	140		7			500	500 7	Cunningham's band dispersed Gainey's band of Tories surrender Small affair, in which Col. John Laurens was killed
er ish officer	26	8	11				19	Last action in which Marion engaged British Black Dragoons cut to pieces Balfour galley taken Capt. Wilmot killed on John's Island

TABLE OF BATTLES, ACTIONS, AND ENGAGEMENTS WHICH
TOOK PLACE IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING THE REVOLU-
TION, ARRANGED BY COUNTIES¹

- Abbeville . . . Ninety Six, 1775; Cherokee Ford, Savannah River; Long
Cane; Hammond's Store; Beattie's Mill; Ninety Six,
1781.
- Aiken Beach Island; Fort Galphin.
- Anderson . . . Great Cane Brake, Cherokee Indian Town; Essenecca.
- Barnwell . . . Wiggins's Hill; Vince's Fort.
- Beaufort . . . Beaufort; Coosawhatchie; Fort Balfour, Pocotaligo;
Savannah River; Port Royal Ferry.
- Berkeley . . . Monck's Corner, 1780; Lenud's Ferry; Monck's Corner,
1781; Wadboo; 2d Wadboo; Quinby Bridge (Shu-
brick's); Washington's Raid; Charlestown Road;
Eutaw; Fair Lawn; Dorchester, Dec. 1, 1781; Dor-
chester, Dec. 29, 1781; Videau's Bridge; Wambaw;
Tidyman's Plantation; Dorchester, April 24, 1782;
Wadboo, Aug. 29, 1782; Capers's Scout.
- Charleston . . . Naval battle; Fort Moultrie; Prévost's Invasion; Stono;
Galley fight, Stono River; Mathews's Plantation; Cap-
ture of seven British vessels; Schooner *Rattlesnake*;
Rantowle's; Siege of Charlestown; Quarter House;
Galley Capture, Ashley River; John's Island.
- Chester Beckham's Old Field; Fishing Creek; Fishdam.
- Chesterfield . .
- Clarendon . . . Nelson's Ferry; Singleton's Mill (Halfway Swamp);
Wright's Bluff; Wiboo Swamp; Fort Watson.
- Colleton Salkehatchie; Pon Pon; Four Holes; Barton's Post;
Pocotaligo Road; Horse Shoe; Parker's Ferry; Com-
bahee.
- Darlington . . . Hunt's Bluff.
- Edgefield . . . Mathews's Bluff; Horner's Corner; Hammond's Mill;
Stevens's Creek; Cloud's Creek; Lorick's Ferry.
- Fairfield Mobley's Meeting-house; Dutchman's Creek.

¹ These counties are as the counties existed prior to the recent subdivisions.

- Georgetown . . . De Peyster's Capture; White's Bridge, Sampit Road; Georgetown; Sampit Bridge; Witherspoon's Ferry; Georgetown.
- Greenville . . . Gowen's Fort.
- Hampton . . . This county was much traversed by the armies in 1779.
- Horry The scene of Tory operations.
- Kershaw Flat Rock; Camden; Rugeley's Mill; Lynch's Creek; Hobkirk's Hill; Evacuation of Camden.
- Lancaster Buford's Massacre; Rocky Mount; Hanging Rock; 2d Hanging Rock; Waxhaws Church.
- Laurens Lyndley's Fort; Musgrove's Mills; Cuninghams's Raid; Hayes's Station.
- Lexington Granby; Mydelton ambuscaded; Eggleston's Capture; Tarrar's.
- Marion Snow Island; Bowling Green.
- Marlboro
- Newberry Williams's Plantation; Mud Lick; Bush River.
- Oconee Brass Town; Oconore; Tomassy; Indian Villages; Oconee River.
- Orangeburg . . . Thomson's Plantation; Orangeburgh (May, 1781); Fort Motte; Fork of Edisto; Moore's Surprise; R. Hampton's Surprise; Dean Swamp.
- Pickens
- Richland Wateree; Friday's Ferry, May, 1781.
- Spartanburg . . . Cedar Springs; Gowen's Old Fort; McDowell's Camp; Pursuit Dunlap; Thicketty Fort; Old Iron Works; Cowpens.
- Sumter This county was much traversed by the armies during 1780-81. High Hills of Santee were the headquarters of Greene.
- Union Brandon's Camp; Blackstock.
- Williamsburg . . Port's Ferry; King's Tree; Black Mingo; Tarcote; Mount Hope; Black River.
- York Williamson's Plantation; Stallions; King's Mountain.

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